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Abstract 
This thesis is a study of the Bengal Army from c. 1800 to c. 1870. Its central aim is to explain why the 
majority of the Bengal Army's native troops mutinied in 1857. It begins by comparing the pre-mutiny 
trends in the Bengal Army to those in its sister armies of Madras and Bombay: in particular the Bengal 
Army's changing pattern of recruitment, its growing list of professional grievances, the deteriorating 
relationship between its sepoys and their European officers, its relaxation of discipline and its sepoys' 
use of caste issues as a smokescreen for other grievances. Then it analyzes the events of 1857: the 
cartridge question, the conspiracy and the pattern of the mutiny itself. Finally it outlines the 
deliberations of the post-mutiny Peel Commission and the subsequent army reforms, and puts the 
Indian Mutiny in the context of the recent historiography of military revolts. Its conclusion is that the 
essential cause of mutiny in 1857 was not the defence of caste and religion, as is generally supposed, 
but service issues particular to the Bengal Army. 
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Glossary 
alkaluk Long, loose tunic wom by irregular cavalry 
anna One sixteenth of a rupee 
assami A payment made, or debt incurred, by a silladar trooper upon receiving his uniform, weapons 
and horse. 
Aryan One belonging to, or descended from, the ancient people who spoke the parent Aryan language 
(often called Indo-European) from which Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, Teutonic and Persian (and their 
modem representatives) are derived; one of those who invaded and conquered India c. 1500 B. C. 
bania (banya) Hindu moneylender or merchant 
batta field allowance for soldiers 
bell-of-arms Conical bell-shaped building used for storing weapons 
Brahmin Member of the first varna, traditionally priests and scholars; the highest Hindu caste 
caste Ascribed ritual status in the Hindu social hierarchy 
crore One hundred lakhs, or 10,000,000 
dhoti Loin cloth wom tucked between the legs and fastened at the waist 
Din (Deen) Faith or religion 
Diwan (Dewan) Chief minister of a royal court 
Durbar Royal court or lev6e 
ghi (ghee) Clarified butter 
havildar Native non-commissioned officer, equivalent to sergeant 
jagir Assignment of government revenue from a district, often in return for military service 
jemadar Junior native officer in regular infantry or cavalry regiment 
Hindi Major Aryan vernacular of northern India, spoken (with many dialects) from the frontiers of 
Bengal to those of the Punjab and Sind 
Hindustan Originally the region of the river Indus; in the colonial period it denoted upper India (the 
plain of the Ganges, except Bengal) 
Hindustani See Urdu 
viii 
kurta Loose frock coat wom by irregular cavalry 
Kshatriya Member of the second, or warrior, vanta 
lakh 100,000 units, usually rupees 
naik Native non-commissioned officer, equivalent to corporal 
pugri (puggree) Light turban or thin scarf wom round hat 
Pandit Learned Hindu Brahmin 
parwana Orderorwarrant 
Peshwa Hereditary leader of the Maratha Confederacy; originally the minister of the Raja of Satara 
purbia (purbiya) Inhabitant of the north Indian region that included Oudh, Bihar and Benares 
pyjamas Loose native trousers 
Raja Indian prince or ruler; title of nobility 
Rajput Member of the most prominent military and landholding caste in northern India; Kshatriya 
class 
ressalah (risala) Troop or squadron of irregular horse 
ressaidar (risaidar) Senior native officer in irregular cavalry regiment 
rupee Indian silver coin, valued at one-tenth (two shillings) of a pound sterling (gold) until about 1870 
Sati (Suttee) Hindu custom requiring the self-immolation of a widow on her husband's funeral pyre 
sepoy Infantry private 
Shudra Member of the fourth vania, of serfs or labourers 
Sikh Member of a monotheistic religion founded in the Punjab in the fifteenth century 
silladar Irregular cavalryman who provides, or pays for, his own weapons, horse and 
accoutrements 
sowar Cavalry trooper 
subedar Senior native officer in regular infantry or cavalry regiment 
tulipar (talwar) Native sword 
Urdu Language of the Muslim conquerors of Hindustan, derived from Hindi, but written in Arabic 
script; also known as Hindustani 
varna One of the four pre-ordained classes - Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras - into which 
all Hindu society is divided 
Vaishya Member of the third vania, of farmers and merchants 
Source: Wes Mactagan, Clemency Canning (London, 1962) 
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I have deliberately used the word 'native' rather than 'Indian' to refer to the indigenous population of 
nineteenth century India. No offence is intended. 'Native'was the term used by the British at the time 
- as in native infantry and native officer - and it frequently appears in direct quotation. I have favoured 
it in the text for the sake of consistency. It would, in any case, be anachronistic to describe an 
inhabitant of the Punjab in 1857, for example, as an 'Indian'. He or she would not have done so. 
Moreover the term'Indian'was often used to denote a European who was bom or working in India, 
such as an Indian officer. 
The spelling of place names is generally the one in current usage. The exceptions are those places 
which are far better known to a British readership by their'colonial' spelling: Benares (Varanasi), 
Cawnpore (Kanpur), Oudh (Awadh), Madras (Chennai) and Bombay (Mumbai), among others. 
Introduction 
As every schoolboy knows, the Indian Mutiny of 1857 came about because the native troops of the 
Bengal Army refused to bite cartridges greased with cow and pig fat: the former unacceptable to Hindu 
scpoys and the latter abhorrent to Muslims. Of course historians have shown the underlying causes to 
be far more complex. Yet certain unresolved questions remain: were the prime motives for mutiny 
really the preservation of caste and religion, or were grievances particular to the Bengal Army more to 
blame? Did the scpoys act of their own volition, or was there an element of manipulation both from 
within and without the military? 
The prc-mutiny history of the Indian Army - and its Bengal component in particular - has been the 
subjcctofanumbcrofrcccnt studies. ' But only three books conccntratccxclusivclyon the prc-mutiny 
period -Amiya Ilarat's 7heBenga1Nafiiv1tftan1iy, Dirk KolfrsNaukar, Rajj, -u1aWSej)oy, and Seema 
Alavi's 7he Selmys mul the Comlxvi), - and not one of them extends beyond 1852.11cy arc, therefore, 
unable to test their various theories as to why the mutiny took place by an analysis of the actual 
sequence orcvcnts. This study is designed to fill that void. 
It is also an attempt to reinstate the military dimension of the mutiny. For there has been a trend 
among recent scholars - such as Chaudhuri, Stokcs, Bayly, Mukhedee and Roy' - to view the mutiny as 
a rcflcction of what was happening in Indian society. The sepoys were an integral part of peasant 
society, they argue, and wcrc therefore susceptible to the same social, economic and religious pressures 
I 11c principal publications include: Amiya Barat, Ae BengaWative Itifwary: its orgaiiisatioti mid 
discipline. 1796-1852 (Calcutta, 1962); Stephen P. Cohen, Yhe liulfan Army. Its Contributioti to the 
A-Mopinem ofa Aation (Dclhi, 197 1); Philip Mason, A Alatler ofilowur. A Account of the kidimi 
A riny. its Offt cers mul A IM (Lo ndon, 1974); T. A. 1-1 cat h co t c, Me lhdimi A rmy. Me Garrismi ofBritish 
Imperial huha, 1822-1922 (Lo ndon, 1974); Di rk 1-1. A. Kol ff, NauAvr, I? ajl)ul mid Scpoy: Me etlyiologý, 
(! f the military hibour triarket in Himiustati, 1450-1850 (Cambridge, 1990); Douglas M. Peers, Betweet: 
Mars widAlammon: ColontalArtnies mul the Garrisoti State in Itulia 1819-1835 (London, 1995); 
Scema Alavi. 7he SeIK))w mwJ the Cotnjxuij,. Trculition aW 7ýmLvitioii M Alortheni bidja 1770-1830 
(Dclhi, 1995). 
2 S. B. Chaudhuri, Civil Rebellioti hi the huhati Mutinies 1857-1859 (Calcutta, 1957); Eric Stokes, 7he 
Pe(Lwitwulrhe I? cy. -. Vtijtlicsiti4, fgrariaiiSocietý, wklPeaunitRebellioii it; Coloniallwha (Cambridge, 
1978) and 7he Pewmit Armed: Me Itulicut Revoll of 1857 (Oxford, 1986); C. A. Bayly, Rulers, 
TowiLunett arxllla=rs: Morth hidimi Society itt theAge ofBrifish rýajvijsion, 1770-1870 (Cambridge, 
1983); Rudrangshu Muklicrjec, Auadh in Rewill 1857-58:. 4 study of]"opular Resistwice (Dclhi, 1984) 
and '"Satan let loose upon the canh', Flie Kanpur massacres in India in the revolt of 1857, Past wAd 
Present, No. 128,1990, pp. 92-116; Tapti Roy, 7he Politics ofa Popular Uprising., Buiydelkhm)d M 
1857 (Dellti, 1994). 
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that affected civilians. Seen in this light the mutiny was little more than a precursor to a general revolt 
by disaffected elements of the native population. Yet by taking this approach there is a tendency to lose 
sight of the fact that the mutiny was, first and foremost, a military uprising and that, without it, the civil 
rebellion would almost certainly not have taken place. 
Not all scholars have been guilty of this omission. Sir John Kaye, the first and most thorough 
historian of the mutiny, devoted a third of the first volume of his unfinished work to the evolution of the 
East India Company's Indian Army and the gradual alienation of the sepoys from their colonial masters. 
His conclusion was that as the sepoy 
grew less faithful and obedient, he grew also more presuming; that whilst he was less under the control of his 
officers and the dominion of the State, he was more sensible of the extent to which we were dependent upon his 
fidelity, and therefore more capricious and exacting. He had been neglected on the one hand, and pampered on the 
other. As a soldier, he had in many ways deteriorated, but he was not to be regarded only as a solidcr. He was a 
representative man, the embodiment of fcclings and opinions shared by large classes of his countrymen, and 
circumstances might rcndcr him one day their exponent. 
Kaye was, therefore, able to take account of both the internal and external factors which contributed to 
the sepoys' disaffection. Yet in his opinion these external factors - the "political and social measures of 
the British Government" - might have been disregarded by the sepoys had it not been for the fact that 
they "affected others, wiser in their generation, more astute, more designing, who put upon everything 
we did the gloss best calculated to debauch the [sepoy's] mind, and to prepare him, at a given signal, for 
an outburst of sudden madness". These agents provocateurs were able to point to a series of 
government measures - culminating in the cartridge question - that "tended to persuade" the sepoys that 
they "were directed to one common end, the destruction of Caste, and the general introduction of 
Christianity into the land". As to the identity of these conspirators, Kaye suggested everyone from the 
agents of dispossessed princes to "members of old baronial families which we had brought to poverty 
and disgrace", and from "emissaries of Brahminical Societies" to "mere visionaries and enthusiasts". ' 
This external 'conspiracy' theory was downplayed by the British historian T. Rice Holmes in his 
History of the IndianMutiny, published in 1883. In his opinion, the native troops of the Bengal Army 
3 Col. G. B. Mall eson (ed. ), Kaye andMallesoiis History of the Itidiati Mutiny of 1857-8 (London, 
1888), 1, pp. 255-8. 
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were relatively unaffected by outside influence. They had, moreover, hardly any substantial 
professional grievances beyond the fact that "a small fraction of officers and men were underpaid" and 
"there was no legitimate outlet for ambition". Yet they were "less attached to their British officers than 
they had once been" and a "relaxation of discipline had encouraged them to twist into a grievance 
anything that startled their imaginations, or offended their caprices". They had, in conclusion, "become 
so powerful and were so conscious of their power that, from purely selfish causes, they were ripe for 
mutiny". The cartridge question simply acted like a "flaming brand hurled into a mass of stored 
gunpowder". 
Holmes did not dismiss the possibility of disgruntled civilians scheming to embarrass the British 
government of India. But because of a lack of genuine provocation, "coupled with the diversities of 
race, religion, rank, status and aim among the discontented", he felt that they "neither wished nor were 
able to combine" against their colonial overlords. Instead they simply took advantage of the disorder 
created by the mutiny. The sepoys were different. Even in Dalhousie's time they "were in a mutinous 
temper, and doubtless had vague ideas of rising", though Holmes was certain that "they formed no 
definite plot for a general mutiny" before "the greased cartridge story got abroad". Thereafter "a 
correspondence was kept up among the regiments of the Bengal Army" who "generally agreed to refuse 
the cartridges". Holmes therefore placed even less importance than Kaye on the effect external factors 
had in alienating the sepoys from their European employers. For him, the key to the mutiny was more a 
question of minor professional grievances, deteriorating discipline, overindulgent officers and the 
sepoys' overdeveloped sense of power - all factors internal to the army. 4 
However since the turn of the twentieth century, and particularly since India gained its independence 
in 1947, most Indian and British historians of the mutiny have tended to downgrade the importance of 
these military factors. In his 1909 publication, Ae Indian War ofIndependence of 1857, the 
revolutionary poet V. D. Savarkar defined the mutiny and the rebellion that succeeded it as a popular 
uprising in defence of swadharina (religion) andiAith the aim of winning back a swaraj (kingdom). 
Kaye's self-serving civilian conspirators have been replaced by nationalist freedom fighters like Nana 
Sahib and Maulvi Ahmadullah Shah. Savarkar was prepared to concede that the sepoys had some 
4 T. R. E. Holmes, A History of the Indian Mutiny (London, 1883), p. 564-5 
military grievances, but they were minor compared to the economic, political and social factors that had 
alienated Indian society as a whole. ' 
Professional historians have taken a less 'political' view of the revolt. To coincide with the centenary 
of the mutiny, the Indian government commissioned S. N. Sen to write an 'official' history. Published 
on 10 May 1957, Serfs Eighteen Fifty-Seven rejected Savarkaes notion of a nationalist uprising. Only 
in Oudh and Shahabad was there "evidence of that general sympathy which would invest the Mutiny 
with the dignity of a national war". Elsewhere the rebels tended to look back rather than forward. Sen. 
wrote: "What began as a fight for religion ended as a war of independence for there is not the slightest 
doubt that the rebels wanted to get rid of the alien government and restore the old order of which the 
King of Delhi was the rightful representative. " Thus while Sen and Savarkar disagreed about the 
ultimate nature of the struggle, they were united in their belief that it was fought initially for religion. 
Sen noted: "Religion is the most potent force in the absence of territorial patriotism and in 1857 men 
from all walks of lifejoined hands with the sepoy in the defence of religion. " 
Sen was also prepared to concede that the sepoys had professional grievances - in particular their 
maltreatment by European officers and N. C. O. s and their lack of career prospects - but explained them 
as merely symptoms of a more general malaise that would eventually afflict any indigenous mercenary 
army. "The sepoy enlisted for the sake of his bread and sooner or later he was bound to recoil against 
the obvious humiliation of his unnatural position, for as a sepoy it was his duty to hold his country 
under the foreign heel... The Mutiny was not inevitable in 1857 but it was inherent in the constitution 
of the empire. " 6 
A second work to appear in 1957, Yhe SepoyMuliny & Revolt of 1857 by R. C. Majumdar, was even 
more categorical in its insistence that religious grievances were the chief cause of the military uprising. 
The sepoys "had many grievances against the British government", wrote Majumdar, but the most 
serious "was the interference with their time-honoured religious practices and social customs and 
conventions". Their "deep-rooted conviction ... that 
it was the deliberate object of the British to convert 
them by direct or indirect means to Christianity" was the"reason the question of greased cartridge 
produced a conflagration". While conceding that there was much evidence to suggest that the 
"besetting sin" of the sepoys during the mutiny was "greed", Majumdar put this down to the fact that 
flevil passions, once aroused, do not remain confined to their immediate object" (i. e. the defence of 
5 V. D. Savarkar, 7he Indian War ofIndependence of 1857 (London, 1909). 
religion). As to the possibility of a general conspiracy among the sepoys, Majumdar could not rule it 
out. "It is likely, " he wrote, "that some secret negotiations were going on between the leading sepoys 
of different cantonments, though the exact nature of this cannot be ascertained. It is probable that the 
object of these negotiations was to organise a general mutiny, but for this we have got no definite 
evidence... But though there might have been understanding and negotiations between the different 
bodies of troops, the plot was confined to them, or rather to some leading figures in each group, and no 
connection has been established between the mutinous sepoys and the ruling chiefs, or other prominent 
leaders mentioned above. " The furthest that MaJumdar was prepared to go on the question of external 
interference was to concede that the sepoys "might have been excited by outside agencies like Maulavi 
Ahmadulla or some other persons, but the actual plot was hatched by the sepoys themselves". He is 
prepared to accept, however, that "once the sepoys were excited by a mutinous spirit it was fanned and 
inflamed by interested individuals to serve their own purpose, so that what was in the first instance a 
mere desire to resist an infringement of their religion took, in certain cases or areas, a decidedly 
political chracter". 
MaJumdar is very clear about the sequence and overall nature of the uprising. The civil outbreak 
"was the direct outcome of the initial success of the Mutiny, and was fed by the volume of discontent 
and resentment existing against the British". But as there was "no coherence" between the "several 
distinct elements" of the general revolt, "each being limited in extent and objectives", and "no definite 
plan, method, or organisaton, it cannot be regarded as a national rising, far less a war of independence". 
Instead the "miseries and bloodshed of 1857-58 were not the birth-pang of a freedom movement in 
India, but the dying groans of an obsolete aristocracy and centrifugal feudalism of the mediaeval age". 7 
S. B. Chaudhuri's Civil Rebellion in the Indian Mutinies was the third major study to be published in 
1957. Though essentially an analysis of the civil uprising, it devoted a section to the causes of the 
mutiny in the army, concluding that they "were in part purely military, in part a discontent shared by 
the general population". These military grievances - which "flowed independently of any external 
pressure and originated from the conditions of the existing military service" - included a "consciousness 
of power" that had "grown up among the sepoys" and a feeling "that India was weakly guarded by 
England". Far more important than both, however, was the controversy over the greased cartridges in 
6 S. N. Sen, Eighteen Fifty-Seven (Delhi, 1957), p. 411-12,23-8,417. 
7 R. C. Majumdar, YheSepoyMutiny and the Revolt of 1857 (Calcutta, 1957), pp. 172,174,176,218, 
210,268 and 241. 
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early 1857 which produced a genuine fear among sepoys that their religion and caste were in danger. 
Such a fear had been "reinforced by similar feelings of the civil population in respect of religion 
arising from the ever increasing pressure of western civilization including the whole series of 
progressive measures from the establishment of the railways to the legalisation of widows' marriages 
and the dissemination of female education", not to mention the "missionary activities against early 
marriage and the purdah system, the messing in jail, the compulsory system of shaving, and the 
enlistment order of 1856", all of which had "ruffled the feelings of caste and strengthened the suspicion 
that the government intended to force them all to embrace christianity". 
In other words, the mutiny came about because sepoys were just as susceptible to the type of non- 
professional grievances - particularly socio-religious and economic - that had affected the rest of Indian 
society for many years previously. "There is no doubt, " wrote Chaudhuri, "that the strong under- 
current of popular disaffection which was frequently manifesting itself in open resistance against the 
British in the early period culminated in the sepoy war of 1857. " The end result was a "national 
outburst against foreign rule" that was "an anticipation of the future and not a mere recoil to the past". 
He thereby rejected the conclusion reached by his former teacher, ILC. MaJumdar. 8 
The American historian Thomas Metcalf, in his 1964 publication Me Afiermath ofRevoll, concurred 
with many of Chaudhuri's conclusions, particularly his belief that it was a broad, popular uprising. For 
Metcalf, the sepoy uprising was "little more than the spark which touched off a smouldering mass of 
combustible material". Nevertheless, when assessing the causes of the sepoy mutiny, Metcalf is 
prepared to accord professional grievances a certain weight. "By 1857, " he writes, "the Bengal Army 
was no longer the vigorous fighting force it had been in the days of Wellesley and Lake. Discipline 
had grown lax, the best British officers had abandoned their regiments for more attractive civil 
employment, and the sepoys, after many victories in which British troops had played only a small role, 
had become puffed up with a sense of their own importance. Many even believed that British rule in 
India was dependent upon their support and would collapse without it. " In addition to this "slow 
deterioration of morale" were "specific grievances with regard to pay, pension rights, and terms of 
service", the loss of the "special privileges" which the sepoy had enjoyed as the "servant of the 
Company" with the annexation of Oudh, and a "general dissatisfaction at the limited prospects of 
promotion, at the enervating system of seniority, and at the contemptuous arrogance ofjunior officers". 
7 
Yet Metcalf identified "professional discontent" as "only the beginning". Of far more significance to 
the actual outbreak of mutiny was the fact that by 1857 "the sepoys were convinced that the English 
were out to take away their caste and convert them forcibly to Christianity". A belief that had been 
brought about, according to Metcalf, by the evangelical zeal of Christian missionaries and European 
officers, and the introduction of greased Enfield cartridges in early 1857.9 
The 1984 publication of Rudrangshu Mukhedee's Awadh in Revolt, a micro-study of a major area of 
rebellion, promised fresh insights into the cause of the sepoy mutiny - not least because his 
geographical choice of study, the recently-annexed province of Oudh, was where the majority of 
Bengal sepoys were recruited. Yet his chief conclusions in this regard were not that far removed from 
Chaudhuri's. Mukherjee was also convinced that the primary cause of mutiny was the preservation of 
religion and that the grievances of the Oudh sepoys were similar to those held by their civilian 
counterparts. He noted: "Here was a military mutiny, sparked off by certain fears about caste and 
religion, merging itself with disaffection created by interventions in the traditional rural world of Oudh, 
using the loss of land, loss of a king and threats to religion as a rallying cry, seeking its identity in the 
traditions of a former despotism and finding its popular base among a rural confraternity held together 
by bonds of mutual interdependence. " 
According to Mukhedee, this link between sepoy and civil society also helps to explain why the 
rumour that the British were going to despoil caste and religion spread so quickly through the Bengal 
Army. "The ties of the village world, " wrote Mukherjee, "which were automatically carried over into 
the army by the sepoys'common origins, facilitated the workings of the grapevine. " The closest that 
Mukherjee came to acknowledging that professional grievances played an important part in the 
outbreak of mutiny is to state that the sepoys displayed "sheer greed for money, evident from the 
plunder of the treasury and the sepoys' concern about the movement of treasure". In his opinion, 
however, this was "a natural act on the part of a body of men who were proverbially ill-paid" and not a 
fundamental cause of mutiny. 10 
8 S. B. Chaudhuri, Civil Rehellion in the IndidnMulinies 1857-1859 (Calcutta, 1957), pp. 1,258,6,4, 
297-8 
9 Thomas R. Metcalf, Yhe Aftermath ofRevoll: India 1857-1870 (Princeton, 1965), pp. 61,47-8 
10 Mukhedee, Awadh in Revolt, pp. 169,78-9,71 
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Eric Stokes pioneered the practice of analytical micro-study in Yhe Peasant and the Raj (1978), a 
collection of academic articles that concentrated on a handfiil of districts in upper India. " But it is in 
his seminal and posthumously-published work Yhe Peasant Artned (1986) that he developed fiirther the 
theme of a close association between peasant and sepoy. Though primarily concerned with the 
identification of rural rebels - whom he characterized as pseudo-gentry who had lost out during British 
rule because of heavy revenue demands, adverse ecology and poor communications - Stokes included a 
chapter on 'The Sepoy Rebels'. He died before he could supply a conclusion to this collection of 
essays, so his thoughts on the specific link between the mutineers and the rural rebels were, in the 
words of his editor C. A. Bayly, "implicit rather than explicit". Bayly's own interpretation, included in 
the introduction, was that the "peasantry formed the vital link between military mutiny and rural 
turbulence". 12 In his chapter on the sepoy rebels, Stokes fell into line with recent historiography by 
identifying their defence of caste and religion as the primary cause of mutiny. But his assessment of 
their motives was far more sophisticated than anything that had hitherto been proposed because it 
interlinked socio-religious discontent with grievances that were particular to the military. He wrote: 
For the most part, mutiny required a successful internal insurrection beforehand within the rank and file. This was 
usually the work of a small minority playing upon the hopes and fears of their fellows. And fear was always a 
more powerful spur to action than hope or greed. Fear for loss of caste was unquestionably the most common 
sentiment among the sepoys, but apprehension of defilement in a purely religious sense was not at the root of this 
sentiment, as was to be seen when later sepoys cheerfully used the Enfield rifle. Loss of caste denoted rather loss 
of that superior status by which ashraf (respectable) Muslims, Brahmins, Rajputs, and all who aspired to Rajput 
status, had traditionally secured a near monopoly over entry into the Bengal Army. If die British were to be 
allowed to enforce practices demeaning to the higher castes, the respectability of the military profession and their 
quasi-monopoly over it were gone. 
As evidence that the British were preparing to transform a "loosely disciplined mercenary army" into "a 
modem force yielding unhesitating obedience and prepared to serve anywhere it was ordered", Stokes 
cited "the General Service Enlistment Order of August 1856" which "ended - at least for new recruits - 
the Bengal Army's privilege of not being required to serve overseas except on a voluntary basis". He 
11 Eric Stokes, The Peasant and the Raj. - Studies inAgrarian Society and Peasant Rebellion in Colonial 
India (London, 1978). 
12 Stokes, Yhe PeasawArmed, p. 14. 
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also points out that the low pay of the sepoy - seven to nine rupees per month - "was an indication that 
he was driven to serve by strong pressure from his domestic situation". For infantry sepoys in 
particular, military service "was often the only honourable escape for men from families whose 
'ownership'of the land had failed to keep pace with growing numbers, and who were steadily being 
forced down into the position of the humbler tillers of the soil". This "attribute of gentility was their 
last economic asset" and it underlay their "desire to retain their monopolistic grip on the Bengal 
regiments". 
Thus did Stokes hint at the connection between mutinous sepoys and rural rebels, both of whom came 
from the same impoverished gentry background. One of the major causes of the mutiny, he insisted, 
was the gradual erosion of the recruitment monopoly enjoyed by high-caste Bengal sepoys. "The 
'closed shop' of the Purbias (eastemers) of the middle Ganges was under obvious threat, " writes Stokes, 
"and with it all those privileges of'home service'and a certain independent negotiating power 
characteristic of mercenary armies. Hence solid material fears underlay the apprehension over any 
infiingement of caste rules by British authority. " The only other relevance that Stokes was prepared to 
attribute to 'military' factors was a recognition that "slackness of discipline, traditional usage, and 
compassionate consideration by commanding officers for the susceptibilities of their men had led to a 
highy respectful form of trade union bargaining". Such a tradition of collective negotiation was 
dangerous in the highly-charged atmosphere of 1857 because "the voicing of grievances" tended to 
verge "upon open disobedience", causing the British authorities to "swing suddenly from the extreme of 
conciliation to the harshest of penalties". 13 
The micro-study tradition was continued by Tapti Roy's The Politics ofa Popular Uprising. * 
Bundelkhand in 1857 (1994) - but with a difference. By concentrating on the actions of different 
categories of men in the province of Bundelkhand - from ordinary people to rajas, sepoys to RaJput 
landowners - she was able to demonstrate how "the rebels of 1857, operating at different levels, were 
involved in a fight for power, attempting to capture nothing less than the apparatus of the state". Her 
chapter on the sepoys was particularly revealing. "A mutiny does not dissolve a body of soldiers, " 
observed Roy, "it turns them as a body from the side of the state to its opposite. A rebel army, in other 
words, carries on its body the signs of order and legitimacy; only now it has forsaken its old loyalty and 
is looking for a new source of authority to give it social recognition as an instrument of legitimate 
13 Ibid., pp. 50-3 
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force. " This attempt to create "a centralized, supra-local political order, as an alternative to the British 
authority they had displaced" had "never happened before" and therefore, in Roy's opinion, marked a 
break in the "linear progression from the sporadic mutinies of the early nineteenth century to this 
widespread ferment of 1857". 
So Roy rejected the "standard historiographical practice" of explaining the mutiny "narratively by its 
causal antecedents", preferring to take the mutiny itself as the "first term of narrative". Using this 
method, Roy observed that the mutineers always spoke "in the idiom of religion", and that such a 
"justification for their actions reads quite differently from the historians' analyses of the causes", which 
include unsatisfactory conditions of service, the growing distance between the sepoys and their officers, 
and even their sympathy with the economic, social and political discontent felt by the rest of rural 
society. Yet Roy believed that scholars like Stokes and Mukhedee were right to extend "the causal 
space from the army barracks to the wider society from which the soldiers came" because there was 
evidence to show that mutineers "drew upon their wider social traditions when conceiving of the 
struggle in terms of a cause and an ideology". In particular, the "written addresses sent out to mobilize 
men in the cause of rebellion" described the uprising "not so much as a struggle for political ends as an 
imperative, a sacred duty, for upholding religion which was threatened by the British rule". Roy added: 
"The cause of religion also enabled the mutineers to justify and legitimize their actions which refuted 
the basic norms of loyalty. " The only vague concession that Roy was prepared to make in terms of 
professional grievances was that "a practical need to mobilize men for military action against the 
British" meant that "religious evocations" were "often juxtaposed with material allurements", and that 
to "separate the two and to ask which was the 'real' incentive for action" would be "a useless 
exercise". 14 
For most of the twentieth century, therefore, historians tended to downplay the importance of 
professional grievances and other specifically 'military' factors in their accounts of why the mutiny took 
place. The two exceptions in chief were Metcalf and, to a lesser extent, Stokes. Yet Metcalf still 
considered the defence of caste and religion to be the key factor behind the mutiny, while Stokes made 
much of the connection between high-caste sepoys and their impoverished civilian counterparts, 
equating the sepoys' fear of losing their caste with a fear of losing their status as members of a 
privileged military 'club'. However Stokes seemed to regard the high-caste sepoys' defence of their 
14 Roy, Yhe Politics ofa Popular Uprising, pp. 21,24-8,50-153. 
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privileged monopoly as an issue more 'social'than 'military' in nature. The opposite interpretation was 
made by the young Indian historian Kaushik Roy, who wrote: "Before 1857, the Bengal Army became 
dependent on a particular group, the Purbiyas, when numerical decline of the white troops and 
weakening of the punishment system made the Purbiyas conscious of their own power. The English 
tried to balance them with the Sikhs. This was too little and too late. Enraged at encroachment into 
their monopoly the Pandies revolted. " Roy added that "peasants and sepoys were distinct entities" and 
that it was "problematic to fuse the sepoy insurgency with peasant insurgency". 15 
This is not to deny either that there was a link between the sepoys and their civilian counterparts, or 
that many sepoys genuinely feared the loss of their caste and religion in 1857. But the extent to which 
these factors were primarily responsible for the mutiny has perhaps been exaggerated. The evidence of 
this study leads me to conclude that caste issues between Bengal sepoys and the Indian government 
were as much about a privileged majority asserting its exclusive position and collective bargaining 
power as they were about religious faith and social position. Internal military issues, on the other hand, 
have been consistently underestimated. 
All armies have generic grievances relating to conditions of service, including pay, promotion, 
discipline and relations with officers. What made colonial armies different was that they were 
volunteer mercenary forces officered by men of a different race and religion. Their loyalty to their 
paymasters, therefore, was entirely dependent upon the incentives for service outweighing the 
disincentives. This point becomes particularly pertinent when considering Tapti Roy's observation that, 
in 1857-8, the Bundelkhand mutineers largely kept together as a disciplined body and actively sought to 
replace their British employers with a new political order. Could it not be argued that this desire to 
replace one employer for another is proof that the sepoys' grievances were essentially professional in 
nature? 
This was exactly the point made by two recent historians of the Indian military labour market, Dirk 
Kolff and Seema Alavi. Kolff s thesis - in his book Naukur, Rajput and Sepoy. Yhe ethnology of the 
military labour market in Hindustan, 1450-1850 (1990) - was that the Company sepoys were simply 
the latest in a long line of professional soldiers from eastern Hindustan (hence purbiyas or'eastemers') 
available to the highest bidder. No sooner did service under an alternative employer prove more 
attractive than the sepoys would unilaterally terminate their contracts. Kolff's study identified two quite 
15 Kaushik Roy, 'The Historiography of the Colonial Indian Army', Studies hi History, Vol. 12, No. 2, 
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separate RaJput traditions: "at one end, mainly in Rajasthan, a genealogically defined RaJput aristocracy 
and a centre and opposite end occupied by a variety of peasant groups and tribal elites, largely in 
Hindustan, whose values and behaviour kept alive a more ancient layer of Rajputhood. " It was in this 
"older, pastoralist tradition" that Kolff saw the ethnic connection between the RaJput mercenaries of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the REýjputs and Brahmins from the eastern Hindustan region 
who came to dominate the Bengal Army in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
"This phenomenon, " wrote Kolff, "can only be explained as the successful endeavour of the dominant 
groups in the Bhojpur and Oudh region to reserve to themselves what quickly became the most 
important redistributive institution of the new British empire in India, to wit the Bengal Army. " He 
added: "An inevitable ritual complement of this closed shop social strategy was a tendency towards 
brahminical exclusiveness, in other words, towards the doctrine of caste. The new monomania for the 
privileges of employment soon took on religious overtones and stands in sharp contrast to the old 
survival strategies characterised by multiple layers of identity of Cheros, Bhumimars and 'spurious' 
Rajputs, and to the open attitude towards adopting and recruitment that had been typical of centuries of 
peasant soldiering. The Bhojpuri and Avadhi soldier-elite, securely ensconced in the new empire, now 
adopted the 'modem' -to use Buchanan's epithet -ideology of caste. it justified their closed shop 
practices. " 
In other words, said Kolff, Bengal sepoys reinvented caste issues to protect a monopoly that was 
increasingly under threat as "British North India was almost totally demilitarised", the "opportunites for 
military employment had dwindled" and "competition for service had become acute". However Kolff 
pointed out that caste was not an issue in the Bombay Army, despite the fact that many of its sepoys 
were recruited from the same area of Hindustan as the Bengal Army. In this respect, "the old North 
Indian tradition of service suited the modem state better than the'modem' emphasis on exclusiveness". 
Nevertheless, wrote Kolff, the 1857 mutiny "still showed that two crucial features of the old service 
tradition survived when the old Purbiya gentry closed its shop". First was "the sociological link 
between soldiering and agrarian society", in that sepoys continued to remit as much as three-quarters of 
their pay to their families. Second, and a "feature that was lost in Bombay", came the "peasant soldier's 
insistence on what was his birthright, i. e. to negotiate his own alliances or, in other words, to choose his 
employers himself'. The threat posed by such a tradition was only broken after the mutiny when the 
1996, pp. 2634. 
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"colonial administration in disgust dropped I-Endustan as a recruitment area" and the "market for 
military labour ceased to be a sellers' market". 16 
Kolff therefore made two important points with regard to the 1857 mutiny: on the one hand the 
Bengal sepoys were simply part of a long tradition of mercenary soldiers from eastern Hindustan who 
were liable to switch employers if the occasion demanded; while on the other hand they represented a 
break with the past in that they reinvented caste issues as a means to defend their privileged position. 
Both points support my own thesis that issues exclusive to the military are more central to an 
understanding of the mutiny than has hitherto been recognized. Yet Kolff was unable to prove his 
theory with evidence drawn from the mutiny because his study ends in 1850. My research is designed 
to provide that missing evidence. It will show that the cartridge question was used by at least some 
sepoys - mainly the ringleaders - as a pretext to oppose the state. It will also demonstrate the extent to 
which the sepoys were seeking to replace one, no longer acceptable, employer with another. Proof of 
this latter assertion includes the fact that many mutinous regiments retained their organisation and 
discipline, that the ringleaders were in many cases the native officers who simply took over from their 
European counterparts, and that these native officers invariably sought to legitimize their actions by 
placing their regiments under the command of an alternative political authority. 
In her 1995 publication, Yhe Sepoys and the Compaqy. ý Tradition and Transition in Northern India 
1770-1830, Seema Alavi came to much the same conclusion as Kolff-. that the mutiny came about 
because the Bengal sepoys were seeking an alternative employer. She differed from Kolff in her 
explanation why. Her argument is that, far from being simply the latest in a long line of mercenary 
paymasters, the Company introduced a new military tradition into northern India by replacing the 
dominant urban Mughal cavalry with high-caste peasant infantry from Benares, Bihar and Oudh. 
Among the chief characteristics of this new service were regular pay and attention to the recruits' 
religious sensibilities. The sepoys began to look for alternative employers, said Alavi, when these 
financial, social and religious benefits began to disappear. 
Like Kolff, Alavi insisted that "the high-caste status in rural north India was reinvented" by the 
Bengal Army. It "formalized" the "social tensions hinging around the ritual purity of the rual high 
caste" and "made them more obvious and rigid". But for the Bengal Army's policy of selective 
recruitment, "the evolution of high-caste status in rural India would have progressed differently". 
16 Kolff, Naukur, Rajput and Sepoy, pp. 73,186-19 1. 
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However, wrote Alavi, while it was keen to ensure the loyalty of its sepoys by "buttressing their 
assumed high-caste status", the East India Company also took pains to abstract them "from the 
constraints and hierarchy of 'Hindu' society". It did this by "exempting" the scpoys from "certain 
religious obligations which reinforced the superiority of the priestly class of Brahmins", such as the 
payment of pilgrim dues and fees during the performance of religious rituals in temples outside the 
cantonments. According to Alavi, this attempt by the Company to separate the Bengal Army from 
society by creating a "very specific form of military Hinduism" would ultimately backfire. 
Alavi's central thesis is that the principal role of the army was political in that it functioned as a 
cultural link between the rulers and the ruled. She argued that as the Company advanced to "a position 
of political strength and maturity" by the early 1830s, it instituted a number of reforms designed to 
"increase its effective control over the army". For example the establishment of military offices "to 
administer the settlements of invalid soldiers and their families", which would enable the Company "to 
intervene in the family affairs" of its sepoys and thereby increase its grip over its peasant regiments. 
But instead of ensuring political, economic and social stability, these reforms merely created bad 
feeling within the army. 
Though the stopping point for Alavi's study is 1830, she attempted to explain the outbreak of the 1857 
mutiny as the inevitable result of this policy of excessive control. While doing so, she rejected Kolffs 
theory of "a conflict in which an antique Indian warrior tradition protested against the increasing 
encroachments of a militarily modernized Company". Instead, wrote Alavi, "Company power was 
under threat from its military 'subaltems'who were incensed because the reforms of the 1830s had 
disturbed the power relations within which they and their families had enjoyed financial security and a 
high religious and social status". Such resentment was manifested in their opposition to the withdrawal 
of foreign service batta in Sind and the Punjab in the 1840s, in their postings to distant military outposts 
and, more importantly, in "their apprehensions over the infringement of their high-caste status 
which... the Company had sedulously promoted over the previous three generations". In this respect, 
the cartridge question was the final straw. The end result was the re-emergence in 1857 "of that 
contested military labour market which the Company had done its best to control since the beginning of 
the nineteenth century". Alavi added: "All at once the Company ceased to be the most attractive 
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employer in India and patrons amongst the rebel leaders were able to hold out to them the material, 
political, and ritual inducements which the Company had once monopolized. " 17 
While Alavi makes a number of good points - not least her assertion that the mutiny was an attempt 
by sepoys to secure a more amenable employer - her overall thesis is unconvincing. Far from being 
caused by excessive interference, I wH1 argue that one of the reasons the mutiny came about was 
because the Bengal Army's control over its sepoys had progressively weakened. This trend can be seen 
in the reduction of the commanding officer's power to punish and reward, and in the relative lack of 
interest shown by young officers in the welfare of their sepoys. Moreover the bulk of military reforms 
in the 1830s were essentially benign in nature and designed to improve the sepoys' conditions of 
service. Examples include the abolition of flogging for native troops, the institution of the Orders of 
British India and of Merit, the award of Good Conduct pay and an increase in the Bengal Army's 
marching batta (or extra allowance) to bring it into line with the other presidency armies. Kaushik 
Roy was surely right to point out that there was a "lobby which constantly cried for reforms between 
1830-1856", in particular the Punjab school which called for a policy of mixed recruitment. "If their 
progammes had been implemented, " wrote Roy, "there may have been no 1857 mutiny". is 
Constrained by the chronological parameters of her study, Alavi was forced to rely mainly on 
secondary sources for her assessment of the nature of sepoy grievances in the 25 years that preceded the 
mutiny. The best of these sources is Amiya Barat's Yhe Bengal Native Infantry, the publication of her 
Ph. D thesis and the first scholarly work on the colonial Indian Army to appear since Indian 
independence. But even Barat's study ended in 1852, a full five years before the mutiny begins. This is 
deliberate. Though her work is ultimately geared to pinpointing the causes of the 1857 outbreak, Barat 
admitted that she did not want to become involved "in the very complex issues raised by the mutiny of 
1857". This is something of a contradiction in terms: for she cannot hope to prove her theories without 
a detailed study of the mutiny itself. Her thesis's other weaknesses are its neglect of the separate arms 
that made up the Bengal Army - most notably the artillery and the regular and irregular cavalry - and 
her failure to draw conclusions from a comparison with the Bombay Army (which suffered just a 
handful of mutinies) and the Madras Army (which was uniformly loyal). This study will cover all of 
these areas. 
17 Alavi, Yhe Sepoys and the Company, pp. 76,85-6,90,293-6 
18 Roy, 'The Historiography of the Colonial Indian Army', p. 270. 
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Nevertheless Barat deserves credit for pinpointing a deterioration in the Bengal sepoys' service 
conditions and a gradual disintegration in the relationship between sepoys and their European officers 
in the years prior to the mutiny. The thrust of her argument is that the sepoys' professional grievances 
caused a number of "increasingly serious and frequent" mutinies after 1824, by which time "many of 
the grievances of the European officers had been redressed". The 1857 mutiny was, therefore, simply 
the culmination of the sepoys'various grievances. But as not all of them were serious enough to require 
such "drastic action", mutiny had to be a "sign of maladministration, of bad man-management". This, 
in turn, was caused partly by the ambiguous position of the native officers who both identified with 
their men and yet were "seen by the men as part of the officers' group, indifferent or hostile to their 
interests". It was also caused, said Barat, by the lack of contact between the men and their European 
officers who hankered after better paid detached appointments and neglected regimental duties. 
Increasingly, too, young cadets would arrive from Britain with a fixed idea of the inferiority of Indians 
which hardly improved relations. "Another common feature of the regiments in which mutinies 
occurred, " wrote Barat, "was the absence of a considerable proportion of such officers as had been 
posted to them". There is much in this. But the absence of European officers is only relevant in the 
sense that those left behind resented being passed over and became increasingly lax in their duty. That 
a large number of European officers were not needed to ensure the loyalty of sepoys is proven by the 
fact that the post-mutiny Bengal Army had far fewer officers per regiment and yet rarely displayed a 
mutinous disposition. 
Barat identified pay and allowances as one of the issues "round which discontent frequently 
focussed"; such a preoccupation with financial rewards was only to be expected ftom a mercenary 
army. As proof that the sepoys were becoming progressively worse off, Barat cited the fact that their 
pay of seven rupees a month stayed constant throughout the period of her study, whereas the cost of 
living and the average wage of a labourer or ploughman was increasing. In addition, more and more 
sepoys "found themselves posted to up-country stations" in recently-annexed provinces like Sind and 
Punjab "where peace was of recent introduction", "agriculture was less prosperous" and prices were 
generally higher. This extension of the Company's territory also imposed upon the sepoys ever longer 
marches that were both "tedious" (their uniforms were uncomfortable and their equipment unwieldy) 
and "expensive" (they paid for their own carriage and contributed to new hutting). Other consequences 
included the difficulty for sepoys returning on leave to their villages and the curtailment of balta for 
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service beyond the boundaries of the Bengal Presidency. The latter grievance was behind the serious 
mutinies in Sind in 1844 and in the Punjab five years later. Barat also pointed to the diminishing 
opportunities for promotion and the fact that there was no "spur for ambition" equivalent to the 
European officer's "opportunities outside the regiment, in the political or civil lines, or in service with 
irregular regiments". 19 
This claim that pay and prospects were major grievances does seem to be borne out by a study of the 
mutiny itself In almost every case, the first action of the mutineers was to seize or attempt to seize the 
district treasure. But instead of simply dividing it up among themselves, they often guarded it until it 
could be handed over to the new military or political authority (in effect their new employers). For 
their part, the rebel leaders recognized the importance of financial incentives by issuing a series of 
proclamations offering increased pay to all sepoys who joined them. Improved career prospects were 
also a factor in that the majority of mutinous regiments were led by native officers who had been 
prevented from rising to pre-Company positions of prominence by the presence of European officers. 
According to Barat, the "other permanent cause of disturbance was the caste feeling of the sepoys, 
and in particular the sepoy's dislike of serving outside India and of sea voyages". This she identified as 
the main cause of mutinies in 1824 and 1852. "Yet in 1857, " wrote Barat, "when those same scruples 
were again offended, there was, initially at least, a great readiness [by the authorities] either to pooh- 
pooh or dismiss them, or to attempt to overcome them by force. " 20 This latter statement underlines the 
problem Barat had in equating the 1857 mutiny with previous small-scale mutinies without a specialist 
knowledge of the later uprising. Far from dismissing the sepoys'caste and religious scruples in 1857, 
the authorities did everything they could to allay their fears. The fact that they were so spectacularly 
unsuccessful could be seen as an indication that other factors lay behind the mutiny. There is, in 
addition, much evidence to suggest that the earlier mutinies were motivated more by professional 
grievances than issues of caste and religion. 
The argument that the 1857 mutiny was caused by service issues particular to the Bengal Army is 
supported by the bulk of evidence given to the Peel Commission, set up in 1858 to report on the post- 
mutiny reorganization of the Indian Army. Former and serving officers of the Indian and British armies 
who gave oral and written evidence to the Commission were generally agreed, for example, that the 
Bengal Army had become an interconnected brotherhood because it was recruited from too restricted an 
19 Baraý Me BengaINalive Infantry, pp. xii, 294,296-7,299-302, pp305-6 
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area and among too few castes. They also tended to concur in the view that the sepoys had little outlet 
for ambition, that the power of Bengal commanding officers to punish and reward had diminished to 
the extent that they had become mere cyphers, that Bengal sepoys were overindulged with regard to 
caste issues, and that the discipline of the Bengal Army as a whole had become too lax . 
21 There is, of 
course, the possibility that such responses contain more than a little hindsight. On the other hand, a 
number of senior officers and administrators - including General Sir Charles Napier, Sir Henry 
Lawrence and Lieutenant-Colonel John Jacob - had warned that reforms in these areas were necessary 
in the decade or so prior to the mutiny. 
The nature of the subsequent Indian Army reforms also supports the theory that military factors were 
central to the mutiny. The most far-reaching reform was the replacement of all regular native cavalry 
and infantry regiments with irregular ones that had far fewer European officers (six, and later seven, as 
opposed to twenty-four). This had the effect of increasing the career prospects and job satisfaction of 
native officers by giving them more responsibility. Their pay was also increased. Other reforms were 
designed to increase the authority of commanding officers: on the one hand they were given complete 
authority to select their N. C. O. s on merit; on the other they were accorded the summary power to 
reduce N. C. O. s to the ranks and to discharge N. C. O. s and sepoys. Finally, the high-caste Hindus and 
well-bom Muslims from north-east India who had formerly dominated the Bengal Army were replaced 
by Pathan, Sikh, Dogra and Punjabi Muslim recruits. 22 The result of these reforms: no serious mutiny 
in any part of the Indian Army until the First World War. Even the revolt by four companies of the 51' 
Light Infantry at Singapore in February 1915, in which 34 people were killed, is described by David 
Omissi in Me Sepoy and the Raj (1994) as a "minor" affair. 23 
In his chapter on mutinies in Soldiers of the Raj (1997), the Indian historian and former general S. L. 
Menezes put most of the post-1 858 tumults down to "poor leadership by the commanding officers 
concerned, many of whom were removed". The exceptions were those risings in the First World War 
"where a religious appeal by the Caliph not to fight the Turks supervened, or in the Second World War, 
where communist influences appear to have been at work". Menezes concluded: "In general, up to the 
20 Ibid., pp. 3034. 
21 P. P., H. C., 1859, V, pp. 1-645. 
22 A. H. Shibly, 7he Reorganisation of the Indian Armies, 1858-1879, Ph. D. Thesis, S. O. A-S., London 
University, 1969; Articles of War, Act XXIX of 1861, OIOC, LqSflU17/11/15; Bengal Army 
Regulations, 1873, OIOC, L/MUJ17/2/443, p. 98. 
23 David Omissi, 7he Sepoyandthe Raj., YhebidianArmy, 1860-1940 (London, 1994), pp. 135,151. 
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time of the British Government's Partition announcement of 3 June 1947, the fidelity of the undivided 
Indian Army was not in doubt". 24 
24 S. L. Menezes, Race, Caste, Mutiny and Disicipline in the Indian Army, from its Origins to 1947, 
Soldiers of the Raj. - The Indian Army 1600-1947 (London, 1997), Alan J. Guy and Peter B. Boyden 
(eds. ), p. I 11. 
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Chapter One - Recruitment 
This chapter will trace the development of the East India Company's recruitment policy for the Bengal 
Army over the hundred years that preceded the Indian mutiny, providing a comparison with the policies 
practised by the Bombay and Madras armies. It will concentrate, in particular, on the attempt to widen 
the Bengal Native Infantry's sphere of recruitment in the late 1840s and early 1850s. 
In 1857, the total strength of the native Indian Army was 232,224 men. 1 Of the three presidency 
armies that made up the Indian Army, the Bengal force was by far the largest with 135,767 troops. 2 
The biggest single element of the Bengal Army, and therefore the Indian Army as a whole, was its 
regular Bengal Native Infantry of 74 regiments, with an establishment strength ofjust under 86,000 
men. The 18 regiments of Bengal Irregular Cavalry numbered 10,500 men, while the regular Bengal 
Light Cavalry was just ten regiments and 4,900 men strong. Even smaller was the artillery component 
of four horse troops and 18 foot companies (3,000 men) and the twelve companies of sappers & miners 
(1,630 men). The balance was made up of irregular and local regiments. It is because the Bengal 
Native Infantry was so pre-eminent in size, and because it was the arm most affected by the shift in the 
Company's recruitment policy, that it dominates much of this chapter. 
The first companies of native infantry sepoys 3 under British command were raised in the Madras 
Presidency by Major Stringer Lawrence in 1748. But Bengal saw the formation of the first native 
battalion - the famous Lai Pallan (or Red Regiment' from the colour of the sepoy's coats) - by Robert 
Clive at Calcutta in January 1757. Its recruits were chosen from the agricultural classes of India 
' 'Return showing the Numbers of the troops, regular and irregular, which were serving in the three 
Presidencies immediately before the Mutiny', P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 17, p. 379. The same return 
gives the total number of European troops as 45,522: 6,170 officers and 38,562 other ranks (24,263 of 
whom were Queen's troops). An alternative source gives a grand total of 275,304 native troops, but this 
includes regular, irregular, local and contingent forces officered from the line. It does not include the 
Punjab police battalions, the Scinde and other organized police who, together, numbered at least 16,000 
drilled and well-armed soldiers. To these could be added about one hundred thousand ordinary police 
and revenue peons. [Source: 'Tabular Statement of the Army of India in January 1856', Sir Henry 
Lawrence, F-vays, Military and Political, Written in India (1859), pp. 3 70- 1] 
2 Ibid. Another source gives the total number of regular, irregular, local, contingent and military police 
troops officered from the Bengal Army as 176,834 men. [Source: 'Statement showing the Number and 
Distribution of all Troops, Native and European, serving in the Bengal Presidency in January 1857', 
P. P., H. C., 1859, VIII, p. 13]. 
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because Company officials had already decided that, as in Britain, they would make the best soldiers. 
According to the Company ideologue Robert Orme, the inhabitants of the wheat-producing zones of 
northern India were better built and thus more 'martial' than the shorter people in the rice-producing 
areas of the south and east. "In practice, " writes Seema Alavi, "this meant that recruitment was guided 
by two main considerations: the Company would only consider peasants with a well-built Physique and 
an average height of 5 feet 7 inches; secondly, at this stage, at least, it confined recruitment to the 
Company's territories and established direct contact with the recruiting villages in wheat-growing 
areas. " 4 
After Clive's victory over the Nawab of Bengal at Plassey on 23 June 1757 had established British 
supremacy in the province, the Company began to recruit from the rural areas of Bengal, particularly 
around Burhanpur and Dinapore. But not enough recruits of the requisite size were available, causing 
the recruitment base to be extended westward to the wheat-growing areas of north India. In Kolff s 
opinion, the Company's gradual reliance on recruits from outside Bengal proper stemmed partly from 
the fact that the majority of the two thousand or so sepoys who fought with Clive at Plassey were 
brought from Madras but had names that "indicate a Rajput or Northern origin". These new 
infantrymen were clothed by the Company, armed with firelocks rather than matchlocks, commanded 
by European officers and "drilled and disciplined according to the methods first tried out in the South in 
the decades preceding Plassey". They came to be known by the old name ofpurbia and were simply 
"new incarnations of the same old soldiering tradition of Hindustan" in which Rajputs and pseudo- 
Rajputs from Purab -a term that describes the Oudh, Bihar and Benares region - had travelled far and 
wide to find employers. 5 
Most of these new recruits from outside Bengal were high-caste Hindu peasants: Rajputs, the 
traditional warrior caste of northern India; or Bhumimars, the military wing of the priestly caste of 
Brahmins; or Brahmins themselves (though, for official purposes, the two latter groups were lumped 
together as Srahmins) . This reliance on high-caste recruits was partly because they were the most 
physicially imposing, partly because the Company assumed that these "traditional high-caste warriors" 
would prove to be the most loyal, and partly because Warren Hastings, the first Governor-General 
(1774-85), was keen to preserve Indian caste roles in the military institutions the Company was 
3 From the Persian sipahi (soldier) 
4 Alavi, Ae Sepoys and the Company, pp. 3 5-7. 
5 Kolff, Naukur, Rajput and Sepoy, p. 177-8 and 87. 
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gradually imposing upon north India. The "high-caste overtones of the army" suited the political 
interests of the Company, wrote Alavi, because "it provided the requisite legitimacy to Company rule". 6 
The Purab in general - but particularly Oudh - would supply the majority of recruits for the Bengal 
Native Infantry right up until the mutiny. Of the 279N. C. O. s and sepoys of the 22ndN. I. who deserted 
in 1824 while on the march from Lucknow, 263 (or 941/o) came from Oudh .7 Major-General Sir Jasper 
Nicholls told the select committee of 1831 that "the whole sepoy army of Bengal is drawn from the 
Company's province of Bihar and Oudh, with very few exceptions... " Ten years later, William 
Sleeman noted: "Three-fourths of the recruits of our Bengal Native Infantry are drawn from the Rajput 
peasantry of the kingdom of Oudh. "9 Finally, General Sir Patrick Grant, a former Adjutant-General of 
the Bengal Army, informed the Peel Commission that recruits for the Bengal Native Infantry were 
drawn "chiefly from Oude, a few from the the Punjaub, and the rest from Bhajepoor [in Bihar] and the 
Doab"ý' 
High-caste Hindus were still dominating the Bengal Native Infantry by 1857, though their overall 
majority was under threat. Clive had recommended in 1765 that native battalions should contain an 
equal number of Muslims and Hindus to balance each other, but this policy was never carried out 
because there were not enough suitable Muslims in the areas that had been targeted for recruitment. 
High-caste Hindus were, in any case, preferred by successive governors-general because they were seen 
as more pliable than Muslims. In 1789, therefore, Cornwallis was able to inform the Court of Directors 
that four-fifths of the Bengal Army - by now 36 native infantry battalions strong - was composed of 
Hindus. " 
The initial method of recruitment was for the commanding officer of a battalion to enlist from the 
area in which his regiment was stationed. Occasionally recruiting parties were sent out to neighbouring 
areas when sufficient recruits were not available. But by the beginning of the nineteenth century the 
preferred method was to encourage sepoys on furlough to bring recruits from their own villages. This 
6 A] avi, Yhe Sepoys and the Company, p. 45. 
7 Bengal Military Consultations, OIOC, P/3 1/10, No. 33 of 6 Jan 1825. 
8 Quoted in Barat, Bengal Native Infantry, p. 119 
9 Major-General Sir William Sleeman, Rambles andRecollections ofan Indian Official (1844, this 
edition 1915), p. 624 
10 P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 65, p. 481 
11 Barat, Bengal Native Infantry, p 12 1; Kolff, Naukur, Rajput and Sepoy, 179-80 
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was because the serving sepoy "acted as the guarantor of the respectable antecedents and fifture loyalty" 
of the new recruit. 12 Thus was the high-caste monopoly perpetuated. 
One such recruit was Sitaram Pandy, a high-caste Brahmin from the Rai Bareilly district of southern 
Oudh. The son of a small landholder, he was persuaded to join up in 1812 by his maternal uncle who 
was ajemadar Ounior native officer) on leave from his battalion of Bengal Native Infantry. Sitaram's 
father gave his permission not out of financial necessity, but because he had a lawsuit pending over the 
disputed ownership of a grove of mango trees "and he thought that having a son in the Company 
Bahadu? s service would be the means of getting his case attended to in the law courts of Lucknow". 
For though Oudh was still an independent state, "it was well known that a petition sent by a soldier 
through his commanding officer", who forwarded it to the British Resident in Lucknow, "generally had 
prompt attention paid to it, and carried more weight than even the bribes and party interest of a mere 
subject of the King of Oudh". 13 The removal of this privilege by the annexation of Oudh in 1856 was 
to add yet another grievance to the sepoys' growing list. 
The virtual monopoly that high-caste Hindus enjoyed over the Bengal Native Infantry is illustrated by 
the ethnic breakdown of officers and men in a battalion raised at Benares in 1814-15 (see Table 1). " 
Table I- Ethnic composition ofa new battalion ofBenizal Native In/antry in 1815 










High-caste Hindus (Brahmins and Rajputs) made up almost four-fifths of the battalion, while Hindus of 
all castes were 90 per cent of the whole. Though this sample is only one of many - the Bengal Native 
Infantry had expanded, because of war, to 27 two-battalion regiments by 1808 - it is generally 
representative of the whole. In 1824, for example - by which time a reorganization of the army had 
12 A] avi, Yhe Sepoys and the Company, p. 4 8. 
13 James Lunt (ed. ), From Sepoy to Subedar: Being the Life andAdventures of Subedar Sita Ram, a 
Native Officer of the BengalArmy, written andrelatedby himsey(1873, this edition 1970), p. S. 
Sitaram completed his memoir shortly after his retirement in 1861. It was translated and first published 
by his former commanding officer, Lt. -Col. J. T. Norgate, in 1873. Doubt has been cast on its 
authenticity by several authorities, most recently J. A. B. Palmer. But Sir Patrick Cadell, the 
distinguished historian of the Bombay Army who devoted many years to a study of the memoir, came 
to the conclusion that it was genuine. 1, too, am convinced that only a genuine Bengal sepoy could 
have supplied the rich and (mostly) accurate detail that the memoir contains. 
14 Barat, Yhe Bengal Native Infantry, p, 122. 
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produced 68 single battalion regiments -a descriptive roll for 279 N. C. O. s and sepoys who had 
deserted from the 22d N. I. showed that more than 84 per cent of them were high-caste. 15 
Some of the reasons for this official bias are given in a journal entry for May 1818 by the then 
Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of Bengal, Lord Hastings (1813-1823). "Inournative 
regiments, " he wrote, "none but men of high caste are suffered to enlist; so that individuals being 
ordinarily connected with respectable families, have the best chance to be impressed with any just 
sentiments or principles of rectitude that may be afloat in the country. A dignity, too, is attached by 
general opinion in India to the character of a soldier; whence the sepoy may be expected to habituate 
his mind to a generous tone of thought. " 16 
Lord William Bentinck, Governor-General from 1828 to 1835 (and Commander-in-Chief of Bengal 
from 1833 to 1835), also believed in the superiorcharacte? and physique of the recruits from northern 
India; but he did not confine that admiration to high-caste I-Endus alone. In his minute on military 
policy of March 1835, he wrote that "the Hindustani is larger and more robust than the native south of 
the [River] Narbada and the presumption must be that he is considered a more powerful if not a better 
soldier". 17 He then pointed out that even those Bombay sepoys who had been recruited from 
Hindustan (about half the total) were smaller and lighter than those in Bengal, while the incidence of 
corporal punishment in the Bombay Presidency was much higher. From this he was able to form the 
opinion "that the Hindustanis engaged at Bombay" were "inferior in stature and character to those of the 
Bengal Army". Bentinck's solution was to abolish the Bombay Army, transferring its Hindustani half 
to the Bengal Army and to allow "the Bombay half to remain as a separate corps to be recruited always 
within the territories" and to be commanded by a major-general "as any other division of the army". ' 8 
Fortunately, the Court of Directors did not agree. If they had, the mutiny of 1857 might have been 
more widespread still. 
15 Troceedings of a Special Committee of Inquiry, Berhampore, 13 Dee 1824, Bengal Military 
Consultations, OIOC, No. 33 of 6h Jan 1825, P/3 1/10. The ethnic breakdown was as follows: 
Brahmins 122 (43.7%); Rajputs (Chuttrees) 113 (40.5%); Muslims 12 (4.3%); Other castes 32 (11.5%). 
16 Marchioness of Bute (ed. ), Yhe Private Journals of the Marquess ofHastings. Governor-General mid 
Commander-in-Chief in India (1858), vol. 2, pp. 324-5. 
17 C. H. Philips (ed. ), Yhe Correspondence of Lord William Cavendish Bentinck. Governor-General of 
India 1828-1835 (Oxford, 1977), H, Letter 810, pp. 1445-6. Bentinck gave the average height and 
weight of sepoys from the three presidency armies as follows: Bengal - height 5' 7.82", weight 9st 
0.8oz; Bombay - height 5'4.75"-S'-6.5", weight 8st 5.25oz -9st 0.5oz; Madras - height 5'5.36"-56.59", 
weight 7st 9.73oz-8st 5.18oz. The statistics for the Bombay and Madras Armies are variable because 
some of their sepoys were recruited from outside their presidencies; the higher figures are those 
recruited from Hindustan. Almost all Bengal sepoys were recruited from Hindustan. 
18 Ibid., p. 1445-6. 
25 
In Bentinck's opinion, all Indian sepoys suffered from a "want of physical strength, and of a moral 
energy" which would prevent them from defeating a European invader such as Russia. Recent wars 
with "enemies of a more masculine character" like the Nepalese and Burmese had proved this to be the 
case. Yet Bentinck believed "that if the bolder and larger men of the north were mixed with a due 
proportion of European troops, and excited to acts of valour by sufficient encouragement", there was no 
reason why they "should not acquire the same superior bearing as the Portugese and Neapolitans, under 
British and French direction". As for the sepoys from the "territories proper of Madras and Bombay" 
he could "entertain no such hope". Short of disbanding them entirely - which was clearly out of the 
question - the only solution he could suggest was to increase the proportion of European troops to 
native troops in India from less than 1: 6 to 1: 4.19 But while considerably more European troops were 
stationed in India over the next 20 years, their native counterparts also increased in number, so that the 
proportion of European to native troops only improved to 1: 5.1 (45,522 to 232,224). In Bengal, 
however, the ratio in 1857 was about 1: 5.6 (24,366 to 135,767). 20 If all native troops commanded by 
European officers are taken into account - including regulars, irregulars, local corps, contingents and 
military police - then the ratio falls back to 1: 6 for India generally (45,522 to 275,304) and 1: 7.3 
(24,366 to 176,834) for Bengal. 21 
If Bentinck had a marked preference for sepoys from Hindustan, he and his government did not agree 
with the semi-official policy of confining recruitment to the highest Hindu castes. They were, in 
particular, convinced that the army contained too many Brahmins who tended to put caste issues before 
duty. As early as 1830, the Bengal government had commented that "an unusally large number of 
Brahmins has of late entered the service [and that] it would be desirable, to follow the proportion which 
formerly prevailed by giving a decided preference to the Rajputs and to the Mahomedans". 22 But the 
Brahmins simply got round this restriction by enlisting - in the 59th N. I., for example - as Rajputs. 
19 Ibid., 1450-2. Bentinck gives the relative strength of the Indian Army in 1835 as follows: European 
18,016; Native 112,684. 
20 Return showing the Numbers of the troops, regular and irregular, which were serving in the three 
Presidencies immediately before the Mutiny', P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 17, p. 379. The number of 
European troops in Madras and Bombay are given as 10,730 and 10,430 respectively. An alternative 
troop breakdown is given in 'A Return of the actual Military Force that was in India at the time of the 
Outbreak of the Mutiny at Meerut', NAM, 8211-13-14. This source gives the total number of troops in 
India as follows: Bengal, 118,663 natives and 23,13 8 Europeans; Madras, 49,73 7 natives and 10,194 
Europeans; Bombay, 30,940 natives and 9,589 Europeans. It appears to exclude local troops, 
contingents, military police and some irregular corps. 
21 'Tabular Statement of the Army of India in January 1856', Lawrence, Essays, Military andPolitical, 
p. 370-1; 'Statement showing the Number and Distribution of all Troops, Native and European, serving 
in the Bengal Presidency in January 1857', P. P., H. C., 1859, VIII, p. 13 
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Bentinck's solution was to issue, in late 1834, a General Order which stated that "all objections to men 
belonging to the respectable classes of the native community, or preferences among such classes on 
account of caste or religion, shall cease to operate in respect to their admission into the ranks of the 
Bengal Army". 23 It removed, at a stroke, the recent prejudice against Brahmins and the more 
entrenched bias against 'respectable'Muslims and Hindus who were not high-caste Brahmins and 
Rajputs. Among these 'respectable'Hindu castes were Ahirs (the cowherd caste of Bihar and Upper 
India), Bhats (a caste of genealogist and family bards), Kaits (the writer caste ofBengal proper and 
Bihar) and Kumbis (a very large cultivating caste of upper India, Bihar, Chota Nagpur and Orissa). 24 
The overall result, Bentinck hoped, would be an erosion of the high-caste (particularly Brahmin) 
monopoly. 
But this cleverly disguised assault on the Brahmin-dominated brotherhood of high-caste sepoys was a 
far cry from throwing the ranks open to natives of all castes. For while this policy of non-prejudice 
towards any particular element of the "respectable classes" was re-emphasized by the Bengal Army 
regulations of 1855 (the first revised edition for 16 years), they also stipulated that "special care" had to 
be taken "to reject all men of inferior caste" and "any others habitually employed in menial 
occupations". Moreover the regulations stressed that "it was not considered desirable to have too large 
a proportion of Brahmins in any regiment", but added that appearances of "strength, activity, boldness, 
and smartness, should be the principal guide in the selection of recruits". Furthermore, they affirmed 
the established practice of new recruits being brought to the regiments by soldiers returning from leave 
as the primary method of recruitment, a policy hardly calculated to cut the ties of kinship and caste that 
existed in the Bengal ArMy. 25 
Nevertheless the high-caste monopoly was gradually eroded. In 1842, according to figures presented 
by Lieutenant-General Briggs, the proportion of Rajputs and Brahmins in the Bengal Native Infantry 
was 34.9% and 3 1.0% respectively (see Table 2). 26 
Table 2- Ethnic composition qf1he Bengal Native Infantry in 1842 
Rajputs Brahmins Hindus of inferior 
caste 
I Muslims Christians r Total I 
27,993(34.91/o)_ 24,840(31.0%) 13,920 (17.3%) 1 12,411 (15.4%) 1 1,076 (1.3%) 1 80,240-1 
22 Barat, The Bengal Native Infantry, p. 123. 
23 G. O. G. G., 31 Dec 1834, Abstract of General Orders from 1817 to 1840, OIOC, L/MEU17/2/435. 
24 Barat, 7he Bengal Native Inanhy, p. 122. 
25 Bengal Army Regulations 1855, OIOC, LAIEU17/2/442, pp. 215-16. 
26 Barat, Yhe Bengal Native hfianhy, p. 123. 
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It is not ideal to compare these figures with those for the single newly-enlisted battalion of 1814-15. 
But if we do, then it becomes clear that more Muslims and Hindus of inferior caste have been recruited 
at the expense of high-caste sepoys (the latter's combined total having slipped from 80 per cent to just 
under 66 per cent), and that the RaJputs have replaced the Brahmins as the dominant caste. 
But this marginal change did not satisfy Henry Lawrence, a talented artillery officer who had been 
seconded to the Political Department. In 1844, while serving as Resident in Nepal, he wrote the first of 
a number of anonymous articles for the Calcutta Review that advocated sweeping military reform. 
Entitled 'Military Defence and our Indian Empire', it declared his belief that the British deceived 
themselves if they thought that their government was "maintained otherwise than by the sword". It was 
necessary, therefore, to keep that sword from rusting. Not least because, in his opinion, the greatest 
threat to British rule "is from our own troops" and the recruitment policy of the Bengal Army was 
partly to blame. He wrote: 
Our Scpoys come too much from the same parts of the country; Oudc, the lower Dooab and upper Behar. There is 
too much of clanship among them, and the evil should be rcmedicd by enlisting in the Saharunpoor and Dclhi 
districts, in the hill regions, and in the Malay and Burmah States... We would go farther, and would encourage the 
now despised Eurasians to enter our ranks, either into scpoys corps where one or two here and there would be 
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useful, or as detached companies or corps... 
At first Lawrence's warnings fell on deaf ears as most Bengal Army offlicers were still of the opinion 
that high-caste peasants made the best soldiers But the two Sikh wars of the 1840s were to cause a shift 
in recruitment policy nonetheless. After the successful conclusion of the first war (1845-6), two local 
regiments of Sikh infantry - the Ferozepore and Ludhiana - were raised to protect the new frontier with 
Punjab with the same pay, allowances and pensions as regiments of the line. 28 A further four regiments 
of Sikh frontier infantry (later known as the l"41' Sikh Infantry) were enlisted in 1846 and 1847. The 
famous Corps of Guides - which initially consisted of two companies of infantry and one troop of 
cavalry - was also formed in 1846 to assist the Sikh rulers of the Punjab in policing the turbulent North- 
27 Lawrence, Duqs, Military and Political, pp. 5,29-3 0. 
29 G. O. C. C., 30 July 1846, Abstract of General Orders from 1840 to 1847, OlOC, lAffUI7/2/436. 
28 
West Frontier with Mghanistan. 29 "The object of the corps, " wrote its first commandant, "was to have 
trustworthy men who could at a moment's notice act as guides to troops in the field, and collect 
intelligence beyond as well as within the border. , 30 It was initially recruited from Hindustani soldiers 
serving in the Sikh army, Pathans who had served with the British in Mghanistan, and some Mazbi - or 
low-caste - Sikhs. 
Following the second war (1848-9) and the annexation of the Punjab, five regiments of irregular 
infantry and five of cavalry were enlisted in the province to pacify and protect the North-West 
Frontier. 31 This had the effect of absorbing some of the 100,000 soldiers who lost employment when 
the Sikh army was disbanded. The irregular infantry regiments, for example, were composed of 
roughly equal proportions of Pathans, Punjabi Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus (many of whom were high- 
caste). 32 The Guides were also increased to three troops of cavalry and six of infantry, and the whole 
force became known as the Punjab Frontier Cater Irregular) Force. While none of these augmentations 
directly threatened the high-caste power base in the regular infantry regiments, they did provide the 
Company with an alternative instrument of authority and an alternative source of recruits. 
The necessity for such an option was made all the more urgent in 1849 when a number of Bengal 
Native Infantry regiments reacted angrily to the news that foreign service batta would no longer apply 
in the Punjab because it had become a British territory. 33 Sir Charles Napier, the Commander-in-Chief, 
would ultimately receive information that as many as 24 native infantry regiments (a third of the total) 
were tainted with a "mutinous spirit". 34 The first sign of discontent came at Rawalpindi in July 1849 
when the 13th and 22"d regiments refused to receive their reduced pay. Though both regiments were 
eventually persuaded to back down, Napier was uneasy because his intelligence indicated that other 
disaffected regiments were in communication with their Rawalpindi comrades . 
35 He decided to act on 
hearing that high-caste sepoys were to blame. "When it was made known that Brahmins were at the 
29 Captain Lionel J. Trotter, Yhe Life ofRodsonqfRodsons Horse (London, 1901), pp. 434. 
30 Lt H. B. Lumsden to Lt. J. Younghusband, P. S. Lumdsen and GR Elsmie, Lumsden of the Guides 
jLondon, 1899), p. 37. Quoted in Shibly, 'The Reorganisation of the Indian Armies', Ph. D, p. 122. 
1 G. O. G. G. 18 May 1849 and 15 February 1851, Abstract of General Orders from 1848 to 1853, 
OIOC, IJMIU17/2/437. 
32 Evidence of Lt. -Col. Alfred Wilde, 26 Aug 1858, P. P., I-I. C., 1859, V, p. 91. 33 G. O. G. G. 25 Oct 1849, ibid. The exception to this rule were the troops stationed across the Indus 
because "being on the extreme frontier of a newly conquered country" they were "required to be in 
constant readiness to move at a moment's notice". As a result, they were allowed to continue to receive 
the same foreign batta given to those in Sind, i. e. two more rupees for sepoys in cantonment, and three 
and a half for those in the field. 
34 Sir Charles Napier, Defects, Civil andMilitary, of the Indian Govemment (London, 1853), p. 3 8. 
35 Ibid., p. 25, 
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head of the insubordinate men of the 13th and 22ný" he wrote later, "and that in the first regiment alone 
there were no less than four hundred and thirty, the necessity of teaching that race they should no 
longer dictate to the Sepoys and the Government struck me, and my thoughts at once turned for means 
to the Goorkas. 06 
The troops in question were the same hillmen that Henry Lawrence had recommended for the native 
infantryinl844. At that stage there were three irregular Gurkha battalions -the Nasiri, Sirmur and 
Kumaon - which had been raised in the wake of the I't Nepal War of 1814-15. They were recruited 
from both the independent kingdom of Nepal and the neighbouring hill country that was ruled by the 
British, and though the vast majority were officially described as'Rajputs', they included Gurkhas, 
Doteallies, Ghurwallies and Kumaonees, and bore little relation to the Rajputs from the plains of 
India. 37 According to Napier, they were the "bravest of Native troops" and "at the battles on the 
Sutledge [Sutlej in the I" Sikh War] displayed such conspicuous gallantry as to place them for courage 
on a level with our Europeans". 38 
An even greater attraction for Napier, however, was the fact that they did not take their own caste 
rules too seriously. "It is said they do not like cow-beef, " wrote Napier, "yet a cow would not be long 
alive with a hungry Goorka battalion; they mess together, these Goorkas, and make few inquiries as to 
the sex of a beefsteaki 09 The "higher Hindoo castes", by contrast, were all "imbued with gross 
superstitions" and allowed "their religious principles to interfere in many strange ways with their 
military duties". 40 The worst offenders, in Napier's opinion, were the Brahmins: "Having two 
commanders to obey, caste and captain, if they are at variance the last is disobeyed, or obeyed at the 
cost of conscience and of misery. 1141 
For Napier, the Gurkhas were the ideal soldiers to combat the influence of the Brahmins, not least 
because they were "said to have a dislike to the [Bengal] Sepoys amounting to contempt". 42 Having 
recently heard from one of their commanders that a combination of high prices at Simla and their low 
pay as a local battalion Oust five and a half rupees a month) meant that they were all but starving, 
36 Ibid., p. 29. 
37 Caste Returns of the Sirmoor, Kemaon and New Nusseeree Battalions, May 1851, India Military 
Consultations, OIOC, P/43/38, No. 45 of 14 May 1852. 
38 Napier, Defects, Civil andMilitary, p. 28. 
39 Ibid., p. 29. 
40 Ibid., pp. 28-9. Napier added: "One goes to the devil if he eats this; another if he eats that; a third 
will not touch his dinner if the shadow of an infidel falls over it; a fourth will not drink water unless it 
has been drawn by one of his own caste. " 
41 Ibid., p. 29. 
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Napier decided to "adopt the Goorka regiments into the line, abolish their limitation of service to the 
to 43 hills, and give them pay and allowance as Sepoys . This move was formally sanctioned by the issue 
of a General Order by the Governor-General in March 185044. Napiees long-term plan was to enlist up 
to 40,000 Gurkhas. Backed by them and 30,000 European troops, the British possession of India would 
no longer depend on opinion', but on an Army, able with ease to overthrow any combination among 
Hindoos or Mahomedans, or both togetherl "45 He concluded: "We may thus set the Brahmin at 
defiance, if he behaves ill. "46 
Unfortunately for the British, Napier fell out with the Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie - over his 
unilateral decision to mollify the sepoys by cancelling an earlier government order to reduce the 
compensation paid to them when their fixed rations exceeded a certain price - and resigned before he 
could undertake such a radical reform. He nevertheless made some headway with his plan to dilute the 
high-caste Bengal sepoy. By far the most serious act of disaffection over the abolished batta issue took 
place in February 1850 when the 66th N. I. made an abortive attempt to sieze the fortress at Govindghur 
in the Punjab. Napierosimmediate response was to disband the regiment and replace it with the Nasiri 
Battalion, henceforth known as the 60h (Gurkha) N. I. "I resolved to show these Brahmins that they 
cannot control our enlistment, " he informed the Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, on 27 February 
1850. "1 mean to repeat the operation if another regiment mutinies, unless your Lordship 
disapproves. "47 However there were no more mutinies because, wrote Napier, the "Brahmins saw that 
the Goorkas, another race, could be brought into the ranks of the Company's Army -a race dreaded as 
more warlike than their own oM 
But there was one more significant change in the Bengal Army's recruitment policy before Napier 
was replaced by Sir William Gomm as Commander-in-Chief in December 1850. A circular letter was 
sent by the Government of India to all commanding officers on II November 1850, containing an 
extract of a letter from the Court of Directors which stated that inhabitants of Punjab "should, under the 
general regulations of the service, with respect to age, height, and fitness, and with due advertence to 
the number of Hindoos, Mussulmans, and Seikhs in each Regiment, be considered eligible as Recruits 
42 Ibid., pp. 29-30 and 28. 
43 Ibid., p. 30. 
44 G. O. G. G. 22 March 1850, Abstract of General Orders from 1848 to 1853, OIOC, LMU17/2/437. 
45 Napier, Defects, Civil widMilitary, p. 3 0. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., p. 130. 
48 ibid., p. 134. 
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for our Regular Native Army ". 49 This reform was highly significant because it made Sikhs and Punjabi 
Muslims eligible for service in regular infantry regiments. Though their number in any one regiment, 
as stated by the Bengal Army Regulations of 1855, was "never to exceed 200, nor are more than 100 of 
them to be Seikhs", the threat this posed to the high-caste monopoly was obvious. 50 
The effects, however, took time to make themselves felt. The caste breakdown for the Bengal Native 
Infantry in 1851 - as given in evidence to a Parliamentary select committee by Philip Melvill, Secretary 
to the Government of India in the Military Department, the following year - is remarkably similar to 
that provided by General Briggs in 1842 (see Table 3). 51 The only meaningful changes are the 
increases in the proportion of inferior caste Ilindus from 17.3% to 18.8%, and Brahmins from 3 1% to 
32.1%. But as the percentage of Rajputs had shrunk from 34.9% to 32.6%, the overall proportion of 
high-caste sepoys had fallen marginally from just under 66% to 64.7%, a decrease ofjust over one per 
cent. 
Table 3- Ethnic composition ofthe Bengal Native Infantry in 1851 
Rajputs Brahmins Hindus of Muslims Christians Sikhs Total 
inferior caste 
27,335 26,983 15,761 12,699 1,118 so 83,946 
(32.6%) (32.1%) (18.8%) (1.3%) (0.1 */0) 
Part of the reason for the small increase in the proportion of Brahmin sepoys was because commanding 
officers often ignored official guidelines. For as Lieutenant-Colonel Wyllie informed the post-mutiny 
Peel Commission, "the feeling was that [in Brahmins] they have a more respectable man, 
in the same way as in our country you would rather have a farmer's son than a man taken from the 
streets". 52 In 1856, Sir Henry Lawrence - now Agent to the Governor-General in Rajputana - argued 
against this practice in another essay demanding military reform in the Calcutta Review. He blamed the 
"Hindoo prejudices of commanding off icers" for the fact that "scarcely three thousand" Sikhs had been 
recruited to the Bengal Native Infantry since the regulations were altered in November 1850.53 The 
actual number was probably half as much, Lawrence believed, because "some Sikhs have abjured 
Sikhism, others have been driven out of it, and not a shadow of encouragement has been given to 
49 Circular No. 2346,11 Nov 1850, Abstract of General Orders from 1848 to 1853, OIOC, 
L/MIU17/2/437. 
50 Bengal Army Regulations 1855, OIOC, LM1117/2/442, p. 215. 
51 P. P., H. of L., 1852-3, =, p. 10. 
52 B arat, Me Bengal Native Infantry, p. 124. 
53 Lawrence, Essays, Military andPolitical, p. 423. 
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counteract the quiet, but persistent opposition of the Oude and Behar men". Such internal opposition 
"to the introduction of new classes into the army" had even prevented Lieutenant-General Sir Patrick 
Grant, then a captain, from recruiting "hardy Aheers" and "Ranghurs" into the ranks of the newly-raised 
Hurriana Light Infantry in the late 1830s. According to Lawrence, who heard it from Grant himself, 
"the Rajpoots and Brahmins bullied the new levies out of the corps". Lawrence's solution had not 
altered much since 1844. It was both to extend the field of recruitment for the regular army and to have 
regiments of separate classes. He wrote: 
Oude should no longer supply the mass of our infantry and regular cavalry; indeed, twenty years hence, it will be 
unable to do so. The Punjab, Ncpaul, and the Delhi territory should be more largely indented on; as should the 
whole North-West Provinces, and the military classes of Bombay and Madras.... The plan to be followed, to get 
and to keep the best soldiers throughout India, and to quietly oppose class against class, and tribe against tribe, is to 
have separate regiments of each creed or class, filling up half, three-fourths, or even more of the commissioned and 
non-commissioned ranks from their own numbers... We have not a doubt that, thus organized, the low-caste man, 
who, under present influences, is the mcre creature of the Brahmin, would as readily meet him with the bayonet, as 
he would a Mahommedan. 54 
As before, Lawrence's recommendations received no official sanction. Yet the high-caste sepoys' 
defence of their dominant position could not succeed indefinitely. It was to receive a further blow in 
the summer of 1856 when the new Governor-General, Lord Canning, ordered that all enlistment to the 
Indian Army would henceforth be for general service . 
55 I-Etherto it had been the practice in Bengal to 
ask for volunteers when troops were needed for service beyond sea. This was in deference to its 
Brahmin and Rajput sepoys who, theoretically, would lose their caste if they travelled over the'black 
watee. As a result, only the Bengal Artillery and six of the 74 regiments of Bengal Native Infantry had 
56 been recruited for general service. Now all new recruits would be taken on that basis. Leaving 
specific caste issues aside (they will be dealt with in a later chapter), one of the main reasons why 
Brahmin and Rajput sepoys objected to this measure was because they thought it would discourage 
their brethren from enlisting and so undermine their monopoly. Sir John Kaye wrote: "There was an 
end, indeed, of the exclusive privileges which the Bengal Sipahi had so long enjoyed. The service 
54 Ibid., pp. 421-2,424-5. 
55 G. O. G. G., 25 July 1856, quoted in P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 14, p. 376. 
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never could be hereafter what it had been of old; and all the old pride, therefore, with which the veteran 
had thought of his boys succeeding him was now suddenly extinguished. 07 
Lord Canning was of the opinion that the new regulation was not in any way responsible for the 
disaffection shown by certain regiments of the Bengal Native Infantry in early 1857. "Not a murmur 
has been heard against it anywhere, " he informed the President of the Board of Control, "and the two 
regiments who have shown the worst spirit, the 2 nd and 34h [N. I. ], have enrolled as many recruits 
monthly under the new system as the old & without any signs of difference between the old sepoys & 
their new comrades". 58 But Sir Henry Lawrence, recently appointed Chief Commissioner of Oudh, 
provided evidence to the contrary. "The General Service Enlistment Oath is most distasteful, " be 
informed Canning on I May 1857, "keeps many out of the service, and ffightens the old Sipahis, who 
imagine that the oaths of the young recruits affect the whole regiment, " He had been told as much the 
previous week by "one of the best captains of the 1P N. I. 11. In addition, Mr E. A. Reade of the Sudder 
Board had "had the General Service Order given to him as a reason last year, when on his tour, by 
Rajputs for not entering the service". 59 
If the General Service regulation is seen in the context of the previous 20 years, when successive 
government measures had sought to broaden the recruitment base of the Bengal Army, then it is 
possible to understand why, in Kaye's words, it caused the "the old race of Sipahis" to leap to the 
conclusion "that the English had done with the old Bengal Army, and were about to substitute for it 
another that would go anywhere and do anything, like coolies and pariahs". 60 Canning may have 
insisted that the new legislation had not affected the recruitment pattern of the 34h N. I., seven 
companes of which were disbanded for mutinous conduct in early May 1857, but the writing was 
61 
clearly on the wall (see Table 4). 
Table 4- Ethnic composition ofthe 34h Bengal Native Infantry on 21.4pril 1857 














56 These were the 27'ý 47h and 65h N. I., which were then at Pegu, and the 40'h, 67h and 68h N. I. which 
had all served there as recently as 1854. 
57 Mal I eso n (ed. ), Kaye andMalleson's History of the Indian Mutiny of 185 7-8,1, p. 3 44. 
58 Canning to Vernon Smith, 23 March 1857, Lyveden Papers, OIOC, MSS Eur/F231/4. 
59 G. Anderson and M. Subedar (eds. ), Yhe Last Days of the Company. A Source Book ofIndian History 
1818-1858 (London, 1918), 1, pp. 109-10 
60 Malleson (ed. ), Kaye andMallesons History of the IndianMuliny, 1, p. 345. 
'61 George W. Forrest (ed. ), Selectionsfrom the Letters, Despatches and other State Paperspreserved in 
the Military Department of the Government ofIndia 1857-58 (Calcutta, 1893), L p. 177. 
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If we relate the figures in Table 4 to those for the whole Bengal Native Infantry in 185 1, then it it clear 
that the high-caste majority had suffered a significant erosion. For compared to an average ofjust 
under 65% then, the high-caste proportion has fallen to less than 53%, with Rajputs the biggest losers. 
The main beneficiaries, on the other hand, are the Sikhs (up almost 7% on the 1851 average), the 
Muslims (up more than 3%) and low caste I-findus (up 2.5%). No figures relating to the whole of the 
Bengal Native Infantry are available for 1857, and the extent to which the 34h N. I. was typical is 
difficult to assess - not least because it was a relatively new regiment, having replaced the original 340' 
on its disbandment for mutiny in 1844. But even in its former guise - as the Infantry of the 
Bundelkhand Legion - it had been recruited from much the same areas and castes as the regular 
infantry. 
There are, in any case, alternative statistics for ethnic composition which confirm that the number of 
high-caste sepoys had fallen significantly since 1851. The first, dated September 1858, is an official 
caste breakdown for the seven regiments of Bengal Native Infantry which had remained loyal or 
partially loyal: the 2 1", 3 I't, 471hP 65ý 6e (Gurkhas), 7& and 73d (see Table 5) . 
62 Their high-caste 
proportion was 58% (33.7% Rajputs and 26.2% Brahmins). 
Table 5- Ethnic composition ofthe seven loyal regiments ofBengal Native Infantry in 
September 1858 




(2 6.2 IYO) 
1,930 






The first point that needs to be made is that the Rajput figure would be much lower if it did not include 
the hill Rajputs'who formed the majority of the 66h (Gurkhas) and who, as already mentioned, had 
little in common with their plain-dwelling namesakes. If we take the 66h regiment out of the equation - 
using the 1851 caste composition of 88% or so! Rajputs' in the Sirmur and Kemaon Battalions as a 
template63 - then the total number of Rajputs in the six remaining regiments would be 1,708 out of 
6,835, or 25.0%. This, in turn, would give those six regiments a high-caste proportion of 53.2%, a 
figure remarkably similar to the 53% in the 30 N. I. in 1857. 
62 P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 22, p. 382. 
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The second set of statistics concerns the ethnic composition of the whole Bengal Army in April 1858 
(see Table 6). 64 Of the 23,187 regular native soldiers who had not mutinied, deserted or been disbanded 
by this date, 21,928 were infantrymen and the rest from the light cavalry. Though the figures are 
slightly distorted by the presence of a few cavalrymen, the overall proportion of high-caste soldiers 
(56.8%) is still roughly in line with the other statistics for the native infantry of 1857-8. A comparison 
with the ethnic breakdown of the mutinously-disposed 34th Regiment, however, raises a tantalizing 
question: does the relatively small number of Sikhs (0.6%) in the loyal and disarmed regiments indicate 
that those regiments which had been least affected by the changes in recruitment policy were the least 
likely to mutiny? For the mutinously-disposed 3e N. I. had a far higher proportion of Sikhs (7%) and a 
slightly larger share of low caste sepoys (21.2% compared to 18.8%). 
Table 6- Ethnic composition ofthe regular Bengal native army on I April 1858 
Rajputs Brahmins Hindus of Muslims Gurkhas Christians Sikhs & Total 
inferior Punjabis 
caste 














Stokes has suggested, on the other hand, that "unity of action could be seriously affected by any 
dilution of the high-caste element" and that this might have been the reason "why Mangal Pande was 
not supported by his comrades when he sought to raise the 34th Regiment at Barrackpore on 29 March 
1857 iv. 65 Only a close study of the ethnic composition of all the mutinous and non-mutinous regiments 
in the Bengal Native Infantry would be able to prove this point one way or the other. Sadly the 
statistics are not available. Those that are show that the proportion of high-caste sepoys in the Bengal 
Native Infantry had fallen a long way from its high point in the 1810s (when one newly-raised battalion 
contained 78% Rajputs and Brahmins). 
Barat summed up the "image of a representative Bengal sepoy recruit" in the first half of the 
nineteenth century as follows: "He was a Hindu of high caste, a resident of Bihar and Oudh regions and 
had Hindustani as his mother tongue. He was a person of good physique and in sharp contrast to his 
English fellow soldiers [in the service of the Company], hailed from the peasantry and a station which 
63 Ibid. In 185 1, the Sirmoor Battalion contained 654 Rajputs out of a total of 749 native officers and 
men (or 87.3%) and the Kemaon Battalion contained 720 Rajputs out of a total of 8 10 (or 88.9%). 
64 Evidence of Lt. -Col. Durand, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 71. Quoted in Omissi, Yhe Sepoy and the 
Raj, p. 7. 
65 Stokes, 7he Peasant Armed, p. 52. 
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possessed a social heritage. In fact, as like as not, he was of the landed gentry and did not seek escape 
in the ranks; rather by enlistment he gained status in his society to which he continued to retain his 
allegiance. He therefore remained a civilian at heart though becoming a soldier by profession. "66 Yet 
by the outbreak of mutiny, just five years after Barat's study ends, these "representative" high-caste 
sepoys were barely in a majority. In 1858, summing up the replies given by a number of senior serving 
officers to the Peel Commission, Lieutenant-Colonel Durand noted that the Bengal Native Infantry 
"was composed of Mahommedans, Brahmins of all denominations, Chuttryas [Rajputs], Gwallahs, 
Kaits, Aheers, Jats, and that some few low caste men, such as Mallees, Kuchees, Gurrereeahs, i. e. 
Shepherds, had crept into corps". 67 They came from "Oude, from North and South Behar, especially 
the latter", from "the Doab of the Ganges and Jumna, from Rohilcund, a few from Bundlecund, and 
68 
since the conquest and annexation of the Punjab, a proportion from that province". 
Some historians have suggested that mutiny was a means of reversing this trend. In summing up the 
apprehensions of the 19'h and 34h N. I. at Lucknow during the annexation of Oudh in early 1856, Pandit 
Kanhyalal, a nineteenth century historian of Oudh, wrote: "They were discontented because they 
thought that their rights had been taken away from them, and were angry over the introduction of 
Punjabi and Sikh soldiers in the army. They saw the latter as the new recipients of the Company's 
favours which were now being denied to them. `59 
This was also the conclusion reached by Eric Stokes, who wrote: "The'closed shop'of the Purbias 
(eastemers) of the middle Ganges was under obvious threat, and with it all those privileges of 'home 
service'and a certain independent negotiating power charactersitic of mercenary armies. Hence solid 
material fears underlay the apprehension over any infringement of caste rules by British authority. 00 
Stokes also believed, unlike Barat, that the main reason the high-caste sepoys "from southern Oudh, the 
eastern part of the North-Western Provinces, and western Bihar" were so determined to "retain their 
monopolistic grip on the Bengal regiments" was because "military service was often the only 
honourable escape for men from families whose'ownership'of the land had failed to keep pace with 
66 Barat, Yhe Bengal Native Infantry, pp. 125-6. 
67 P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 71, p. 536. 
68 ]bid., p. 537. 
th ( '9 Pandit Kanhyalal, Tarikh-i-baghawat-i-hind. 1857 (Kanpur, 6 edition, 1916). Quoted in Alavi, Yhe 
Sepoys and the Company, pp. 295-6. 
70 Stokes, 7he Peasant Armed, p. 52. 
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growing numbers, and who were steadily being forced down into the position of the humbler tillers of 
the Soiln. 71 
Once in the army, however, these peasant soldiers were relatively insulated from civilian life. They 
sent and received letters and went on leave once a year. For the rest of the time they lived and behaved, 
in Tapti Roy's words, as a "corporate body". She added: "The sense of belonging to a corporate 
identity, a single body of men, was inculcated in the Company's soldiers in their everyday life in the 
army. They lived in cantonments, mostly situated at some distance from the towns and usually 
alongside the civil lines where the British officers lived... The day for a soldier began with the music of 
reveille and closed with the beating of the retreat while the last post was played late at night. 02 
One contemporary who believed that the mutiny came about because the Bengal sepoys were more 
influenced by their intra-regimental brotherhood than by their family ties was Lord Elphinstone, the 
perspicacious Governor of Bombay (1853-60). Ina minute on the future composition of the Indian 
Army in September 1857, he stated his opinion that "the influence of the family and the village was 
wholly wanting" in the regiment of a high-caste Bengal sepoy. 73 Instead his family links "had a directly 
opposite tendency, for the Bengal sepoy had his relations and his correspondents in half the regiments 
in the army", and "any attack real or fancied upon the susceptibilities of one regiment was thus felt by 
the whole, and when one mutinied, the rest followed, as if impelled by some unseen, but irresistable 
impulse, as if an electric shock had been felt by them all". 74 Elphinstone believed that the Bengal 
Native Infantry's over-reliance on high-caste men from the same province "was the radical error to 
which the greatest disasters which we have experienced were chiefly to be attributed". 75 Yet caste itself 
was not to blame, rather "a system of enlistment which fosters those feelings of common interest and 
mutual reliance upon each other, and that consciousness of power, without which no mutiny of an army 
eti masse could ever be brought about". 76 
By 1857, the high-caste Hindu majority in the Bengal Native Infantry was clearly under threat. 
However the extent to which this trend contributed to the mutiny is difficult to assess. Stokes believed 
that it was a major factor, and that it underlay perceived infiingements of caste such as the cartridge 
question. That may have been true for many high-caste sepoys. But it does not explain why so many 
71 Ibid., p. 51. 
72 Roy, Ae Politics of a Popular Uprising, pp. 4 9-5 0. 




lower caste Hindus, Muslims and even Sikhs also mutinied. All we can say with any certainty is that 
the high-caste brotherhood made a general mutiny possible. 
As far as the other arms of the Bengal Army were concerned, the Company's recruitment policy was 
much less provocative. The first two regiments of regular light cavalry were formed in 1796 by the 
conversion of existing regiments of irregular cavalry. The main difference between the two arms was 
in the number of European officers: the regulars then had 15, the irregulars just two. A third light 
cavalry regiment was raised in 1796 and a fourth a year later. Two more followed in 1800, and a 
further two in 1806. These original eight regiments were supplemented in 1824 by two Extra regiments 
which became the 9h and W Light Cavalry (L. C. ). in 1826. However the original 2 nd L. C. was 
disbanded in 1841 for misbehaviour during the I" Afghan War and replaced by the cavalry regiment of 
the Bundelkhand Legion which was renamed the 111" L. C. In 1850, after distinguished service at 
Multan in the 2nd Sikh War, the I I'h was renumbered the 2nd L. C. When mutiny broke out in 1857, the 
number of light cavalry regiments was still ten, each consisting of 24 European officers and about 500 
native officers and men. 77 
According to Alavi, the recruitment pattern of the regular cavalry after 1802 was determined by the 
East India Company expansion into the central and western Doab, later known as the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces. "It soon realized, " writes Alavi, "that a peasant army recruited on the basis of an 
assumed high-caste Hindu identity was less relevant here. 08 This was partly because the Company 
wanted to stem the migration of Muslim troopers from the area to the Maratha army, partly because 
incidents like the Vellore mutiny of 1806 meant that the peasant army was "gradually being viewed 
with greater scepticism", and partly because the "relatively small population of Brahmins and the 
weaker nature of Hindu social hierarchy" made the recruitment of respectable Muslims more 
attractive. 79 From 1802, therefore, the Company began to recruit those Muslim troopers who were 
affluent enough to provide securities. Many of them came from the princely state of Rampur, to where 
76 Lord Elphinstone's minute of 22 May 1858, P. P., RC., 1859, V, Appx. 67, p. 503. 
77 W. Y. Carman, hidian Army Untforms Under the Brifiskfrom the I? century to 1947 (London, 
1961), 1, p. 23. 
78 Al avi, 7he Sepoys atul the Company, p. 225. 
79 Ibid., pp. 226-7. 
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most of the Rohilla aristocracy had fled after their defeat by the British in 1774. Alayi concluded: "The 
Company never experienced any difficulty in attracting the landed class of wealthy Rampuri Rohillas 
who, once in Company service, used their political connections to protect their wealth in Rampur. 
However, a recruitment method which looked for the wealthy and the rich was bound to attract only a 
limited section of the Rohillas. "80 The regular cavalry was therefore forced to recruit the same high- 
caste Hindus who dominated the infantry. 
Though there are no separate statistics for the ethnic composition of the Bengal Light Cavalry in 
1857, it has generally been assumed that Muslims formed the biggest component. In his Ph. D. thesis 
on the post-mutiny reorganisation of the Indian Army, A. H. Shibly noted that the Bengal cavalry 
contained a "much larger infusion of the Muhammadan element" than the infantry "where the Hindus 
dominated". " George Chesney, a contemporary civil servant, was even more specific in his highly- 
regarded book on British rule in India. "The cavalry, " he wrote, "was principally recruited in 
Rohilcund and the country westward of the Gangetic Doab; it consisted chiefly of Mahomedans, and it 
was generally expected to prove indifferent to any passions which had their origin in Hindoo caste- 
prejudices. ss82 
Both these writers seem to have made the mistake of grouping the regular and irregular cavalry 
together. The latter force was dominated by Muslims in 1857 (as we shall see), but the former was not. 
Lieutenant Colonel Harington of the 5h Bengal L. C. - which was disarmed at Peshawur on 22 May 
1857 - told the Peel Commission that his regiment was composed of roughly "one-fourth Mussulmans 
and two thirds Brahmins, of the fighting class, and the others a lower class". 83 When asked if it might 
have mutinied if it had not been disarmed, he replied: "Yes, if it had been down country, for the men 
were of the same caste, country, and feeling as the other corps ... which murdered their officers. 
1184 This 
explains Sir Henry Lawrence's comment in 1856 that "Oude should no longer supply the mass of our 
infantry and regular cavalry". 85 It also helps to explain why the majority of Bengal Light Cavalry 
regiments were so willing to follow the lead taken by mutinous sepoys in 1857. Seven out of ten 
mutinied, or partially mutinied, and the remaining three were disarmed. Of this latter group, two - the 
go Ibid., p. 230. 
81 Shibly, Yhe Reorganisation of the IndfanArmies, Ph. D Thesis, p. 315. 
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339. 
93 Evidence of Lt. Col. Harington, 24 Aug 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, p. 48. 
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50'and 8"' - were initially ear-marked for rearmament. But the decision was reversed by Canning in 
early 1858 when he discovered that their conduct since disarmament made neither of them "worthy" of 
being "retained in the service". 86 Unlike the trend in the native infantry, the proportion of high-caste 
Hindu recruits in the Bengal Light Cavalry seems to have increased in the decades prior to the mutiny. 
But despite being more secure as a group, they would naturally have sympathized with their high-caste 
kinsmen. 
The Bengal Irregular Cavalry, too, was initially recruited from the Muslims of northern India who had 
dominated the pre-Company Mughal cavalry. But unlike the regular cavalry, it retained its 
overwhelming Muslim majority until the mutiny. The first Bengal irregular unit was the Mughal horse, 
raised by Major Calliaund in 1760. It differed from subsequent regular regiments in that all its troopers 
provided their own horses, arms and equipment. It also had far fewer European officers - the maximum 
of four being a commandant, second-in-command, adjutant and doctor - giving its native officers more 
responsibility. Such regiments performed the true light cavalry work of escort duty and reconnaissance. 
As already stated, the two surviving units of irregular cavalry were converted to regulars in 1796. But 
as the Company began to make incursions into the central and western Doab at the turn of the 
nineteenth century, and its peasant armies proved incapable of combatting the Mughal cavalry of the 
Marathas, the need for irregular cavalry returned. So the government turned to Eurasian officers who 
had commanded irregular regiments in the armies of Indian princes to raise new regiments. The most 
famous was James Skinner, the son of a Bengal officer and a Rajput woman, who resigned from the 
army of the Maratha ruler of Gwalior when the Company declared war in 1802. The first corps of 
Skinner's Horse (later the I't Bengal Irregular Cavalry) was raised in 1803 from a body of Perron's 
Horse in Scindia's service who had come over to the British after the Battle of Delhi. Skinner tended to 
recruit the same well-bom Rohilla and Afghan troopers who had served the Mughals and later the 
Marathas. If a man brought 100 horses, he was given the rank of ressaldar; if he brought 60 then he 
was made a naib rissaldar, and so on. He also recruited Ranghurs, the descendants of Rajputs who had 
become Muslims, though he did not believe they were respectable enough to be made officers. 87 By 
1809 there were twenty-two ressalahs (or troops) of more than 3,000 men on Skinner's estate which 
86 Lord Canning to the Court of Directors, 8 July 1858, P. P., FLC., 1859, V, Appx. 63, p. 469. 
97 Lt. -Col. C. Carmichael Smyth, A Rough Sketch of the Rise andProgress of the Irregular Horse of 
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stretched from the Aligarh district to Hansi in Harrianah. But not all Skinner's recruits were Muslim: 
he also enlisted Ahirs, Jats and Gujars. 88 
With the successful conclusion of the Pindari and Third Maratha Wars in 1818, the need for irregular 
cavalry diminished and Skinner's regiments became little more than a local police force. As a result, 
most of them were disbanded when Bentinck sought to reduce military expenditure in the late 1820s. 
By 1840, when the Bengal local horse was formally renamed irregular cavalry, there were just six 
regiments in existence: the V' and 4d' had evolved out of Skinner's Horse; the 2'ý P2 5h and 6th had 
been raised in 1809,1815,1823 and 1838 respectively. But as the Company expanded into Sind and 
the Punjab in the 1840s, twelve more regiments were added. The last eight were recruited after the I" 
Sikh War in 1846 by the offer of tenders to respectable Muslims who brought their relations and 
retainers with them. 89 
In late 1844, Henry Lawrence described the irregular cavalry as "mostly Pathans or Rajpoots and 
Mahommedans of family". 90 Lieutenant-General Sir Patrick Grant, the former Adjutant-General of the 
Bengal Army, was more specific in his evidence to the Peel Commission in 1858. He stated that the 
regiments were composed of "Hindoostanee Mahommedans, Sheikhs, Synds, Moghuts, and Pathans, 
and Hindoos, Brahmins, Rajpoots, Jats, and some also of the inferior castes", as well as "considerable 
numbers" of Ranghurs and "some few Sikhs and Afghans". 9' As in the regular regiments, recruits 
tended to be the friends and relations of those already serving, while castes "habitually employed in 
menial occupations" were excluded. 92 The main areas of recruitment were Delhi and Rohilkhand. 93 
Other senior officers specifically mentioned the towns of Hansi, Hissar, Meerut, Moradabad, Kumaul, 
Bareilly, Agra, Bharatpur, Farruckabad, Mainpuri, Shabjehanpur, Patiala and Ludhiana, and to a lesser 
extent Jullundur, Hoshiapur, Cawnpore and Lucknow. 94 
Sir James Hope Grant and Major Daly told the Peel Commission that the Bengal Irregular Cavalry 
was "composed chiefly of Mahomedans of various tribes and races" and that Rajputs "were formerly in 
greater numbers than now, though there are still some to be found, and a few Brahmins". 95 The method 
of recruitment had also altered. "In the early days of its formation, " they noted, "the nobles and chiefs 
88 A] avi, 7he Sepoys and the Company, pp. 244-5. 
89 Ibid., p. 262. 
90 Lawrence, Fssays, Military and Political, p. 3 2. 
91 P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 65, p. 490. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid., Appx. 72, p. 564. 
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of tribes brought their retainers into the field, and thus troops and regiments were raised. Gradually this 
has changed, and though the services still has attractions for men of mark, as all have to pass through 
the ranks to position, these have decreased. "96 Lately, such had been the demand for irregulars, "that no 
man who could manage a horse, and find good security among his comrades, has been refused 
service". 97 There is, however, no evidence that this change in recruitment policy was particularly 
resented by the ordinary sowars. 
The ethnic breakdown for the 76Bengal I. C., which was disarmed at Peshawur in May 1857, proves 
that Muslims were still the dominant faction (see Table 7). 98 Muslims made up more than four-fifths of 
the regiment, while fewer than one in six were high-caste lEndus. Such a relatively small proportion of 
Brahmins and Rajputs shows that the Bengal Irregular Cavalry was not linked to the native infantry by 
ties of kinship and caste in the same way that the regular cavalry was. This might help to explain why 
only ten out of eighteen regiments of irregular cavalry mutinied or partially mutinied in 1857 (the 
lowest proportion of the three native arms of Bengal infantry and cavalry), why three regiments 
retained their weapons and fought on the side of the British, and why eight regiments were later 
considered loyal enough to be incorporated into the reorganized Bengal Army. 99 
Table 7- Ethnic composition qfthe 74h Bengal Irregular Cavalry in May 1857 
Muslims, Synds Muslim Rajputs Brahmins Rajputs Sikhs Hindus of Total 
& Pathans an hu s) inferior caste 
392 82 62 28 20 2 586 
(66.9%) (14.01/o) (10.6%) (4.8%) (3.4%) (0.3%) 
Alavi insists that there is a connection between the "mutiny-rebellion" of 1857 in the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces and the resentment of Company troopers who, thanks to the military retrenchment 
of the 1820s, "had been forced to give up their military income and had been settled on land which 
often proved insufficient or was resumed by the Company". 100 However she does not speculate on the 
extent to which these discontented ex-troopers influenced their serving brethren. My own feeling is 





99 The regiments of Bengal Irregular Cavalry that mutinied or partially mutinied in 1857 were the 3'ý 
4d' 5h 8"' Wh I 1'ý 12th, 13'ý 14th, 15'h. Those that remained loyal and retained their arms were the I't, ýn' 
aný 6'ý Tlose that were incorporated into the reorganized Bengal Army were the 111,2 nd , 4ý 6 
th 
, 7ý 8d2 17dt 18th . 
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It may not be a coincidence that the Bengal Artillery also had a minority of high-caste recruits in 1857 
(though the proportion was bigger than in the irregular cavalry) and a comparatively modest number of 
mutinous units. The first foot artillery companies were formed in all three presidencies in 1748.101 But 
because of the tactical importance of the arm, the men who fired the guns remained exclusively 
European for the rest of the century. They were assisted in unskilled work by units of natives known as 
Golatwlaze (literally 'ball-throwers). By the first reorganization of the presidency armies in 1796, the 
Bengal Foot Artillery had grown to three European battalions of five companies each. 102 Early in the 
nineteenth century, however, as the Bengal Army continued to expand and the cost of forming more 
European artillery became prohibitive, native foot artillery companies were raised. At around the same 
time, troops of 61ite horse artillery were formed with their native proportion. By 1857, the Bengal Foot 
Artillery was made up of six European battalions of four companies each, and three native battalions of 
six companies each. The Bengal Horse Artillery comprised three brigades of three European troops 
and one native troop. (The exception was the I" Brigade which had a fifth native troop, a remnant of 
the contingent raised by the British to fight for Shah Shuja in the I' Afghan War of 183842). 
The largest single grouping in the Bengal Artillery was Muslim. "There is a much larger infusion of 
the Mahometan element than in the infantry", Lord Clyde (the former General Sir Colin Campbell, 
Commander-in-Chief, India, during the mutiny) informed the Peel Commission in 1858.103 This was 
partly because Muslims had tended to dominate the Mughal artillery of pre-Company days, and partly 
because the Golundaze auxiliaries of the eighteenth century had been recruited from the Muslims of 
lower Bengal. Clyde observed: "Some men (particularly gun lascars) come from Lower Bengal, which 
furnishes hardly any soldiers to any other branch of the army. These are Mahometans. " 104 But most 
came from "Oudli, the Doab, Rohilcund, and the districts of Agra". 105 While these were all former 
Mughal areas, Oudh and the Doab plain between the rivers Jumna and Ganges contained a majority of 
Hindu inhabitants. Recruits from these areas counterbalanced the Muslims. 
100 A] avi, Yhe Sepoys and the Company, p. 297. 
101 Bryan Robson, 'The Organization and Command Structure of the Indian Army', Soldiers of the Raj- 
Me Indian Army 1600-1947 (London, 1997), p. 10. 
102 Shibly, 77ie Reorganisation of the Indian Armies, PhD Thesis p. 24. 




According to the 1858 caste return of the 1,017 native officers and men of the Bengal horse and foot 
artillery who did not mutiny and were not disbanded, the Muslims were not in an absolute majority (see 
Table 8). 106 They were, however, the biggest single grouping, with high-caste Hindus (Brahmins and 
Rajputs combined) and ! Hindus of inferior caste' not that far behind. With such a mixed level of 
recruitment, it is perhaps logical that artillerymen rarely took the intitiative in the mutinies of 1857. Of 
the nine companies of foot artillery and two troops of horse artillery that actually mutinied or deserted, 
only one - the 6h Company, 8h Battalion at Bareilly - seems to have taken an active part in the plot to 
mutiny. Most of the others were coerced to join the rebels by the mutinous native infantry. None is 
credited with having murdered its European officers, and many actually helped them to escape. 107 It is 
probably no coincidence that the 5h/Ist B. H. A., the only Bengal Artillery unit that actually fought 
alongside the British during the mutiny, was raised for service in Mghanistan in 1838, and therefore 
had a different recruitment pattern from its older counterparts. It would, for example, have contained a 
relatively small proportion ofpurbiyas because travel north of the Indus was said to involve loss of 
caste. 108 
Table 8- Ethnic composition ofthe Bengal Native Artillery in 1858 










The smallest and last arm of the regular Bengal Army (the irregular cavalry was regular in all but name) 
was its Sappers and Miners. Founded in 1803 as the Pioneer Corps, within five years it had become the 
Corps of Pioneers and Sappers, with eight companies of 90 men each and a company of miners. In 
1819 two companies and contingents from the rest formed the Bengal Sappers and Miners, while the 
remaining pioneers were absorbed during the military cutbacks of 1833. Fourteen years later, when it 
was renamed the Bengal Sappers and Pioneers, the corps was comprised of three companies of Sappers 
and Miners, officered by engineers, and seven of pioneers, under infantry officers. The distinction 
"' 'Return showing the Number, Caste, and Country of the Native Officers and Soldiers of each 
Regiment, Regular and Irregular, of each Presidency, Sept 1858', P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 22, p. 382. 
107 The only murders that appear to have been carried out by artillerymen were those of a European 
staff sergeant's wife and three children by the Golundaz of the 4 1h Troop, 11 Brigade, Bengal Horse 
Artillery, at Nimach on 3 June 1857. (Source: Ust of Regiments and Detachments of the Native Army 
which have taken part in the Mutinies', II Aug 1858, F. C., NAI, 17534 of 30 Dec 1859. ) 
log Lunt (ed. ), From Sepoy to Subedar, p. 85. Sitaram writes: "The sepoys dreaded crossing the Indus 
because it was beyond I-Endustan; this is forbidden by our religion and the very act means loss of caste. 
Consequently many sepoys obtained their discharge, and many deserted. " 
45 
between the two branches ended in 1851 and the title Bengal Sappers and Miners was readopted. By 
1857 the number of companies had increased to twelve, each containing two native officers, 14 
N. C. O. s, 2 buglars and 100 sepoys. The corps was commanded by four European officers (a 
commandant, an adjutant, an interpreter and a quartermaster), while each company was headed by a 
junior European officer with a European N. C. O. as his assistant. 
Although there are no ethnic breakdowns available for the Bengal Sappers and Miners, Lord Clyde, 
Commander-in-Chief in India (1857-60), informed the Peel Commission that the pre-mutiny corps had 
been composed of "mostly Hindoostanees" of all types from "the usual recruiting grounds" of the 
North-Western Provinces, though "there were probably fewer higher caste Hindoos than in the 
infantry". 109 That Brahmins and RaJputs were in a majority, however, was confirmed by the testimony 
of Colonel Felix, a former military secretary to Lord Dalhousie, who agreed that Bengal Sappers and 
Miners had been "enlisted all from one district" and belonged "generally to one caste, namely, the 
higher caste of Hindoos". 110 Colonel Leslie of the Bombay Artillery concurred, telling the Peel 
Commission that the Bengal sappers he came across during the I" Afghan War "were a high-caste set 
of men" and "did not care about doing their work". " 1 Yet the very fact that high-caste Hindus were 
prepared to join a corps that, by definition, indulged in menial work such as digging is negative 
confirmation of the argument that the army invented a tradition of caste (see Chapter Five). A fellow 
feeling towards their brethren in the native infantry could be one reason why six out of twelve 
companies of Sappers and Miners mutinied - including four at Meerut on 16 May 1857, murdering their 
commandant and havildar-major in the process - while the remaining six were disarmed. 
Madras had the second biggest presidency army in 1857 with 51,244 native troops. ' 12 Its largest 
component was its 52 regiments of regular native infantry, numbering around 43,000 men, It also had 
eight regiments of regular native cavalry (2,800 men), nine companies of Sappers and Miners (820 
men), one battalion (or six companies) of foot artillery and two troops of horse artillery (1,200 men). 
109 Lord Clyde's replies, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 53, p. 425. 
110 Colonel 0. Felix's evidence, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, p. 65. 
111 Colonel JT Leslie's evidence, ibid., p. 94. 
112 Return showing the Numbers of the troops, regular and irregular, which were serving in the three 
Presidencies immediately before the Mutiny', P. P., RC., 1859, V, Appx. 17, p. 379.. 
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However the ethnic composition of these native units bore little relation to their counterparts in the 
Bengal Army. 
This had not always been the case. According to Kolff, "Rajputs were employed as early as 1664 to 
defend Fort St George and, from the earliest years of the Madras Army, people from outside the 
Presidency had been generally preferred as recruits to Madrasis". 1 13 The eight Circar battalions who 
were disbanded in 1785, for example, were composed of men of northern descent who spoke 
Hindustani, "though it may have been generations since their families had settled in the South in search 
of service". 114 But unlike its Bombay rival, the Madras Army began to confine its recruitment to its 
own presidency and an experiment, in the 1790s, of importing sepoys from Bengal was not repeated. ' 15 
In his 1835 minute on military policy, Lord William Bentinck noted that Madras sepoys were 
"recruited principally from their own territories" and had "only a small portion of Bengal men in their 
ranks". ' 16 Though not shorter than Bombay sepoys recruited from their own presidency, the Madras 
troops were lighter, causing Bentinck to doubt their martial qualities. "It is impossible, " he wrote, "for 
any dispassionate observer, who has seen the Madras scpoys, not to say that their physical defects, their 
small stature, and delicate frame, supposing all other qualities equal, render them very inferior to the 
northern Hindustanis, and that consequently, as a body of men, they are inferior to either of the other 
armies... "' 17 Given that it was politically and logistically impossible to recruit the southern Madras 
Army entirely from the northern Bengal Presidency, Bentinck had concluded that the only solution was 
to increase the number of European troops in India. 118 But this was because he identified the principal 
danger to British India's security as an external one. If he had recognized the threat from within, he 
might have been comforted by a recruitment policy which ensured that at least one presidency army had 
virtually no ties of caste or kinship with the other two. 
Three years earlier, the Court of Directors had ordered both the Madras and Bombay governments to 
restrict the recruitment of their armies to their own territory. Now Bentinck's government asked them 
to convene a military committee to consider whether the order "had operated beneficially or whether it 
would be better to permit the Madras and Bombay armies to recruit as formerly in Bengal territory". 119 
113 Kolff, Naulair, Raiput andSepoy, P. 177. 
114 Ibid. 
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The response of the Madras committee was that no alterations were necessary for the cavalry, "the men 
being chiefly Mussulmans from the Carnatic", whereas the number of Bengal men in the infantry could 
be increased "with advantage" to one hundred per regiment. 120 
This latter recommendation does not appear to have been carried out. In his evidence to the Peel 
Commission, Lieutenant-General Sir Patrick Grant, Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army (1856- 
61), noted: "All men physically fit for soldiers, and of the prescribed age, without distinction of race, 
tribe, or caste, are eligible for enlistment in the Madras Army. There is no exclusion either by 
regulations or practice. ""' Without specific discrimination, it was inevitable that the Madras Army in 
general - and the native infantry in particular - would be largely representative of the ethnic groups that 
dominated Madras society (see Tables 9 and 10). 122 
Table 9- Ethnic comnosition ofthe Madras Native Infantry in 1858 
Muslims Telingas Tamils Christians & Brahmins Hindus of Total 
(Gentoo) Eurasians; 
_ 
& RajpUtS inferior caste 
15,856 15,613 4,372 2,868 2,005 2,021 42,735 
(3 7.1 */o) (36.5%) (10.2%) (6.7%) (4.7%) 
Telingas, Tamils and the vast majority of Muslim recruits were natives of the Madras Presidency. Not 
surprisingly the chief recruitment areas - Northern Circars, the Carnatics, Tanjore and Mysore - were 
also within that region. Less than five per cent of Madras sepoys were recruited in Hindustan, and 
Table 10 - Counirv of origin of the Madras Native Infantry in 1858 
Northern Central Southern Tanjore Mysore Hindustan Others 
Circars Carnatic Carnatic 
17,255 9,080 4,937 3,736 2,757 1,989 2,981 
_(40.4%) 
(21.21/6) (11.61/o) (8.71/6) (6.5%) (4.7%) (7.0%) 
most of them would have been high-caste Hindus. Evidently the number of men from the Bengal 
Presidency was far below the one hundred per regiment, or 5,200 in total, that the Madras committee 
had recommended in 1835. It is not particularly suprising, therefore, that just one of the 52 regiments 
of Madras Native Infantry - the 36d- showed any outward sign of disaffection during the mutiny of the 
Bengal Army in 1857 (half its rifle company refused to volunteer for service in Bengal in August 
120 Ibid. 
121 P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 65, p. 483. 
122 P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 22, p. 382. 
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1857). Lord Harris, the Governor of Madras, put this down to Muslim influence. "The men are not 
actually disloyal but their confidence is shaken, " he informed Robert Vernon Smith, the President of the 
Board of Control, on 27 August. This, on top of quite separate grievances, had enabled the "evil 
disposed" in regiments dominated by Muslims "to produce an unfavourable impression". 123 
The Madras regular cavalry contained an even greater proportion of Muslims. According to General 
Grant, it had "for many years been considered the birth right of the Mahommedans of the Arcot district" 
and, "with the exception of a few Mahrattas", commanding officers had "made little effort to recruit 
elsewhere". 124 Since 1843, some effort had been made to recruit more Rajputs and Marathas, "with but 
partial success". 125 The composition of the regular cavalry in 1858, therefore, was largely the same as it 
had been "when the two senior regiments were transferred to the East India Company in 1784 by the 
Nawab of Arcot". 126 The vast majority were Muslims from the Arcot district, Vellore and Madras (see 
Tables II and 12). Less than 4% were Rajputs and fewer than 1% came from Hindustan. They had, 
therefore, no local ties to the mutineers of the Bengal Army. Their only connection to some of the 
mutineers (notably in the Bengal Irregular Cavalry and artillery) was their dominant faith: Islam. 
Table II- Ethnic composition qf1he Madras Light Cavalry in 1858 














The only regiment of Madras Light Cavalry to display disaffection during the mutiny was the 8h when 
it refused to sail by ship to Bengal to fight the rebels in August 1857. In a letter to Vernon Smith, Lord 
Harris put this partly down to "a disinclination to act against men of their own race & faith". 127 But a 
Table 12 - Country of origin of the Madras Light Cavalry in 1858 















more pertinent reason, in his opinion, was their wish to have their old levels of pay and pension restored 
(both had been reduced in 1837 to bring them into line with Bengal regulations). "I have no doubt, " he 
123 Lord Harris to Verrion Smith, 27 Aug 1857, Lyveden Papers, OIOC, MSS Eur/F231/5. 
124 P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 65, p. 488. 
125 Ibid., pp. 488-9. 
126 Ibid., p. 488. 
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wrote, "that this was thought a good opportunity to make a stand on the point that this regiment was 
considered to represent the whole of the cavalry". 128 
Local Muslims were also the biggest group in the Madras Native Artillery, though they did not 
represent an absolute majority (see Tables 13). 129 
Table 13 - Ethnic composition ofthe Madras Native, 4rtillery in 1858 















Most Madras native artillerymen came from the Central Carnatic and other Madras regions; only 6% 
hailed from Hindustan (see Table 14). 130 
Table 14 - Country oforigin ofthe Madras Native Arlillety in 1858 
Central Southern Mysore Hindustan Nothern Tanjore Others 
Carnatic Carnatic Circars 
717 183 82 74 72 52 58 
(57.9%) (14.8%) (6.0%) (5.81/o) (4.2%) (4.7%) 
The Madras corps of Sappers and Miners, on the other hand, was dominated by low-caste Hindus (see 
Table 15). 131 
Table 15 - Ethnic composition offhe Madras Sappers and Miners in 1858 
Hindus of inferior Tamils Christians Telingas (Gentoo) Muslims Others Total 
caste 
358 181 120 102 51 14 826 
(43.3%) (21.91/6) 14.5% (12.3%) (6.2%) (1.7%) 
As with the artillery, most members of the Madras Sappers and Miners came from the Central Carnatic, 
the Southern Carnatic and other parts of the Madras Presidency; Hindustan provided just 3.1% of 
recruits (see Table 16). 132 With so little in commonwith their Bengal counterparts, it is perhaps no 
127 Lord Harris to Vernon Smith, 27 Aug 1857, Lyveden Papers, OIOC, MSS Eur/F231/5. 
128 Ibid. 





surprise that the Madras artillery and sappers not only stayed loyal during the Indian mutiny, but in 
some cases served with distinction against the rebels and mutineers in central India. 133 
Table 16 - Country of origin of the Madras Sappers and Miners in 1858 
Central Southern Tanjore Mysore Northern Hindustan Others 
Carnatic Carnatic Circars 
359 162 93 82 65 26 39 
(43.5%) (19.6%) (9.90/. ) (7.9%) (3.1%) (4.7%) 
Overall the regular Madras native army was dominated by Muslims and Telingas from its Northern 
Circars and Carnatic provinces (see Tables 17 and 18). 134 
Table 17 - Ethnic composition ofthe regular Madras native army in 1858 
Muslims Telingas Tamils Christians & Brahmins & Others Total 
(Gentoo) Eurasians Rajputs 
18,466 15,932 4,796 3,202 2,167 2,772 47,415 
(38.9%) (33.6%) (10.1%) (6.8% 4.6% fc 0041, 
This was hardly surprising given the fact that infantrymen were more than nine-tenths of the total. 
Brahmins and Rajputs, on the other hand, accounted for fewer than 5 per cent, as did those from 
Hindustan. In an ethnic sense, therefore, the Madras Army had little in common with its northern 
Table 18 - Countryqf origin of the regular Madras native army in 1858 
Northern Central Southern Tanjore Mysore Hindustan Others 
Circars Carnatic Carnatic 
17,459 12,061 5,494 3,972 3,136 
Y 
2,111 3,182 
(36.8V (25.4%) (11.6%) (8.4%) 6 _L Yc 6 6 (4.4%) (6.7%) 
neighbour. This absence of common ties would be reflected in the fact that only two Madras units - the 
8"' L. C. and the 36h N. I. - showed any signs of a mutinous disposition in 1857. 
Bombay possessed the smallest presidency army in 1857 with 45,213 native troops. '" Its largest 
component was its 29 regiments of regular native infantry, made up of around 25,000 men. It also had 
133 B Company of the Madras Sappers and Miners, for example, served with distinction in the Deccan 
and Central India Field Forces. 
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three regiments of regular native cavalry (1,500 men), one troop of horse artillery and two battalions - 
or twelve companies - of foot artillery (2,000 men), and five companies of Sappers and Miners (450 
men). The balance was made up of irregular troops. Unlike their Madras counterparts, however, a 
significant proportion of Bombay troops were recruited from the same classes and areas that supplied 
the Bengal Army. 
The first company of native sepoys under their own officers was formed in Bombay from RaJputs in 
1684, though the first battalion would not be created for another 83 years. 136 Though it was said of 
these sepoys in 1739 that they were "formerly subjects and have relations and are intermarried with the 
inhabitants" of the Bombay area, Kolff is of the opinion that "they may well have been of Northern 
origin as in 1747 the Council of Fort St David on the Coromandel Coast asked Bombay for'the best 
,, 137 Northern People ... as they are reported to be much 
better than ours, and not so liable to Desertion! . 
Kolff adds: "The name of Purbiya ... was soon 
in general use in Bombay to denote these Northerners, 
thousands of whom would serve the company in Western India especially after 1818. " 138 
According to Sir George Malcolm, Governor of Bombay from 1827 to 1830, the number of sepoys 
from Hindustan - generally known as Pardesis orforeigners'- before 1817 "did not exceed 4,000". 
139 
But after the start of the 3rd Maratha War in that year, and more particularly during that with Burma in 
1824-5, the number steadily increased until they formed a slight majority of the Bombay Army in 
1830.140 Malcolm was at a loss to explain why this had come about, though he cited the increase of the 
Bombay Native Infantry's establishment in 1825 to 1,000 men per battalion, with an addition of two 
extra battalions, as a point at which "this class was greatly augmented, caused a good deal perhaps by 
the station of the Bombay troops at Mhow [formerly a Bengal station in central India], where an officer 
was specifically employed to recruit for the army". On the other hand, noted Malcolm, this "increase of 
foreigners over the natives of the Bombay territories was by no means desired by the more experienced 
officers of this army, and was, moreover, contrary to the wishes of the Court of Directors who, in 182 1, 
directed that the armies of the three Presidencies should be kept as distinct as possible to their 
134 P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 22, p. 382. 
135 'Return showing the Numbers of the troops, regular and irregular, which were serving in the three 
Presidencies immediately before the Mutiny', P. P., RC., 1859, V, Appx. 17, p. 379. 
136 Shibly, Yhe Reorganisatioti of the Indian Armies, pp. 8-10. 
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138 Ibid., pp. 176-7. 
139 Malcolm to Lord George Bentinck, 27 Nov 1830, quoted in Major-General Sir John Malcolm, Yhe 
Goveniment ofIndia (London, 1833), p. 233. 
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respective territories". In 1824 the recruitment of Bombay sepoys in the Bengal provinces was 
"positively prohibited" by the Indian government. While the Bombay officers "generally considered it 
beneficial to have a mixture of castes in their regiments", wrote Malcolm, including a proportion of 
Hindustani men (though not more than 200 per battalion), they only considered them "indispensable 
when their own provinces cannot recruit their ranks". The officers regarded the Hindustanis as 
superior to their own men "in size, appearance, and perhaps in a certain degree of military pride", but 
"in nothing else". The Concanis and Deccanis, by contrast, were thought to be "more patient under 
,, 141 privation and fatigue, more easily subsisted and managed, and in bravery to be fully their equals . 
Malcolm's own preference was for less high-caste Hindustani recruits because they tended to "lower 
the self-esteem, and damp the hopes of men of lower caste and stature". 142 He added: "Till within 
twelve years the general sentiment among (the Bombay Army] was pride of corps. I regret to observe 
that the pride of caste is now much cherished by the men and considered by the officers. There are no 
prejudices and pretensions that will be found so injurious, if not restricted, as those minor ones of caste, 
if they receive more attention than is due to them. " 143 
In 1832, as mentioned above, the Court of Directors again instructed the Bombay and Madras 
governments to restrict military recruitment to their own territories. But again the directive made little 
difference. According to Bentinck's reading of the report by the Bombay military committee in 1835, 
the "court's restrictive order" had been "totally inoperative because though the order had been so far 
obeyed, that no recruiting parties had been sent to Bengal, yet the Bengal men having voluntarily 
presented themselves for enlistment they had been engaged as before ,. 144 In any case, the Committee 
recommended sending recruiting parties to Bengal as before "for the purpose of getting a better 
description of man". 145 
In providing evidence for the Peel Commission in 1858, Lord Elphinstone explained that no races, 
tribes or castes had been excluded from enlistment to the Bombay Army by the regulations, though in 
practice "hardly any recruits have been hitherto obtained from Guzerat, and few from the Southern 
Mahratta country". In addition "Bheels, Kolies, Beeruds, and other aboriginal tribes" were "virtually 
140 Ibid. Malcolm's place of origin breakdown for the 24,401 native troops of the Bombay Army in 
1830 is as follows: Hindustan 12,476 (51.10/o); Concan 10,015 (41.0%); Deccan 1,910 (7.8%). 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid., p. 234. 
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excluded from the ranks of the regular army". As with the other presidency armies, recruits were 
"brought in by their comrades when they return from furlough", but recruiting parties were also sent 
out. Elphinstone added: "All castes are professedly admitted, but most commanding officers have 
hitherto given the preference to the higher castes. " 146 
This preoccupation with appearance was to ensure that the the proportion of high-caste sepoys 
remained almost constant. between 1830 and 1858 (see Table 19). 147 During the same period, the 
Table 19 - Ethnic composition ofthe Bombay Native Infantry in 1858 
Marathas Hindus of Brahmins & Muslims Christians Purwarees, Total 
inferior caste Rajputs Jews etc. 
8,096 7,918 6,609 2,159 275 376 25,433 
_(31.8%) 
(31.1%) (25.9%) (8.49%) 
number of Hindustanis in the Bombay regular native infantry only fell by about five per cent (see Table 
20). 149 
Table 20 - Country oforiein ofthe Bombay Native Infantry in 1858 
Hindustan Concan Deccan Central Southern Others Total 
Carnatic Carnatic 
11,357 11,051 1,877 449 216 483 25,433 
(44.7%) (43.5) (7.4%) (1.8%) 1.90/0 
By the outbreak of mutiny, therefore, just under one in two Bombay sepoys were from Hindustan, 
while more than one in four were high-caste Hindus, mostly from Oudh. 149 Yet only six of the 29 
regiments of Bombay Native Infantry gave any cause for anxiety during the mutiny, though the trouble 
was invariably traced to men from Hindustan. 150 When part of a detachment of the 12ýh Bombay N. I. 
refused orders at Nasirabad on 10 August 1857, for example, the Hinclustanis "threatened to shoot the 
Marattas, Purwarees and other castes if they tried to separate themselves". 151 Bothoftheother 
regiments that actually mutinied - the 2 V4 at Karachi on 12 September and the 27h at Kolhapur on 31 
146 P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 68, p. 507. 
147 'Return showing the Number, Caste, and Country of the Native Officers and Soldiers of each 
Regiment, Regular and Irregular, of each Presidency, Sept 1858', P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 22, p. 382. 
148 Ibid . 149 Sir Patrick Cadell, History of the BombayArmy (London, 1938), p. 200 
150 The six regiments of Bombay Native Infantry that displayed a mutinous disposition in 1857 were the 
2'ý ffh, 21" ' 27'ý 2e and 
29h. Only three partially mutinied: the 12'h, 21" and 27h. 
151 Return affording the information on MutitV since January 1857, as calledfor by the Honourable 
Court ofDirectors ... in Letter No. 829, 
dated 29 January 1858, from the Military Secretary to the 
Government ofBombay, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVIII. 
54 
July - were relatively new and contained a high proportion of Hindustanis. 
152 The 27h, the sole 
regiment to murder some of its officers, had only been raised in 1846, following the conquest of Sind, 
and "had no record of past warfare to keep it steady". 153 The 28h and 29h regiments, elements of which 
planned to rise at the same time as the 27th, were also "new regiments with no tradition behind them, 
and a considerable Pardesi element". 154 While the 2nd Grenadiers, a part of which attempted an uprising 
at Ahmedabad on 15 September 1857, had been dominated by Hindustanis "ever since such men had 
been recruited to improve the appearance of the regiment when it had been made 'Grenadiers' after [the 
Battle ofl Koregaum" (in 1818]. 155 Despite this, the disloyal element was "overcome by the Marathas 
of the battalion". 
156 
The first two regiments of Bombay regular cavalry were raised in 1817, followed by a third three 
years later. According to Cadell, "they differed markedly from the infantry battalions, as they only took 
men of high caste, and particularly men of Pathan descent and Hindustani Mussulmans". 157 This was, 
he claims, in response to the Bombay General Order of 5 November 1817 which stated that the first two 
regiments were to recruit exclusively "men of Musselman, Mahratta or Purbee Cast" 158 Yet by 1851 
the largest ethnic group was none of these three (see Table 21). 159 
Table 21 - Ethnic composition ofthe Bombay Light Cavalry in 1851 
Hindus of inferior Muslims Rajputs (and Brahmins) Marathas Christians Total 
caste 
441 435 406 109 84 1,475 
(29.9%) (29.5%) (27.5%) (7.41/6) (5.7%) 
By 1858, the balance had tipped even more in favour of the Hindus of inferior caste and Muslims (see 
Table 22). 160 
Table 22 - Ethnic composition ofthe Bombay Light Cavalry in 1858 
Hindus of inferior Muslims Brahmins and Rajputs Marathas Christians Total 
caste 
520 471 261 119 67 1,461 
(35.6%) (32.2%) (17.9%) (8.1%) (4.61/o) 
152 Cadell, History of the Bombay Army, p. 202. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid., p. 204. 
155 Ibid., p. 202. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Ibid., p. 163. 
158 Ibid. 
159 P. P., H. L., 1852-3, Vol. XXKI, p. 11. 
16' 'Return showing the Number, Caste, and Country of the Native Officers and Soldiers of each 
Regiment, Regular and Irregular, of each Presidency, Sept 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 22. 
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Though the high-caste representation fell quite steeply in the 1850s, the vast majority of Bombay 
cavalrymen in 1858 still came from Hindustan (see Table 23). 161 It is, therefore, not particularly 
Table 23 - Country oforikin of the Bombay Lieht Cavalrv in 1858 
Hindustan Deccan Concan Central Northern Others Total 
Carnatic Circars 
1,073 127 115 30 22 94 1,461 
(73.4%) (8.7%) (7.9%) (2.21/6) (1.5110) (6.401o) 
surprising that two of the three Bombay Light Cavalry regiments displayed a mutinous disposition in 
1857. On 28 May, the I" Bombay L. C. (Lancers) refused to follow their British officers in a charge to 
recover guns captured by mutinous Bengal sepoys at Nasirabad, two officers dying as a result. A 
captain in one of the mutinous Bengal regiments later commented: "It is a well known fact that the 
Bombay Cavalry Regiment here are ripe for mutiny, but are only deterred from breaking out by a 
162 
wholesome dread of being followed up by our European Horse Artillery. ". A trooper of the V4 
Bombay L. C. was also said to have incited the mutiny of the 12th Bombay N. I. at Nasirabad on 10 
August 1857.163 Two days later, a conspiracy to mutiny by part of a squadron of the VO Bombay L. C. 
was discovered at Nimach and three ringleaders were hanged; according to the commanding officers 
report, the plot was "confined to a party of Patan Beloochees and Purdesee [or foreign] sepoys" who 
were "associated with disorderly troops of native states, many from same districts, who had been 
discharged the British service". 164 The mutinous disposition of both the I" and 2nd regiments, therefore, 
can probably be explained in part by their empathy with their Hindustani brethren, and could even have 
been a high-caste reaction to their diminishing numbers. 
As late as 1839, Bombay possessed just one regiment of irregular cavalry: the Poona Auxiliary Horse 
(raised in 1817). In that year, the Sind Irregular Horse was formed around the Cutch levy of the Poona 
Horse which had been serving for some time on the border between Cutch and Sind. 165 The Gujerat 
Irregular Horse was also formed in 1839, followed by the Southern Maratha Horse in 1850, but both 
were raised for police duties and came under the civil authorities whereas the Sind Horse was a purely 
161 lbid 
162 Captain T. Pierce to his parents, 30 June 1857, Pierce Letters, BL, Add. MSS 425000, vol. 3. 163 Return affording the information on Mutiny since January 1857, as calledfor by the Honourable 
Court of Directors ... in Letter No. 829, dated 29 January 1858, from the Military Secretary to the Government ofBombay, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVHI. 
164 Ibid. 
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military formation. Its distinctive recruitment pattern evolved after John Jacob became commandant in 
1842. According to Cadelf, the new commandant "disliked the Baluch and Pathan soldiers and 
recruited his horsemen entirely form Hindustani and Deccani Mussulmans and Deccani Marathis: the 
Hindustanis finally predominating". 166 This claim is largely borne out by an 1848 general return for the 
two regiments of Sind Horse (the second was raised in 1846) which states that out of 1,600 men, over 
1,500 came from Hindustan, mainly the Delhi districts and Oudh. 167 There were 52 Deccanis and just 
three men - including two officers - from Baluchistan. Muslims accounted for about 85 per cent of the 
total. Of the Hindus, 34 were Marathas and 140 were Brahmins and Rajputs. 169 in other words, it had a 
recruitment pattern that was remarkably similar to that of the Bengal Irregular Cavalry. Yet the Sind 
Horse never wavered in its loyalty to the British government during the mutiny despite some severe 
provocation, particularly from disaffected members of the 6 th Bengal I. C. which was stationed at 
Jacobabad - the regimental headquarters of the Sind Horse - during the summer of 1857.169 Jacob 
would have put this down to the high level of discipline that prevailed in the Bombay Army in general - 
and his corps in particular - because commanding officers still had sufficient powers to punish and 
reward. 
The Bombay artillery contained an even bigger proportion of low caste Hindus than the regular 
cavalry, though a majority still hailed from Hindustan (see Tables 24 and 25). 
170 
Table 24 - Ethnic comnosition ofthe Bombav NativeArtillery in 1858 
Hindus of inferior caste Marathas Brahmins and Uputs I Muslims Others Total 
919 
(4 6.3 I/o) 
410 








As with the infantry and cavalry, Hindustani golundaze are said to have been behind the foiled plot to 
mutiny by the 5h Company, 4t" Battalion at Hyderabad in Sind on 8 September and the partial mutiny 
165 Cadell, History of the Bombay Army, p. 175 
166 Ibid., p. 191. 
167 'A general return of the age, size, caste, country and length of service of the Indian officers and men 
of the Scinde Horse, dated 21" Sept 1848', quoted in H. T. Lambrick, John Jacob ofiacobabad 
(London, 1960), pp. 178-9. 
168 Ibid., p 179. 
169 Bartle Frere to Brig. Jacob, 6 Oct 1857, Jacob Papers, OIOC, MSS Eur/F 75; Lambrick, John Jacob 
ofJacobabad, pp. 3324,348-9. 
171 'Return showing the Number, Caste, and Country of the Native Officers and Soldiers of each 
Regiment, Regular and Irregular, of each Presidency, Sept 1858', P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 22. 
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of the Yd Company, 4h Battalion, at Shirkapur in Sind on 23 September 1857.171 Both companies were 
raised in the 1840s and contained a large number of Hindustanis. 
Table 25 - Country oforigin ofthe Bombay Native Artillery in 1858 
Hindustan Deccan Concan Northern Central Others Total 
Circars Carnatic 
1,190 391 338 27 22 11 1,983 
(60.0%) (19.7%) (17.0%) (1.4%) (1.10%) (0.6%) 
The 464 Bombay Sappers and Miners had a similar ethnic make-up to the artillerymen in 1858 (see 
Table 26). 172 
Table 26 - Ethnic composition Qfthe Bombay Sappers and Miners in 1858 
Hindus of inferior Marathas Brahmins & Rajputs Telingas (Gentoo) Muslims Total 
caste 
200 103 63 49 46 464 
(43.1 */o) (22.1%) (130/6) (10.6%) (9-90/0) 
Though not an absolute majority, Hinclustanis made up the biggest single group (see Table 27). 
Table 27 - Country ofOrigin ofthe Bombav Sappers and Miners in 1858 
Hindustan Deccan Concan Central Others Total 
Carnatic 
202 194 57 6 2 464 
(43.5%) (41.8%) (12.3%) (1.3%) (0.4%) 
In 1858, the regular Bombay native army contained 29,341 native officers and men. The largest ethnic 
groups were (in descending order): Hindus of inferior caste, Marathas, Brahmins and Rajputs, and 
Muslims (see Table 28), 173 
Table 28 - Ethnic composition ofthe regular Bombay native army in 1858 
Hindus of inferior Marathas Brahmins & Muslims Christians Others Total 
caste Rajput 
9,557 8,728 7,273 2,983 342 210 29,341 
(32.6%) (29.7%) (24.8%) (10.2%) (1.2%) (1.5vo) 
171 Retunt affording the itfiormation on Mutiny s*ice January 185 7, as calledfor by the Honourable 
Court ofDireclors ... in Letter No. 829, dated 29 January 1858, 
from the Military Secretary to the 
Government ofBombay, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVHI. 
" 'Return showing the Number, Caste, and Country of the Native Officers and Soldiers of each 
Regiment, Regular and Irregular, of each Presidency, Sept 1858', P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 22. 
173 Ibid. 
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Hindustan was the biggest provider of soldiers, followed by the Concan and the Deccan (see Table 
29). 174 Given the close ties of country and caste that bound many Bombay and Bengal sepoys, the fact 
that the cavalry was dominated by Hindustani Muslims to whom the restablishment of the Moghul 
Table 29 - Country oforigin ofthe regular Bombay native army in 1858 
Hindustan Concan Deccan Central Southern Others Total 
Carnatic Camatic 
13,642 11,561 2,589 509 222 818 29,341 
(46.5%) (39.41/o) (8.8%) (1.7%) (0.8-/. ) (2.8%) 
emperor at Delhi was expected to appeal, and the likelhihood that the Maratha element - the biggest 
single group in the army - might well have sympathized with rebel Maratha princes like Nana Sahib 
(who declared himself Peshwa), the Rani of Jhansi and the former ruling families of Satara, Baroda and 
Kolhapur, it is perhaps suprising that more mutinies did not take place in the Bombay Army. Instead a 
large number of Bombay units played a key role in suppressing the mutiny. 175 In Cadell's opinion, this 
was chiefly because the Bombay Army was more disciplined, more meritocratic and less inclined to 
pander to caste than its Bengal counterpart. He wrote: 
In the Bombay regiments ... men of all castes, some high, others extremely low, stood and worked together. 
Promotion was by mcrit and selection, and men of low caste were constantly promoted to the commissioned ranks: 
while those of exceptionally intelligent, though numerically small, classes, such as the Bene Israel, supplied a large 
number of officers, who had no caste tics. In the Bengal Army, moreover, officers nominally in command of 
regiments had, in the words of a Bengal officer, become Scrjcant-Majors owing to excessive centralization and 
interference from above. In Bombay such officers still commanded their regiments. To some extent the jealousy 
between the sepoys of Bengal and Bombay ... tended to prevent the Bombay men from 
following the evil example 
of the mutiny. But the main reason was the superior discipline of the Bombay sepoys. Above all their traditional 
attachment to their regimental colours and their off iccrs... 176 
174 Ibid. 
175 The Bombay native units that fought against the rebels and mutineers inside and outside their 
presidency in 1857-9 included- I" VO and PLC- 2nd 3"d e, 50% 7'h, 8th Sýh I&, 121h, l3tý 1411% 16ý 
17'h, I 5'h, 23d, 24h 25th N. I.; ý/3ý 2/4th and 474ý F"A; 
'Vd: 3 rd and 5h Coýpanies, Bombay Sappers 
and Miners; I't and Yd Baluch Irregular Infantry; units of the Baluch, Gujarat, Poona, Southern 
Mahratta and Sind Irregular Horse; the I" and Yd Cavalry, and I" and 5h Infantry, Hyderabad 
Contingent. 
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Eric Stokes believed that a major cause of mutiny in 1857 was the determination by high-caste Bengal 
sepoys to retain their stranglehold over recruitment. 177 But he provided no compelling evidence. The 
point is merely inferred from the steady decline in the proportion of high-caste Bengal infantrymen, 
particularly after the 2nd Sikh War. It could just as easily be argued, as Stokes did himself, that "unity 
of action could be seriously affected by any dilution of the high-caste element". 178 In other words, the 
government's recruitment policy had succeeded in making a general mutiny less likely in 1857 than it 
would have been ten years earlier because the Bengal Native Infantry was less homogenous. That it 
took place nonetheless - and involved many other Bengal troops who had little in common with the 
high-caste sepoys - is perhaps an indication that other, more generally held professional grievances 
were involved. The debt-ridden Muslims that dominated the Bengal Irregular Cavalry, for example, 
seem to have been motivated by plunder and the promise of higher pay in the service of the restored 
Mughal emperor. The fact that service issues such as these were less prominent in the other two 
presidency armies might help to explain why the Bombay Native Infantry, despite containing a 
signficant proportion (25.9%) of high-caste sepoys from 11industan, 179 experienced so few mutinies in 
1857. The Madras Army, on the other hand, had virtually no ethnic ties to its Bengal counterpart. Only 
two of its regular regiments displayed any mutinous disposition in 1857: on both occasions the 
ostensible reason was a disinclination to serve against their fellow Muslims among the Bengal 
mutineers; but the underlying grievances were identified as professional. "0 
176 Cadell, History of the Bombay Army, pp. 201-2. 
177 Stokes, Ae Peasant Armed, pp. 51-2. 
178 ibid., p. 52. 
179 'Return showing the Number, Caste, and Country of the Native Officers and Soldiers of each 
Regiment, Regular and Irregular, of each Presidency, Sept 1858', P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 22, p. 382. 180 Lord Harris to Robert Vernon Smith, 27 Aug and 10 Oct 1857, Lyveden Letters, OIOC, MSS 
Eur/F231/5. 
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Chapter Two - Professional Grievances 
This chapter will outline the professional grievances held by the native troops of the Bengal Army in 
the years prior to the Indian mutiny, particularly those that were not shared by the Madras and Bombay 
sepoys. It will argue that certain grievances - such as insufficient pay and inadequate career prospects 
- played a much more important role in the decision to mutiny than has hitherto been acknowledged. 
All armies have professional grievances and none are more typical than those that relate to their 
conditions of service. Of particular irritation to the sepoys of all three presidency armies were the rules 
and regulations concerning dress and accoutrements which mirrored those of the British Army. In 
place of his baggy native dress, a sepoy had to wear a tight red coatee, or swallow-tail coat, and close- 
fitting dark blue trousers (white in summer). On his head he wore a shako dress cap that weighed from 
two and a half to three pounds with its brass rims, scales and badge, "a heavy unwieldly thing, more 
like an inverted fire-bucket than a chaco". 1 Sitaram Pandy, who joined the 26h Bengal N. I. in 1814, 
recalled: "At first I found it very disagreeable wearing the red coat; although this was open in front, it 
was very tight under the arms. The Shako was very heavy and hurt my head, but of course it was very 
smart. I grew accustomed to this after a time, but I always found it a great relief when I could wear my 
own loose [cotton] dress. 4 Describing other elements of a sepoy's equipment, Captain Hervey of the 
Madras Native Infantry wrote: 
On his back is slung a great knapsack, fastened to his body by means of Icathcr-straps going round his shoulders 
and his chest, tight enough to cut him in two... Across his chest he has two broad belts, held together by a brass 
plate passing on either side of him. To one of these is fastened his bayonet, and to the other his pouch or cartouch- 
box, large enough to contain some sixty rounds of ball ammunition, the whole sufficient to break a poor man's 
1 Charles Allen (ed. ), A Soldier of the Company. ý Life ofan Indian Ensign 1833-43 [Capt. Albert 
Hervey] (London, 1988), p. 148. 
2 Lunt (ed. ), From Sepoy to Subedar, p. 23. 
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back. Round his waist passes another belt, intended to keep the others together, but tight enough to cut his very 
intcstincs out of him. 3 
Upon his feet the sepoy wore "a pair of clumsy things called sandals", while constricting his neck was a 
Stock 
4 
stiff black leather , But most irksome of all was his unwieldy musket known as the 'Brown Bess', 
weighing a full 10 lbs. 3 ozs. and with an effective range of 300 yards, though only accurate up to one 
hundred. 5 Sitaram found his musket "very heavy, and for a long time my shoulder ached when carrying 
it,,. 6 Hervey noted that it was "heavy enough for a roast-beef-fed Englishman to carry, but too much for 
the delicately-formed light body and slender limbs of the sepoy lad". 7 Though Bengal sepoys were 
generally bigger than their Madras counterparts, they still struggled to carry and fire this large weapon. 
There were many calls for the reform of sepoy dress and equipment in the years prior to the mutiny. 
According to the Delhi Gazelle in 1852, so heavy and unsteady was the shako that a sepoy could barely 
move without using his free hand to keep his hat on. $ The following year The Times commented: "The 
soldier ought to be so clothed that his natural acquirements may be as little cramped as possible. Every 
exception to this rule diminished his utility and rendered him ridiculous. "9 John Jacob, the commandant 
of the Sind Irregular Horse, was even more explicit in an essay in 1854: "A sepoy of the line, dressed in 
a tight coat; trousers in which he can scarcely walk, and cannot stoop at all; bound to an immense and 
totally useless knapsack, so that he can hardly breathe; strapped, belted and pipeclayed within a hair's- 
breadth of his life; with a rigid basket-chako on his head, which requires the skill of a juggler to balance 
there, and which cuts deep into his brow if worn for an hour; and with a leather stock round his neck, to 
complete his absurd costume - when compared with the same sepoy, clothed, armed, and accoutred 
solely with regard to his comfort and efficiency, forms the most perfect example of what is madly 
called the 'regular' system. " 10 In his famous treatise on the defects of the Indian Army, Sir Charles 
Napier made many of the same points, adding that the sepoys' muskets were "too heavy" and "should 
3 Allen (ed. ), A Soldier of the Company, p. 148-9. 
4 Ibid., p. 149. 
5 Major G. Tylden, 'The Principal Small Arms carried by British Regular Infantry', JSAHR, Vol. 45, 
1967, pp. 244-5. 
6 Lunt (ed. ), Rrom Sepoy to Subedar, p. 23. 
7 Allen (ed. ), A Soldier of the Company, p. 148. 
8 Delhi Gazelle, 24 April 1852. 
9 Yhe Times, 12 January 1853, ibid. 
10 Captain Lewis Pelly (ed. ), The Views and Opinions ofBrigadier-General John Jacoh C. B. (London, 
1858), p. 129. 
62 
be reduced to six or seven pounds weight". " It is ironic, therefore, that the only pre-1857 reform of 
dress or equipment was the replacement of the 'Brown Bess' musket with the lighter Enfield rifle (8 lbs. 
140ZS. )12 whose greased cartridge was the ostensible cause of mutiny. 
The Peel Commission of 1858 heard much evidence recommending reform. Major-General Birch, 
Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, was of the opinion that sepoys should 
henceforth wear "a loose dress or tunic, loose trousers, and turbans" ; 13 as was, among others, Major- 
General Mansfield, the Adjutant-General of Bengal, who advised that "tight jackets and shakos should 
be forgotten for ever". 14 The Punjab Committee - consisting of Sir John Lawrence, Brigadier-General 
Chamberlain and Lieutenant-Colonel Edwardes - noted that "a sepoy in his European dress could 
neither stoop to the ground nor take rest in his accoutrements", 15 while Sir Mark Cubbon pointed out 
that more men had been "invalided and pensioned from the chest-foundering action of the knapsack 
than ever would have been the ordinary risks of the sepoys". 16 During the mutiny itself, many sepoys 
discarded their knapsacks and shakos, and replaced their trousers with loose-fitting dhotis, though for a 
time they continued to wear their red coats as a sign of regimental unity. A contemporary print of the 
siege of Arrah House in August 1857, shortly after the mutiny of the 7'h, Wh and 4e N. I. at Dinapore, 
shows the mutineers in forage caps, full dress jackets and white trousers. In the background can be 
seen a full regiment in parade formation, still carrying its regimental colours. James Atkinson's pencil 
drawings of a rebel artilleryman and a rebel trooper also contain many elements of the soldiers' orginal 
uniforms. Captain George Atkinson's print of'Mutinous sepoys', on the other hand, depicts the rebels 
in white turbans or skullcaps, white jackets or shirts, and white dhotis. Only their cartridge belts, 
pouches and waist-belts have survived. 17 
The dress and accoutrements of the regular light cavalry were also styled on the British Army, though 
their quilted tunics - short-waisted and extremely tight - were Trench grey' (fight blue) rather than the 
dark blue or scarlet of the British light cavalry. They, too, wore the awkward shako (made even more 
top-heavy by its horse-hair plume), choking leather stock, clumpy jack-boots and close-fitting leather or 
" Napier, Defects, Civil andMilitary, pp. 302,307 
12 TyIden, 'The Principal Small Arms carried by British Regular Infantry', JSAHR, Vol. 45,1967, pp. 
244-5. 
13 P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 61, p. 433 
14 Ibid., Appx. 62, p. 452. Colonel J. Holland of the Bombay Army was another who recommended 
that turbans and loose-fitting clothes should replace shakos and coatees (Ibid, Appx. 7). 
15 P. P., H. C., 1859, VIII, p. 28. Quoted in Barat, Yhe Bengal Native Itfianlry, p. 167. 16 Ibid., p. 106. Quoted in Barat, 7he Bengal Native Infantry, pp. 167-8. 
17 Boris Mollo, Yhe Indian Army (Poole, 198 1), pp. 90,100-1. 
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cloth breeches with straps under the instep (the latter were dark blue until 1847 and French grey 
thereafter). But the most unsuitable pieces of their equipment were the heavy, slightly-curved light 
dragoon sword (1821 pattern) and the tall, European-style saddle. The former was cumbersome and 
unwieldy, and could neither cut nor thrust to any real effect; the latter pushed the rider so high above 
the horse that he was forced to ride by balance alone. The irregular cavalry, by contrast, worepugris 
(turbans), long loose alkaluks (tunics), cummerbunds, and baggypyjama trousers with either puttees or 
long boots, They were armed with the lightly-curved and extremely sharp native sword known as the 
tulwar, or the scimitar-like shamshir, and seated on low, local pattern saddles. ] 
Among the most strident critics of regular cavalry equipment was Lieutenant-Colonel Charles 
Carmichael Smyth who had commanded regiments of Bengal light and irregular cavalry. In 1847, in a 
pamphlet recommending the transformation of all regular cavalry to "demi-irregular cavalry" (an idea 
first proposed by James Outram, of the Bombay Army), he condemned the regulars' restrictive uniform, 
pointless headdress and ineffective sword. His solution was to clothe and equip all cavalry like 
irregulars with "a broad cloth Ukaluck [sic], or long native dress, a pair of loose trowsers, a turban and 
Kummerbund, with Hindoostanee saddles and bridles". For the sake of uniformity these items would 
be supplied by the same clothing agents that kitted out the regulars, with troopers charged stoppages of 
one and a half rupees a month (out of a minimum pay of 23 rupees a month) so that commanding 
officers would continue to profit from the off-reckoning fund - unlike British colonels, they pooled any 
profits from the annual sum they were paid to clothe their men. With regard to arms, Carmichael 
Smyth suggested that each man "should carry a sharp sword of his own selection", with some also 
carrying lances and pistols and others carbines. All weapons would be "supplied from the magazines, 
and sold to the men at prime cost", thereby reducing the expense to government. 19 
Other officers were quick to emphasise the detrimental effect that unsuitable equipment had on 
combat effectiveness. In his eye-witness history of the 2 nd Sikh War, for example, Captain E. J. 
Thackwell put the shameful performance of three regiments of Bengal Light Cavalry at Chilianwalla 
down to inadequate arms and tack. "It was incontrovertibly proved, " wrote Thackwell, "at this and 
subsequent actions, that the Troops of the Light Cavalry have no confidence in their swords as effective 
weapons of defence. It would have been difficult to point out half-a-dozen men who had made use of 
18 Heathcote, Yhe Indian Army, pp. 38-9; Mollo, 77je IndianArtny, pp. 55-6. 
19 Carmichael Smyth, A Rough Sketch of the Mse andProgress of the Irregular Horse of the Bengal 
Anny, pp. 22-5. 
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their swords. On approaching the enemy they have immediate recourse to their pistols, the loading and 
firing of which form their sole occupation... Very few natives have ever become really reconciled to 
the long seat and powerless bit of the European Dragoons. "20 Thackwell's solution, partly influenced 
by the illustrious charge of Jacob's Sind Horse at the Battle of Gujerat, was to convert all light cavalry 
into irregulars. 21 
Another vocal critic was Captain Nolan of the 15'h Hussars (who was to die so infamously with the 
Light Brigade at Balaklava). Having served in India for much of the 1840s, he published a best-selling 
book on cavalry tactics in 1853. Its recommendations for the Indian regular cavalry included replacing 
all European dress and equipment with their native equivalents. 22 Nolan was partly influenced by an 
officer's letter to the Delhi Gazette which stated: "A cavalry soldier should find himself strong and firm 
in his seat, easy in his dress, so as to have perfect freedom of action, and with a weapon in his hand 
capable ofmating dowti an adversary at a blow. There is scarcely a more pitiable spectacle in the 
world than a native trooper mounted on an English saddle, tightened by his dress to the stiffness of a 
dummy, half suffocated with a leather collar, and a regulation sword in his hand, which must always be 
blunted by the steel scabbard in which it is encased. 43 Henry Lawrence agreed. In his 1856 essay 
entitled 'The Indian Army', he wrote: "Every trooper should be permitted to fit his own saddle, and 
adapt his bit to his own horse. Lancers should be abolished, and the tulwar, the weapon of the Indian 
horseman, should be allowed, as also a carbine and one pistol, to each trooper. It must be borne in 
mind that they are light horsemen, not heavy dragoons. 44 The majority of oral and written evidence 
presented to the Peel Commission concurred in that it recommended replacing regular cavalry 
regiments with irregular ones. Colonel Becher, the Quartermaster-General of the Bengal Army, was 
typical. When asked if the native cavalryman preferred wearing his own dress and riding on a familiar 
saddle, he replied: "Certainly... I would have all cavalry in future on the irregular system. , 25 
The East India Company's native foot artillery wore shakos, dark blue coatees with scarlet facings, 
and were "virtually indistinguishable in their uniforms from the Royal Artillery". 26 The dress of their 
horse artillery counterparts "was, if anything, even more splendid than those of the British service, for 
20 E. J. Thackwell, Narrative of the Secotid Sikh War (London, 1851,2 nd edition), pp. 180-1. 
21 Ibid., p. 183. 
22 Captain L. E. Nolan, Cavalry., Its History and Tactics (London, 1853), p. 102 
23 Ibid., p. 103. 
24 Lawrence, E ssays, Military and Political, p. 411. 
25 P. P., H. C., 1859, V, H. C., p. 26 
26 Heathcote, The Indiati Army, p. 41. 
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although both wore a short blue jacket decorated with rows of gold lace and ball buttons, the 
Company's men wore, instead of the RHA hussar busby, a great Roman helmet, like that of the French 
cuirassier, with a long flowing mane of red or black horsehair". 27 Sappers and Miners in all three 
presidencies wore shakos, scarlet jackets with blue facings and were armed with 'sapper carbines'which 
were considerably longer than the cavalry version (the exception being the Bombay corps which used 
the Brunswick rifle) . 
28 None of these corps are specifically mentioned in the many calls for uniform 
and accoutrement reform, though their inclusion is probably implicit. 
The Indian government's failure to bow to this pressure for change is particularly suprisng given the 
alterations that were made to the uniforms of both its European troops and the British Army at this 
time. Criticism of the top-heavy shako and tight-fitting coatee worn by British infantrymen had begun 
in the late 1820s. Minor improvements were made to these items in the 1840s but it was not until two 
generals of royal blood, the Duke of Cambridge and Lord Frederick Fitzclarence, entered the lists that 
real change became possible. Both supported the replacement of the coatee and leather stock with a 
frock coat that provided better protection from the elements and was easier to wear. But because the 
frock coat was bigger and therefore more expensive than the coatee, it was bound to reduce the profits 
that many regimental commanding officers made out of 'off-reckonings', the fixed sum they were paid 
annually to clothe their regiments. This obstacle was finally removed in June 1854 when the provision 
of clothing by regimental colonels was abolished in favour of a contract system. Within a year, the 
coatee had been superseded by a double-breasted tunic (a modified version of the frock coat) and the 
Albert-pattem shako by a lower shako. The other branches of the British Army also had their uniforms 
redesigned on the basis of practicality. 29 
Even the European troops of the Indian Army experienced some relief from the restriction of their 
uniform. As early as 1845, Sir Charles Napier, then Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Sind, had 
complained to Sir Henry Hardinge, the Governor-General, about the weight of the shako. He himself 
wore a double-peaked cap with a white cover and Hew Strachan, in his essay on the pre-Crimean 
reform of British uniforms, speculated that this was the template for the "trial frame of a helmet or cap 
that he had made up in 1850, ostensibly for adoption by the Indian Army". 30 But he resigned as 
27 Ibid. 
28 Mollo, Yhe Indian A riny, p. 5 7. 
29 H. F. A. Strachan, 'The Origins of the 1855 Uniform Changes: An Example of Pre-Crimean Reform', 
JSAHR, Vol. 55,1977, pp. 85-117 
30 Ibid., p. 109. 
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Commander-in-Chief of India before his vision could become reality. More successful was Lord 
Frederick Fitzclarence who in 1853, during his tenure as Commander-in-Chief of Bombay, modified 
the dress of his European troops by replacing their leather stocks with square collars. He also made 
their coatees less tight-fitting. Uniforms for native troops, on the other hand, received no such 
modification. There are two possible explanations: either Indian colonels, like their British Army 
counterparts, were unwilling to see a diminution in their profits from the off-reckonings system (they 
would have been supported by the 21 senior officers - nine from Bengal, eight from Madras and four 
from Bombay - who also received a cut of the cake); 31 or senior administrators believed that the 
survival of British India depended upon the separation of its soldiers from civil society, and that a 
European-style uniform was one way to achieve this. 
A second professional grievance held by native troops in general - and Bengal sepoys in particular - 
was with the nature of their duties. "Year after year, " writes Barat, "[the Bengal sepoy] would have to 
face the monotonous round of peace time assignments - forenoon parade for cleaning his arms and 
accoutrement, evening parade for orders, guard duties, a brigade exercise once a week, regimental 
exercises four or five times a week - and would have to carry out these tasks as a sepoy with years to 
serve before he could expect promotion. 02 Barat argues that the situation became particularly acute 
after the 1800s because "campaigns were waged at less and less frequent intervals and the native 
soldiery was restricted to duties which it considered to be monotonous and tiring". 33 For while 
annexations reduced the chances of active service, they increased the need for policing the new areas. 
Such duties - which included escorting treasure and guarding prisoners - were increasingly undertaken 
by infantry sepoys. Ina minute of 1833, Lord William Bentinck quoted the two most recent half- 
yearly returns for the "disposable force that could be collected upon an emergency from the principal 
stations of the Bengal Army, afler providing all the guards required for the headquarters of corps, sick, 
baggage etc. 04 In one case 54 per cent of troops were available, and in the otherjust 42 per cent. 35 
Bentinck commented: 
31 Details of the development and workings of the East India Company army's off-reckonings fund are 
contained in the Bombay Military Regulations, 1850, L/MIU17/4/548, OIOC, ppl65-90. 
32 Barat, 7he Bengal Native Infantry, p. 154. 
33 Ibid., p. 155. 
34 Philips (ed. ), Yhe Correspondence of Lord William Cavendish Bentinck, II, p. 1332. 
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At every one of the large stations mentioned in the statemcnt, there are government establishments of all kinds; 
commissariat, ordnance magazines, public cattle, pay office, bazar , and other 
deposits of public property, 
requiring protection and their separate guards. The largeness of the country ... and the large bands of 
dacoits 
... require that all 
detachments going with treasure or any other escort, should be large and efficient... No 
greater political error can be committed than that of imposing upon the scpoy during peace excessive duty, or by 
tormenting him with an overstrained system of drill and discipline, which too frequently occur... Care should be 
taken, when estimating the total amount of force to be required, that the ordinary duty should never fall hard upon 
die scpoy. 
36 
Yet conditions did not improve. In 1844, for example, Henry Lawrence suggested that all treasuries 
and magazines, as well as a number of fortresses, should be "garrisoned by invalids, supported by small 
detachments of regulars for night and exposed duties". 37 This would relieve the majority of regulars 
from such arduous tasks. Lawrence added: "There should be no afler drill and parades to keep men out 
ofmischief - to disgust them with their duty. They should have as much of exercise and instruction as 
should keep them practised and able soldiers, and their lives should be rendered happy, that they might 
remain willing and contented ones. 09 
But no reforms were instituted. Lieutenant-General Sir Patrick Grant told the Peel Commission that, 
as Adjutant-General of the Bengal Army during Napier's time as Commander-in-Chief (1849-50), he 
submitted a return which showed that "one third of the entire native army was permanently on duty, day 
and night, from year's end to ycar's end to. 
39 Barat states that during 1849-50 "more than 30,000 Bengal 
native soldiers were engaged in guarding treasure and that too for a total period of 15 months". 
40 
These figures did not escape the attention of Napier who informed the Duke of Wellington in 1849 that 
it was necessary to have a large and efficient police force that would "leave the military to their own 
duties". 41 His later treatise on the defects of the Indian Army stressed that the breaking up of a 
regiment into small detachments for guard duty made it "unserviceable as a military body" and 
35 Ibid., pp. 1332-3. The figures quoted are for 45 regiments of native infantry, comprising 31,320 
drummers and rank and file. The first figure of 16,833 men is for I January 1833 when all the men 
were present; the second figure of 13,213 is for I August 1833 when the usual proportion were absent 
on furlough. 
36 Ibid., pp. 13334. 
37 Lawrence, Essays, Military and Political, p. 25. 
39 Ibid., p. 59. 
39 P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 65, p. 485. 
40 Barat, 77ie Bengal Native lifiantry, p. 155. 
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destroyed discipline. 42 "Soldiers hate to be constantly on guard, " he wrote, "constantly dressed and 
accoutred in any climate, in a tropical one it is unendurable, and therefore evaded... Here is the origin 
of the general Indian custom of guards going to bed and seIf-relief of sentries. oo43 Lord Ellenborough 
(Governor-General 18424) had tried to reduce the number of sepoys needed for civil duties by forming 
police battalions. But only a handful had been raised by the time he left India. "The evil therefore 
remains, " concluded Napier, "and the Sepoys are wearied and disgusted. , 44 
It was not a problem that was confined to the Bengal Army. After he took command of the Bombay 
Anny in 1856, General Grant "made repeated representations" that that army was "similarly 
overworked". 43 Yet Napier felt that the discipline of the Bengal Army had suffered the most as a 
consequence. "The officers of the Queen's and Bombay Armies, " he wrote, "naturally cry out, when 
they see sentries self relieved and guards going to bed; but when the remote causes of this loose 
discipline were revealed, I saw that a partial effort to remedy would make matters worse. 06 
Onerous duties were a particular irritant for Bengal sepoys because, proportionately, they were strung 
out over a far wider area than their Madras and Bombay counterparts. The situation was made even 
worse by the annexation of the Punjab in 1849 and parts of Burma in 1853, though Bombay's territory 
was also augmented by Sind in 1844. Yet irksome duty remained one of the few grievances that 
Bengal and Madras native troops had in common. The fact that no Madras sepoys actually mutinied in 
1857 might help to explain why, unusually, this professional grievance was not ameliorated by the post- 
mutiny reforms of the 1860s. For, as late as 1879, the Commander-in-Chief of Madras was 
complaining that one of the reasons his regiments were undermanned was because sepoys' duties had 
"considerably increased of late years - the discipline is stricter - and very often the men do not get the 
47 
nights in bed they are entitled to by Regulation". He added: "Heavy guard duty, combined with 
constant parade instruction and a more rigid discipline have lessened the popularity of the army. i0g 
41 Ibid. 
42 Napier, Defects, Civil andMilitary, p. 228. 
43 Ibid., pp. 229-30. 
44 Ibid., p. 23 1. 
45 p. p., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 65, p. 485. 
4f'Napier, Defects, Civil andMilitary, p. 23 1. 
47 Gen. Sir N. Chamberlain to the D. of Cambridge, 17 April 1879, Chamberlain Correspondence, 
OIOC, MSS Eur/C203. 
48 Ibid. 
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The well-being of voluntary armies has always depended upon the adequacy of their incentives to 
serve. These can be roughly divided into two groups: financial reward and enhanced status. In 1845, 
Sir Henry Hardinge, Governor-General of India, listed the grounds upon which the allegiance of the 
native army rested as "superior pay, good pensions, just & kind treatment, high consideration & respect 
for the profession of a soldier" and a "conviction that these advantages are more secure under the 
11 49 irresistable good fortune of British rule, than by taking service under any Native Prince . 
MY 
contention is that by 1857 the Bengal Army's incentives were no longer sufficient to ensure its loyalty. 
The chief incentive for volunteer armies - particularly colonial armies - is usually pay. In this respect, 
the East India Company's army was an immensely attractive proposition in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries because it offered regular pay, pensions and other financial benefits - perks largely 
unheard of in the armies of native states. Yet the basic pay for ordinary sepoys - seven rupees or 14 
shillings a month - was the same in 1857 as it had been at the turn of the century (and would remain so 
until it was raised to nine rupees in 1895). This figure was identical in all three presidencies, although 
the Bengal sepoys were paid a basic five and a half rupees with one and a half as an allowance, known 
as half batta. 50 Until 1837, the presidencies differed in the amount of batta they paid to their sepoys 
when they were on the march or in the field. A Bengal sepoy received an extra one and a half rupees a 
month, a Madras sepoy 2 rupees 5 annas 4 pice, and a Bombay sepoy two and a half rupeeS. 51 The 
initial justification for this discrepancy was that the price of rice was higher in Madras and Bombay 
than in Bengal. But after Bentinck pointed out in 1835 that rice or a grain substitute was virtually the 
same price "in all the interior part of India where the great body of native troops are employed", the 
Court of Directors eventually agreed that the pay and batta for all native regular troops should be 
regulated by the Bengal standard. 52 The alteration was formally introduced by general order in April 
1837 (and was still in operation at the time of the mutiny). As well as equalizing pay, it reduced the 
number of years that ordinary sepoys had to serve to qualify for a pension from twenty to fifteen, and 
increased the rate from three rupees a month to four (see Tables 30 and 3 1). 53 
49 Hardinge to Sir Charles Napier, 31 Oct 1844, Napier Papers, BL, Add. MSS 54517, f 102. 
50 Barat, Yhe Bengal Native Infantry, p, 132. 
51 Ibid., p. 133. 52 Ibid., p. 134. 
53 G. O. C. C., 17 April 1837, Abstract of General Orders from 1817 to 1840, OIOC, L/NIIU17/2/435. 
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Table 30 - Pay, allowances andpensionsfor Light Cavalry and HorseArtilleryfrom 
1837 
Rank Pay (with half 
batta) 
Extra batta (field) Pension (15 yrs' 
service) 
Pension (Disabled 
or 40 yrs' service) 
Subedar Major* 105 15 25 40 
Subedar* 80 15 25 40 
Jcmadar 32 8 12 20 
Havildar 20 5 7 12 
Naik 16 4 7 12 
Trumpeter 16 4 7 12 
Trooper 9 1.8 4 7 
Table 31 - Pay, allowances andpensionsfor Native Infantry and Foot Artilleryfrom 
1837 
Rank Pay (with half 
batta) 
Extra batta (field) Pension (15 yrs' 
service) 
Pension (Disabled 
or 40 yrs' service) 
Subcdar Major* 92 15 25 40 
Subcdar* 67 15 25 40 
Jemadar 24.8 7.8 12 20 
Havildar 14 5 7 12 
Naik 12 5 7 12 
Trumpeter 11 5 4 7 
Sepov 7 1.8 4 7 
* Bengal Army only; Madras and Bombay retained their own pay structure for subedars and subedar- 
majors based on their length of service. 
As far as the equalization of pay and allowances was concerned, the big losers were the ordinary 
sepoys, sowars and native officers of the Madras and Bombay presidencies who now received less field 
batta. The Madras troops also forfeited the full batta of three rupees a month which they had been paid 
for serving outside their own presidency, though all sepoys still received a higher rate of pay for service 
beyond the frontiers of British India. The only beneficiaries were N. C. O. s (naiks and havildars) in all 
arms of the Madras and Bombay armies who had formerly received less basic pay than their Bengal 
counterpartS. 54 
in theory, all native troops stood to benefit from the institution of long service pay in 1837.55 Also 
recommended by Bentinck, it increased the monthly pay of a sepoy by one rupee after 16 years of 
54 Barat, YheBengaINaliteInfantry, p. 133. The pre-1837 monthly pay for havildars and naiks was as 
follows: Bengal 14 rupees and 12 rupees; Madras and Bombay 10 rupees 12 annas and 8 rupees 12 
annas. Jemadars were paid the same and the rate for subedars in the respective presidencies did not 
change. 
55 G. O. G. G., 17 April 1837, Abstract of General Orders from 1817 to 1840, OIOC, L/lVEIU17/2/435. 
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service and by two rupees after 20 years. It was, however, dependent upon good service and would be 
forfeited by those who had been convicted by a court martial "of some serious offence", or whose 
names had been twice entered in the regimental defaulter book during the two years prior to the 
completion of the period of service. 56 Also Bentinck's proposal for a graduated scale of pay in every 
rank had not received the Court of Directors' approval, resulting in a standard rate for all. Yet in 1838 a 
subedar in the I" Bengal N. I. told his former officer, William Sleeman, that the introduction of long 
service pay had increased the value of the service "very much". 57 Of the 800 or so men in his regiment, 
"more than" 150 received two extra rupees a month and the same number number qualified for one. 59 
The native officer continued: 
This they feel as an immense addition to the former seven rupees a month. A prudent sepoys lives upon two, or at 
the utmost three, rupees a month in seasons of moderate plenty, and send all their former seven to their families. 
The dismissal of a man from such a service as this distresses, not only him, but all his relations in the higher grades 
fic native officcrs], who know how much of the comfort and happiness of his family depend upon his remaining 
and advancing in it. 59 
Writing four years afler the new pension regulations of 1837 (see Tables 30 and 3 1), Sleeman noted 
that the pension was "probably the greatest of all bonds between the government and the native 
army". 60 The basic rate of four rupees a month was paid to sepoys who had served at least 15 years and 
who had been pronounced no longer fit for duty by a board of surgeons. The higher rate of seven 
rupees a month was given to those who had served 40 years, those disabled by wounds, and the families 
of those killed in action. According to Sleeman, there were 22,381 military pensioners and 1,730 
family pensioners in the Bengal Presidency as of I May 185 1.61 "1 question, " he wrote, "whether the 
number of retired soldiers maintained at the expense of government bears so large a proportion to the 
number actually serving in any other nation on earth. 1162 General Alexander, the former Adjutant- 
General of the Bombay Army, was less enthusiastic because, he told the Peel Commission in 1858, the 
56 G. O. C. C., 5 May 1837, ibid. 
57 Sleeman, Rambles andRecollections, p. 617. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
('0 Sleeman, Rambles andRecollections, p. 640. 
61 ibid., p. 643. 
62 Ibid. The proportion ofpensioned to serving soldiers was 22,381 out of82,027 men, or 27.3%. 
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new pension regulations favoured sepoys over more senior rankS. 63 A sepoy received almost 60 per 
cent of his monthly pay after 15 years, whereas a subedar, with at least 30 years'service behind him, 
would get just over a third. The consequence, said Alexander, was that native officers appealed to their 
commanding officers t1not to have them removed to the pension-list", while sepoys had a far greater 
inducement to feign incapacity and leave the army. 64 
Yet according to Colonel Keith Young, Judge Advocate-General of the Bengal Army from 1852 to 
1862, a major cause of discontent was the fact that it was so difficult for Bengal native officers and 
sepoys to get on the Pension Establishment in the first place. "There is", he wrote in 1857, "no chance 
whatever" of a Bengal soldier "being granted a pension as long as he can put one foot before another". 
He added: 
So a commanding officer of a regiment, do what he will, cannot get rid of useless, wom-out men, who arc sent 
back to him by the invaliding committees to become a source of discontent in the corps. [Capt. H. W. ] Norman, our 
Assistant Adjutant-Gcneral ... told me of an instance within his knowledge of every man who was sent before the 
invaliding committees of a certain regiment having been rejected, except one, and that poor fc1low died before his 
papers could be made our for pension. At Bombay, where the Army has always been in a more contented state 
than here, the invaliding rules arc quite different, and men arc admitted to pensions there - if pronounced unfit by 
the regimental authorities - who would be kept on the strength of the Army for years longer in Bcngal. " 
The 1840s saw the native troops granted a number of other financial concessions. From 1842, for 
example, they were allowed to receive one family letter per month free of charge (they already had the 
reciprocal privilege of sending one letter per month the other way for nothing). 66 But this privilege was 
withdrawn in the early 1850s, prompting Sir Henry Lawrence to describe the "new post-office rules" in 
a letter to Lord Canning as "bitter grievances" and one of the "many recent acts of Government" which 
67 had "been skilfully played upon by incendiaries". In 1845 the Bengal Army was brought into line 
with the other presidencies by the award of hutting money. The full allowance of three rupees for 
63 Evidence of Major-General Robert Alexander, 25 Aug 1857, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, pp. 79,8 1. 
64 Ibid., p. 81 
65 Col. K Young to Col. H. B. Henderson, 2 May 1857, in Gen. Sir Henry Norman and Mrs Keith 
Young (eds. ), Delhi-1857.7he Siege, Assault atid Capture as Giveii hi the Diary and CorrespoWetice 
01 the Late Colonel Keith Young CR (London, 1902), p. 10. 
G. O. P. C., II Nov 1842, Abstract of General Orders from 1840 to 1847, OIOC, IAHU17/2/436. 
67 Lawrence to Canning, May 1857, quoted Anderson and Subedar (eds. ), Yhe Last Days of the 
Company, p. I 10. 
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sepoys (rising to 30 rupees for subedars) was for the "erection of huts on the formation of new Lines"; a 
half allowance was for repairing those they moved into when changing stations. 68 
But despite these boons (one of which was only temporary), and contrary to the testimony of 
Sleeman's native officer, Barat has produced much evidence to suggest that many Bengal sepoys found 
it difficult to make ends meet. This was partly because they were charged for a number of items of 
dress and equipment, including three undress tunics, three pairs of white linen trousers, one pair of 
coloured trousers, one set of beads, one pair of shoes, one cummerbund, one turban and cover, one 
knapsack and one greatcoat. As of 1828, they were given a jacket and a pair of woollen pantaloons 
every two years free of charge, while deductions for the other items were not to exceed five rupees per 
annum. But this figure was often exceeded. And there were other expenses, such as buying their own 
food, paying for the services of a washerman, barber and sweeper, and defraying the cost of 
transporting their baggage when on the march (a sum that generally came to more than the marching 
batta of one and a half rupees a month). 69 Bengal sepoys would also send as much as three-quarters of 
their pay back to their villages to support their families (a practice that was not followed by Madras and 
Bombay sepoys because their families lived with them in the military cantonments). 70 Was it any 
wonder, asks Barat, that the Bengal sepoy "found himself in strained circumstances, lived on the 
cheapest kind of food, and at times even starved so as to fulfil his various social obligations" ? 71 
But Bengal sepoys were not the only ones who found it difficult to make ends meet. Captain Hervey 
considered the pay of a Madras sepoy to be totally inadequate to convey and feed himself and his 
family when on the line of march. He wrote: 
Before starting a scpoy generally receives an advance of pay... With [it] he has to clear himself from the station 
(for probably he has incurred debts), besides paying an advance equal to one half, for the means of conveying his 
goods and chattels, as well as his numerous family, some of whom, particularly the young and aged, arc unable to 
walk. Exclusively of all this, he has to provide the means of sustenance for himself and dcpcndants, and that with a 
total of perhaps two rupees in his pocket, for a journey of about two or three or four hundred miles I Howcanhcdo 
68 G. O. G. G., 15 August 1845, Abstract of General Orders from 1840 to 1847, OIOC, IJMIU17/2/436. 
69 Barat, 7he BengalNafive Infantry, pp. 136-7,177. 
70 ibid., p. 177. 
71 Ibid. 
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this? Impossiblel He must starve and so must his family; at all events, they must from sheer necessity feed 
themselves upon the most economical plans that they can possibly devise. ' 
To put a Bengal sepoy's pay into perspective, Barat states that domestic servants of European officers 
earned between four and 20 rupees a month, field labourers from two to six rupees, carpenters from five 
to 10 rupees and blacksmiths from five to 20 rupees. 73 She also points out that the cost of living (in the 
shape of the price of grain) "nearly doubled between 1796 and 1852"; but "whereas the wages of the 
ploughman and the labourer increased to keep pace with the rising prices, that of the sepoy remained 
static". 74 In other words, his pay fell in real terms by almost 50 per cent during the first half of the 
nineteenth century. By contrast, a private in one of the East India Company's European regiments was 
given 10 rupees, 3 annas and 2 pice a month (with an additional 2 rupees, 6 annas and nine pice after 14 
years' service, and one rupee, nine annas and 4 pice for service 200 miles beyond the presidency 
capital) . 
75 A private in the British Army was paid a shilling a day (or roughly 15 rupees a month) and a 
similar pension after 21 years' service (or 10d. if he was discharged at his own request). 76 He also 
received, from 1839, an extra Id. a day and a ring of lace around his arm for every seven years of good 
conduct (the term was reduced to five years in 1845). 77 While such pay was adequate for India, it did 
not go a long way in Britain at a time when agricultural labourers earned twelve shillings a week and 
skilled labourers more than 11.78 In a comparative sense, therefore, Bengal sepoys were better paid 
than their British counterparts. But then they tended to be drawn from the rural ilites, whereas most 
British soldiers were either from the lowly class of agricultural labourers or the lowest rungs of urban 
employment. 79 
72 Allen (ed. ), A Soldier ofthe Company, pp. 149-50. General Alexander, a former adjutant-general of 
the Bombay Army, supported Hervey's argument by telling the Peel Commission that the pay, batta and 
hutting money of the Madras native troops was "insufficient" [Source: Evidence of Major-General 
Robert Alexander, 25 Aug 1857, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, p. 79] 
73 Baratý The Bengal Native Infantry, pp. 138-9. 
74 Ibid., p. 313. 
75 Establishment and Allowances of a Regiment of the Honourable Company's European Infantry, Pay 
and Audit Regulations 1849, OIOC, IJMIU17/2/459, p. 147. 
76 Hew Strachan, Welfington's Legacy., Yhe Reform of the British Army 1830-54 (Manchester, 1984), 
pp. 69-70. The pension rates quoted came back into force afler 1847. From 1833 to 1847 a British 
private discharged afler 21 years was given just 6d. a day, though this could rise to a shilling after 
additional service, or be added to by a disability. 
77 Ibid., p. 100. 
79 Ibid., p. 70. 
79 ]bid., p. 53. 
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At a time when the spending power of sepoys was being gradually eroded, pay remained a highly 
sensitive issue. "Whether in Bombay, Madras or Bengal, " wrote Sir Henry Lawrence in 1856, "doubts 
as to the intentions of Government in regard to pay have been at the bottom of most mutinies. "80 This 
was certainly the case with Bengal and Madras troops in the 1840s. The first sign of disaffection in the 
Bengal Army arose during the garrisoning of Sind. The province had been annexed in August 1843 
after a successful campaign by Bombay troops. But the government decided to replace them with 
Bengal troops because the Bombay Army had barely enough men to meet its own presidency 
commitments. Four Bengal Native Infantry regiments - the 4'i% 303 64h and 69h - were earmarked for 
the task. But all four objected to serving in Sind, a notoriously unhealthy and expensive province, 
without the extra allowance known as money-rations (rations or their equivalent in money in excess of 
pay and field batta) that had been granted to troops in Sind during the military operations that preceded 
its annexation. 81 Some also demanded that pensions should be paid to the heirs of those who might die 
of disease in Sind. Yet the government had already authorised the payment of field batta to troops in 
cantonment in Sind, while money-rations in excess of field batta were given to those in the field. 82 
Beyond this it would not go, not least because the Bombay troops had submitted to the withdrawal of 
money-rations before their departure in 1843. Unfortunately the same order had not been 
communicated to the Bengal troops until mid-October 1843, by which time some of the Bengal 
regiments had already received orders to proceed to Sind. 83 
The upshot was that the 34h regiment was disbanded in March 1844, while 38 members of the 64d' 
regiment were sentenced to punishments ranging from death to five years in prison. 84 Theothertwo 
regiments discharged a total of 281 men. 85 Yet in retrospect the Court of Directors was not 
unsympathetic to the cause of the mutineers, declaring that it would "be prepared to sanction such a 
regulation for the future grant of money rations to the troops serving beyond the boundaries of 
Hindustan" as might be consistent with the peculiar nature of service, 86 The response of Lord 
Hardinge, the new Governor-General (1844-8), was to concede that Sind was a special case by granting 
troops in cantonments there an extra allowance of two rupees, while those in the field received three 
'0 Lawrence, Essays, Military andPofilical, p. 406. 
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and a half more. 87 A sepoy of under 16 years' service in cantonments, therefore, would be given pay of 
seven rupees, field batta of one and a half rupees, and this special Sind allowance of two rupees, 
making a total of ten and a half rupees. Money rations, however, would cease to be drawn by sepoys in 
the field, though compensation would be paid when the price of "provisions forming the native soldiers 
diet" rose beyond an aggregate of three and a half rupees a month. gs This last stipulation - applicable to 
all native troops wherever they were stationed - actually left the Sind troops worse off because it 
superseded Lord Ellenborough's general order of March 1844 which had granted them compensation 
when the price of individual items of food (including attah, dholl, ghee and salt) became too high. 89 
The disaffection displayed by a number of Bengal sepoy regiments in the Punjab in 1849 and 1850 
(see Chapter One) was linked directly to the above settlement. For until the annexation of the Punjab in 
1849, the native troops there had enjoyed the same allowances granted to those in Sind. From the 
summer of 1849, however, only those troops serving on the frontier beyond the Indus were eligible for 
foreign batta. 90 In early 1850, after the first flames of mutinous discontent had died away, the 
Commander-in-Chief, Napier, tried to mollify the sepoys in the Punjab by reinstating the terms of 
Ellenborough's 1844 general order whereby compensation was paid whenever the price of individual 
food items rose beyond a certain level. Declaring Hardinge's 1845 regulation - which denied 
compensation unless the aggregate price of rations reached a certain level - as "both impolitic and 
unjust" Napier announced that henceforth compensation would be issued under the terms of the old 
regulation. 91 He explained: "As in the present state of transition, from Scinde pay and allowances, to 
the regular pay of the troops, a transition which has produced a most unprovoked state of 
insurbordination in some regiments, the Commander-in-Chief thinks that no cause of dissatisfaction 
should be given to the troops, "92 Napier's failure to consult the government before making his decision, 
however, was to result in the protracted dispute with the Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, that was to 
culminate in his departure from India in December 1850. 
The mutinies in Sind in 1843 and the Punjab in 1849-50 emphasize how sensitive the Bengal sepoys 
were to minor adustments in their pay. This was partly because most sepoys were genuinely hard up 
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and found it difficult to support their families when serving in distant and expensive provinces, and 
partly because, as Sir Henry Hardinge noted in 1844, native troops did not consider collective 
bargaining "leading to mutiny" as a disloyal act, but rather a legitimate "means to obtain a justifiable 
end it. 93 This was particularly so in the Bengal Army where the brotherhood of high-caste sepoys 
regarded mutiny as away of asserting their authority vis-d-vis the government. YheMofiissilife, a pro- 
British newspaper founded at Meerut in 1845, referred to both factors in an article of 8 February 1850. 
Native soldiers served only for their pay, it commented, and unless that pay enabled them to send 
money back to their families then they would quickly become sullen, insolent and even mutinous. 94 
Yet, it added, the Bengal sepoy had been "so petted, belauded and indulged [that he was] quite spoilt" 
and "should be kept well under and taught to think less of himself than he does at present". 95 
Given that only Bengal Native Infantry regiments were involved in the more serious mutinies prior to 
1857, it is tempting to conclude that pay was not an issue that affected the other arms of the Bengal 
Army, or indeed the other presidency armies. Yet, as already noted, the simmering discontent in the 
Bombay Army over the 1837 abolition of foreign service batta was to resurface 20 years later when the 
8th L. C. refused to sail to Bengal to fight the mutineers. The 1840s also saw Madras troops involved in 
two mutinies over the issue of pay. The first involved the e L. C. which, towards the end of 1843, was 
ordered to Jabalpur in central India to replace Bengal troops needed on the Indus. Madras troops 
generally suffered more than their Bengal counterparts when sent to distant stations because they had to 
pay for the transport of their families. Madras cavalrymen suffered the most because they were 
principally well-bom Muslims, and the rigid seclusion in which their women were kept greatly added 
to the cost of transport. So when the troopers of the Oh L. C. were told that not only was their posting 
permanent (it had earlier been declared temporary) but that they would not receive extra allowances, 
"they broke into open manifestations of discontent, and bound themselves by oaths to stand by each 
96 
other whilst they resisted the unjust decree". They only agreed to return to their duty after increased 
rates of pay were granted. But no sooner had one Madras regiment been mollified than another refused 
to obey orders. This time it was the 47th N. I. which had been ordered to supplement Sir Charles 
Napier's force in Sind because the Bombay Army was so stretched. Previously under orders to proceed 
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to Moulmein on the east coast of the Bay of Bengal where foreign batta and ration allowances applied, 
the 47th was promised by its government that the same allowances would be paid in Sind. But the 
Supreme Government disagreed and informed the sepoys at Bombay in February 1844 that they would 
not receive the advantages of foreign service. The tumult died down only afler advances of pay were 
given to the near-starving sepoys. However Sir John Kaye is of the opinion that these two examples of 
disaffection were far less ominous than those displayed by the Bengal Army in the 1840s. "The Madras 
Army, " he wrote, "was not destined to supply the want accruing from the defective loyalty of Bengal. 
It broke down at a critical time; but only under such a weight of mismanagement as might have crushed 
out the fidelity of the best mercenaries in the world. 07 
There is, on the other hand, much evidence to suggest that the possibility of loot and increased pay 
was a major incentive to mutiny for all arms of the Bengal Army in 1857, particularly its irregular 
cavalry. Of the regular Bengal troops, only the cavalry and horse artillery received more pay than the 
infantry, with a trooper given nine rupees a month, a subedar 80 and a subedar-major (the highest 
commissioned rank a native could obtain) 105. The Bengal foot artillery and Sappers and Miners were 
paid the same as their infantry counterparts, with sepoys receiving seven rupees a month, subedars 67 
and subedar-majors 92. In an essay for the Calcutta Review in 1856, Henry Lawrence advised that the 
pay of specialist arms like the foot artillery and sappers "should be higher" than the infantry. 98 In a 
subsequent essay that year, he added: "In all Native armies the artillery are the best and trustiest men. 
They are always true to their guns; they worship them... A thousand Golundauze cost no more than as 
many sepoys. The more is the pity. They should be taught to consider themselves a separate and 
selected body... Their number should not exceed the European artillery, but, whatever the number and 
proportions, let the Golundauze receive the one extra rupee. It would be good economy. "99 The 
opportunity to secure more pay with an alternative native employer during the mutiny may well have 
tipped the balance for a number of wavering artillerymen. 
For members of the Bengal Irregular Cavalry, this was almost certainly the case. Though paid more 
than the regulars, their expenses were far higher. This was because the irregular horse was organized 
on what was known as the silladar principle. In return for a higher rate of pay, the silladar (or recruit) 
agreed to provide and maintain his own horse and equipment. To ensure uniformity, these items were 
97 Ibid., p. 217. 
98 Lawrence, EKWs, Military and Political, p. 395. 
99 Ibid., p. 432. 
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provided by the regiment. The recruit simply paid the regiment a sum corresponding to the value of 
these items known as an assami. Alternatively, a recruit's assami could be paid for by a native 
gentleman who often became his native officer. When the recruit left the regiment, either the value of 
his assami was refunded to him (or his benefactor) or he kept his horse and equipment. If he was 
dishonourably discharged he forfeited his assami, which thus "acted as a bond for good behaviour". 100 
But the irregular cavalryman had so many expenses that his basic pay of 20 rupees a month (rising to 
150 rupees for a rissaldar, the senior rank) was not nearly enough to keep him out of debt. 101 In an 
essay published in 1844, Henry Lawrence pointed out that Bengal Irregular Cavalrymen were mostly 
well-born Muslims with "expensive habits". 102 To make matters worse, they rarely received their full 
pay. He wrote: 
Every man entering, in (we believe) seven out of the nine corps [in existence in 1844], has not only to purchase his 
horse and equipments, but to pay one hundred and fifty rupees or thereabouts to the estate or family of the man 
whose decease or invaliding caused the vacancy. Such donation of course throws the recruit at once into the 
moneylender's hands, and often leaves him for life a debtor. If the man again has not the cash to purchase a horse, 
he rides one belonging to a Native officer or to some privileged person, and becomes what is called a bargeer - the 
soldier receiving only seven or eight rupees a month, and the owner of the horse the balance of the twenty allowed 
by Ciovernment. "' 
Lawrence considered the "evil" of this system to be "so great" that "Government would do well to 
redeem all debts as they now stand and forbid the system for the future". 104 Instead irregular regiments 
should be open to all men of respectability who could bring their own horse or were in a position to 
"purchase that of the man who created the vacancy". 105 Broadly similar views were expressed by John 
Jacob, the founder of the Sind Irregular Horse (part of the Bombay Army), in an article for the Calcutta 
Review of March 1846. He was particularly critical of the existence of a regimental bank in irregular 
100 Heathcote, Me Indian Army, p. 39. 
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regiments. "It paralyses every energy, " he wrote, "nearly every man is hopelessly in debt; frequently he 
cannot even pay the interest of these debts. " Jacob knew of one commandant who had "to borrow, on 
his own personal responsibility, some three lakhs of rupees to pay off the men's debts, so as to get rid of 
the ruinous rate of interest they were then paying". His solution was to introduce the system that 
operated in his own regiment. "There is, " he wrote, "a regimental fund, formed by the subscription 
monthly of fourteen annas per horse, and two annas per man; all fines etc. also go into the fund. On the 
death of a horse, the owner receives Rs. 100 from the fund, to assist him in the purchase of another... 
There is no regimental banker, and no shop-keeper in the regiment bazar dare give a man credit beyond 
the end of the month (this rule is strictly enforced). Any man getting into debt to purchase a horse 
forfeits his assamee... In consequence, the men are not in debt at all, as they never need be, and 
therefore are always ready for service. " Jacob also believed that an irregular sowars pay of 20 rupees a 
month was insufficient. His own sowars received 30 rupees, and even that was not enough "to maintain 
the horseman as he ought to be". 106 
Lord Gough, Commander-in-Chief in India from 1843-9, strongly urged a parliamentary select 
committee in 1853 to recommend a pay increase for the Bengal Irregular Cavalry to 25 rupees a month. 
"The rate of pay is not suff icient in many parts of Bengal, and particularly in going upon service, " he 
declared. "Those soldiers are very hard pressed; they get into debt, they get involved, and they borrow 
money, which is a bad thing always in any country, but particularly in India. " 107 Yet by the time Henry 
Lawrence wrote another article demanding military reform in early 1856, nothing had been done, 
despite the fact that Sir Charles Napier and "almost all irregular cavalry officers" had joined Gough in 
calling for a pay increase of five rupees a month. 108 In September of that year, Lawrence again 
recommended an increase: 
Government allow mounted officers thirty rupees a month for each horse; few gain materially by such contract; and 
yet twenty is given to the trooper, who ought not to be materially worse mounted! Of this twenty, after deductions 
for the remount-fund, clothing, gear, washing, watermen, barber, etc., there is not, we fmnly believe, a sowar in the 
service who receives more than seventeen, to feed himself, his family, and his horse, and to provide arms, a tent, 
and a bull Fix, then, twenty as the sum to be actuallypaid to each man, every month. Let the balance, whether 
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four or five rupees, be retained in the commandant's hands for remounts, clothing, etc... The proposed scheme 
would prevent the necessity of debt, and would enable every sowar to ride a threc-hundred-rupee horse. 109 
The Peel Commission also heard much evidence of the Bengal Irregular Cavalry's indebtedness. 
Colonel Harington of the 5th L. C. told the commission that the "regiment disbanded at Peshawur for 
mutiny last year [the I& I. C. ] owed nearly 110,000" to its regimental banker. ' 10 Colonel Becher, the 
Quartermaster-General of the Bengal Army, insisted that the irregulars were always "very much 
embarrassed and in debt" and that shortly before the mutiny "General Anson and the Government" had 
been asked to raise their pay. Others - including Sir J. H. Grant, Sir George Clerk and Major Daly - 
repeated many of Jacob's recommendations by calling for a post-mutiny increase in pay (to 25 rupees), 
the abolition of regimental banks, a subsidy to help pay for arms and accoutrements, and the discharge 
ofanymenfoundtobeindebt. 111 The only contrary note was struck by Lieutenant General Sir Patrick 
Grant who stated that 20 rupees a month was "sufficient on ordinary occasions to keep a sowar and his 
horse well". 112 While he was prepared to admit that most irregulars were "more or less in debt", he put 
this down to the fact that Muslims generally spent all they received. ' 13 But as a former Adjutant- 
General of the Bengal Army (1846-50) who may well have blocked earlier demands for a pay increase 
on the ground of economy, Grant is hardly an objective witness. 
The bulk of this evidence confirms that the sowars of the pre-mutiny Bengal Irregular Cavalry were 
underpaid and hopelessly in debt. They therefore had a very strong financial incentive to mutiny 
which, in certain instances in 1857, may have overridden the fact that (as stated in the previous chapter) 
only a small proportion of them were linked to the mutinous native infantry by ties of kinship and caste. 
All native troops suffered a reduction in the real value of their pay in the decades prior to the mutiny. 
But the consequences of lower pay were partially offset by successul military campaigns and the 
accumulation of war booty. Plunder had long been a welcome supplement to the ordinary pay of 
Indian mercenaries; the East India Company had even legitimised the practice in the form of prize 
money. By the 1850s, however, the internal conquest of India was complete and the occasional action 
against the tribes of the Sonthal and North-West Frontier did not provide the same opportunity to loot 
as a conventional campaign. Henceforth native troops would have to fight in wars outside India - with 
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Hindu sepoys risking a theoretical loss of caste - if they wished to supplement their diminishing pay. 
For this reason an uprising against their colonial masters, and a return to the traditional cycle of war, 
would have appealed to many native troops. 
A professional grievance that may have been even more influential than low pay as a motive to mutiny 
in 1857 was the inadequacy of career prospects. The highest commissioned rank to which a native 
could rise in all three presidency armies was subedar-major in the regular units and rissaldar-major in 
theirregulars. Yet both were inferior in rank to the most junior European officer -ensign in the 
infantry, comet in the cavalry and second-lieutenant in the artillery - nor could they give orders to the 
two European N. C. O. s present in Bengal native units. 114 
In an article for the Calcutta Review in 1844, Henry Lawrence pointed out the absurdity of this 
situation "in a land,.. that above all others, has been accustomed to see military merit rewarded, and to 
witness the successive rise of families from the lowest conditions". The East India Company army, he 
added, "offered no inducement to superior intellects, or more stirring spirits" who left in disgust. There 
were, as a result, "many commandants in the Mahrattah and Seikh service, who were privates in our 
army", including General Dhokul Singh who had risen to the exalted rank of drill naik (corporal) in the 
Bengal Army before transferring his allegiance to the Maharaja of Lahore. While nine out of ten 
sepoys were no doubt satisfied with the possibility of reaching the rank of subedar-major by the age of 
sixty, noted Lawrence, it was for the tenth - "the bold and daring spirit that disdains to live for ever in 
subordinate place" - that a greater stimulus was necessary. Among his recommendations were 
commands of irregular corps, grants of land and "pensions to the second and third generation". He also 
believed that "no place or office should be absolutely barred to the native solider, although the 
promotion of every individual should be grounded on his individual merits". 115 On all counts his advice 
fell on deaf ears. 
So Lawrence repeated these arguments in an 1856 article. Now he believed up to three sepoys in a 
hundred were "thoroughly and dangerously discontented' because "they feel they have that in them 
which elsewhere would rise them to distinction". His solution was to allow a certain number of 
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irregular corps to be commanded by a native officer on at least 400 rupees a month, while subedars in 
other irregular corps should be given company allowances and an increase in pay from "67 rupees a 
month to 140, or about one-third that of captains doing the same work", with jemadars given a 
proportionate increase. The ordinary sepoy, on the other hand, was "amplypaid'. Lawrence added: 
"He has even been pampered and petted. The extra batta and donatives that he has received, have done 
him harm, and induced greed... The many are usefully provided for, but honours and rewards, present 
and future, are still wanted for the few. "' 16 
Napier, too, appreciated the danger of thwarting ambition. In his posthumously-published book, he 
noted that native officers had "a full share of Eastern daring, genius, and ambition", but to nourish these 
qualities they had to "be placed on a par with European officers". To allow a veteran subedar to "be 
commanded by a fair-faced beardless Ensign, just arrived from England" was the "imposition of 
conquerors" and "one which the Native gentlemen feel deeply and silently resent". Equality between 
natives and Europeans was being ceded in the civil service, wrote Napier, "so it must be for the 
military". ' 17 
Yet no reforms had been instituted by the time Lawrence wrote to Canning on 2 May 1857, warning 
him that "until we treat Natives, and especially Native soldiers, as having much the same feelings, the 
same ambition, the same perception of ability and imbecility as ourselves, we shall never be safe". 118 
The accuracy of Lawrence's prediction was proven during the mutiny. In the majority of mutinous 
regiments in 1857 (as we shall see), native officers were either behind the plot to rise or they quickly 
assumed control once their European counterparts had been driven off or killed. A few were appointed 
to command rebel brigades and even armies. The incentive to mutiny for ambitious yet frustrated 
native officers was obvious. 
A complementary grievance that particularly affected the native troops of the regular Bengal Army 
was the system of promotion by seniority. According to Barat, promotion in Bengal regiments "was 
generally made on the basis of seniority" or length of service even before the reorganisation of the army 
in 1796. The regulations of that year reaffirmed the seniority principle, though merit was also to be 
taken into consideration. In the event of a vacancy for a native officer, the commanding officer would 
generally recommend to the Commander-in-Chief the senior soldier in the rank below. A similar 
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process applied for N. C. O. vacancies, though recommendations were made by company officers to the 
commanding officer and higher authority was not involved. All recommendations were subject to the 
proviso that "the fullest consideration and attention should invariably be given to the claim of seniority 
in every grade where no such disqualifications as want of respectability of character or other equally 
proper and just cause of objection to the advancement of the seniors should exist". 119 
Though the system of promotion for the regular Bengal Army was in theory a combination of 
seniority and merit, in practice merit was rarely rewarded. Bentinck acknowledged as much when he 
recommended the establishment of the Orders of British India and Merit for native troops in 1834 as a 
"counterpoise to the paralysing effects of rise by seniority, a principle of advancement indispensable to 
the fidelity and allegiance of our native troops, though injurious in many respects to discipline and 
efficiency". "0 The two orders were eventually confirmed by the same General Order of April 1837 that 
brought in long service pay. The Order of British India, which was to be given to native officers "for 
long and honorable service", had two classes: first class, for 100 subedars and rissaldars, conferring the 
title sirdar bahadoor and two rupees a day; and second class, for 100 native officers of all grades, 
conferring the title bahadoor and one rupee a day. Half the appointments would go to Bengal native 
officers, a third to those of Madras, and one-sixth to those of Bombay. But given that the Bengal native 
army was about a third bigger than the other two presidency armies combined, its native officers would 
receive fewer orders than was their due. The Order of Merit, on the other hand, was open to to all 
native ranks for "distinguished service in action" and had three classes: I" class, which entitled the 
holder to double pay, or full pay if he was a pensioner, 2nd class (two-thirds of full pay); and 3rd class 
(one-third of full pay). To receive the Order of Merit, Pt class, however, a soldier would have to 
commit three acts of outstanding valour as only the holders of 3rd class orders were eligible for 
advancement to the 2 nd class, and so on. 121 
Bentinck's hope that these two orders would compensate ambitious and gallant soldiers for the time- 
serving nature of promotion by seniority was not realized. Henry Lawrence put his finger on the 
reasons why in the first of two articles for the Calcutta Review in 1856. The Order of British India he 
dismissed as "virtually the reward of old age" with its wearers "mostly invalids at their homes", while 
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the Order of Merit, "though its numbers are not positively limited, had "so many restrictions to its 
obtainment, that'the decorated'are so few as to be hardly discoverable". Despite a "very large 
acquaintance with the Native army", he could not recollect seeing more than a dozen silver stars 
(denoting the 2nd and Yd classes of the order) and not "a single golden one" (1' class). As for the scales 
of extra pay, "what reward are they to the adventurer whose sword, under a different regime, would 
have carved out for himself a principality? " he asked, before providing the answer: "None ." 
122 
As well as the introduction of these orders, the 1830s also saw an attempt by the military authorities 
in Bengal to emphasize that merit should take prececedence over seniority when sepoys or sowars were 
promoted to naik (juniorN. C. O. ). In December 1836, after a subedar of the I& Light Cavalry had 
been court-martialled for encouraging his subordinates to complain that junior soldiers had been 
"unfairly promoted over the heads of their seniors", Sir Henry Fane, the Commander-in-Chief (1835-9), 
issued a General Order to clarify the matter. The subedar, wrote Fane, should have referred his troopers 
to section 16 of the standing orders of the Bengal Army which state "that 'vacancies in the rank of 
Naick are to be filled up from the most deserving sepoys, ' (not the oldest) and it is particularly pointed 
out to 'the young and aspiring soldier, that he may rely on his own exertions for the notice of his 
officers and advancement in the service"'. This would have left the troopers in no doubt that "merit, 
which renders itself conspicuous, gives the claim for promotion from the ranks, and not mere 
seniority". 123 In May 1837, to hammer home the point, part of section 16 of the standing orders was 
revised by Fane to read: "Vacancies in the rank of Naik are to be filled by selection from the best 
qualified and most deserving sepoys... Seniority can be permitted to operate in this selection only when 
the qualifications and fitness of two or more sepoys are equal in which case the Senior is always to be 
preferred. Sepoys whose merits are merely negative and are based on long service only, will now be 
otherwise rewarded [by Good Conduct pay]. it 124 
Despite these new guidelines, the majority of promotions in the Bengal Army continued to be made 
on the principle of seniority. In December 1838, Subedar Shaikh Mahub Ali of the V;, Bengal N. I. 
(who had recently been awarded the Order of British India, I' class) told Captain Sleeman that only 
two men in their regiment "had been that year superseded, one for insolence, and the other for neglect 
of duty", and "that officers and sepoys were all happy in consequence - the young, because they felt 
122 Lawrence, Fssays, Military and Political, p. 3 93. 
123 G. O. C. C., 21 Dec 1836, Bengal Standing Orders and Regulations 1830-6, OIOC, LftvfIU17/2/413, 
p. 38. 
86 
more secure of being promoted if they did their duty, and the old because they felt an interest in their 
young relations". Sleeman himself commented: "We might, no doubt, have in every regiment a few 
smarter native officers by disregarding this rule than by adhering to it; but we should, in the diminution 
of the good feeling towards the European officers and the Government, lose a thousand times more than 
we gained. " 125 
However there were enough examples of Bengal commanding officers promoting without regard to 
seniority to set alarm bells ringing in London and Calcutta. In October 1850, therefore, after 
representations from the Court of Directors, the Bengal government issued a general order (drafted by 
the Adjutant-General of the Bengal Army, Colonel Tucker) criticizing a number of recent promotions, 
including "a Naick superseding 17 seniors, and a sepoy, 23d on the roll of the Company and 216 on the 
gradation roll of the regiment", and reiterating its rule that "full consideration be given to the point of 
seniority". 126 Privately Napier, the Commander-in-Chief, preferred the Bombay system of promotion 
where merit took precedence. But publicly, in his posthumous book, he accepted that he had had "no 
right to alter the Court of Directoes rule and break Government faith with the sepoys". He added: "This 
faith, respected by all my predecessors in command, was by the oldest and most distinguished officers 
of the Bengal Army judged not only binding but vital, and the Commander-in-Chief, who has not the 
right to order the change of a button in the uniform, could not alter an organic regulation. " 127 
Major Jacob, the commandant of the Sind Horse, was unconvinced by this argument. In an 1854 
essay responding to comments in Napiees book, he wrote: "It is a fatal error to suppose that we are 
guilty of breach of faith in promoting according to merit, instead of according to seniority; for the 
sepoys, on enlistment, know and think nothing about their rights to promotion; they enlist to obey 
orders, and serve the State; and their notions of seniority are always acquired after they enter the 
service, under the influence of a vicious system. " In his opinion, the "unavoidable" outcome "of 
promoting according to the seniority system only" was "the paralysation and ultimate ruin of the army", 
because under its operation "talent, skill, energy, high principle, and soldierlike pride" fell "crushed and 
powerless". "' In an earlier essay, Jacob had argued that the Bengal system of promotion undermined 
124 G. O. C. C., 5 May 1837, Abstract of General Orders from 1817 to 1840, OIOC, LIMIL/17/2/435. 
125 Sleeman, Rambles andRecolleclions, p. 623. 
126 G. O. G. G., 18 October 1850, quoted in Barat, The Bengal Native I11fanyry 
127 ,p 
152. 
Napier, Defects, Civil andMilitary, p. 236. See also Major John Jacob, Notes oil Sir C. Napier's 
Posthumous Work (London, 1854), p. 21. 
128 'The Vices of the Seniority System in the Native Army, 1854, Pelly (ed. ), Views and Opinions, p. 
211. 
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discipline and efficiency: "The men, not feeling that their prospects of advancement in the service 
depend on the favourable opinions of their European officers, want the most powerfW stimulus to good 
conduct. They are never disciplined (as I understand the word), are often mutinous, and never acquire 
the knowledge of their profession which may qualify them to hold commissions with advantage to the 
service. " 129 
One consequence of the 1850 general order was that native troops were confirmed in their belief that 
promotion by seniority was a right "irrespective of past conduct and general qualification". 130 In the 
summer of 185 1, therefore, the new Commander-in-Chief, General Gomm, issued a general order 
reminding troops that while claims of seniority would "always be taken into account", they would 
"never be allowed to prevail against proved disqualification in other respects". 13 1 This proviso -which 
had existed since 1796 - was still in place when the last pre-mutiny Bengal Army regulations were 
published in 1855. So that it could be strictly observed, commanding officers were instructed to 
publish in the same regimental orders that announced promotions "the names of those passed over, and 
the causes of their supersession". The only major change from the rules that applied at the beginning of 
the century was the disqualification from promotion of sepoys "without a competent knowledge of 
reading and writing in at least one character". 
132 Though this rule had been introduced some years 
before, Lord Clyde informed the Peel Commission, it was widely disregarded and considered "a dead 
letter". But after 1855 it "was very generally enforced" and "occasioned much dissatisfaction amongst 
men who had expected promotion, and were thus suddenly superseded owing to the revival of this 
rule". 
133 
According to Henry Lawrence, the end result of all these orders and counter-orders was that Bengal 
commanding officers pursued very different policies with regard to promotion. "There is authority [in 
Bengal], though not very explicit, for promotion by merit, " he wrote in 1856, "and provision is made, 
by increase of pay after terms of seven years, for the superseded, but recent orders have directed 
differently. The consequence is, that commanding officers do much as they like. One finds reason for 
129 'Comparison between the Systems obtaining in the Armies of Bengal and Bombay', ibid., p. 120. 
130 G. O. C. C., 29 July 1851, Abstract of General Orders from 1848 to 1853, OIOC, LWU17/2/437. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Bengal Army Regulations 1855, OIOC, L/MIU17/2/442, pp. 397-8. 
133 P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 53, p. 421. 
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promoting all the old, another all the young... Discipline suffers, and deserving Native soldiers of all 
ranks suffer, and are often driven with disgust from the service. " 134 
However, most of the officers who gave evidence to the Peel Commission agreed that seniority took 
precedence. The Punjab Committee, for example, testified that the system of promotion in the regular 
Bengal native army was "based nominally on seniority and merit, but really on seniority, as the senior 
was never passed over unless he was imbecile". 135 The opinion of another group of senior officers 
(including Generals Hearsey, Cotton, Hope Grant and Brigadiers Farquharson, Coke and Troup), 
summarized by Colonel Durand, was that "the general rule in the native infantry of the Bengal Army 
was promotion by seniority" and that "exceptions were rare", hence "the noted inefficiency of superior 
grades of native officers". 136 This latter point was confirmed by Sitaram Pandy who served "forty-eight 
years of hard wear and tear" before being promoted to subedar. "I was an old man of sixty-five years of 
age, " he wrote in his memoirs, "and had attained the highest rank to be gained in the Native Army, but I 
would have been much better fitted for this position thirty years earlier. " 137 When part of the 7th L. C. 
mutinied at Lucknow on 31 May 1857, its subedar-major was 70-years-old . 
138 
A signficant number of witnesses thought that promotion by seniority had weakened the authority of 
commanding officers. Colonel Wintle, who left India in 1856 after thirty-nine years in the Bengal 
Native Infantry, told the commission that he knew of instances where the Commander-in-Chief had 
disregarded a commanding officer's recommendation for promotion to native officer because he was 
not the most senior. 139 Colonel Wyllie agreed that many Bengal commanding officers were even afraid 
to promote to the rank ofjunior N. C. O. on merit because the soldiers passed over might send petitions 
to headquarters which would cause them to be rebuked. 140 As a former member of the Adjutant- 
General's office, he knew of many instances in which - contrary to regulations - such petitions had been 
sent to the Commander-in-Chief direct. A great many other officers shared the views of the Punjab 
Committee, which noted: 141 
134 Lawrence, Fssays, Military and Political, p. 388-9. 
135 P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 71, p. 549. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Lunt (ed. ), From Sepoy to Subedar, p. 172. 
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Rewards and punishments are the two great sources of a commanding officers influence over his men, and both 
seem to have been almost taken out of his hands. The principle Of seniority Promotion has been so hedged in, 
watched and enforced, (even by such a professed military reformer as Sir Charles Napier, whose general order on 
the subject is, perhaps the strongest on record), that practically the commanding officer has no discretion whatever, 
and promoted the senior on the roll, rather than enter upon a vain struggle to prefer a better man. The regimental 
commandant was interested in superseding the inefficicm; and the incfficicnt found a readiness at head-quartcrs; to 
believe injustice had been committed. 142 
Commandants of Bengal irregular units, on the other hand, generally had more say in the promotion of 
their men. According to Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, the men of the Punjab Irregular Force were 
"selected for promotion according to their merits, and not by seniority". In his own regiment, the 4' 
Punjab I. I., the average age of native officers was 26 years. These handpicked men - some of whom 
had been commisssioned on recruitment - had real authority in that they were company commanders, 
rather than powerless adjuncts to the authority of European officers in regular regiments. Such an 
atypical system of promotion had come about, said Wilde, because the Punjab Irregular Force was 
under the authority of the Punjab government rather than the Commander-in-Chief. 
143 On the question 
of promotion in the Bengal Irregular Cavalry, however, opinion was divided. Brigadier Christie 
claimed that it was "based on merit", while Major-General Cotton noted that there was "no rule" 
regarding seniority and that the system varied "according to the ideas of the commandant", 
144 whereas 
Sir Patrick Grant and Sir J. H. Grant thought promotion was based chiefly on seniority. 145 
There was also some disagreement as to best system of promotion for the post-mutiny Bengal Army. 
Lord Ellenborough, Lord Clyde and General Grant all thought that seniority should continue to play a 
dominant role. '46 But the vast majority of officers thought that the authority of the commanding officer 
needed to be bolstered by an extension of his discretion to promote. These views were reflected in 
statements by the members of the Commission themselves. General the Marquess of Tweeddale and 
Major-General Montgomerie both thought that the selection of naiks should be left to the commanding 
141 They included: the Oude committee; Generals Cotton, Hearsey, Hope Grant and Griffith; Brigadiers 
Farquharson, Coke, Steel and Troup; Colonel Bum, Lieutenant Colonels Master and Wilde, Major 
Williams, Captain Browne (Source: Ibid., pp. 15,34,91,119,556-7) 
142 P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 72, p. 556. 
141 Evidence of Lt. -Col. A- Wilde, 26 Aug 1858, ibid,, p. 90. 
144 P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 72, p. 556. 
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officer without regard to seniority. 147 Major-General Viscount Melville, Lieutenant-Generals Harry 
Smith and Sir George Wetherall, and Colonels Burlton and Tait, went even further by saying that 
commanding officers should choose both N. C. O. s and native officers on merit. 148 
But the most forthright opinion was expressed by Major-General Hancock, a former Adjutant- 
General of the Bombay Army, who produced his own report because he did not believe the official 
version went far enough. Like the Punjab Committee, Hancock was convinced that a major cause of 
mutiny was the "fatal policy" of reducing the Bengal commanding officers'powers of reward and 
punishment to a "minimum", thereby reducing those officers to mere "cyphers" and making "the 
maintenance of sound discipline, even by commanders of the highest ability, _ absolutely impossible". 
They had, in particular, been "deprived of the principal means of rewarding merit, by being compelled 
to make promotions in all the native ranks by seniority". His solution, therefore, was to give 
commanding officers "the power to enlist and to promote, upon their own authority alone, as regards all 
non-commissioned ranks" and "to select for all promotions to and in the commission grade, and for the 
appointments of subedar-major and native adjutant". Other powers to reward should include the right 
"to confer good conduct badges, with additional pay, by selection from the entire list of privates", to 
select for appointment to the Order of British India and the Order of Merit, and to grant "leave of 
absence in time of peace to all native ranks". 149 
The inevitable outcome of this waning power to reward or punish was that sepoys; ceased to regard 
their colonels with the same amount of awe and respect as hitherto, and discipline suffered as a result. 
The system of promotion that General Hancock wished to impose upon the post-mutiny Bengal Army 
was essentially that which operated in his former presidency of Bombay. In theory, the system was 
similar to Bengal's in that it was a mixture of merit and seniority; in practice merit was the dominant 
principle. Testifying before a Parliamentary select committee in 1853, Lieutenant-General Sir 
Willoughby Cotton, a former Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, stated that promotion in 
Bombay was usually by selection. He went on to say that selection was "so much preferable to 
seniority" that if he had been the Commander-in-Chief in Bengal he would have tried to introduce such 
147 ibid., Appendices 74 and 78, pp. 583 and 597. 
148 ibid., Appendices 75,76,77,79 and 80, pp. 587-8,594,601,607. 
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a system there. 150 In his posthumous book, Sir Charles Napier observed that "to disregard seniority is 
the custom" in the Bombay Army, which in turn brought on "Native officers and non-commissioned 
officers, younger, more active, and more ambitious than those of Bengal". But, as already noted, he 
also believed that the introduction of this system in the Bengal Army would have been interpreted by its 
sepoys as a breach of government faith. 151 
A number of Bombay officers who gave evidence to the Peel Commission in 1858 confirmed that 
merit took precedence over seniority. Colonel Poole, with 30 years' service in the Bombay Light 
Cavalry, explained that men from the ranks were "generally recommended" for promotion by their 
company officers on the grounds of "smartness", "being good drills" and "general good conduct". 
Promotion to the commissioned ranks was also "entirely by selection" and Poole had known "a havildar 
promoted to be a native officer who had only been a short time in that grade". The average age of 
native officers in the Bombay Army, added Poole, was "about 35" which was "rather young". 152 
Colonel Hill, who commanded the Bombay Sappers and Miners during the mutiny, insisted that the 
Bombay system of promoting by "general merit" was a "very excellent one indeed", though it did not 
always operate as well as it could have. Partiality was "sometimes shown" and "sufficient general 
attention" was "not given to the qualifications of the men". Yet he still regarded it as "the only just 
system which can be pursued with regard to the promotion of natives or Europeans". 153 Major-General 
Capon, who retired in 1850 after 40 years'service, thought that promotion by merit "made the whole 
regiment smart and willing to be brought into notice", whereas under the seniority system "they do not 
care a pin about the officers, because they know they cannot do them good or harm". The European 
officer, in turn, had no incentive to discover "the character of the men under him" because he simply 
promoted the "first man on the roster". On the subject of promoting a havildar to the rank ofjemadar 
(orjunior officer), Capon stated that a Bombay commanding officer's selection was "always" confirmed 
by the Commander-in-Chief and that he "never had any instance of it being otherwise". 154 This was in 
direct contrast to the practice in Bengal whereby the commanding officer's choice could be - and often 
was - overridden by his Commander-in-Chief if it infringed the principle of seniority. 
"' Evidence of Lt. -Gen. Sir W. Cotton, 24 Feb 1853, P. P., H. C., 1852-3, XXVIL p. 20, 151 Napier, Defects, Civil andMililary, p. 23 7. 
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Promotion by merit was even more strictly observed in Bombay's irregular regiments. According to 
Major Merewether of the Sind Irregular Horse, his sowars had to pass an examination by the adjutant 
before even being considered for promotion to naik. Of those who passed, the ones considered to have 
the best characters would then be examined a second time before the best candidate was promoted. 
"And so on throughout, " noted Merewether, "only that the standard of efficiency is of course raised as 
you go up the list". '" Merewhether's claim is supported by an 1848 return for the two regiments of 
Sind Irregular Horse which lists ten native officers with less than ten years' total service, and three 
under the age of 30. Jacob, the founder of the regiment, noted many instances of sons overtaking their 
fathers in rank, one becoming a jemadar while his father, "a most respectable and efficient soldier, but, 
as he knew himself, unfit for further promotion", remained a naik. 156 
In Madras the system of promotion was a genuine combination of seniority and merit, though the 
crucial first step from sepoy to lance-naik was on the latter princple. "It must ... be bome in mind, in all 
promotions up to the commissioned ranks, " stated the Bombay Army regulations of 1849, "that while 
on the one hand a system of succession by mere seniority cannot but fail in exciting the men to zeal and 
exertion in the performance of their duty, on the other hand the supercession of seniors, without a 
specific and sufficient cause, is no less injurious by creating feelings of dissatisfaction and inducing a 
want of confidence in the impartiality of their superiors. " The regulations also stressed that, providing 
he could read and write, a private might be promoted to lance naik after just three years in a regiment, 
and that such selections should be left to troop or company commanders. Thereafter they were to be 
"promoted according to their standing in the Roll" unless their commanding officerjudged them to be 
unfit for further advancement. 157 
Merit therefore played a more important role than seniority. Major-General Alexander explained: 
"The officer of a company has the first promotion to a lance-naik; he selects the fittest man that he 
thinks proper, and if on trial that man is unfit he is remanded to the ranks. When he is promoted to be a 
naik ... he 
is brought into a general regimental list, and he rises in it if he behaves well; if not, he is 
brought to court-martial and reduced. So far the seniority goes on in that way, but no man is ever 
promoted by seniority unless he is competent. " A fortunate man could expect to become a native 
officer within 15 years of enlistment, said Alexander, though 18 or 20 years were probably more 
155 P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 6, p. 367. 
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typical. Given that most sepoys enlisted at 19, the average age of Madras jemadars was about 37 to 40, 
and the average age of subedars "above 50" 
158 
- older than in Bombay, but younger than in Bengal 
where sepoys were rarely promoted to the rank ofjunior N. C. O. until they had reached the top of the 
regimental seniority list. A Madras practice that did mirror Bombay, however - according to Colonel 
Felix, a former private secretary to Lord Tweeddale - was the Commander-in-Chief s habit of bolstering 
the authority of his commanding officers by always confirming their recommendations for promotion 
to native officer. 159 
While all the professional grievances mentioned in this chapter contributed in some way to the growing 
level of disaffection felt by Bengal native troops in the years prior to 1857, some were more particular 
to them - and therefore more relevant to their decision to mutiny - than others. A dissatisfaction with 
European-style dress and accoutrements, for example, was present in all three presidency armies. As, 
to a certain extent, was the belief that their duties were unnecessarily onerous, though Bengal troops 
probably suffered the most because, proportionately, they had to cover a far larger area. Also, as 
Napier pointed out, irksome duties seem to have had a more deletorious effect on the discipline of the 
Bengal Army (which was, as we shall see, being simultaneously undermined by a number of other 
factors), Low pay was another issue that affected all three armies, particularly after their pay scales 
were equalized in 1837. They were all hit by the 50 per cent reduction in the real value of pay during 
the first half of the nineteenth century. Indeed it could be argued that Madras and Bombay troops were 
relatively worse off after 1837 because they received less batta than hitherto. There is, however, no 
doubt that many Bengal native troops - particularly irregular sowars - were in financially straitened 
circumstances in the decade or so prior to the mutiny. Extra pay and booty were very real incentives to 
rebel. Yet the real significance of the mutinies over pay in the 1840s is that they demonstrate a 
willingness by the brotherhood of high-caste Bengal sepoys to ameliorate a professional grievance by 
collective action. 
The one professional grievance that was confined mainly to the Bengal Army was that of 
inadequate career prospects. This was because the Bengal system of promotion was dominated by 
seniority, whereas merit held sway in Bombay and Madras. The dire consequences of this seniority 
I" Evidence of Maj. -Gen. R. Alexander, 25 Aug 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, p. 81. 
94 
system were as follows: it deprived the commanding officer of an important power to reward, thereby 
reducing his authority over his men; it frustrated ambitious and talented sepoys who had to wait in line 
for promotion; and it produced old, inefficent and often bitter native officers who had no worthwhile 
occupation. These two latter groups may hold the key to the mutiny. Lawrence believed that three out 
of a hundred sepoys were "dangerously discontented" in 1856 because they "they feel they have that in 
them which elsewhere would rise them to distinction". 160 It is highly probable that such men were the 
instigators of the mutinies in 1857, and that they used the religious and caste implications of the 
cartridge question to persuade the rank and file to join them in rebellion. Yet the vast majority of rebel 
regiments were led by their old native officers. The implications of this observation are twofold: first, 
that the mutinous regiments retained their cohesiveness and former command structure, and that they 
did so because their rebellion was simply an attempt to find an employer who could offer them more 
attractive incentives to serve; second, that a significant number of native officers were so alienated by 
service under the British that they were prepared to put both their lives and their future pensions at risk. 
Twelve years before the mutiny, Sir Henry Hardinge applauded the Bengal policy of "preferring 
inefficiency & seniority, to activity and selection" because aged and inactive native officers were less 
likely to lead an armed insurrection than their younger and more zealous counterparts. 161 He could not 
have been more wrong. 
So why did the native officers of the Bengal Army become so despondent? With regard to the native 
officers of the Bengal Native Infantry, Barat cites a number of reaons: the relatively low pay of a 
subedar (67 rupees a month) compared to that of a fresh-faced English ensign (180 rupees) or a native 
civil officer (250 rupees on average, rising to a maximum of 500 rupees); the gradual curtailment of the 
authority of Bengal native officers from 1786 onwards when European officers were assigned to each 
company ("From being leaders of their men, " writes Barat, "the native officers were reduced to playing 
the role of contact-men between the sepoys and the commanding officers of their reginients... "); and 
the deteriorating relationship between native officers and their European counterparts in the years prior 
to the mutiny (a theme I will consider in the next chapter). 162 There was also the fact that the new 
pension regulations of 183 7 favoured the junior ranks. It could be argued, therefore, that fewer Bengal 
15' Evidence of Colonel Orlando Felix, 25 Aug 1858, ibid., p. 62. 
160 Lawrence, E: Kms, Militwy and Political, p. 3 95 
16 1 Hardinge to Sir Charles Napier, 31 Oct 1844, Napier Papers, B. L., Add. MSS 54517, f 104. 
162 Barat, Yhe BengalNative Itfiantry, pp. 181-5 
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native officers would have mutinied in 1857 if pensions had been more generous. They certainly had 
relatively little to lose in a financial sense by rebelling - and much to gain. 
While such professional grievances were not exclusive to the Bengal Army, they were certainly 
exacerbated by its seniority system of promotion. "The Bengal native officers are inefficient, and 
necessarily so under the present system, " wrote John Jacob in 1850, "because they are chosen without 
any regard whatever to their fitness to hold commissions, and because they are almost always worn. out 
with age before they receive them. " 163 In an earlier essay, he commented: 
[The] value of native off iccrs is not properly understood in the army of Bengal. They have in that army little 
power over the men, are perfectly separated in heart and feeling from the European officers, and only half 
understand each other: moreover, they arc very often old imbeciles, incapable of active exertion, whether of mind 
orbody. Butitisnotsowithus. A native officer or soldier after twenty ycars'servicc in the Bombay Army is half 
an Englishman in feeling. He is not valued, either by himself or others, on account of his caste, etc., but according 
to his abilities as a soldier, and his conduct as a man. 
164 
163 'Comparison between the Systems obtaining in the Armies of Bengal and Bombay, 1850, Pelly 
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Chapter Three - European Officers 
The deteriorating relationship between the native troops of the Bengal Army and their European 
officers was, arguably, one of the principal causes of the Indian mutiny. This chapter will cover some 
of the factors which contributed to that breakdown of trust. 
With regard to relations with their troops, the social origins of the European officers of the East India 
Company army are particularly revealing. In the early days of Company service the military officers 
were not even gentlemen. "Pay was extremely low, and attracted none with pretensions to gentility, or 
indeed even to respectability, " wrote T. A. Heathcote. "In 1753 it was stated that one of the Company's 
military officers had been a trumpeter at a travelling circus in England, while another had previously 
been a barber. " As the Company's army increased in size in the 1750s and 60s, and the end of the War 
of Austrian Succession and the Seven Years'War left a large number of British Army officers on half- 
pay, efforts were made to recruit a "better class of men". ' This policy was bolstered by the decision, in 
1794, to grant Company commissions in the name of the Crown so that Indian officers could command 
troops of the British Army in India. Yet these commissions ceased to have any authority west of the 
Cape of Good Hope, and Company officers could not appear at their sovereign's court in uniform. 
Nevertheless, it is still commonly believed that Company officers in the early nineteenth century were 
drawn from the same social Mite - the aristocracy, gentry and rich upper middle-classes - that supplied 
the bulk of British Army officers. In fact, according to the unpublished doctoral thesis of J. M. Boume, 
they came from "the 'pseudo-gentry', from the genteel poor and from the sons of East India Company 
servants who were effectively barred, by their lack of connexions and lack of cash, from access to the 
traditional areas of gentlemanly employment - government service, the established church, medicine, 
the armed forces of the Crown and the English bar". These poor middle-class parents could not have 
afforded the high purchase price of a commission in the British Army. Commissions in the East India 
Company army, on the other hand, were in the gift of the Court of Directors whose members, wrote 
Boume, "were not forgetful of their less fortunate comrades at home and in India". During the period 
1796-1854, the "most significant change in the pattern of recruitment" to the Company's service "came 
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in the proportion of recruits born in India": 2.7% in 1800 compared to 36.8% in 1854. Boume 
concluded that recruits to the Indian services "were drawn overwhelmingly from the service, business, 
leisured and professional middle classes, with a significant minority from the sons of manual workers 
and tradesmen", and that "very few were connected with the aristocracy or gentry". 2 
This claim is supported by Heathcote! s analysis of the class origin of 2,000 officers who served in the 
Bengal Army between 1820 and 1834, which reveals that twelve were sons of peers and 26 sons of 
baronets. Only one succeeded to a peerage (the second son of the Earl of Carnwath) and six to 
3 baronetcies (three of whom were originally younger sons). A similar analysis of the social origins of 
British Army off icers in 1830 by Hew Strachan, author of Wellington's Legacy, shows that 21 per cent 
were aristocrats, 32 per cent landed gentry and 47 per cent rich middle-class. "It was not birth that 
dictated the grant of commissions, " comments Strachan, "so much as the wealth to purchase and to 
provide a private income. it 4 Many Company officers, by contrast, were either illegitimate or orphans, 
both categories that were treated with kindly compassion by the Court of Directors. According to 
Bourrie, one in four cadets who entered the Company's service between 1810 and 1854 "came from 
families in which the head of the household was dead". 5 
Given that the economic status of cadets was "predominantly poor", it follows that their chief motive 
for entering the Company's service was because it was well paid and "offered an accessible avenue to 
social status and financial security" .6 In 1849, a lieutenant-colonel in a native infantry regiment 
received 1,227 rupees and 14 annas (orjust under 1123) a month; if he was in the field or stationed 200 
miles from the seat of his presidency's government, he was paid 1,432 rupees and 4 annas (or 1143) a 
month. At the other end of the scale a lieutenant received a basic 225 rupees and 12 annas (L22 10s. ) a 
month, rising to 256 rupees and 10 annas (L25 14s. ) with batta, and an extra 30 rupees (13) if he 
commanded a company. An ensign, the lowest commissioned rank, was paid just over 182 rupees 
(J18) a month, or 202 rupees (L20) including batta. 7 In the British Army, by contrast, an infantry 
lieutenant-colonel received the equivalent ofjust 253 rupees (or 125) a month, a lieutenant between 96 
(L9 12s. ) and III rupees (; El I 2s. ) depending upon his length of service, and an ensign a mere 78 
' Heathcote, Yhe Indian Army, p. 122. 
2 j. M. Bourne, 'The Civil and Military Patronage of the East India Company, 1784-1858', Ph. D. thesis, 
Univ. of Leicester, 1977, pp. 169,172,1834,192. 
3 Heathcote, Yhe Indian Army, p. 123. 
4 Strachan, Wellington's Legacy, p. I 10. 
5 Bourne, 'Civil and Military Patronage', Ph. D thesis, p. 197. 
6 Ibid., pp. 194,200. 
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rupees (V l6s. ). 8 According to Strachan, a private income of at least 150 to 1100 a year was "essential 
for any rank under that of major". 9 However, British Army officers were paid Company allowances 
when in India, which is why those without sizeable private incomes were keen to serve there. 
All of the Company's irregular regiments were officered by men on detachment from regular units. 
They were paid a fixed sum that varied from regiment to regiment. The commandant of a regiment of 
Bengal Irregular Cavalry, for example, received 1,000 rupees (LIOO) a month, his second-in-command 
500 rupees (150), and the adjutant an allowance of 170 rupees and 14 annas (114 4s. ) in addition to his 
normal pay. Whereas the commandant of an infantry regiment of the Gwalior Contingent was paid 
845 rupees (184 10s. ), his second-in-command 600 rupees (160) and the adjutant 500 rupees (150). 10 
The competition for these lucrative appointments was understandably intense. 
Before 1836, Company officers could retire on the full pay of their rank after twenty-five years' 
service, of which three could be spent on furlough. But in that year, because the vagaries of regimental 
promotion meant that some could attain the rank of major in 12 years while others would take more 
than 30, the principle of granting pensions for length of service was introduced. " Henceforth all 
officers could retire on the pay of a captain after 23 years, of a major after 27 years, of a lieutenant- 
colonel after 31 years, and of a colonel after 35 years, including three years furlough. Alternatively, 
they could retire on half-pay after ten years (though a lieutenant had the option to leave after six on the 
half-pay of an ensign, comet or second-lieutenant). 12 
in this struggle to "maintain a social position in British life", wrote Bourne, the "needs of India were 
secondary, if considered at all". He adds: 
The Bengal Army, in particular, was tragically undermined by the nature of its [officers who]... looked to transfers 
in the more lucrative stations, which paid full hatta, or to employment on the staff, the superior status, emoluments 
and opportunities of which deprived regimental officers of all effective decision-making and lowered their prestige 
in native eyes. Financial considerations produced a distaste for the ordinary round of sepoy management and 
7 Pay and Audit Regulations 1849, OIOC, L/MIU17/2/459, p. 273. 
8 Ibid., p. 124c. 
9 Strachan, Wellington's Legacy, p. 112. 
10 Pay and Audit Regulations 1849, OIOC, IAlIL/17/2/459, p. 222a. 
11 Evidence of Philip Melvill, 14 Dec 1852, P. P., H. C., 1852-3, )ONH, p. 10. 
12 B arat, Ae Bengal Native ItIfantry, pp. 10 1-2. 
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training and conspired to create a positive dislike of the sepoy and of all things Indian, a development pregnant 
with danger. 13 
It did not help that the standard of training and education that Company officers received before joining 
their regiments was generally poor. A Military Seminary was established at Addiscombe, near 
Croydon, in 1809 but it only educated artillery and engineer officers until the admission of"general 
service' cadets in 1827. From that date on, Addiscombe produced an average of seventy-five cadets a 
year, with 60 per cent joining the artillery or engineers and 40 per cent the infantry. But even for these 
fortunate officers, the system of education was highly unsatisfactory. The curriculum was dominated 
by mathematics (which occupied 22 hours of a 54 hour academic week), while fortification, based on 
Vauban, "was largely obsolete and irrelevant to Indian conditions", chemistry and classics too narrow 
in their focus, and the study of Hindustani "perfunctory". The aim of the seminary, wrote Boume, was 
"to cram into [the cadet's] mind the greatest number of facts in the shortest possible time, a system 
which at best produced cultivated pedants, and at worst cramped and desiccated intellects incapable of 
original thought and swift action". 14 
Even Addiscombe, however, was preferable to the sketchy education received by direct-entry cadets 
(who accounted for two-thirds of all new officers), particularly after the closure of Baraset college near 
Calcutta in 1811, just seven years since it had been established to provide newly-anived cadets with 
basic instruction in military duties and Indian languages. Until 1851 - when the Company instituted 
exams for direct-entry cadets in arithmetic, English, Latin, French or Hindustani, History, geography, 
elementary drawing and fortification - there was no academic requirement. As a result, most direct- 
entry cadets had "received the bare minimum of education" by the time they reached India. 15 
Company officers, therefore, were characterized by poor education and an unseemly desire to 
abandon regular regimental duty for more lucrative detached appointments (in civil posts such as 
assistant commissioners, for example, officers continued to receive regimental pay as well as civil 
allowances). This was a particular problem in Bengal because the large expansion of its territory in the 
first half of the nineteenth century meant an increasing demand for civil administrators, political 
officers, staff officers, surveyors, engineers and commandants of local and irregular corps. The 
13 Bourne, 'Civil and Mlitary Patronage', Ph. D thesis, pp. 2 10-11. 
14 Ibid., pp. 254,258-9,294. 
15 Ibid., p. 250. 
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potential consequences of too many officers on detached employ were twofold: first, the regiment was 
left underofficered and efficiency suffered; second, the most talented and best-connected officers were 
taken, leaving their less fortunate comrades to regard regimental duty as a sign of failure rather than 
pride. 
Before 1796, the withdrawal of officers for detached duties did not affect regimental establishments 
because they were simply replaced from a general list for each branch. But with the introduction of 
regimental lists in that year, whereby an officer was allotted to a specific regiment and promoted 
according to his seniority within it, any future withdrawals were absorbed by a regiment's fixed 
establishment. At first the number of absentees was relatively small. In 1805, out of a total of 803 
officers, the Bengal Native Infantry had 132 (16.4%) absent on civilian and staff duties and a further 49 
(6.1%) on furlough. By 1825, however, the number of absentees had risen steadily to 379 out of 1,237 
(or 30.6 %), with 93 (7.5%) on furlough. 16 And these figures do not include officers on sick leave. In 
1827, with Bengal infantry regiments down to about 60 per cent of their fixed establishment, the Indian 
government ordered that no more than five officers per regiment were to be absent on staff 
employment. 17 But this restriction was not strictly adhered to. In 1830, for example, less than half the 
Bengal Native Infantry's 1,400 officers were present with their regiments: 547 (39%) were absent on 
detached duty and 185 (13.2%) on furlough. 18 Though the incidence was not as high in Bombay, the 
outgoing governor, Sir John Malcolm, was sufficiently alarmed to pen a minute to the Court of 
Directors in November 1830, deploring the fact that many "excellent" officers preferred junior staff 
appointments to the command of a regiment. His solution was to insist that officers had passed their 
native language certificate and had served a minimum period with their regiments before they could 
take up staff appointments; he also suggested changing brigade and line staff every three years. 19 In a 
subsequent book, Malcolm recommended the formation of a "corps of officers without men, from 
whom vacancies caused by appointments to the staff could be filled, who might be employed on the 
staff, and would join corps with whom their services might be required..., but should rise in unattached 
CorpSvi. 20 A number of other officers suggested the institution of a Staff Corps, in one form or another, 
16 Barat, Yhe Bengal Native Infantry, Appx. C., p. 3 08. 
17 G. O. V. P., 17 Aug 1827, Abstract of General Orders from 1817 to 1840, LAffUI7/2/435, OIOC. 
18Barat, The Bengal Native Infantry, Appx. C., p. 308. 
19 Minute of 30 Nov 1830, Malcolm, Yhe Government ofIndia, Appx. A., p. 33. 
20 Sir John Malcolm, Political History ofIndia, R, p. 234. 
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in the years prior to the mutiny. 21 Even Lord Dalhousie was sympathetic. 22 But the scheme was always 
rejected "on account of its enormous CoStii. 23 Only after the mutiny did it come into being. 
The first of Malcolm's recommendations was partially implemented in 1837 when the Court of 
Directors ordered that all officers who entered the service after that date would need to have passed an 
examination in the Hindustani language to be eligible for detached dUty. 24 Four years earlier, however, 
Bentinck had exempted officers on the personal staff of senior civilian and military officials from the 
five officers absent per regiment rule . 
25 The net result was that the number of absentee Bengal Native 
Infantry officers dropped to 344 in 1835, before rising steadily to 549 in 1852.26 Yet the percentage of 
absenteeism never reached the 1830 level because the total number of officers continued to rise, 
particularly after the addition of one extra captain per regiment in 1845.27 
In general, the number of absentee officers throughout India was on the increase prior to the mutiny, 
with the greatest burden falling on the Bengal Army. In 1852, Philip Melvill told a Parliamentary 
select committee that the "number of officers required for detached employments" had risen from 532 
in 1834-5 to the latest figure of 1,040. With regard to this latter figure, the Bengal Army was supplying 
an average of six officers per regiment, the Bombay Army five, and the Madras Army three and a half. 
Each regiment had, in addition, an average of one officer absent in Britain on private affairs and two- 
and-a-half because of ill health . 
28 The Bengal Army was proportionately the hardest hit because most 
of the new civil appointments were in the recently-annexed Punjab. Bombay was next because it had 
absorbed Sind and was geographically closer to Bengal where the vast majority of extra-regimental 
appointments were available. To accommodate the rising demand, the Indian government increased the 
number of officers eligible for detached duty to six per regiment in 1851 and seven - "in cases of great 
emergency" - in 1853 . 
29 But so great had become the need for staff officers in Bombay by May 1854 
that the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Frederick Fitzclarence, informed the Governor, Lord Elphinstone, 
21 They included General Sir Charles Napier, Lieutenant-General Sir Willoughby Cotton, John Jacob 
and Henry Lawrence. 
22 Shibly, 'The Reorganisation of the Indian Armies', Ph. D thesis, p. 200 
23 Dissent by J. P. Willoughby, 4 July 1860, quoted in Shibly, ibid., p. 201. 
24 G. O. G. G., 9 Jan 1837, Abstract of General Orders from 1817 to 1840, OIOC, L/N4EL/17/2/435. 
25 G. O. G. G., 19 Oct 1833, ibid. 
26 Barat, The BengaiNative Infantry, Appx. C., p. 308. 
27 Ibid. In 1835, for example, the established officer strength of the 74 Bengal Native Infantry 
regiments was 1,702, the actual strength 1,416, the number of absentees 344 (24.2%) and the number 
on furlough 154 (10.9%). In 1852, the established strength was 1,776, the actual strength 1,741, the 
number of absentees 549 (31.5%) and the number on furlough 172 (9.9%). 
28 Evidence of Philip Melvill, 14 December 1852, P. P., H. C., 1852-3, MMI, pp. 9-10. 
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that he did not know how he could supply them. There were, he wrote, only five regiments who were 
"not up to their number, 6, and in these none I fear are passed in surveying"; his only hope was to make 
up the shortfall "from the Queen's troops". 30 
So worried was Lord Canning, the newly-arrived Governor-General, by the high number of officer 
absentees that, in April 1856, he asked the Board of Control to authorise two extra subalterns for each 
31 native regiment, and four for each European corps, the necessity of which was "patent and urgent". 
His request was rejected - presumably on the ground of expense - and the problem simply got worse. 
By 1857, the total number of Indian officers on detached employ had risen to 1,237.32 In April of that 
year, to reduce the pressure on the Indian Army generally, and the Bengal Army in particular, Canning 
opened staff appointments to British Army officers. 33 But the mutiny broke out before this order had 
time to take effect. At this point, most Bengal Native Infantry regiments had fewer than 12 of their 24 
European officers present. According to General Grant, the first twelve regiments of Bengal Native 
Infantry had a total of 133 officers, or eleven and a half per regiment. 34 Even more alarming was the 
fact that they had just 10 field officers and 34 captains out of the established totals of 36 and 96 
respectively. Grant added: "Deduct commanding officer, adjutant and quartermaster, and all ensigns 
under two years' service, and there remains five and three quarter officers per regiment for company 
duty. " Ina regiment often companies, this meant just over one qualified officer for every two 
companies. The official returns for a further 24 regiments of Bengal Native Infantry give a total of 235 
officers, orjust under ten European officers per regiment, present when the mutiny began. 35 The 58th 
and W regiments had the highest number of officers with 15; the 16'h regiment the lowest with six. 
Yet there does not seem to be any obvious correlation between a lack of officers and a tendency to 
mutiny. The 60'h N. I. mutinied while the 3 1" N. I., with just nine officers present in May 1857, was one 
of the few to remain loyal. On the other hand, the 55th and 72ýd regiments had nine officers and both 
29 G. O. G. G., 10 Feb 1851 and 10 June 1853, Abstract of General Orders from 1848 to 1853, OIOC, 
LJMIU17/2/437. 
30 Fitzclarence to Elphinstone, 16 May 1854, Elphinstone Papers, OIOC, MSS Eur/F87A30x 7A/26. 
31 Canning to Vernon Smith, 8 April 1857, quoted in Maclagan, `Clenlenq. ýV, Canning, p. 62. 
32 Colonel Holland's memorandum, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 7, p. 371. 
33 G. O. G. G., 9 April 1857, Sandhurst Papers, OIOC, MSS Eur/D174, p. 238. 
34 Memorandum by Lt. -Gen. Sir Patrick Grant to the Governor-General, 29 June 1857, P. P., H. C., 
1859, V, Appx. 66, p. 497. 
35 'A Return of the Name or Number of each Regiment and Regular and Irregular Corps in India which 
has mutinied, or manifested a disposition to mutiny, since the I" day of January 1857', P. P., H. C., 1859, 
XVIII, pp. 1-64. The regiments of Bengal Native Infantry referred to were the 15d' , 16'h 17ý 190' , 24"' , 
26'hý 27th, 3&, 31", 33'ý 30h, 37ý 40'h, 4&, 49d, 50'h, 55thi 57ý 58h2 60'h, 61ý 64 1h , 6ýý 72. 
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mutinied, but so did the 360'and 37'ý regiments with thirteen and fourteen respectively. The 10h and 
58 th regiments were both disarmed. 
The Bombay Native Infantry had a similar number of absentees. According to a return of July 1858, 
only 362 - or half - the established strength of 725 officers were available for regimental duty: 218 were 
absent on staff employ, 78 ensign vacancies were waiting to be filled, and 67 were on furlough, 36 
The consequence of such high levels of absenteeism was much debated before and after the mutiny. 
Generally, however, it was felt to have had a detrimental effect on regimental morale and discipline, 
particularly in the Bengal Army. Referring to the period before the mutiny, Sitaram Pandy recalled that 
"any clever officer was always taken away from his regiment for some appointment" and that when he 
returned many years later "he knew very little about the men". 37 One of the reasons that Sir Charles 
Napier gave for first tendering his resignation in April 1850 was "that the officers of the Indian Army 
looked at their regiments merely as stepping stones to lucrative civil appointments" which were not 
dependent upon "professional character". He added: "No fewer than 443 officers in the Bengal Army 
had thus been withdrawn from their regiments and placed in lucrative employments by the civil 
authorities, without any distinct recommendation through the military authorities... Thusthe 
mainspring of the Army was relaxed. The officers saw that the posts of emoluments were not granted 
for military duties, and military duty became a painful task. " This in turn made it "impossible for the 
Commander-in-Chief to maintain the requisite degree of military spirit, discipline, and efficiency, in the 
Army of . 
38 
Napier expanded on this theme after his return to England. The absence of senior officers meant that 
subalterns were "constantly in command of regiments without being, as in the Irregular Corps, selected 
for command". Their inexperience caused the sepoys to lose their respect for their British officers and 
"the regiment goes to pieces". Instead it was necessary to keep field officers and captains with their 
regiments. "Dull Generals, Colonels and Majors there are, " wrote Napier, "yet white hairs meet with 
respect, and veteran commanders know at least the routine of service. " He also believed that each 
company need a captain: "Experienced Captains are the pillars of discipline, but scarce in Native 
regiments, the best being taken for staff, or civil employments, which generally turns a good Captain in 
to a bad "political". His solution, like Malcolm before him, was to recommend "a Staff Corps of 
36 P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 69, p. 522. 
37 Lunt (ed. ), From Sepoy to Subedar, p. 77. 
3' Napier, Defects, Civil andMilitary, pp. 195,198. 
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officers, having no more pay than in the line, and no extra advantage than allowance for horses, 
39 
according to rank" . 
Napier's fears were confirmed by Montagu Hall, who in 1852 did duty as an ensign with the 16 th N. I., 
a regiment with a "very distinguished record of war service". Hall remembered: "I was awfully 
disappointed with what I saw of native Regiments; the whole thing seemed to be a sham and a 
delusion... The 16th had a nicely appointed Mess, but the senior officers were all either absent on Staff 
employ, leave, or married. We went most mornings to be drilled under the European Sergeant-Major, 
but parades of the regiment, there seemed none. The Adjutant did all the work and the chief idea of the 
officers seemed to be how to get away from regimental duty. o00 
John Jacob expanded on this theme in an essay written in 1854. "The 'REFUSE' only remain, " he 
wrote. "All proper feeling is thus totally destroyed between the native soldier and his European 
superior. " This was not because there were too few officers, but rather because too many of those left 
were mediocre and uninterested in their duty or their men. Jacob believed that "one active, energetic, 
right-feeling, and right-thinking English gentleman can, even when alone, infuse an excellent spirit into 
thousands of these Eastern soldiers". His solution, therefore, was to appoint only three European 
officers, "carefully selected and entrusted with full powers", to each native regiment, drawn either from 
the strength of the Indian Army's European regiments or from a single unattached list (similar to 
Malcolm's Staff Corps). 41 In an essay published in the Calcutta Review in 1856, Sir Henry Lawrence 
also suggested a Staff Corps, but only to provide officers for staff appointments; he believed that 
regular regiments needed more, not fewer officers, and that native officers would have to be abolished 
to make way for them. 42 
By the outbreak of mutiny, however, nothing had changed. "It ought not to be the aim of every 
officer, or of most of them, to leave the Army for a Civil appointment, but so it is, " wrote Lieutenant 
Chamier, interpreter to the recently-disbanded 34th Bengal N. I., in early June 1857. "One can rarely 
rely on a fortune by serving with a corps. v03 Yhe United Service Gazette, in an article a week later, 
went so far as to identify absenteeism by officers as a key cause of mutiny. The best way to restore 
discipline, it argued, was "by compelling the Officers to make their regiments more distinctly their 
39 Ibid., p. 247-8. 
40 Hall Papers, NAM, '1857'(54)/11919, p. 4. 
41 Pelly (ed. ), Views and Opinions, pp. 124,126,130-2. 
42 Lawrence, Fssays, Military and Political, p. 3 98-9. 
43 Chamier to his father, 5 June 1857, Chamier Letters, NAM, 7510-3 1. 
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homes by associating with the men, entering into their feelings, respecting their prejudices, sharing in 
their games, and keeping them to their duty". This could only be achieved by "limiting the number of 
Staff absentees in each Corps, and placing the qualifications for the Staff so high, that very few Officers 
44 will go out of their way to seek such preferment" . 
General Grant was also convinced that the absence of officers in the Bengal Army was central to the 
outbreak of mutiny. In a memorandum to Lord Canning, during his brief stint as Commander-in-Chief 
in Bengal after the death of General Anson in May 1857, Grant identified a "want of officers in whom 
the sepoy could confide" as one of the four factors that had given rise to a feeling of "dissatisfaction and 
distrust" among the Bengal sepoys long before their religious fears were played upon by conspirators. 
This, in turn, was caused by the fact that so few officers were present with their regiments. "Further, 
these officers are discontented, " wrote Grant, "only looking forward to leaving their regiments for some 
more pleasant employment, so that they perform, and unwillingly, the bare outline of their duty; and 
never, as a general rule, mix or converse with their men; but, on the contrary, too often refuse to listen 
to their complaints, at the best telling them to go to the adjutant, and not unfrequently, "Go to hell - 
45 don't bother me". 
Similar sentiments were expressed by many of the officers who gave written or oral evidence to the 
Peel Commission. 46 They did not, on the other hand, necesssarily believe that a regiment would be less 
efficient if it had a high number of officers absent. Major-General Birch, the former Secretary to the 
Government of India in the Military Department, repeated Jacob's argument "that a regiment well 
commanded will be quite as efficient with but a few officers as a regiment indifferently commanded 
with a larger number of officers, and even more so". Yet he also believed that European officers 
needed to fulfil their duties more "punctually and exactly" as an "example to their men", and that they 
needed to "go more often into the lines and among the men than is generally done". 
47 As to whether a 
regiment with a small number of officers had been more susceptible to mutiny, most witnesses did not 
believe that to be the case. 48 If the influence of a European officer had kept any regiment from 
44 7he UnitedService Gazelle, 13 June 1857. 
43 Memorandum by Lt. -Gen. Sir Patrick Grant to the Governor-General, 29 June 1857, P. P., H. C., 1859, 
V, Appx. 66, p. 496. 
46 P. P., H. C., 1859, V, pp. 25,72,486-7. They included Lt. Col. Becher, Maj. -Gen. Sir Scudamore 
Steel, Lt. -Gen. Sir Patrick Grant. 47 Ibid., Appx. 61, p. 441. 
48 Ibid., pp. 133,215,441-2,562,571-3. Among the witnesses holding this opinion were Lord 
Canning, Lord Clyde, the Punjab committee, Major-General Birch, the Oude committee, Sir Sydney 
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mutinying, noted Birch, it was that exercised by the "commanding officer, or the adjutant, or some 
highly respected and efficient officers in the corps". 49 In other words, quality was more important than 
quantity. This argument was underlined by Lord Tweeddale, a member of the Peel Commission, who 
noted: 
The discipline of a native regiment does not depend so much on the number of European officers present with the 
regiment, as it does on the commanding officer and adjutant, and one officer to each company, being thoroughly 
masters of their business and able to instruct others. Example and regularity in carrying on duty commands the 
respect of a native soldier more than any other cause. 
50 
That the problem of officer absenteeism affected all three presidency armies is proven by the written 
answers provided by the Commanders-in-Chief of Madras and Bombay. In a memorandum dated July 
1858, Lieutenant-General Sir Patrict Grant noted that the efficiency of Madras regiments was "most 
injuriously affected by the number of officers taken from corps for staff employment". He added: 
"Either regiments are drained of their best and most deserving officers, or patronage is not dispensed 
with justice to individuals, and solely with reference to superior merit. " He also quoted from a minute 
he had sent to the Supreme Government and to the home authorities on 21 May 1857, warning that the 
principal causes of complaint in the Madras Army were "the unceasing demands upon the energies of 
the men, their poverty, and, more than all, the great paucity of European officers of standing and 
experience present with regiments". Officers "must be taught to look upon their regiments as their 
home", he advised, "and not to fix their whole thoughts, as they now do, on devising means of getting 
away to staff or other detached employment". The consequences of this "craving" were "utter 
indifference, not to say positive dislike, towards their men, and the engendering of a restless, 
discontented disposition, which is, I doubt not, communicated to the soldier". 51 
Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Somerset, also writing in July 1858, bemoaned the fact that a cadet's 
first priority was to find a good staff appointment. "The young man joins his regiment, " wrote 
Somerset, "learns a little of his drill, but very shortly finds himself selected for military or political 
employ on the staff, and this without any reference to his qualifications, and invariably without any 
Cotton, Sir John Hearsey, Sir George Clerk, Brigadiers Farguharson, Steel, Coke, Troup, Colonel 
Wintle and Major Williams. 
49 Ibid., Appx. 71, p. 562. 
50 Ibid., Appx. 74, p. 583. 
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reference to his commanding officer. " This trend was exacerbated by the fact that the rule stating that 
no more than a certain number of officers could be taken from each regiment was "frequently broken 
through", leaving regiments "almost entirely without officers". He had known of officers who, after 
absences of up to 18 years, had returned to command their regiments. "How can such a man know 
anything of his duty? " asked Somerset. "And how can any discipline be carried on in any army where 
such a system exists? " 52 
The consequences of absenteeism for the Bengal Army were neatly summed-up by George Chesney 
in his perceptive study of pre-mutiny British India. The "paucity of officers", wrote Chesney, "was the 
smallest part of the evil, for a dozen officers under a good system should have been an ample 
complement for a native battalion". Instead the "mischief lay in the unhealthy feeling of dissatisfaction 
with which regimental duty came to be regarded, as the last course, only to be undergone by the 
minority who could get nothing better". As this "degeneracy of feeling" was bound to be "reflected by 
the men", wrote Chesney, the absence of officers, "from the manner in which it came about, "was 
unquestionably one of the many causes which led up to the great mutiny". 53 
Though officer absenteeism was clearly a problem for all three presidency armies, it would only 
prove fatal for the Bengal Army when it was combined with other factors unique to that army which 
were also working to undermine the relationship between the officers and the sepoys. The most 
important of these factors was the diminishing power of the Bengal commanding officer to reward and 
punish. But there were others. 
When Sitaram Pandy joined the 2/26h Bengal N. I. in 1814, the relationship between sepoys and officers 
was very close. "The sahibs often used to give nautches [erotic entertainment by professional dancers] 
for the regiment, " he recalled many years later, "and they attended all the men's games. They also took 
us with them when they went out hunting, or at least those of us who wanted to go. Nowadays they 
seldom attend nautches because their Padre sahibs have told them it is wrong. " Sitaram also 
remembered his company commander - whose nickname was the'Wrestler' because he used tojoin the 
men in their wrestling arena - entertaining a constant stream of men at his house. Some went to further 
51 Ibid., Appx. 65, p. 486-7. 
52 Lt. -Gen. Sir Henry Somerset's replies, 24 July 1858, ibid., Appx. 69, p. 521. 53 Chesney, Indian Polity, p. 288-9. 
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their chances of promotion, but most "because we liked the sahib who always treated us as if we were 
his children". Part of the reason for this closeness, said Sitaram, was because most of the officers "had 
Indian women living with them", which naturally facilitated their grasp of Hindustani and the ease with 
which they could communicate with their men. The practice began to die out in the 1820s and 30s as 
more and more wives and female relatives of civil and military officers came to live in India and it 
became socially unacceptable to keep a native mistress (or bibi) or many a Eurasian. This, in turn, 
meant that Europeans began to keep their own society and contact between officers and men was 
reduced to a minimum. "I have lived to see great changes in the sahibs' attitude towards us, " recalled 
Sitaram. "I know that many officers nowadays only speak to their men when obliged to do so, and they 
show that the business is irksome and try to get rid of the sepoys as quickly as possible. One sahib told 
us that he never knew what to say to us. The sahibs always knew what to say, and how to say it, when I 
was a young soldier.. - 
04 It is surely no coincidence that the commanding officers of the only two 
traditionally-recruited regiments of Bengal Native Infantry to remain loyal and keep their weapons in 
1857 both had native family ties: Major Henry Milne of the 21' regiment had married the Eurasian 
grand-daughter of Colonel James Skinner; Major William Hampton of the 3 1" regiment had two 
55 daughters by a native mistress. 
But even in the early years of Sitaram's service the relationship between European officers and native 
troops (particularly native officers) was not always harmonious. In December 1826, for example, Lord 
Combermere, the Commander-in-Chief of the Bengal Army, felt it necessary to issue a circular urging 
junior officers to be more respectful to native officers. To ensure cordial relations, subalterns were 
instructed never to leave native officers standing when they were waiting to report; instead they were to 
be invited to sit. Furthermore, it was the responsibility of ensigns and comets to learn the various 
modes of address in Hindustani to avoid giving offence to native gentlemen. Finally, Combermere 
wished it to be understood that he considered "a conciliatory disposition and manner towards the Native 
Soldiers, and a due courtesy towards the Native Officers" as essential qualifications for those officers 
aspiring to the command of a troop or company. 56 
But this was not always the case. In 1841, William Sleeman noted that the "good tone of feeling 
between the European officers and their men" had become "somewhat impaired" when regiments were 
54 Lunt (ed. ), From Sepoy to Subedar, pp. 24-5. 
55 Service Records of the officers of the East India Company Army, Hodson Index, NAM. 
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concentrated at large stations. "In such places, " he wrote, " the European society is commonly large 
and gay; and the officers of our native regiments become too much occupied in its pleasures and 
ceremonies to attend to their native officers or sepoys... The consequence is that they often become 
entirely alienated from their men, and betray signs of the greatest impatience while they listen to the 
necessary reports of their native officers, as they come on or go off duty. 1157 
In an attempt to halt this trend, the Indian government issued a general order in 1844 to the effect that 
no subaltern would be allowed to take command of a troop or company until he had passed a colloquial 
examination in the Hindustani language which would prove his competence to converse with the men 
under his command. 58 For officers who had joined since 183 7, the appointments of adjutant and 
regimental interpreter were already dependent upon the possession of the basic qualification in written 
59 
and spoken Hindustani (which itself was worth 500 rupees). Yet, according to a letter to the editor of 
the United Service Magazine from a Madras officer in 1853, the number of Indian Army officers who 
were qualified as interpreters in two languages - Hindustani and Persian - was becoming "small by 
degrees and beautifully less". The correspondent put this down to the fact that young officers had 
begun to realize that, as far as their career prospects were concerned, patronage was far more important 
than a knowledge of native languages: "The cadet comes out, studies hard, and then finds that without 
interest all his efforts and money have been thrown away. His brother cadets seeing this, are warned in 
time, and consequently resolve to pitch Hindustani books and moonshees [native language teachers] to 
the devil. n60 
The consequences were inevitably harmful to officer/soldier relations. During his time as 
Commander-in-Chief, Sir Charles Napier knew of a number of cases in which sepoys had been court- 
martialled for insolence when they were simply trying to make their officer understand what they were 
saying; the other side of the coin was that an officer's language deficiencies enabled some of his men to 
be deliberately insolent. Part of the problem, according to Napier, was that officers were "now more 
numerous than formerly, and associate apart". He added: "All old officers of name in the Company's 
service ... have complained that the younger race of Europeans keep aloof from Native officers; showing 
56 Circular No. 23 99 of 29 December 1826, Abstract of General Orders from 1817 to 1840, OIOC, 
L/MEL/17/2/435. 
57 Sleeman, Rambles andRecollections, pp. 63 8-9. 
58 G. O. G. G,, I" March 1844, Abstract of General Orders from 1840 to 1847, OIOC, L/MEL/17/2/436. 
59 Bengal Army Regulations 1855, OIOC, L/MIL/17/2/442, p. 237. 
60 'A Few Remarks upon the Present Organization of the Indian Army', Letter to the Editor from 
"Military Reform", dated I May 1853, published in the United Service Magazine, August 1853. 
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thereby want of foresight, and casting away, as of no value, the strong attachment these natives are so 
susceptible of forming for them. How different this from the spirit which actuated the old men of 
Indian renown... j116l 
One of these "old officers" was Brigadier J. S. Hodgson who wrote, in 1850, that "the reserved and 
exclusive habits" of European officers were gaining ground, and that most of them "took but little 
interest in their men, who, on their part, ceased to feel either love or reverence for superiors who were 
virtually strangers to them and powerless, besides, to reward or punish". 62 This lack of sympathy 
between officers and men appeared to Hodgson as "fraught with impending peril". Lord Dalhousie 
agreed. A few months after arriving in India in 1848, he informed a close friend in Scotland that if 
there was a danger to the loyalty of the Indian Army it was "in the growing distance between European 
officers and the native soldiers" and in "the diminished interest those officers are now said to take in the 
native troops under their orders". In particular, Dalhousie regretted the low status accorded to native 
officers who, except on parade, were no more important than sepoys. They were "never received by 
European officers, never consorted with" and when they went to make a report they were, despite 
Combermere's order to the contrary, "probably left to stand in the lobby". How could such a man "have 
respect in his own eyes"? asked Dalhousie. How could he have "authority in the eyes of his men" ? 63 
In an 1851 article entitled 'The Defects of the Bengal Army', John Jacob identified the "entire absence 
of a proper confidence between the officers and the native soldiers" as one of the most serious faults 
particular to that army. Recent proof of this, he added, was the tendency of men to desert their officers 
in the field and the fact that no officers had received any forewarning of the recent spate of mutinies. 64 
Jacob's first point probably refers to the infamous behaviour of three regiments of Bengal native cavalry 
at Chilianwalla during the 2nd Punjab War in 1849: two retreated without orders (though the stampede 
was said to have been precipitated by a British regiment)65 and a third - the 5dBengat L. C. - refused to 
advance. 66 There were similar episodes during the I" Sikh War, such as the abandonment of their 
officers by the men of the 260'Bengal N. I. at the Battle of Ferozshah in December 1845. "It was a 
fearful crisis, " wrote William Hodson, a recently-arrived ensign, "but the bravery of the English 
61 Napier, Defects, Civil andMilitaty, pp. 23 940,248,250. 
62 Quoted in S. A. A. Rizvi and M. L. Bhargava (eds. ), Rreedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh: Source 
Material (Lucknow, 1957), 1, p. 324. 
63 Dalhousie to Sir George Couper, 4 Aug 1848, J. G. A- Baird (ed. ), Private Letters of the Marquess of 
Dalhousie (London, 19 10), p. 3 1. 
64 Pelly (ed. ), Views and Opinions, p. 103. 
65 Lord Dalhousie to Wellington, 22 January 1849, Dalhousie Papers, NAS, GD46/6/323/ 
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regiments saved us. The Colonel, the greater part of my brother officers, and myself, were left with the 
colours and about thirty men immediately in front of the batteries 1 "" So mistrustful of native troops 
did Hodson become after this experience that he requested, and was granted, a transfer to the I" Bengal 
68 European Fusiliers, "the finest regiment in India, with white faces too". 
The deterioration of the officer/soldier relationship was emphasized by Colonel (later General Sir) 
Patrick Grant, the former Adjutant-General of the Bengal Army, who told a parliamentary select 
committee in 1853 that the "confidence and attachment" between European officers and native troops 
was less than it had been when he had entered the service because officers were more self-important 
and treated their men with more contempt than had formerly been the case. 69 This attitude was 
illustrated by the anonymous British author of Yhe Rebellion in India, who wrote: "The officers and 
men have not been friends but strangers to one another. The sepoy is esteemed an inferior creature. He 
is sworn at. He is treated roughly. He is spoken of as a'nigger'. He is addressed as a'suar'or pig, an 
epithet most opprobrious to a respectable native, especially the Mussalman... The old men are less 
guilty as they sober down. But the younger men seem to regard it as an excellent joke... "70 
Like officer absenteeism, it was not a problem that was confined to Bengal. According to Captain 
Hervey, who published his memoirs in 1850, many young Madras officers arrived in India with scant 
respect for the natives, referring to their men as "those horrible black nigger sepoys" and cursing them 
on parade. But Hervey also gave many examples of the close bond that existed between the officers 
and men of his second regiment, the 40th Madras N. I.: of cricket matches, hunting expeditions and 
picnics enjoyed by both, and of one incident where a sepoy saved his adjutant's life by tackling a 
cheetah armed only with a knife. 71 Part of the reason for the closeness of this bond may have been the 
fact that, according to Colonel Felix, English was much more commonly spoken in Madras than in 
other parts of India, making communication between officers and men easier. 72 
In Bombay, too, the pre-mutiny relationship between officers and men was not always harmonious. 
In a letter to Lord Elphinstone of 22 January 1854, Lord Frederick Fitzclarence contrasted the 
"ignorance" with which his officers went about their duty with the "intelligence & knowledge of the 
66 Lanibrick, John Jacob ofJacobabad, p. 18 1. 
67 Quoted in Charles Allen, Soldier Sahibs: Yhe Men who made the North-West Frontier (London, 
2000), p. 68. 
68 Trotter, Yhe Life of Hodson of Hodsons Horse, p. 3 1. 
69 Evidence of Col. Patrick Grant, 14 March 1853, P. P., H. C., 1852-3, XXVIII, p. 133 
70 Quoted in Sen, Eighteen Fifty-Seven, p. 23. 
71 Allen (ed. ), A Soldier of the Company, pp. 3 8,103 -4. 
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sepoy, added to the enviable correctness of the native officer", and concluded that such a state of affairs 
was "dangerous to the Empire". His solution was to extend the examination already instituted by him 
for extra-regimental military appointments - which tested ensigns on the duty of a captain, and 
lieutenants and captains on the duty of a major - to civil appointments as well. "These examinations, " 
wrote Fitzclarence, "added to those I have ordered for passing an officer to be an adjutant, to have the 
payment of a company, to the Brigadier's examination of all the officers at his yearly review, & 
occasionally during the year of all young & nearly joined officers, will place the army in the state it 
should be in. ". 73 The Bombay government's compliance with this scheme, not to mention 
Fitzclarence's other reforms, undoubtedly improved the efficiency and knowledge of its European 
officers and, by extension, their relationship with their men. The unfortunate consequences of officer 
absenteeism that was such a feature of the Bengal Army - neglect of duty and worsening relations with 
the native troops - were thereby counteracted. Many of the Bombay officers who gave evidence to the 
Peel Commission were certainly keen to emphasize the depth of mutual respect that existed between 
them and their men. Colonel Poole of the Bombay Lancers, for example, recalled how he would leave 
for evening parade half an hour early if one of his native officers was ill, to give him time to sit and talk 
with the convalescent. 74 
Relations between Bengal officers and their men, on the other hand, continued to deteriorate in the 
years leading up to the mutiny. In 1856, Sir Henry Lawrence recommended the abolition of native 
officers because it would give European officers the opportunity to look into "the interior economy" of 
their regiments or companies. "Seldom is anything of the kind done at present, " wrote Lawrence. "So 
long as all is smooth and quiet on the surface, few inquiries are made. All may be rotten below; the 
jog-trot is followed -a mine may be ready to be sprung, for all that nine-tenths of the officers would 
know. Many do not know the very names of the men of their own company. " 75 Referring to the 
incident at Barrackpore in March 1857 when most of the 34ýh Bengal N. I. stood idly by as one of their 
number attempted to murder the adjutant, Yhe Hindoo Patriot could only conclude that "the system of 
officering the native army" had resulted in "the annihilation ofall moral influence ofofficers over their 
men". It added: "That the Sepoy should see his officer set upon by an assassin and that the officer 
72 Evidence of Colonel Orlando Felix, 25 August 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, p. 66. 
73 Fitzclarence to Elphinstone, 22 January 1854, Elphinstone Papers, OlOC, MSS Eur/F87/Box: 7A/26. 
74 Evidence of Colonel S. Poole, 27 August 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, p. 118. 
75 Lawrence, Fssays, Militaty and Political, pp. 398-9. 
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should cry for help, and in vain ... 
is an occurrence which can be accounted for only on the hypothesis 
that the European Commissioned officers of the Bengal army have utterly lost their prestige. o 76 
Sir George Clerk, a former Commissioner to the Punjab and Governor of Bombay, summed up many 
of the reasons for this loss of "moral influence" in his evidence to the Peel Commission. Asked 
whether there had been a "more intimate association" between European officers and native troops 
twenty or thirty years earlier, he replied: 
Yes. That association was not a preference. Formerly the officer had fewer comrades, the civilian no associate. 
Their duties were more pressing and uninterrupted. They therefore found more objects of interest in attending to 
those duties. They had not everywhere large stations, with a variety of permanent English society, with its 
amusements and connexions of every sort. There were not reinforcements of European troops close at hand... The 
necessity of knowing the native soldiers and the people was imposed on them in order to continue our dominion. 77 
Two other factors contributed to the worsening relations between officers and men: the generally poor 
quality of commanding officers in the Indian Army, and the fact that a great number of them were 
relatively unfamiliar to their troops in 1857. Both factors were the result of the same system of 
promotion by seniority that applied to their sepoys. On arrival in India, newly appointed officers 
hurried to join their regiments because their pay and seniority did not begin until they had. Thereafter 
their promotion was strictly on the basis of regimental seniority. Officers were promoted from senior 
ensign to lieutenant, and from senior lieutenant to captain when a vacancy arose within the regiment 
(though all lieutenants who had failed to reach the higher rank after 15 years' service were awarded a 
brevet captaincy without additional pay). The senior captain also had to wait for a vacancy before he 
could be promoted to the single majority, and so some officers never attained the latter rank. Only 
when regimental officers died, became invalids or agreed to retire in return for a lump sum or 
'subscription' from their juniors - an infantry major, for example, would receive Rs. 30,000, Rs. 12,000 
of which would be subscribed by the senior captain and only Rs. ISO by the junior ensign - was this 
78 
extremely slow system accelerated. 
On promotion to lieutenant-colonel the officer was removed from his regimental list to a branch list 
for the whole army. Once on that general list, he would only be appointed to command his own 
76 The Hindoo, Patriot, 7 May 1857 
77 Evidence of Sir George Clerk, 24 August 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, p. 43. 
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regiment if the major was either absent (most took their home furlough of three years after reaching that 
rank) or the most junior in the branch. Otherwise he would take command of the regiment with the 
most junior commander; which is why so many regiments were commanded by men who had spent the 
majority of their service elsewhere. 79 In May 1857, twenty-six of the 74 regiments of Bengal Native 
Infantry were commanded by officers who had been present for less than three of the previous 20 
years, 80 five by officers who had been present for more than three and less than five, 81 and nine by 
officers who had been present for more than five but less than ten. 82 In other words, forty (54.1 %) of 
the 74 regiments were commanded by officers who had been present for less than half the previous 20 
years. On the other hand, thirty regiments were commanded by officers who had been present for 
more than 15 of the previous 20 years, 83 and four by officers who had been present from between 10 
and 15 years. 84 But of these thirty-four officers who had served more than ten of the previous 20 years, 
nineteen - or more than half - were majors or captains in temporary command . 
85 
An interesting pattern emerges when we equate a commanding officer's time with his regiment to its 
behaviour during the mutiny. Of the 54 regiments of Bengal Native Infantry that mutinied or partially 
mutinied in 1857, twenty-three (or 42.6%) were commanded by officers who had served with them for 
86 less than three of the previous 20 years , two 
(3.71/o) by officers who had served for more than three 
and less than five years, 87 and eight (14.8%) by officers who had served for more than five and less than 
88 10 years. On the other hand, nineteen (or 35.2%) were commanded by officers who had served with 
them for more than 15 of the previous 20 years", and two (3.7%) by those who had served more than 
" Heathcote, 7he Indian Army, p. 132. 
79 Notes by the Marquess of Tweeddale, I Jan 1859, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 74., p. 583. 
80 Service Records of the officers of the East India Company Army, Hodson Index, NAM. The twenty- 
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ten and less than 15 years, 90 though ten of these twenty-one regiments had captains or majors in 
temporary command9'. Of the 17 regiments of Bengal Native Infantry that were disarmed and did not 
mutiny, only three (17.6%) were commanded by officers who had been present for less than three of the 
previous 20 years, 92 while another three had served more than three and less than five years, 93 whereas 
nine (52.9%) were commanded by officers who had been present for more than 15 of the previous 20 
years, 94 and two (11.8%) by those who had served between 10 and 15 years. 95 Both regiments of 
traditionally-recruited Bengal Native Infantry that did not mutiny and retained their arms - the 21' and 
3 1" N. I. - were commanded by officers who had been present for more than 15 of the previous 20 
years. The only other loyal regiment - the 660' Gurkhas - had no ties of kinship or caste with the rest of 
the Bengal Native Infantry, and therefore the time its commanding officer had spent with it (more than 
five and less than ten of the previous 20 years) was not so relevant to its decision to stay true to its salt. 
There were a number of factors that determined whether a regiment would mutiny or not in 1857. 
proximity to other mutinous regiments; the presence of European troops; and, among others, the 
relationship between the sepoys and their senior officers, particularly the adjutant and the commanding 
officer. The above data would seem to suggest that a regiment was more likely to mutiny if it was 
commanded by a relatively unfamiliar officer (i. e. one who had spent less than half the previous 20 
years with it). If, on the other hand, it had a commander - particularly a permanent commander - who 
had been with it for more than ten of the previous 20 years, it was more likely to stay loyal or allow 
itself to be disarmed. Sitaram Pandy stressed the importance of continuity when he noted that there was 
"always discontent" in a regiment when "someone completely strange" was sent to command it. 
"Among us there is a great dislike for new ways, " he added. "One sahib upsets what the other has 
done, and we do not know what to do because what we have been taught one day is wrong the next. I 
have known four Commanding Officers come to a regiment within a year, and three Adjutants, and two 
Quartermasters... It takes us a long time to learn the ways of a sahib and once the men have got used to 
him it is wrong to have him removed. " 96 Sitaram's regiment, the 63rd, was disarmed as a precaution in 
August 1857 and became one of only eight disarmed native infantry regiments to be incorporated into 
'0 The additional regiments were: 38h and 46h Bengal N. I. d 91 The regiments were: 13'h, 170% l8thP 260,28"') 29hs 46h, 5e, 53" 1 61" and 74h Bengal N. I. 92 The regiments were: 39th, 64 th and 70'h Bengal N. I. 
93 The regiments were: 16'h, 25h and 49ýh Bengal N. I. 
94 The regiments were: 2nd 24ý 27"' 33 rd I 
Vdý 47h, 58thl 59h and 65h Bengal N. I. 
95 The regiments were: 35th and 63d'Bengal N. I. 
96 Lunt (ed. ), From Sepoy to Subedar, p. 77. 
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the post-mutiny Bengal Army. It was commanded by Brevet Colonel Houghton, 53, who had joined 
the regiment as a subaltern in 1823 and remained with it for most of the next 34 years (though he was 
absent on staff duties for much of the 1840s). The presence of such an "old" hand in 1857 may well 
have prevented his regiment from mutinying. 
The overall effect of promotion by seniority was that officers did not reach the upper ranks of the army 
until a relatively late age (see Tables 32 and 33). 97 
Table 32 -Average length of service (in years) of infantry officers on promotion to their rank in 
Ocloher 1853 
Colonels Lt. Colonels Majors Captains Lieutenants 
Bengal Army 43.8 32.0 28.0 13.4 4.7 
Madras Army 39.4 31.3 26.5 12.8 4.3 
Bombay Army 39.3 31.2 27.8 12.2 4.6 
Table 33- Average age of infantry officers on promotion to their rank in October 1853 
Colonels Lt. Colonels Majors Captains Lieutenants 
Bengal Army 60.8 49.0 45.0 30.4 21.7 
Madras Army 56.4 48.3 43.5 29.8 21.3 
Bombay Army 56.3 48.2 44.8 29.2 21.6 
In the Bengal Army in 1853, some majors had been promoted afterjust 18 years'service, while others 
had to wait 35 years. In Madras and Bombay the most fortunate majors were promoted in 14 and 13 
years, and the least fortunate in 34 and 33 years respectively. Amongst the captains of the three 
armies, the most fortunate were of nine, eight and seven years' standing, while the least fortunate had 
been subalterns for 26,20 and 17 years respectively. " Overall Bengal infantry officers had to wait the 
longest for promotion, but officers in the other two armies were not that far behind. No native infantry 
officer, for example, could expect to receive the permanent command of a regiment much before his 
481 birthday, or 31 years of service. My own study of the service records of the officers commanding 
all 74 regiments of Bengal Native Infantry in May 1857 gives an average age of 50.5 years, though this 
figure includes 23 officers in temporary command. 99 The eldest was 61 (Lieutenant Colonel John 
Liptrap of the 45th N. I. ) and the youngest 35 (Major John Shakespear of the 24th N. I. ). Of the 51 
97 Lawrence, Essays, Military andPolitical, pp. 457-8. 
98 Ibid., p. 458. 
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officers in permanent command (with a rank of brevet lieutenant-colonel or higher), the average age 
was 53 years. 
The youngest of these permanent commanders, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel David Pott of the 47g'N. I., 
was 45 (and just 43 when he received his promotion). Apart from furlough and sick leave, Pott had 
served with the regiment since joining it as a 17-year-old ensign in 1829, seeing action in both the I' 
Sikh War (when he was a captain in temporary command) and the 2nd Burma War. It may not be a 
coincidence that his corps was one of only eight disarmed regiments of Bengal Native Infantry to be 
incorporated into the post-mutiny Bengal Army (i. e. they were considered to be the least disaffected). 
Of the other seven, five were commanded by officers who had joined them as ensigns and since served 
more than 10 of the previous 20 years'00 (and four by officers who had served more than 15 of those 
years). 101 Only one, the 70", was commanded by an officer who had been present for less than three of 
the previous 20 years, while the commander of the remaining regiment, the 32nd, had served between 
five and ten years. The age of these eight officers ranged from 45 to 54, with an average of 49.9 years 
(almost identical to the average for the whole Bengal Native Infantry). Four were permanent 
commanders and four in temporary command. These statistics would lead one to conclude that the 
familiarity of a commanding officer was a more important factor than his age in determining whether or 
not his regiment remained loyal. Younger officers were probably more efficient; older officers more 
respected. 
The average age of the officers commanding the ten regiments of Bengal Light Cavalry in May 1857 
was, at 49.7, only marginally younger than that of their native infantry counterparts. The eldest was 53 
(Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Barton of the 6th L. C. ) and the youngest 42 (Major Alfred Harris of the I' 
L. C. ). 102 But there was little difference between the average age of the commanding officers of the 
seven regiments that mutinied and the three that were disarmed, and therefore age can be discounted as 
99 Service Records of the officers of the East India Company Army, Hodson Index, NAM. The average 
, 
Ae of the 23 officers in temporary command was 45.7 years. a 
The regiments were: 33rý 43'd. 59P, 63rd and 650'Bengal N. I. 
'0' The regiments were: 33d ' 43rd ' 
59h and 65h Bengal N. I. 
102 The name and age of the Company officers commanding the 10 regiments of Bengal Light Cavalry 
in May 1857 were as follows: Major Alfred Harris, 42,1" L. C.; Brevet Major Edward Vibart, 49,2nd 
L. C.; Brevet Col. George Carmichael-Smyth, 53,3 rd L. C.; Brevet Col. Henry Clayton, 52, e L. C.; 
Brevet Lt. -Col. Thomas Harington, 46,5th L. C.; Brevet Lt. -Col, Nathaniel Barton, 53, 
Oh L. C.; Lt. -Col. 
Robert Master, 50,7h L. C.; Brevet Col. James Mackenzie, 52,8h L. C.; Lt. -Col. Archibald Campbell, 
52,9h L. C.; Major Ronald McDonell, 48,1 Oth L. C. 
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a factor. 103 Commandants of the 18 regiments of Bengal Irregular Cavalry, on the other hand, were 
generally much younger because they had been appointed on the basis of selection rather than seniority. 
Their average age was only 39.7 years, with the eldest 52 (Brevet Major James Verner of the 10 th 
regiment) and the youngest just 23 (Lieutenant James Campbell of the 14'h regiment). 104 Their ranks 
reflect this: two were lieutenants (in temporary command), three were captains, eight were brevet 
majors, one was a major, two were brevet lieutenant-colonels and only one was a substantive 
lieutenant-colonel (and he was a British Army officer). 105 But unlike the light cavalry, there is a 
noticeable difference between the average age of the Company officers who commanded the nine 
regiments that mutinied (36.8 years), and of those who commanded the three loyal and five disarmed 
regiments (42.1 years). Taken in conjunction with the earlier data relating to officer familiarity in the 
Bengal Irregular Cavalry, these statistics would seem to suggest that the older and more experienced a 
commandant was, the better chance he had of preventing his troops from mutinying, 
Henry Lawrence addressed the problem of aged senior officers in 1844 by recommending that all 
European and native officers be either sent to the invalids at the age of 50 or, if their health was up to it, 
allowed to serve for another five years; but no officer was to be allowed to remain with his regiment 
beyond the age of 55, or 60 in the case of the invalids. Lawrence was also concerned that the seniority 
system of promotion failed to weed out those unsuitable for higher command. Every officer was "not 
fitted for command", he stressed, "much less to command soldiers of a different religion and country"; 
those that could not manage their regiments because they were either too severe or too weak "should be 
removed from them, and that quickly, before their corps are irredemiably destroyed". 106 But this rarely 
happened. In 1853, Colonel Grant told the Select Committee on Indian Territories that he had "never 
seen an officer withdrawn from the command of a regiment on account of age and infirmity", and knew 
103 The average age of the commanding officers of the seven regiments of Bengal Light Cavalry that 
mutinied was 49.6 years; the average age of the commanding officers of the three regiments of Bengal 
Li lit Cavalry that were disarmed was 50.0 years. 
16TThis average age is for the Company officers who commanded 17 out of the 18 regiments of Bengal 
irregular Cavalry. Lieutenant-Colonel S. Fisher of the 150'I. C. is not included because he was a British 
Army officer. 
105 The name and age of the commandants of the 18 regiments of Bengal Irregular Cavalry in May 1857 
were as follows: Brevet Major Crawford Chamberlain, 36,1" I. C.; Brevet Major George Jackson, 44, 
2nd I. C.; Brevet Major Sydney Hire, 34,3rd I. C.; Brevet Major Anthony Martin, 46,4th I. C.; Brevet 
Major John Macdonald, 48,5th I. C.; Captain James Curtis, 37,6th I. C.; Brevet Lt. -Col. William 
Mulcaster, 36,7h I. C.; Lt. Alexander Mackenzie, 32,8"' I. C.; Brevet Lt. -Col. James Fraser-Tytler, 35, 1h SP I. C.; Brevet Major James Verner, 52, lOh I. C.; Captain William Alexander, 39,11 I. C.; Brevet 
Major James Holmes, 40, ffh I. C.; Captain Henry Guise, 39,13"' I. C.; Lt. James CaTXbell, 23,10 
I. C.; Lt. -Col. S. Fisher, age uncertain, 15"' I. C.; Brevet Major Wright Davison, 46,16 I. C.; Major John 
Liptrott, 44,17th I. C.; Brevet Major William Ryves, 45,18'h I. C.. 
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of only "one instance of a commanding officer having been reported by the inspecting officer as unfit to 
exercise command". But in the latter case the officer refused to transfer to the invalid establishment 
and the matter was dropped. When asked whether an officer was given the command of a regiment on 
account of seniority, and regardless of his suitability, Grant replied: "He must be promoted; but it rests 
with the Commander-in-Chief to withhold a command of that sort from him or not. But I have never 
known that power exercised. " The system of seniority therefore affected the discipline of Bengal 
regiments, Grant believed, "inasmuch as, with very few exceptions, an officer is far advanced in years 
before he attains the rank which would entitle him to the command of a regiment". In his opinion, the 
service would greatly benefit from younger senior officers as few men were "as efficient at 60 or 70 as 
they are at 40 or 50". 107 He himself, at 48, was the youngest fUll colonel in the Bengal Army, though he 
did not expect his energies to be unimpaired by the time he succeeded to the command of a division in 
not less than 15 years. As it happened, Grant was promoted to major-general the following year, and 
lieutenant-general commanding the Madras Army within three years. But he was the exception to the 
rule. 
Promotion to the higher ranks of brigadier and general was theoretically on the basis of merit, with 
the Commander-in-Chief s selection confirmed by the Indian government. But in practice the claim of 
seniority was rarely ignored. The Court of Directors underlined this principle in 1835 by pointing out 
that while officers had no right to succeed to the appointments of brigadier or brigadier-general "on the 
ground of mere seniority, these being staff appointments, involving both confidence and responsibility", 
they had every right to expect that their respective governments would never set aside their claims 
"arising out of length of service" except on public grounds. In effect, Colonel Durand told the Peel 
Commission, the rule was one of selection but "with a strong preference to the claims of the senior 
officer, if not unfit". 108 The average age of Company officers who had reached the rank of brigadier 
and major-general (in command of a division) in the Bengal Army in May 1857 was 55.6 and 66.4 
years respectively. 109 The average ages in Madras were slightly lower at 55.1 and 62.5 years 
106 Lawrence, Essays, Military and Political, p. 25. 
107 Evidence of Col. Patrick Grant, 14 March 1853, P. P., H. C. 1852-3, XXVII, p. 127. 
'08 Evidence of Col. Henry Durand C. B., 25 November 1858, ibid., p. 243. 
109 Service Records of the officers of the East India Company Army, Hodson Index, NAM. The 
youngest Bengal brigadier in May 1857 was Alexander Jack, 5 1, commander of the Cawnpore station 
(Neville Chamberlain, 37, the commander of the Punjab Irregular Force, had the responsibility of a 
brigadier but his substantive rank was only captain); and the oldest was Hugh Sibbald, 66, commander 
of the Bareilly brigade. The youngest Bengal major-general was John Hearsey, 64, commander of the 
Presidency Division; and the oldest was George Gowan, 68, commander of the Lahore Division. 
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respectively, ' 10 while in Bombay they were lower still at 53.4 and 60.0 years respectively. "' ABengal 
Army officer, therefore, was the last to receive promotion in every rank. 
Ina private letter of January 1851, Lord Dalhousie underlined the consequences. "TheCourt; "he 
wrote, "refuse to believe in the inferiority of the Bengal Army in discipline and order; nevertheless, it is 
true... [The] supervision of the boys when they join, the maintenance of order in a corps, the 
discouragement of extravagance and vice, are things which each commanding officer in his own corps 
alone can effect. But commanding officers are inefficient; brigadiers are no better; divisional officers 
are worse than either, because they are older and more done; and at the top of all they send 
commanders-in-chief seventy years old [Napier]. How can things go on right under such a system? " To 
rectify the situation, Dalhousie stated his determination not to confirm any promotion to brigadier or 
major-general unless his new Commander-in-Chief, Gomm, could tell him that the officer was 
"undeniably competent for the efficient and active discharge of his duties". 112 But this was wishful 
thinking and senior officers continued to be promoted on the basis of seniority. 
In March 1856, Sir Henry Lawrence warned that there had to be a "bar against the command of 
regiments being the reward of thirty and forty years of incompetence" because bad colonels were even 
more harmful to an army than bad generals. He conceded that some commanding officers, "to the 
injury of the service, were good men and true twenty years ago", but others "were never fit for a 
corporal's charge" and could only have risen from the subaltern ranks in a seniority service. "' In a 
second essay that year, he embellished this point by stating that the British Army had only ever escaped 
disaster by superseding its senior officers after the first disastrous campaign of each war. And yet the 
Bengal Army was full of officers - "not one of whom would have been instrusted in his youth, health, 
and strength with the charge of a mill, by a sensible cotton-spinner, during a disturbance" - who had 
been placed in commands "where their incompetence may any day blow a spark into a flame that may 
cost hundreds of lives and millions of money". The answer, he said, was to create an unattached list for 
superannuated colonels that would free up promotion below them and reduce the average period of 
110 Ibid. The youngest Madras brigadier in May 1857 was Edward Messiter, 53, commander at Thayet 
Mew; and the oldest was George Whitlock, 58, commander at Bangalore. The youngest Madras major- 
general was James Bell, 55, commander of the Pegu Division; and the oldest was Alexander Tulloch, 
68, commander of the Northern Division. 
"'Ibid. The youngest Bombay brigadier in May 1857 was Willoughby Trevelyan, 51, commander at 
Rajcote; and the eldest was Robert Hormer, 57, on field service in Persia. The youngest Bombay 
major-general was Sir James Outram, 54, commander of the Persian Expeditionary Force; and the 
oldest was George Wilson, 67, commander of the Southern Division. 
112 Dalhousie to Sir George Couper, 13 Jan 1851, Baird (ed. ), Dalhousie Letters, p. 108. 
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service in the grade of lieutenant-colonel from 10 years 2 months to 5 years and 10 months. ' 14 But as 
with all Lawrence's suggestions for army reform prior to the Indian mutiny, this measure was not taken 
up by the Indian government. 
The deteriorating relationship between the native troops of the Bengal Army and their European 
officers was probably the single most important cause of the mutiny. A series of factors contributed to 
this breakdown of trust, not least the arrival of an increasing number of poor, badly-educated officer 
cadets whose chief motives for entering the Company's service were social advancement and financical 
gain. "It was, therefore, the object of every ambitious and capable officer to secure" one of the more 
lucrative extra-regimental appointments, observed Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, a Bengal subaltern in 
the 1850s, "and escape as soon as possible from a service in which ability and professional zeal counted 
for nothing". ' 15 For the mediocre majority who possessed neither the talent nor connections necessary 
to obtain a detached appointment, regimental duty came to be regarded as a sign of failure rather than 
of pride - and was despised as a consequence. Such dissatisfied officers had little interest in the welfare 
of their men. 
But perhaps the biggest factor in the breakdown of officer/sepoy relations - and one that was 
particular to the Bengal Army - was the gradual reduction in the authority of the commanding officer. 
This was partly the result of the seniority system of promotion which failed to weed out old, unsuitable 
and inefficient officers, and which caused a significant number of regiments to be commanded by 
unfamiliar officers. An even more important antecedent, however, was the gradual weakening of the 
commanding officer's power to reward and punish. The former trend was considered in the previous 
chapter; the latter will form the basis of the next chapter. Yet it is worth pointing out that this reduction 
in power was the necessary consequence of the seniority system. "The seniority rise among the officers 
of a native regiment, originally appointed at hazard, " wrote John Jacob in 1854, "renders it impossible 
at present to ensure there being at the head of each native regiment a man capable of wielding the 
113 Lawrence, Essays, Military andPolitical, pp. 383-4. 
114 Ibid., p. 415-16,455-61. 
113 Field Marshal Lord Roberts, For4-one Years in India: From Subaltern to Commander-in-Chief 
(London, 1898), p. 244. 
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powers necessary to govern it efficiently and well. This is the great difficulty experienced at head- 
quarters; this is the stumbling-block of all honest reformers... 116 
In other words, the lack of a process of selection meant that the commanding officers of the Bengal 
Army were a mixed bunch who could not be trusted with the powers necessary to gain the respect and 
devotion of their native troops. And yet, in a foreign mercenary army more than any other, the 
attainment of such respect was crucial. Sitaram Pandy noted: 
The Sirkar should remember that the value of a regiment of scpoys greatly depends on the Commanding Officer. 
If the men like him, if he understands them and can enter their fcclings and has their confidence - which is not to be 
done in one day, or even in one year - and above all if he has power and is just, they will do anything, will go 
anywhere, and his word is law. 117 
Sitararn does not bother to spell out the alternative. But it is only too clear that most Bengal 
commanding officers had neither the physical nor moral authority to avert mutiny in 1857. 
116 Pelly (ed. ), Views and Opinims, p. 126. 
117 Lunt (ed. ), Rrom Sepoy lo Subedar, p. 77. 
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Chapter Four - Discipline 
Regimental commanding officers in all three presidency armies experienced some diminution in their 
power to punish in the decades prior to the mutiny, but Bengal colonels suffered the most severe 
reductions as more authority was concentrated in the offices of the Commander-in-Chief and Adjutant- 
General. This move towards a more centralized military system was part of a wider process of 
government reform in India from the 1820s which, wrote Stokes, "was to eradicate in the name of 
utility all the historical associations connected with the rise of British power; and in the cause of 
efficiency, simplicity, and economy, sought to reduce the historical modes of government to one 
centralized, uniform practice". ' 
Driving these reforms was the political philosophy of Utilitarianism: a belief that until humans "had 
sufficiently disciplined themselves to forgo immediate pleasure for the sake of lasting happiness, a 
'severe schoolmastee was necessary in the form of law"; human legislators were required to "assist men 
to avoid harmful acts by artificially weighting such acts with the pains of punishment". Utilitarianism 
retained, therefore, an immense faith in the power of law and government to shape conduct and 
transform character. With regard to India, its chief proponents were men like James Mill, his son John 
Stuart Mill and Edward Strachey, all senior officials of the East India Company in London in the 1820s 
and 30s, and Lord William Bentinck, Governor-General of India from 1827 to 1835 (and also 
Commander-in-Chief from 1833 to 1835). At a farewell dinner in London, attended by a number of 
leading Utilitarians including Jeremy Bentham, Bentinck is said to have remarked to James Mill: "I am 
going to British India, but ... 
it is you that will be Governor-General. 0 
The Utilitarian passion for uniformity, mechanistic administration and legislative regulation was not 
shared by the Monro school which had dominated Indian policy until the 1820s. 3 The latter's members 
made a careful distinction between uniformity and unity. Sir John Malcolm, for example, was the first 
to recognize the need for a more unified system of government as the Company expanded its territory. 
But he believed that economy, efficiency and a greater consistency of principle could be achieved "by 
1 Eric Stokes, Yhe Diglish Ulifilariata andIndia (Oxford, 1959), p. 14. 
2 Ibid., pp. 55,5 1. 
3 The Monro school was named after Sir Thomas Munro, Governor of Madras from 1819 to 1827. Its 
leading members were: the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay from 1819 to 1827; Sir 
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the delegation of full powers to trusted individuals, and not through a deadening centralized 
administration". 4 Among the natural heirs to the Monro school were the Lawrence brothers, Lord 
Elphinstone, Sir Charles Napier and John Jacob. For most of the 30 years or so that preceded the 
mutiny, however, Utilitarian policy was in the ascendancy at Calcutta and the consequent move towards 
a more centralized military justice system was to prove disastrous for the Bengal Army. 
Until 1845, when the first Articles of War were enacted for the whole Indian army, each presidency 
army was regulated by its own articles. But only one section of the Bengal articles, which dated from 
1796, alluded to the power of a commanding officer to punish without the intercession of a court- 
martial. It stated: "Every non-commissioned officer and soldier shall retire to his quarters or tent at the 
beating of retreat, in default of which he shall be punished, according to the nature of his offence, by 
the commanding oficer. " In lieu of any specific guidelines, therefore, Bengal commanding officers 
were able to impose a wide range of summary punishments - including dismissal, corporal punishment 
with a rattan cane, reduction of N. C. O. s to the ranks, refusing furlough and awarding extra drill and 
duty - for most of the first three decades of the nineteenth century. But these powers, never 
"authoritatively conferred upon commanding officers", were gradually reduced by the introduction of 
official regulations. 5 
In 1828, shortly after the arrival of Lord William Bentinck at Calcutta, new standing orders for the 
Bengal Native Infantry limited the power to discharge sepoys to those who were either physically unfit 
or awkward at drill. In all other cases of unfitness for service, the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief 
was required. "In other words, " Major-General Birch told the Peel Commission, "commanding officers 
were declared to havc, no power to dismiss men as a punishment for offences committed. " This 
regulation was eventually enshrined in the 1845 Articles of War. Article 2 provided that "no 
Commissioned Officer shall be dismissed except by the Sentence of a General Court Martial" and "no 
Non-Commissioned Officer or Soldier shall be Discharged as a punishment except by the Sentence of a 
Court Martial, or by order of the Commander-in-Chief at the Presidency to which he may belong". 7 
When the revised code of regulations was published in 1855, it took away from commanding officers 
John Malcom, Governor of Bombay from 1827 to 1830; and Sir Charles (later Lord) Metcalfe, a 
longtime Resident at Delhi and Member of the Supreme Council from 1827 to 1834. 
4 Stokes, 7he English Uldilarians and India, p. 22. 
5 Replies by Major-General Birch, 28 Aug 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 61, p. 436. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Articles of War, Act No. XX of 6 September 1845, OIOC, V/8/32. 
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the power even to discharge men who were physically unfit. Henceforth all such cases would have to 
be referred to the Commander-in-Chiefg 
Corporal punishment with a rattan cane was generally carried out on incompetent drill recruits or 
sepoys who displayed stupidity or obstinacy during regimental parades. It was abolished for native 
troops throughout India by Bentinck's General Order of February 1835 (the same order that did away 
with flogging). 9 But not all native soldiers thought abolition was a good thing. In 1838, a senior 
subedar told Captain Sleeman, formerly of his regiment, that "doing away with the rattan at drill had a 
very bad effect". He added: "Young men were formerly, with the judicious use of the rattan, made fit 
to join the regiment at furthest in six months; but since the abolition of the rattan it takes twelve months 
to make them fit to be seen in the ranks. " There was much virtue in its use, he believed, and "it should 
never have been given up". 10 But it was not reintroduced, even when flogging was brought back for 
certain offences in 1845. The "punishment of soldiers with a rattan, " stated the Bengal Army 
Regulations of 1855, "at the pleasure of individuals entrusted with the instruction of recruits, or on any 
other occasion whatever, is strictly prohibited". " 
The practice of commanding officers demoting N. C. O. s was not curbed until the enactment of the 
Articles of War of 1845. Article 107 stipulated that "no Non-Commissioned Officer shall be reduced to 
the ranks but by the sentence of a Court Martial, or by order of the Commander in Chief of the 
Presidency to which the offender shall belong". Article 109 outlined the remaining summary 
punishments that a commanding officer could award his native troops. They included: extra drill, with 
or without pack, for a period not exceeding fifteen days; restriction to barrack limits, not exceeding 15 
days; confinement in the quarter guard or defaulter's room, not exceeding seven days; solitary 
confinement, not exceeding seven days; removal from staff situations or acting appointments; piling 
shot and cleaning accoutrements. 12 But even these modest powers were further reduced in Bengal by 
General Gomm's general order of November 1854 which stipulated that any man awarded drill 
exceeding six days or confinement to barracks for six days - adjusted two months later to drill for 15 
days, imprisonment in the quarter-guard or defaulter room, or confinement to barracks for six days - 
8 Bengal Army Regulations 1855, OIOC, L/NHU17/2/442, pp. 189-90. 
9 G. O. G. G., 24 February 1835, Abstract of General Orders from 1817 to 1840, OIOC, lAffUI7/2/435. 
11) Sleeman, Rambles andRecollectiotis, p. 621. 
11 Bengal Army Regulations 1855, OIOC, L/MIU17/2/442, p. 390. 
12 Articles of War, Act No. XX of 6 September 1845, OIOC, V/8132. 
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could choose to be court-martialled instead. 13 In his own report (separate to the official report of the 
Peel Commission), Major-General Hancock referred to the absurdity of a system in which Bengal 
commanding officers "were so completely stripped of all power to punish, upon their own authority 
alone, that private soldiers were allowed to claim a court-martial at their option, on their commanding 
officers awarding a punishment of only a few days' drill, and to forward written complaints against him 
direct to the Commander-in-Chief'. 14 The effect this reduction of power could have on the discipline 
of a regiment is illustrated by Lieutenant-Colonel Drought who, afler three years furlough, resumed 
command of the 60'h N. I. in January 1857. He wrote: 
I saw very great laxity in all ranks, worse even than when I got command of the regiment in 1849. The authority of 
the commanding officer had become less than mine was as a subaltern, as regards punishment drill to non- 
commissioned officers, owing to army standing orders being set aside by circulars, and by station orders issued by 
officers perfectly ignorant of the proper method of keeping sepoys in subjection, and thereby interfering with a 
commanding officcr's authority, and rendering him a mere cipher in the eyes of his men... is 
By comparision, regimental commanding officers in the British Army had the summary power to award 
stoppages of pay (to make up losses incurred by damage or for habitual drunkenness), extra drill or 
guard duty, 'billing up' men in the 'black hole' for up to two days, and confinement to barracks for up to 
two months. But these relatively minor punishments were backed up by the ultimate threat of corporal 
punishment, a recourse not available to Indian army colonels from 1835 to 1845, and only for the most 
serious offences thereafter. 16 
As well as the curtailment of their powers of summary punishment, Bengal commanding officers also 
experienced considerable interference in their authority to convene court-martials and to confirm their 
sentences. At the same time the range of sentences those courts-martial could impose was reduced. 
Native troops could be tried by three types of court-martial: regimental, district (or garrison in larger 
cantonments) and general. Only a general court-martial could sit in judgement on a native officer (or a 
European officer for that matter), whereas all three could try privates and non-commissioned officers. 
A general court-martial was also the only tribunal that could pass a sentence of death. It was 
13 G. O. C. C., 16 Nov. 1854, quoted in P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 61, p. 439. 
14 Report of Maj. -Gen. Hancock, 5 March 1859, P. P., H. C,, 1859, V, p. 642. 15 Brevet Lt. -Col. R. Drought to Major Ewart, 23 March 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVIIII, p. 63. 16 Strachan, Wellingtons Legacy, pp. 81,83. 
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composed of no less than 13 native officers; regimental and district courts-martial had a minimum of 
three and five native officers respectively. All three were superintended by a single European officer 
who exerted a disproportionate influence. The native officers "remain in a state of mesmerism during 
the whole of the proceedings, " noted one Bengal officer, "and when finally called upon for their 
opinion, invariably answer the superintending officer with'Jo apkee khooshee (What your honour 
pleases)', and can seldom, if ever, be induced to give any other reply". 17 
The 1796 Bengal Articles of War had directed that no sentence of a regimental court-martial could be 
carried out until the commanding officer (not being a member of the court) or the garrison commander 
had confirmed it. 18 But all this changed in 1818 when Lord Hastings, the Governor-General and 
Commander-in-Chief, came to the conclusion that regimental and district courts-martial were not being 
conducted "with the strictest adherence to legal Form, and the Laws of evidence". In other words, he 
did not believe that commanding officers and brigadiers (who confirmed district courts-martial) were 
capable of ensuring that all native troops received a fair trial. He therefore issued a general order which 
stated that all sentences by courts-martial inferior to general courts-martial would henceforth be 
confirmed by the local divisional commander, or major-general. He also ordered the deputy judge 
advocate-general in each division to keep a register of all courts-martial, in which the confirming 
general had noted his opinion on "the quality of the proceedings, the aptitude of the finding and 
sentence, and of the Commanding Officer's procedure thereon". 19 If the proceedings were not 
satisfactory, the general could set aside the sentence of the court-martial. "Reversal of sentence was 
never directed without the most cogent reasons, " commented Major-General Birch, "but no doubt the 
practice was one which worked ill for the discipline of the regiments. 40 
The authority of commanding officers with regard to courts-martial was further reduced by Lord 
Combermere's general order of March 1827, which limited the award of corporal punishment in the 
Bengal native army to the crimes of stealing, marauding or gross insubordination. It also directed that 
dismissal from the service would invariably follow the infliction of such punishment and that, in line 
with Hastings' general order, the divisional commander's sanction would be required. 21 In Madras and 
17 Col. J. S. Hodgson, Opinionson the IndianArmy. ofiginallypublishedatMeerutin 1850, under the 
title qfMusings on Military Matters (London, 1857), p. 136. 
18 Replies by Major-General Birch, 28 Aug 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 61, p. 439. 
19 G. O. C. C., 6 Nov. 1818, Abstract of General Orders from 1817 to 1840, OIOC, L/MIL/17/2/435. 
20 Replies by Major-General Birch, 28 Aug 1858, P. P., I-LC., 1859, V, Appx. 61, p. 440. 
21 Bentincles minute on army corporal punishment, 16 Feb. 1835, Philips (ed. ), Bentinck 
Correspondence, 11, p. 1427. 
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Bombay, meanwhile, commanding officers still had the authority to confirm the sentences of 
regimental courts-martial, including flogging for a whole host of minor offences. This was probably 
down to the influence of the Governors of Madras and Bombay, Sir Thomas Munro and the Hon. 
Mountstuart Elphinstone, neither of whom were convinced by the Utilitarian creed of centralization. 
Some temporary relief was provided for commanding officers in Bengal by Sir Edward Bames, 
Commander-in-Chief of India (1832-33), who came to the conclusion that this interference in inferior 
courts-martial by divisional commanders had led to "some injurious consequences". His circular of 
November 1832, therefore, overturned Hastings' general order by authorizing the convening officers of 
all courts-martial to confirm and carry into effect the sentences (the only exception being a sentence of 
22 imprisonment with or without hard labour). The circular also undermined Combermere's general 
order by giving a commanding officer "the power to confirm or not a sentence of corporal punishment, 
and to discharge a sepoy sentenced to flogging instead of inflicting that punishment". 23 But this power 
would not be enjoyed for long. 
On succeeding Barnes as Commander-in-Chief of India in late 1833 (whilst also retaining the civil 
post of Governor-General), Lord William Bentinck set up military committees in each presidency to 
report upon the well being of their respective armies. Of particular interest to Bentinck was the 
expediency of abolishing flogging. "I had long been of opinion, " he wrote in 1835, "that without some 
reason of much more urgent necessity than any I had heard this degradation could no longer be inflicted 
upon the high caste sepoy of the Bengal Army". The general feeling among all three military 
committees was that flogging could not be abolished entirely without endangering the discipline of the 
service, though some form of restriction was desirable. The Madras Committee, for example, 
suggested giving courts-martial the authority to award solitary confinement instead of corporal 
punishment, while the Bengal and Bombay Committees advised limiting the award of corporal 
punishment to general courts-martial (though the Bombay Committee also thought that offences which 
regimental courts-martial could punish by dismissal should also incur sentences of flogging). But 
Bentinck condemned these recommendations as "prejudice" and "opposed to reason", highlighting 
instead comments made by a majority of the Madras Committee and a minority of the Bengal 
Committee that "young men of respectable connections are deterred from entering the ranks, and that it 
22 Circular No. 1661A, 2 Nov. 1832, Abstract of General Orders from 1817 to 1840,010C, 
L/MIL/17/2/435. 
23 Replies by Major-General Birch, 28 Aug 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx, 61, p. 440. 
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produces a baneful moral influence upon the pride, the manly feeling and character of the whole 
service". 24 The fear of discouraging high-caste recruits was the main reason the lash was already less 
prominent in Bengal than in the other two presidencies. From 1829 to 1833, the average annual 
incidence of flogging was 7.59 men per Bengal regiment (or roughly one per cent), 23.79 men per 
Madras regiment (roughly three per cent), and 36.54 men per Bombay regiment (roughly four and a 
half per cent). 25 
Such arguments dovetailed nicely with Bentinck's Utilitarian belief that human character could be 
transformed by enlightened legislation. With the concurrence of the Council of India, therefore, he 
abolished corporal punishment (the cat o' nine tails and the rattan) throughout the native Indian army by 
a general order of February 1835. Henceforth, minor courts-martial were empowered to dismiss 
soldiers for offences that had formerly been punishable by flogging, though all such sentences had to be 
confirmed by divisional commanders. 26 Thus were some of the powers conferred on commanding 
officers by Barnes's order of 1832 removed. 
Most of the Indian military regarded the abolition of flogging as a mistake, particularly those British 
Army officers who occupied the senior commands. Their colleagues were in the process of seeing off a 
sustained campaign by Radical Ws to abolish flogging in the British Army, though the maximum 
number of lashes awardable by regimental and district courts-martial had been limited in 1833 to 200 
and 300 respectively. 27 Wellington was the most strident supporter of corporal punishment. He 
believed, as did many in India, that army discipline depended upon the regimental commanding officer 
having the ultimate threat of flogging to back up his power to impose summary punishments. Without 
it, he informed the Adjutant-General, "We might as well pretend to extinguish the lights in our houses 
or theatres by extinguishers made of paper as to maintain the discipline of the army". The statistics 
seemed to confirm Wellington's argument. In 1826,5,524 courts-martial resulted in 2,242 cases of 
flogging, in 1834 (despite a reduction in the establishment of the British Army by 8,000 men), 10,212 
courts-martial resulted in just 963 cases of flogging. In other words, as the use of flogging declined the 
overall crime rate increased. Yet more parliamentary calls for abolition in 1833 forced the military 
24 Bentinck's minute on army corporal punishment, 16 Feb. 1835, Philips (ed. ), Bentinck 
Correspondence, II, pp. 1426,143 0- 1. 
25 Douglas M. Peers, 'Sepoys, Soldiers and the Lash: Race, Caste and Army Discipline in India, 1820- 
501, JICH, Vol. 23: 2,1995, p. 229. 
26 G. O. G. G., 24 February 1835, Abstract of General Orders from 1817 to 1840, OIOC, 
L/MIL/17/2/435. 
27 Peers, 'Sepoys, Soldiers and the Lash', XCH, 23: 2,1995, p. 233. 
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authorities to agree to restrict flogging to the punishment of mutiny, insubordination or violence, 
drunkenness on duty, the sale of equipment, stealing or disgraceful conduct. Only thus could they save 
for regimental courts-martial the right to award corporal punishment. The calls for abolition were 
temporarily silenced by the setting up of a Royal Commission on corporal punishment which published 
its report in 1836. "It endorsed the views of the vast majority of commanding officers, " writes Hew 
Strachan, "who agreed that corporal punishment should be inflicted as rarely as possible and anticipated 
its eventual abolition, but who were extremely reluctant to answer for their regiments without the lash. " 
" As a result, regimental, district and general courts-martial were limited to 100,150 and 200 lashes 
respectively. But after the death of a private who had received 150 lashes in 1846, the maximum 
punishment was further reduced to 50 lashes and restricted to general and district courts-martial. 
Corporal punishment was finally abolished in the British Army in 1868. 
Back in India in the 1830s, most senior officers of the native armies were vehemently opposed to 
abolition. In a memorandum of November 1836, Lieutenant-General Sir Robert O'Callaghan, 
Commander-in-Chief of Madras (1831-8), stated his belief "that there may be occasions, even in 
cantonment, when the power of resorting to corporal punishment would alone prove adequate to the 
maintenance of order, while in the field, on the march, the want of that power may lead to the most 
disastrous consequence". These remarks were prompted in part by the high incidence of indiscipline 
displayed by Madras troops during their service in Goomsur in 1836, the first time they had seen action 
since the end of flogging. His advice therefore was for flogging to be reintroduced "in cantonments for 
acts of mutiny or violence against a superior officer, or disgraceful crimes, and when marching in the 
field for all offences at discretion 09 Sir Henry Fane, Commander-in-Chief of India (1835-39), was 
sufficiently impressed by the concerns expressed by O'Callaghan and other Madras officers to pass 
them on to Lord Auckland, the new Governor-General (183 6-42) . 
30 Further representations were made 
in 1838 by Lieutenant-General Sir Peregrine Maitland, O'Callaghan's successor, who called for the 
reintroduction of corporal punishment "in extreme or disgraceful cases 11,3 1 and in 1839 by Sir Jasper 
Nicolls, Fane's succesor, who noted that the abolition of flogging "has been productive of the worst 
consequences to the discipline of the Native Army, and probably of serious discontent amongst the 
28 Strachan, Wellington's Legacy, p. 81. 
29 Memorandum by the Adjutant-General of Madras, 8 March 1836, 'Copy of Correspondence & 
Minutes from C-in-C India & others on Bentinck's G. O. of 1835 abolishing corporal punishment, 
OIOC, L/MIL/5/417/341. 
30 Minute by Sir Henry Fane, 6 Nov. 1836, ibid. 
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European soldiery, the sooner it can be restored the better". 32 Additional pressure for the reintroduction 
of flogging was brought to bear by the Madras government, the Court of Directors and the Board of 
Control. 33 
But Auckland - who, like Bentinck, had a strong moral objection to flogging - retorted by pointing out 
that the recent high incidence of indiscipline in the Bengal Army was caused by a sudden influx of 
34 
recruits at the outbreak of the Afghan War in 1838. His position was bolstered by the opinion of 
officers like Major-General Sir William Casement, the Military Member of the Supreme Council and a 
former native infantry commanding officer, who argued that the "recent addition to the flower of our 
native army" was due to the abolition of corporal punishment and that its restoration would "create 
extensive disgust with our service" . 
35 The only concession Auckland was prepared to make was the 
reintroduction of flogging for camp followers in 1839. 
Most native troops were naturally pleased with abolition. In 1838, a senior Bengal subedar told 
Captain Sleeman, his former officer, that there was not one native officer in a hundred who did not 
regard the end of the lash in a positive light. "Flogging was an odious thing, " he explained. "A man 
was disgraced, not only before his regiment, but before the crowd that assembled to witness the 
punishment. " Abolition, on the other hand, had "reduced the number of courts-martial to one-quarter of 
what they were before, and thereby lightened the duties of the officer". It had also made bad men more 
orderly. The subedar explained: 
A bad man formerly went on reck-Icssly from small offences to great ones in the hope of impunity. He knew that 
no regimental, cantonment or brigade court-martial could sentence him to be dismissed the service; and that they 
would not sentence him to be flogged, except for great crimes, because it involved at the same time dismissal from 
the service. If they sentenced him to be flogged, he still hoped that the punishment would be remitted... Now he 
knows that these courts can sentence him to be dismissed from the service - that he is liable to lose his bread for 
ordinary transgressions, and be sentenced to work on the roads for graver ones. He is in consequence much more 
under restraint than he used to be. 36 
31 Maitland to Fane, 18 Dec. 1838, ibid. 
32 Minute by Sir Jasper Nicolls, 7 Jan. 1839, ibid. 
33 Peers, 'Sepoys, Soldiers and the Lash', XCH, 23: 2,1995, p. 236. 
34 Ibid., p. 239. 
35 Minute by Sir William Casement, 29 July 1839, OIOC, L/MIU5/417/341. 
36 Sleeman, Rambles andRecollections, p. 616. 
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On the other hand, this same subedar (as already mentioned) did not believe that abolishing the use of 
the rattan was in the interest of regimental discipline. And not all native soldiers were glad to see the 
end of the lash. One old Bengal subedar of more than 30 years'service remarked: "Tauj be dar hoaa 
(The army has lost its fear). 07 Sitaram Pandy was of a similar opinion, 38 as were most European 
officers. According to Sleeman, the vast majority thought that the abolition of corporal punishment in 
general had been, or would be, "attended with bad consequences". In the early 1840s, Sleeman himself 
condemned the "odious distinction which it leaves in the punishments to which our European and our 
native soldiers are liable", arguing instead that corporal punishment should apply to all soldiers in India 
for mutiny and gross insubordination in cantonments, and for plunder or violence while in the field. 39 
In 1839, in response to this chorus of criticism by European officers, the Supreme Council of India 
gave regimental, district and general courts-martial the additional authority to sentence native soldiers 
to periods of imprisonment with or without hard labour for up to six months, one year and two years 
respectively for the same crimes that had formerly been punishable by flogging. The down side for 
regimental colonels was that only those sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour for any period, or 
to imprisonment without hard labour for periods exceeding six months - and therefore outside the remit 
of regimental courts-martial - would also be dismissed. Furthermore, all sentences of imprisonment 
required the confirmation of the local major-general . 
40 As if this was not enough, Bengal commanding 
officers were then denied the right to try sepoys for desertion before a regimental court-martial by Sir 
Jasper Nicholls' general order of 1840. In future just general courts-martial were to have that power; 
inferior courts could only try soldiers on the lesser charge of absence without leave. 41 A year later, 
Nicholls restricted the sentences of regimental courts-martial to six months' deprivation of pay and 20 
days' solitary confinement. 42 
It was not until the Governor-Generalship of Sir Henry (later Lord) Hardinge (1844-8), a Tory, that 
various measures were introduced to bolster the powers of commanding officers. Chief among them 
was the reintroduction of flogging. Even before leaving London, Hardinge had sounded out Sir Charles 
Napier, then Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Sind, as to the feasibility of bringing back the 
37 Barat, Yhe Bengal Native Infantry, p. 165. 
38 Lunt (ed. ). F-rom Sepoy to Subedar, p. 75. 
39 Sleeman, Rambles andRecolleclions, pp. 619 & 621. 
40 G. O. P. C., 2 Oct. 1839, Abstract of General Orders from 1817 to 1840, OIOC, LIMIU17/2/435. 
41 G. O. C. C., 5 May 1840, ibid. 
42 G. O. C. C., 29 March 1841, ibid. 
133 
43 ca lash. His reason for so doing, he told the Queen in a letter of October 1845, was be use the most 
experienced ofticers in India believed that the discipline of the army had "greatly degenerated since 
1835", as proved by the recent rash of mutinies by Bengal and Madras regiments, particularly those 
ordered to serve in Sind. Hardinge's own conviction was that the introduction of imprisonment with 
hard labour for offences formerly punishable with flogging had not been a success, not least because 
the sepoys considered it to be "more hurtful to their feelings by the loss of caste than the former 
punishment of corporal punishment". His preference was for the reinstatement of flogging without 
mandatory dismissal for "military offences such as insubordination and other irregularities incident to 
the life of a soldier" committed on the line of march or in the field, while disgracefiil crimes such as 
stealing would continue to be punished by imprisonment with hard labour and the loss of livelihood. 44 
In other words, he believed that high-caste Hindus would regard being flogged and retained in the 
service as less disgraceful than being sent to work in a chain-gang with common felons before being 
discharged. Bentinck had regarded immediate discharge as less disgracefiil than flogging. Both were 
eager to placate the high-caste sepoys who dominated the Bengal Army. 
But the "uncertain temper" of the native army - thanks to the recent disasters in Afghanistan and the 
spate of mutinies over pay - required Hardinge to proceed with caution. He therefore made discreet 
enquiries of the senior civil and military officers in India as to the desirability of restoring corporal 
punishment. The response was all but unanimous. "Every Governor, Councillor, and Commander in 
Chief and the great majority of the General and field officers have concurred in the necessity of this 
measure, " he informed the Queen. "The public press of India have taken the same view. " In August 
1845, to sweeten the pill, he made the native army a number of financial concesssions such as increased 
allowances for those serving in Sind and hutting money (see Chapter 2). 45 
Flogging was formally reintroduced by the enactment of the first Articles of War that applied to all 
three presidency armies in September 1845. They empowered all courts-martial to award up to 50 
lashes for a wide range of offences, including 'disgraceful' crimes such as stealing, embezzlement and 
the self-infliction of wounds to avoid service. 46 But because Hardinge was anxious to restrict the 
infliction of corporal punishment "to offences of a strictly military nature, the delinquent remaining 
43 Hardinge to Napier, 7 June 1844, Napier Papers, BL, Add. MSS 54517, ff. 55-8. 
44 Hardinge to the Queen, 22 Oct 1845, Peel Papers, BL, Add. MSS 40475, ff. 45-7. 
45 Ibid., ff. 51-2. 
46 Articles of War, Act No. XX of 6 September 1845, OIOC, W8/32. 
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within the service,, '47 he also announced a resolution of the Supreme Council which stated that 
flogging could only be awarded for the crimes of mutiny, insubordination, violence, using or offering 
violence to superior officers and drunkenness on duty. In ordinary circumstances and in cantonments it 
was not to be inflicted for disgraceful conduct. But on the line of march, on board a ship or on service 
in the field the full power of the Articles of War could "be exercised according to the absolute necessity 
of the case". Officers in command of troops were to "clearly understand" that the object of the 
resolution was to "inflict corporal punishment as seldom as possible, commuting it for other 
punishment in all cases where it can be done with safety to the discipline of the army". 48 A further 
restriction was imposed in Bengal by the issue of an Adjutant-General's circular in 1846 which warned 
commanding officers to take account of the "state of the weather at the time of inflicting punishment" 
because "extreme heat, cold or damp" might affect the health of the flogged soldier. 49 
The overall effect of these restrictions was that flogging was used sparingly in all three presidencies 
(see Tables 34 , 35 and 36). 
50 During the period 1850 to 1854, the lash was inflicted upon an average 
ofjust 24.2 Bengal sepoys per annum, 20.2 Madras sepoys and 12.6 Bombay sepoys. If we take into 
account the relative size of the Bengal Army - two and half times that of Madras and three times that of 
Bombay - it had by far the lowest incidence of corporal punishment: an average of 0.02%, compared 
with 0.04% in Madras and 0.03% in Bombay. By contrast, the average annual incidence of flogging in 
the pre-abolition period of 1829 to 1833 was about 1% (50 times greater) in the Bengal Army, 3% (75 
times greater) in the Madras Army and 4.5% (more than a ISO times greater) in the Bombay Army. 
The disparity in the incidence of flogging between Bengal and the other presidencies was therefore not 
as great as it had been before abolition. But the frequency of corporal punishment after reintroduction 
was much, much lower. So low, in fact, that Bengal sepoys did not regard it as a deterrent to 
indiscipline. In his evidence to the Peel Commission, Lieutenant-Colonel Master of the 7h Bengal L. C. 
made no distinction between abolition and reinstatement. "I think that the abolition of flogging did 
more harm to the army than anything else, " he declared. "My own native officers have often said to 
47 Replies by Major-General Birch, 28 Aug 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 61, p. 436. 
48 Resolution of the Supreme Council of India, 30 Aug. 1845, ibid. 
49 Adjt. -Gen. 's Circular, No. 2317,20 Oct. 1846, Abstract of General Orders from 1840 to 1847, OIOC, 
IJMUJ17/2/436. 
50 India Military Consulations, OIOC, P/43/37, P/44/18 and P/45/59, No. 5 of 30 April 1852, No. 333 
of 4 April 1853 and No. 41 of 13 April 1855. 
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me, 'As long as that rod was hanging over that bad man's head he was all right, but now they do not 
care for the commanding officer or anyone else. ,, 51 
Table 34 - Corporal punishment in the Bengal Native Army 1850-4 





Total Remitted Set aside Total 
1850 0 25 25 0 0 0 
1851 1 0 17 17 0 0 0 
1852 0 21 1 21 9 11 10 
1853 2 27 29 1 0 1 
1854 0 29 29 0 0 0 
As well as reintroducing corporal punishment on a limited scale, the 1845 Articles of War were also 
designed to bolster the authority of commanding officers in all three armies by restoring to them the 
power to confirm all sentences passed by a regimental court-martial, including flogging, reduction to 
Table 35 - Corporal punishment in the Madras Native Army 1850-4 





Total Remitted Set aside Total 
1850 0 14 14 0 1 1 
1851 0 19 19 0 2 2 
1852 0 21 1 21 1 01 1 
1853 0 19 19 3 0 3 
1854 1 27 28 2 1 3 
the ranks, loss of seniority, up to six months' imprisonment with or withour hard labour, solitary 
confinement and dismissal, They also gave them extensive powers to commute and mitigate sentences. 
But commanding officers could not carry into effect the sentences of corporal punishment, dismissal or 
Table 36 - Corporal punishment in the Bombay Native Army 1850-4 





Total Remitted Set aside 1 Total 1 
1850 2 8 10 5 0 5 
1851 1 7 8 2 0 2 
1852 L 13 14 1 0 0 0 
1853 0 21 21 0 0 
1854 2 8 10 0 0 0 
51 Evidence of Lt. -Col. R. Master, P. P., RC., 1959, V, p. 61. 
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imprisonment with hard labour, nor could they mitigate or commute such sentences, without higher 
authority. 52 These limitations were removed by the revised Articles of War in 1847 which gave 
commanding officers the "power to confirm and carry into effect, or to mitigate, all Sentences 
whatever" passed by a regimental court-martial. 53 
However, regimental courts-martial were excluded from trying a range of offences, including 
insubordination and 'disgraceful' crimes such as stealing and fraud. Commanding officers were 
therefore allowed to try in regimental courts-martial some of the less serious crimes normally reserved 
for district or garrison courts-martial - but only after permission had been obtained from higher 
authority. 54 In practice, however, this discretionary power was quickly abused. In 1846, Lord Gough, 
the Commander-in-Chief, was forced to issue a general order informing commanding officers that he 
had had to overturn a number of sentences of dismissal because, though "convicted on clear evidence of 
disgraceful conduct or of insubordination", the sepoys had been "tried by inferior Courts Martial 
without due permission obtained, or tried under inaccurate charges, or sentenced to punishments not in 
accordance with the Articles of War and the Orders of Government". In future, commanding officers 
were directed to pay special attention to all these requirements. " 
But even when courts-martial were legitimate, Bengal sepoys had the opportunity to overturn 
convictions by petitioning the Commander-in-Chief. Sitaram recalled one particularly farcical episode 
when a havildar, on being sentenced to dismissal for insolence to a superior officer, turned to his 
commanding officer and told him that he would go straight to the Commander-in-Chief and lodge an 
appeal. The result of that appeal was that he was restored to his regiment, "thereby laughing in the face 
of the General, Brigadier and his Commanding Officer". Sitaram added: "No sepoy worried about a 
court-martial at that time, but this was in the days when any complaint received attention from the 
Commander-in-ChieC The Colonel sahib was furious, but he had no power, and what could he do? 06 
In theory, no native soldier could petition his Commander-in-Chief except through the medium of his 
commanding officer. Yet in the Bengal Army petitions were regularly sent from sepoys directly to the 
Commander-in-Chief without censure; and to add insult to injury, these appeals were oflen upheld. 
Brigadier Coke told the Royal Commission that many Bengal commanding officers had had men who 
52 Article 76, Articles of War, Act XX of 6 Sept 1845, OIOC, V/8/32. 
53 Article 79, Articles of War, Act MIX of 18 Dec 1847, OIOC, LIMIU17/11/14. 
54 Article 65, Articles of War, Act XX of 6 Sept 1845, OIOC, V/8/32. 
55 G. O. C. C., 15 May 1846, Abstract of General Orders from 1840 to 1847, OIOC, LMIU17/2/436. 
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had been dismissed as unfit, or by sentence of a court-martial, returned to their regiments afler they had 
presented petitions at headquarters. The general feeling engendered among sepoys by these and other 
similar acts (such as the lack of "discretion to promote, save by seniority"), thought Coke, was "that 
their commanding officer was helpless to punish or reward". This gradual erosion of a commanding 
57 officer's power was, in Coke's opinion, "one of the principal causes of bringing about the mutiny". 
Many other officers agreed. In an 1851 essay, John Jacob listed eight serious defects of the Bengal 
Army, the second of which was the "want of power placed in the hands of regimental commanding 
officers" and the "want of confidence reposed in, and support afforded to them, by the Commander in 
Chief and by Government". 58 Three years later, in a subsequent essay, he expanded upon this point. 
To be in a "really efficient state", sepoys needed to regard their commanding officer as "their absolute 
prince - as the paramount authority". Yet by concentrating all real power at army headquarters, the 
authorities had done considerable harm. "In many instances, " wrote Jacob, "the sepoy has been allowed 
and encouraged to look on his regimental commander as his natural enemy; and, in the Bengal Army, at 
least, to forward secret complaints against him to army head-quarters. While courts-martial, articles of 
war, rules and regulations, bewilder the native soldier, and fill his mind with the idea that his officers 
are wishing to keep him out of his rights". In Jacob's opinion, the only principle of military discipline 
which a native soldier "thoroughly understands is obedience to his commanding officer". As such, it 
was vitally important that "enlistment, discharge, promotion to all ranks, and everything else should rest 
with the regimental commander alone". 59 These were, of course, the very powers that Jacob enjoyed as 
commanding officer of the Sind Irregular Horse (a system of command that, according to his successor, 
Major Merewether, produced "perfect trust, confidence, and mutual respect on all sides" and the "best 
and most satisfactory state of discipline"). 60 Yet Jacob was well aware that he and other irregular 
officers had been selected, whereas regular commanding officers had risen through seniority, and that 
something had to be done about the quality of the latter before they could be entrusted with more 
power. 
Many of these points were echoed by Subedar Sitaram Pandy after the mutiny. He wrote: 
56 Lunt (ed. ), From Sepoy to Subedar, p. 75. 
57 Replies of Lt. Col. H. M. Durand, 4 September 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 71, p. 557. 
58 'The Defects of theBengal Army, 1851, Pelly (ed. ), Views and Opinions, p. 102. 
59 'Remarks on the State of the Native Army of India in General', 1854, ibid., p. 125. 
60 P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 6, p. 367. 
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The Articles of War are often read out to regiments, but the language is seldom understood, being nearly all Persian 
and Arabic... [A] sepoy does not require a lot of rules and regulations to be read out to him. They only fill his head 
with doubts and fears. He should look upon his Commander as his father and mother, his protector, his god, and as 
such be taught to obey him. We do not understand divided power; absolute power is what we worship. Power is 
much divided among the English... The Commanding Officer has to ask half a dozen off icers: before he can punish 
a scpoy and the permission takes months before it is received. By the time the punishment is inflicted, half the men 
will have forgotten all about the case and the effect of the punishment entirely lost. "' 
As the extent of the disaffection in the Bengal Army became evident in 1857, an increasing number of 
military and civilian officials identified the weakening of commanding officers' authority as a 
contributory factor. In May 1857, before he had learned of the outbreak proper, Robert Vernon Smith, 
the President of the Board of Control, was informed by Colonel Tait of the 3d Bengal I. C. that there 
was "a severance between the officers & men of the Native Infantry" that was likely to interfere with 
the good feeling that used to exist, and that he attributed it "very much to the late regulation for 
transferring all power to the C-in-C which used to be given more to Regimental officers". Vernon 
Smith told Canning that he had heard similar comments from "many quarters" and that "all recent 
changes" had "tended towards the same severance". 62 
In mid-June, Vernon Smith received a letter from Lord Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, which 
repeated the point Jacob had made in his 1854 essay on the state of the native army. It was because the 
seniority system had produced "the most incapable officers in command of regiments & even of 
stations & divisions", wrote Elphinstone, that it had become necessary to "concentrate authority as 
much as possible in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief". The evil effects of such a system of 
concentration were "more felt in the large army of Bengal, occupying such an immense extent of 
country, than in the smaller armies of the subordinate Presidencies". As a result, discipline in the 
Bengal Army had "relaxed to a degree which appears hardly credible". 63 
But most telling of all were the assertions made by Sir Patrick Grant in a memorandum to Canning 
during his brief stint as acting Commander-in-Chief of India in the summer of 1857. Four years earlier, 
while giving evidence to a Parliamentary select committee, Grant had insisted that the powers of 
61 Lunt (ed. ), Rrom Sepoy to Subedar, p. 74-5. 
62 Vernon Smith to Canning, 26 May 1857, Lyveden Papers, OIOC, MSS Eur/F231/4. 
63 Elphinstone to Vernon Smith, 14 June 1857, ibid., MSS Eur/F231/5. 
139 
Bengal commanding officers were "sufficient ifjudiciously exercised". 64 By the outbreak of mutiny, 
however, the former Adjutant-General of the Bengal Army (and therefore a man partially responsible 
for the erosion of those powers) had altered his opinion. One of the four main reasons why 
dissatisfaction and distrust had developed in the Bengal Army, he told Canning, was because officers 
did not have "sufficient control over their men" and were therefore "not looked up to and respected as 
they should be". He cited four contributory factors: the "order preventing officers from punishing non- 
commissioned officers except by sentence of a court-martial", which was tantamount to saying that an 
officer had no authority over them because it was "impossible to try a man for the thousand and one 
trifling faults which made up the sum of a bad" N. C. O.; the "inability to reduce a bad and careless non- 
commissioned officer except by sentence of a court-martial for some very gross fault, and the 
consequent laxity of discipline in the army"; the "difficulty experienced in punishing even bad men by a 
court-martial, as any legal flaw, however, trifling, is sufficient to invalidate the proceedings", so that 
officers preferred to ignore indiscipline than to demonstrate "their own powerlessness to their men"; 
and the encouragement of petitions against officers "who have either to prove their case or submit to 
reproof', while the presenter of an unfounded petition - which was the case 99 times out of a hundred - 
65 
escaped "scot free" . 
Grant then gave two examples of how the authority of regimental commanding officers was routinely 
undermined (related to him by "one of the most intelligent field officers" in the Bengal Army). In the 
first case, a non-commissioned officer, who had plundered property and then pedured himself to 
conceal his crime, took his discharge to avoid a court-martial. Some months later, having petitioned the 
Commander-in-Chief to be reinstated, he was found guilty of his offences, but still allowed to remain in 
the service and returned to his regiment. In the second case, a native officer tried to gain a second 
month's extension to his leave by pleading urgent business in the civil courts, even though he knew his 
commanding officer had no power to make such a concession. The colonel duly refused, instructing 
him to return immediately, but despite several orders to this effect the native officer stayed away until 
the end of the second month. Arrested on his return, he pleaded illness as the reason for his absence. 
His commanding officer's response was to apply for permission to court-martial him for disobedience 
and falsehood. But the divisional commander would not agree, pointing out that a "native officer had a 
64 Evidence of Col. Patrick Grant, 14 March 1853, P. P., H. C., 1852-3, XXVII, p. 129. 
65 Memorandum by Lt. -Gen. Sir Patrick Grant to the Governor-General, 29 June 1857, P. P., H. C., 1859, 
V, Appx. 66, pp. 496-7. 
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right to expect that his application would be attended to, and the man was released with a reprimand". 
A few days later, a "very excellent native officer" requested two months leave, and the same 
commanding officer applied to the same general of division that it should be granted. The general's 
response was that the government was already so liberal in its leave to soldiers that he could not 
consider such an application. Grant's only comment was that "the system which allows a commanding 
officer of a regiment to be so lowered in the eyes of his men, calls loudly for amendment". 66 
Yhe United Service Gazette, which received much correspondence from both British and East India 
Company officers, was under no illusion as to one of the major causes of disaffection in the Bengal 
Army. In early June 1857, before news of the Meerut and Delhi uprisings had reached England, it 
commented: "Disipline has been relaxed by the tendency to deprive Commanding Officers of power. " 
A month later, by which time the full picture was known, it recommended the restoration of 
commanding officers'powers of summary punishment and reward, including corporal punishment, to 
prevent mutinies in the future. "The old bonds which united the Sepoy to his European Officer have 
been loosening for a quarter of a century, " opined its editor. "Let them be drawn closer by the return to 
the system which prevailed before the late Lord W. Bentinck assumed the command of the Army. " 67 
Much of the evidence given to the Peel Commission was in a similar vein. In Lord Clyde's opinion, 
the reduced power of Bengal commanding officers had rendered them "almost cyphers". He added: 
"The commanding officer being thus crippled, found his only means of getting influence with the men 
was by flattering and coaxing them, and thus discipline was still further shaken. In truth, it was only 
when it suited the pleasure and convenience of the sepoy that he went heartily with the commanding 
officer. " Clyde's solution was to give commanding officers the power to discharge sepoys, demote non- 
commissioned officers, curtail furlough and confine sepoys with stoppages of pay, as in the Queen's 
service. "But above all, " he wrote, "they should be as little interfered with as possible by superior 
authorities in matters of regimental detail. The Asiatic soldier must look to his commanding officers as 
very powerful. " If he was inefficient then the Commander-in-Chief should have the power to replace 
him. 68 
The Punjab Committee considered a Bengal commanding officer's powers of summary punishment 
to be wholly inadequate: 
66 Ibid., p. 497. 
67 yhe United Service Gazette, 6 June and II July 1857. 
68 P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 53, pp. 422-3. 
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He could neither flog for insubordination, nor dismiss for general bad character; he could not give extra duty to the 
negligent soldier, nor refuse furlough to an habitual offender; he could not send a non-commissioncd officer to 
drill, nor reduce without formal trial; and he was even prohibited from confining one before trial, and required to 
put him simply under arrest. When to all these restrictions is added the facility of direct appeal through the post 
office by any scpoy to the commander-in-chief, and even the reception of anonymous petitions, we can understand 
how such a system in course of years undermined the legitimate influence of the cormnanding officers, and 
gradually reduced them to the cyphers which they were found to be in 1857.69 
The Committee! s recommendation was simple: "Trust the European officers with power; train them to 
its exercise; supersede them unhesitatingly if they prove unequal to the trust; and heavily punish them if 
they abuse it. We may then hope to hear no more of mutiny. 00 
According to Colonel Durand, virtually all the senior British and East India Company officers he 
consulted in India in 1858 on behalf of the Peel Commission expressed views broadly similar to those 
of the Punjab Committee. They included the Oudh Committee, Major-Generals Sir Sydney Cotton, Sir 
James Hearsey and Sir James Hope Grant, Brigadiers Farquharson, Coke, Steel and Troup, Colonel 
Burn, Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson and Major Williams. All believed that the authority of 
commanding officers needed to be enhanced. The Oude Committee suggested that they should have 
the summary power to flog. Brigadiers Farquharson and Coke, and Colonel Burn, went even further by 
recommending magisterial powers (similar to those enjoyed by the commander of the Sind Irregular 
Horse), as well as the power to promote, demote, dismiss and inflict corporal punishment. Coke would 
have no Articles of War and no oath of loyalty; standing orders and field exercise would be sufficient to 
maintain drill and discipline. 71 General Mansfield, Clyde's chief of staff during the mutiny campaign, 
also recommended abolishing the Articles of War and replacing them with "a set of simple regulations". 
He too believed that the power of commanding officers needed to be increased. "In the eye of the 
native, " he noted, "there should be no apparent limit to the power of his immediate chief 02 
The lone voice of dissent was that of Major-General Birch, the Military Secretary to the Government 
of India, who insisted that the powers of regimental officers had neither increased nor diminished in 
any perceptible degree during his period of service in India. Birch, it will be recalled, had helped to 
69 Replies of Lt. -Col. H. M. Durand, 4 Sept 1858, ibid., Appx. 71, p. 557. 70 Ibid., p. 559. 
71 Ibid., pp. 557 and 559. 
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frame the Articles of War of 1845 and 1847. He now stated his belief that the "greatly extended powers 
granted to officers commanding regiments" by those articles "must have had at least a beneficial 
tendency on the discipline of regiments", and where that had not been the case the fault lay "with the 
officers themselves". Nevertheless he was prepared to recommend an enhancement of certain powers, 
including a commanding officer's summary power to demote N. C. O. s and to award corporal 
punishment with a rattan cane. He also believed that once a commanding officer had confirmed a 
court-martial's sentence of dismissal, there should be no right of appeal. 73 
Many of the witnesses who appeared before the Peel Commission in London were likewise of the 
opinion that Bengal commanding officers needed more authority over their men, including enhanced 
powers to punish and reward. They included: Major-General Low, the former military member of the 
Supreme Council of India; Lieutenant-Colonel Wyllie, a former Assistant Adjutant-General of the 
Bengal Army; Colonel Becher, the Quartermaster-General of the Bengal Army; Sir George Clerk, the 
former Governor of Bombay; Sir Charles Trevelyan, a former deputy secretary of the Political 
Department of the Government of India; Colonel Henry Durand, the former Agent for the Governor- 
General in Central India; Colonel Wintle, a former commander of a regiment of Bengal Native Infantry; 
and Lieutenant-Colonels Harington and Master, both former commanders of regiments of Bengal light 
cavaly. 74 Typical of those witnesses with regimental experience was Wintle, an officer of 39 years' 
service, who particularly regretted the loss of the summary power to dismiss, adding: "We certainly felt 
as regimental officers that the men did not care about our authority. "75 
Of the eleven members of the Peel Commission, four made specific written references to this issue. 
The most forthright was Major-General Hancock who recommended that commanding officers be 
granted the summary power to demote, to dismiss and to award up to 50 lashes. He also believed they 
should have the authority to convene and confirm regimental courts-martial for more serious offences, 
and the power to recommend that non-commissioned officers be removed to the pension establishment, 
awarded a reduced pension, or dismissed altogether for repeated dereliction of duty. 76 Lieutenant- 
General Sir Harry Smith thought that "every power consistent with judgement and discretion should be 
72 Replies by Maj. -Gen. W. R. Mansfield, 4 Sept 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 62, p. 452. 73 Replies by Maj. -Gen. Birch, 28 Aug 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 61, pp. 436 & 440. 74 P. P., H. C., 1859, V, pp. 13-14,21,28,42,107,315,131,51 and 61. 
75 Evidence of Brevet Col. Wintle's, 24 Aug 1858, ibid., p. 13 1. 
76 Report of Major-General Hancock, 5 March 1859, ibid., pp. 642-3. 
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restored or established for the officers commanding corps and regiments". 77 General the Marquess of 
Tweeddale considered the summary power to dismiss to be a sufficient enhancement of authority, 
though he also suggested replacing regimental courts-martial with the punchayet system (see belOW). 78 
Colonel Tait, the only former or serving Bengal officer on the Royal Commission, wanted a complete 
revision of the Bengal regulations and the less the discretion of commanding officers was limited the 
better. "I believe, " he added, "that the limitations placed on their power of late years have been greatly 
instrumental in causing an entire separation between the native soldiery and their European officers, 
from whom they had nothing to hope or fear. 09 
Most of the foregoing evidence refers to the inadequate powers possessed by the commanding officers 
of regular Bengal corps - including the artillery and the Sappers and Miners. After 1846, it could just 
as easily apply to the commandants of Bengal Irregular Cavalry regiments. For much of the first half of 
the nineteenth century, the system of discipline in those regiments was similar to that in the Sind 
Irregular Horse. Commandants had complete authority over their men and could flog, demote and 
dismiss at will. According to one irregular officer, even the legendary Colonel Skinner "was a great 
advocate for strict discipline, and though loved for his benevolence and justice, he was feared for his 
habit of punishing defaulters" by flogging them with a zeerbund (or martingale). 80 But all this changed 
in 1846 when the branch was brought under the direct control of the Commander-in-Chief and made 
subject to the Articles of War. 81 The following year, an Adjutant-General's circular removed the power 
of the punchayet court - the irregular cavalry's less formal equivalent of a regimental court-martial in 
which an offender was tried by a "jury of native officers, under the guidance of the commandant 1182 _ to 
rule on anything other than private disputes. Henceforth, all "offences of a public nature, involving the 
discipline of a Corps and Criminal cases", had to be referred to regular courts-martial . 
"3 
The outcome of these reforms, the Punjab Committee told the Peel Commission, was that the 
authority of an irregular cavalry commandant had diminished even more than that of his regular 
77 Lt. -Gen. Smith's answers, 3 Aug 1858, ibid., Appx. 76, p. 588. 78 Notes by the Marquess of Tweeddale, I Jan 1859, ibid., Appx. 74., p. 583. 
79 Colonel Tait's answers, 3 Aug 1858, ibid., Appx. 80, p. 607. 
so Carmichael Smyth, Irregular Horse, p. 9. 
81 Replies by Lt. -Gen. Sir Patrick Grant, 16 July 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 65, p. 490. 82 Precis of Replies on Subject of Irregular Cavalry, ibid., Appx. 72, p. 571. 
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infantry counterpart. Men could no longer be discharged or demoted without a court-martial. "The 
commandant, " it wrote, "has not even the power to order any man in his regiment to be given an extra 
allowance of grain to a horse out of condition. All minor punishments must be dealt out according to 
regulation. In fact, the thing has been laid down by Procustean rule, and the'irregular cavalry'has long 
been a misnomer. " The end result was "to reduce the efficiency of the regiments, and to render them 
dangerous to the state". Similar opinions were expressed by Sir Sydney Cotton, Sir J. H. Grant, 
Brigadier-General John Jacob and Brigadier Christie, the latter commenting: "In former days the men 
looked up to their commanding officer, and did everything in their power to please him. Now matters 
are greatly changed, knowing that all power has been taken out of the hands of commanding officers. "" 
Not surprisingly, all recommended an increase of the commandant's powers. The Marquess of 
Tweeddale went even further, it will be recalled, by suggesting the replacement of all regimental 
courts-martial with punchayet courts. 85 Even Sir Patrick Grant, whose circular had abolished 
punchayets in 1847, was able to comment with hindsight that the erosion of the irregular cavalry 
commandant's "almost absolute authority" had been "very injurious". He now believed a resumption of 
these former powers to be desirable. 86 
The Punjab Irregular Force was the branch of the Bengal Army that experienced the least weakening 
of its commanding officers' power to punish in the years prior to the mutiny. It was also the most loyal 
with just one minor example of disaffection in 1857.87 Formed in 1849 and placed under the civil 
authority of the Punjab government rather than the Commander-in-Chief, the five regiments of irregular 
cavalry and five (later six) of irregular infantry were not at first bound by the Articles of War. Instead 
the commandants were given the summary powers of a civil magistrate and could sentence their men to 
50 lashes, a fine of 50 rupees, dismissal from the service and up to three years' imprisonment with hard 
labour. In theory all this changed in 1852 when, against the wishes of the commandants, the whole 
Punjab Irregular Force was made subject to the Articles of War and courts-martial were required for 
most serious offences. One unfortunate consequence, according to Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde of the e 
Punjab I. I., was that the "men began to look beyond their commandants to get their punishments 
83 Adjutant-General's Circular, No. 1408,19 June 1847, Abstract of General Orders from 1840 to 1847, 
OIOC, L/NW17/2/436. 
" Precis of Replies on Subject of Irregular Cavalry, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 72, p. 571. 
85 Notes by the Marquess of Tweeddale, I Jan 1859, ibid., Appx. 74., p. 583. 
86 Lt. -Gen. Sir Patrick Grant's Replies, 16 July 1858, ibid., Appx. 65, p. 49 1. 
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reprieved or remitted, or their promotion granted". Yet some commandants still used their discretion 
and would "flog the first man that refused obedience". Wilde explained: "In any extreme case, we 
should have taken the law into or own hands, as we always felt we should be fully supported by the 
brigadier and government. " In 1857, as a number of Punjab regiments were ordered south to retake 
Delhi, Wilde and the other commandants asked the local government to reconfer their old power of 
magistrates. "It was granted, " Wilde told the Peel Commission, "and from that time to this we have 
never had any difficulty. "88 
Given that the Articles of War of 1845 and 1847 applied to all three presidencies, it follows that regular 
commanding officers in the Madras and Bombay armies also experienced a marked restriction in their 
power to punish in the years prior to the mutiny. By 1857, their power to award summary punishment 
and to convene and confirm courts-martial was almost identical to that exercised by their Bengal 
counterparts. 89 The only significant difference was that Bengal sepoys awarded the summary 
punishments of extra drill and confinement to barracks were able to opt for a court-martial instead. 
Even the Bengal practice of appealing against punishment by sending a petition direct to the 
Commander-in-Chief was mirrored by some Madras sepoys. "They ought not to do so, " Major-General 
Steel told the Peet Commission, "but they have done so. " He also admitted that they were rarely 
punished for this breach of regulations, and that, as a result of such petitions, the Adjutant-General had 
sometimes interfered with the decision of a commanding officer. 90 Lieutenant-General Sir Patrick 
Grant, Commander-in-Chief of Madras, explained the erosion of power in the following terms: 
If we could always arrange to have none but sensible, judicious, and thoroughly competent officers in command of 
regiments, it would certainly be desirable to increase their powers and to give them every latitude. But constituted 
as the service is, and that an officer not notoriously incompetent must obtain command of a regiment when he 
attains a certain rank- and standing, the restrictions imposed on the powers of commanding officers have been 
salutary I concieve. 
87 Three Hindustani native officers of the 2rd Punjab Irregular Cavalry were executed for inciting others 
to mutiny during the siege of Delhi (Source: Precis of Replies on Subject of Irregular Cavalry, P. P., 
H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 72, p. 571). 
88 Evidence of Lt. -Col. Alfred Wilde, 26 Aug 1858, ibid., pp. 90-2. '9 Madras Army Regulations 1849, OIOC, L/MIL/17/3/491; Bombay Army Regulations 1850, OIOC, 
UMIL/17/4/548. 
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Nevertheless he was prepared to recommend that commanding officers be given the additional power to 
confirm and execute the sentences of all regimental courts-martial "without referring to any superior 
authority", to award non-commissioned officers the summary punishments of extra drill (with or 
without packs) and loss of seniority, and to cane sepoys and recruits at drill. If any officer was %0 
wanting in judgement, temper and discretion as to be incapable of fitly exercising these increased 
powers", he was unfit for command and should be removed. "' 
Bombay differed from Madras in that it did not allow its sepoys to appeal directly to the Commander- 
in-Chief over the heads of their commanding officers. When a havildar in the Bombay Light Cavalry 
did just this in an attempt to overturn the sentence of a court-martial, he was tried a second time and 
dismissed the service. According to his commanding officer, Colonel Poole, the submission of a 
petition without going through the proper channel was "considered a great military offence" and "dealt 
with accordingly". 92 Yet most Bombay officers were of the opinion that regular commanding officers 
had inadequate powers to punish. Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Somerset, Commander-in-Chief of 
Bombay, told the Peel Commission that the magisterial power which "answers admirably in the 
irregular regiments" might "with advantage by introduced generally". He referred particularly to the 
summary award of flogging "for theft, insubordination, and any disgraceful conduct, to which should be 
added imprisonment, and as a consequence expulsion". 93 Colonel Willoughby concurred by noting that 
commanding officers should always have the power to inflict summary punishment "for any offence" 
that was given to them on the outbreak of mutiny. 94 A minimum requirement, according to Colonel 
Sinclair, was the summary power to discharge. 95 Both Sinclair and Willoughby contrasted the Bombay 
commanding officer's lack of power to punish with his ample power to promote. 
Thus while regular commanding officers in all three presidency armies suffered a broadly similar 
reduction in their theoretical power to punish, the effect in Bengal was exacerbated by the way the 
military authorities were prepared to receive and act upon petitions from native soldiers that bypassed 
commanding officers. In Madras the authorities were also prepared to tolerate such an irregular 
practice, though it was much less frequent. In Bombay it was punished severely. When asked by the 
90 Evidence of Maj. -Gen. Sir S. Steel, 25 Aug 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, p. 73. 91 Replies by Lt. -Gen. Sir Patrick Grant, 6 July 1858, ibid., Appx. 65, p. 485. 92 Evidence of Colonel S. Poole, 27 Aug 1858, ibid., p. 118. 
93 Replies by Lt. -Gen. Sir H. Somerset, 24 July 1858, ibid., Appx. 69, p. 521. 94 Evidence of Col. M. Willougby, 26 Aug 1858, ibid., p. 103. 
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Peel Commission if such a practice was likely "to shake discipline almost more than anything", Colonel 
Felix replied: "Certainly. , 96 
If we accept that Bengal commanding officers experienced the most serious diminution of their 
authority in the years prior to the mutiny, then it would follow that the Bengal Army was more 
indisciplined than its Madras and Bombay counterparts. But does the evidence bear this out? In the 
early 1850s there were, in a proportionate sense, many fewer court-martial convictions in Bengal than 
in the other presidencies (see Tables 37,38 and 3 9). 97 In 1854, for example, the Bengal Army had less 
than twice the number of convictions of the Bombay Army and only 50 per cent more than Madras. 
Such statistics can be viewed in one of two ways: either the Bengal Army required proportionately 
fewer courts-martial because it contained men of a better character who were in a higher state of 
discipline (as Bentinck believed in the 1830s); or the low figures are a reflection of the fact that Bengal 
commanding officers preferred to turn a blind eye to indiscipline rather than risk the humiliation of an 
acquittal or the overturning of a sentence on appeal (a point made by Sir Patrick Grant in his 
memorandum of May 1857). The evidence would seem to support the latter interpretation. 
That the Bengal Army was the least disciplined of the three is confirmed by contemporary opinion. In 
1846, shortly before his transfer from the 260'N. I., Ensign Hodson informed a friend that in "discipline 
and subordination [the sepoys] seem to be lamentably deficient". A couple of months later, having 
joined the I" Bengal European Fusiliers (renamed fusiliers in recognition of their excellent service 
during the I" Sikh War), he commented: "We are under much stricter 
Table 37 - Sentences ofBengal native courts-martial 1850-4 
Year Inflicted Remitted Set aside for irregularities Total 
1850 824 25 17 866 
1851 635 49 29 713 
1852 616 35 10 661 
1853 727 44 14 78 
L 1854 845 36 14 895 
95 Evidence of Col. I Sinclair, 26 Aug 1858, ibid., p. 101. 
96 Evidence of Col. 0. Felix, 25 Aug 1858, ibid., p. 68. 
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discipline in this corps, both officers and men, and obliged to be orderly and submissive. No bad thing 
for us either. I hold there is more real liberty in being under a decent restraint than in absolute freedom 
from any check. "98 
Table 38 - Sentences ofMadras native courts-martial 1850-4 
Year Inflicted Remitted Set aside for irregularities Total 
1850 649 22 17 688 
1851 591 16 14 621 
1852 600 31 25 656 
1853 562 17 23 602 
1854 513 34 15 7 tlýl 
Sir Charles Napier was even more explicit. On assuming command of the Bengal Army in the early 
summer of 1849, he found it "in a state of gross undiscipline, and grievously inexpert in military 
movements". 99 In the same year Brigadier the Hon. Henry Dundas (later Major-General Lord 
Table 39 - Sentences ofBombay native courts-martial 1850-4 
Year Inflicted Remitted Set aside for irregularities Total 
1850 361 16 1 378 
1851 428 24 12 464 
1852 381 41 6 428 
1853 425 17 7 449 
1854 429 19 16 7 týý 
Melville, a member of the Peel Commission), commanding the Bombay Field Forces 13'Cavalry 
Brigade in the 2d Sikh War, offended some Bengal officers - who were "boastful that their army had 
been the one that had conquered India" - by telling them that the indisicipline of the Bengal Army 
"would be the means of losing India". 100 
Though a Bombay officer, John Jacob had seen much of the Bengal Army and had had many 
conversations with its officers during his long years of service. In an essay published in 1850, he noted 
that, to an outsider like himself, the Bengal Army appeared to be in a permanent "state of muliny". The 
sepoys "are not taught and trained instinctively to obey orders", he added, "and even the European 
97 India Military Consulations, OIOC, P/43/37, P/44/18 and P/45/59, No. 5 of 30 April 1852, No. 333 
of 4 April 1853 and No. 41 of 13 April 1855. 
98 Trotter, Life of Hodson of Hodsons Horse, pp. 33 -3. 99 Napier, Defects, Civil andMilitary, p. 194. 
100 Lord Melville to Jacob, 18 Nov 1857, Jacob Papers, OIOC, MSS Eur/F75/5. 
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officers are afraid of them". 101 So struck was he with the Bengal Army's "defects and indiscipline" 
that, the following year, he wrote an article on that subject alone. In it he identified eight "serious 
faults" that were particular to the Bengal Army. They included: the "want of power placed in the hands 
of regimental commanding officers"; the "entire absence of a proper confidence between the officers 
and the native soldiers"; the "very bad and fatally injurious" system of promotion by seniority"; and the 
"entire absence of proper discipline throughout the native part of the Bengal Army". This latter fault 
was the necessary consequence of the rest. It manifested itself not only in the more serious cases of 
mutiny, but in everyday military life. Citing the example of sentry duty, Jacob explained that only one 
Bengal sepoy would remain at his post while, contrary to regulations, the rest of the guard undressed 
and went to sleep. Eventually, when he had had enough, the sentry would relieve himself by handing 
his musket to the first man he could wake. All the while the naik was fast asleep under his sheet. 
According to Jacob, he had been "assured by numerous Bengal officers that this is the regular way of 
mounting guard". Such slackness was even more extraordinary given the fact that there were four men 
to a guard party in Bengal, but only three in Bombay and Madras, meaning that Bengal sepoys would 
be on duty for just six hours in every 24, instead of eight. Part of the problem, wrote Jacob, was that 
many Bengal guards were only relieved once a week, and sometimes at even longer intervals. When 
Henry Dundas took command at Peshawur during the latter stages of the 2nd Sikh War, he caused much 
"grumbling and complaining" by insisting that the Bengal guards be relieved daily. In Jacob's opinion, 
"where guards are relieved weekly, where the sentries relieve each other as they please, and where the 
whole guard strips naked, there can be no discipline whatever". 102 
A number of other Bombay and Madras officers made the same point about lax Bengal sentries in 
their evidence to the Peel Commission. During the siege of Multan in 1848, Major-General Capon was 
astonished to see a half-dressed and lackadaisical Bengal sepoy guarding the divisional commander's 
tent. 103 General Alexander recalled that some lazy Madras sepoys, having served with Bengal troops at 
Sagar in central India, "used to grumble and send in anonymous petitions, stating that the Bengal Army 
were allowed to do so-and-so, and asking for the same privileges". 104 The root of the problem, 
according to Captain Browne, was that while Madras sepoys were forbidden to take off their 
accoutrements for the 24 hours they were on guard duty, Bengal sepoys could do so when eating. The 
'01 Pelly (ed. ), Views and Opinions, pp. 122-3. 102 Ibid., pp. 103,115-16. 
103 Evidence of Maj. -Gen. David Capon, 28 Aug 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, p. 126. 
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practice of Bengal sentries sleeping naked was clearly a manipulation of this privilege. They had got 
into the "habit of taking great liberties", said Browne, which would never have been allowed in his own 
regiment. 105 Napier put the laxity of Bengal sentries down to fact that they were constantly on 
detached guard duty and only rarely relieved (see Chapter 2). The Bombay Army was more 
disciplined, he explained, because its troops were spread out over a much smaller area. 106 Onamore 
general level, Herbert Edwardes, a Bengal officer on detached Political employ who saw both armies in 
action during the 2nd Sikh War, gave "the palm of discipline to the Bombay sepoys". 107 
By 1857, the indiscipline of the Bengal Army was notorious. In February 1857, before the first news 
of the cartridge question had reached Britain, 7he United Service Gazelle described the sepoy in the 
heart of India as a "lackadaisical, discontented idler, prompt to seize excuses for refusing to do his duty, 
and absolutely rendering the presence of Europeans necessary ... to keep him to his allegiance". 
log On 
28 May, with the mutiny in full swing, a lieutenant in the 47h N. I. informed his wife: "There is no 
doubt that all this will turn out for the benefit of the army; discipline was at the lowest ebb, and 
something like this must have taken place before Government would do anything for the Army. They 
have had warning enough, for the papers have been teeming with it for the last 6 years. " 109 The 
magistrate of Benares, in a letter of 31 May, blamed the "fake and hollow" system of military 
government. He added: "The system of centralization has proved to be the ruin of the native army. All 
power is centred in the highest authority. Regimental officers have no authority, they are mere puppets, 
and the sepoys, cannot look up to such weak and powerless men with respect. In days of yore the 
commanding officer was the [lord] of every sepoy, he could punish neglect & reward [diligence]. He 
was therefore respected and beloved. Now he cannot promote a sepoy to be a naik without the sanction 
of proper authority. " 110 In a letter to Lord Elphinstone of 9 June, Bartle Frere, the Commissioner of 
Sind, rejected the fashionable opinion that the disaffection in the Bengal Army was "attributable to 
anything but bad system" as a dangerous fallacy. A week later, continuing this theme, Frere voiced his 
regret at John Lawrence's recommendation of Sir Patrick Grant as acting Commander-in-Chief of India. 
"He cannot be the man to eradicate the evils which have ruined the Bengal Army, " wrote Frere (with 
"' Evidence of Maj. -Gen. R. Alexander, ibid., p. 82. 105 Evidence of Captain Brown, ibid., p. 34. 
"' Napier, Defects, Civil andMilitary, p. 228. 
107 Quoted in Cadell, History of the BombayArmy, p. 194. 
108 Rie UnifedService Gazette, 21 Feb 1857 
109 Lt. Walcot to his wife, 28 May 1857, Walcot Papers, OIOC, MSS Eur/B227. 
110 Francis Lind to his mother, 31 May 1857, Lind Papers, NAM, 51084. 
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reference to Grant's time as Adjutant-General of the Bengal Army), "evils with the creation of which he 
has had much to do. ""' Elphinstone agreed, telling the President of the Board of Control that the revolt 
had been caused by the "faulty system & want of discipline in the Bengal Army". "' 
There was also a belief that the laxity of discipline in the Bengal Army had inflated the sepoys' sense 
of self-importance, and that confrontation had been inevitable. "The [Bengal sepoys] are confident of 
their power to dictate terms to their masters, " remarked the pro-government Friend ofIndia on 7 May 
1857. "l 13 The following March, during his closing speech at the trial of the rebel King of Delhi, the 
prosecutor described the Bengal mutineers in the following terms: "Pampered in their pride and 
besotted in their ignorance, they had as a body become too self-sufficient for military subordination and 
unhesitating obedience. " 114 Giving evidence to the Peel Commission, Major-General Cotton remarked 
upon the "leniency with which varous acts of misconduct, all more or less bordering on mutiny, were 
on several occasions dealt with", in consequence of which the Bengal sepoys, "who under their own 
system of government would have been ruled with a rod of iron, lost the awe necessary to the 
preservation of discipline in a large army". ' 15 The loyal native officer SitaramPandy expressed a 
similar opinion. "The principal cause of the rebellion, " he wrote in his post-mutiny memoirs, "was the 
feeling of power that the sepoys had , and the 
little control the sahibs were allowed to exert over them. 
Naturally, they assumed from this that the Sirkar must be afraid of them, whereas it only trusted them 
too well. 016 The final word on discipline must go to the distinguished Victorian historian T. Rice 
Holmes, who wrote: 
The relaxation of discipline had encouraged [the Bengal sepoys] to twist into a grievance anything that startled 
their imaginations, or offended their caprices: they were from various causes far less attached to their British 
officers than they had once been: it was in the nature of things impossible that, without such attachment, they 
should feel active loyalty towards the British Government; and they had become so powerful and were so 
conscious of their power that, from purely selfish causes, they were ripe for mutiny. 117 
111 Frere to Elphinstone, 9 and 15 June 1857, Elphinstone Papers, OIOC, MSS Eur/F87/Box 6B/8/1. 
112 Elphinstone to Vernon Smith, 14 June 1857, Lyveden Papers, OIOC, NISS Eur/F231/5. 
113 Quoted in Rizvi and Bhargava (eds. ), Freedom Struggle, I, p. 328. 
114 P. P., H. C., 1859, XVIIL p. 257. 
115 P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 72, p. 557. 
116 Lunt (ed. ) From Sepoy to Subedar, p. 174. 
117 Holmes, A History of the Indian Mutiny, p. 564. 
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Chapter Five - Caste and Religion 
Most recent historians agree that the defence of caste and religion was the chief cause of mutiny in 
1857. Moreover some scholars of the Company army, like Barat and Alavi, are convinced that the 
caste feeling of Hindu sepoys - in particular their dislike of serving outside India and of sea voyages - 
was a permanent cause of disaffection in the decades prior to the mutiny. Yet the evidence suggests 
that caste awareness in the Bengal Army was partly a British invention, that caste rules were not as 
inflexible as Bengal sepoys would have their European officers believe, and that they provided a useful 
excuse both to avoid unwelcome duty and to provide redress for other grievances. 
The ancient religious scriptures divided Hindu society into four pre-ordained and mutually exclusive 
varna (classes): Brahmin (priest), Kshatriya (warrior), Vaishya (farmer and merchant) and Shudra 
(serO. To marry, take food from or mix with a person from a lower class was to become ritually 
polluted. The Mleccha (Untouchables) were outside the class system and performed degrading tasks 
like sweeping and working with leather; all Christians and Muslims were ritually unclean and therefore 
tobe avoided if at all possible. ' The caste system was gradually developed as Brahmins sought to 
divide the invading Aryans and the indigenous population into a large number of distinctive groups or 
jad, based loosely on region and occupations, and each internally bound by rules concerning diet and 
marriage. 2 Castes were regulated by local committees of senior members who could both formulate 
rules and judge those who infringed them. Expulsion was the dreaded penalty for serious breaches of 
caste rules. A person who was ritually polluted would lose his place both in the cosmic order (his class) 
and in society (his caste). Castes, however, were not immutable: new castes appeared, rules changed 
and membership was not necessarily exclusive. In his Account of the District ofShahabadin 1809-10, 
Buchanan observed that Bhumimars (or military Brahmins), like Rajputs, were "not scrupulous in 
admitting into their number whatever tribes adopted their manners". 3 
' Heathcote, 7he Indian Army, p. 8 1. 
2 N. K. Dutt, writing in the 1930s, noted there were more than 3,000 castes in India, some "confined to a 
few score men", while others claimed "millions of members". See Dutt, Origin and Growth of Caste in 
India (London, 193 1), 1, pp. 34. 
3 Quoted in Kolff, Naulair, Rajput andSepoy, p. 185. 
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Until relatively recent times, Indian civil society did not take caste distinctions that seriously. 
According to the historian and social anthropologist Susan Bayly, the modem concept of caste in India 
"has been engendered, shaped and perpetuated by comparatively recent political and social 
developments". Even in "parts of the so-called Hindu heartland of Gangetic upper India, " wrote Bayly, 
"the institutions and beliefs which are now often described as the elements of 'traditional' caste were 
only just taking shape as recently as the eighteenth century". 4 By the 1820s, India was still not a 
homogenous 'caste society'. Bayly noted: 
The boundaries between individual orders or classes was still open and ambiguous in the early decades of British 
expansion; the language of caste or castelikc relationships still allowed for the great man who could reshape or 
disregard conventional marriage rules and dietary codes, and for the thrusting regional clite with the power to 
proclaim something new about their birth and moral attributes. This openness and fluidity were much less apparent 
at the end of the nineteenth century, when many more Indians had embraced forms of caste that were significantly 
more formalised than those of their recent forebears. 5 
As the nineteenth century progressed, caste distinctions became increasingly important to those Indians 
with "anxieties about the preservation of status and economic advantage". Bayly refers, in particular, to 
the "superior landholders who found themselves clinging to inherited lordships in India's most volatile 
agricultural regions", the self-same impoverished gentry that Stokes identified as the dominant force in 
6 the Bengal Army. Enhanced caste status was a means of compensating for their increasingly humble 
standard of living. It is important to remember, however, that this Rajput and Brahmin "insistence on 
the radicial differentiation between those who were and those who were not defined as high, clean and 
superior" was a relatively recent phenomenon. As such, caste rules were never as rigid as they might 
7 have appeared . 
'Susan Bayly, 7he New Cambridge History of India: Vol, IV., 3- Caste, Society andPofilicsinIndia 
f 
, rom the 
Eighteenth Century to the Modenj Age (Cambridge, 1999), p. 4. 
5 Ibid., p. 188. 
6 Ibid., pp. 190 and 197; Stokes, The Peasant Armed, p. 5 1. However Bhadra has argued that rural 
rebels in 1857 were not motivated solely by economic grievances. 'At a primary level, 'he wrote, 'a 
notion of community organized along ethnic settlements and an aversion to the encroachment of an 
alien power into this territorial unit determined the domain of rebel authority. ' See Bhadra, Gautam, 
'Four Rebels of Eighteen-Fifty-Seven, in Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (eds. ), Selected 
Slibaltern Studies (Oxford, 1988), pp. 142. 
7 Bayly, 7he New Cambridge Histoty of India: Vol, IV-3, p. 201. 
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The same could be said about caste consciousness in the Bengal Army. According to the sacred 
laws, the role of warrior was confined to the kshatriya class. From the earliest times, however, the 
Hindu armies of India were composed of men from different castes and even classes. The Rajputs of 
western India, whose name was later synonymous with kshatriya, were descendants of non-aryan 
invaders. Brahmins turned to soldiering because there was not enough employment for priests. At no 
time was there a caste barrier to men serving as soldiers. All this was to change in the late eighteenth 
century when Warren Hastings and his successors strove towards the creation of a high-caste monopoly 
in the Bengal Army (see Chapter One). "An inevitable ritual complement of this closed shop social 
strategy, " writes Kolff, "was a tendency towards brahminical exclusiveness, in other words, towards the 
doctrine of caste. The new monomania for the privileges of employment soon took on religious 
overtones and stands in sharp contrast ... to the open attitude towards adopting and recruitment that had 
been typical of centuries of peasant soldiering. " 
Alavi takes this argument one step further by demonstrating how, "by providing a forum for sorting 
out the social tensions hinging around the ritual purity of the rural high caste, the army formalized these 
tensions and made them more obvious and rigid". But for the Bengal Army's recruitment policy, says 
Alavi, the "evolution of high-caste status in rural north India would have progressed differently". Part 
of the process of achieving this high-caste monopoly was the promotion of the sepoys' religious, dietary 
and travel preferences. In 1779, during the I't Maratha War, Hastings sent reinforcements from Bengal 
to Bombay by the slower overland route because he knew that a sea crossing would offend the religious 
feelings of the high-caste sepoys. By the early nineteenth century, a complex set of rules governed the 
Bengal sepoys' diet, manner of preparation and mode of eating. According to Alavi, the sepoys began 
to eat food "which had previously been associated exclusively with high caste and ritual purity". They 
were therefore able "to mark out their high-caste status much more effectively than would have been 
possible in their own villages". In a sense, "the Company was promoting the "sanskritization of the 
military. "9 Buchanan referred to the creation of a "modem" doctrine of caste. 10 
The diet of high-caste sepoys was strictly vegetarian. It included: atta (flour), gram, dal, ghi (clarified 
butter), salt, wheat, sugar and some vegetables. They were not supposed to consume fish, meat, pulao 
(spiced rice), curry or alchohol. Tubular vegetables like potatoes, aubergines, radishes, leeks and 
8 Kolff, Naukur, Rajpul and Sepoy, p. 186. 
9 A] avi, The Sepoys and the Company, pp. 4 5,76. 
10 Quoted in Kolff, Naulair, Raiput andsepoy, p. 187. 
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onions were also avoided. To maintain their ritual purity, the high-caste sepoys cooked their own food, 
ate alone and then spread fresh cow-dung on their place of repast (as laid down in the Shastras). The 
type of food available at the permanent station bazars and temporary camp bazars mirrored these 
preferences. As did the type of food provided by govenrment for overseas expeditions, beginning with 
the Sumatra campaign in 1789. 
The Company also authorised the celebration of religious festivals in cantonments, and encouraged 
European officers to participate. So successful were the latter's attempts to absorb the culture of their 
men that their names were often introduced into the Holi festival songs. The Ramlila festival was 
particularly endorsed, says Alavi, because it "provided the company with a cultural idiom through and 
by which British authority could be represented in India". But its significance went further than this. 
In medieval times, Ram's defeat of the giant Ravana had been represented by a sword-bearing 
horseman; but during the Company period, artillery was used to depict the victory of good over evil. 
"The form of celebration therefore changed to express new power relations and create a new tradition, " 
writes Alavi. "Further, the Company, by making the sipahis celebrate Ramlila independent of the 
patronage of any priestly figure, created a superior status for [the British]. " 
This attempt to separate sepoys from the influence of Brahmin priests was deliberate: Hindu temples, 
for example, were rarely situated in military cantonments. Of course this did not preclude contact with 
Brahmin priests outside the regiment. But even here the "military maintained its exclusive high-caste 
status independent of and superior to that of the Brahmin patronage networks" by exempting the sepoys 
from certain religious obligations such as pilgrim dues and shrine fees. The success of this policy to 
isolate high-caste sepoys from Hindu society can be gauged by the use of Bengal regiments to disperse 
crowds of Brahmins protesting against cow slaughter in the Kumaon district in 1815, and, more 
importantly, the peaceful response to the banning of sali (self-immolation by high-caste widows) in 
1829.11 In the latter case, Bentinck sounded out no less than 49 experienced officers as to the sepoys' 
likely reaction before introducing the measure. 12 If the sepoys did not object to infringements in Hindu 
customs, it was argued, they could be relied upon to put down any form of civil protest. This point is 
important because it suggests that sepoys were relatively insulated from the type of religious issues that 
affected civil society; their own acts of disobedience, it follows, were much more likely to be motivated 
by 'selfish' professional grievances. 
11 Alavi, Yhe Sepoys and the Company, pp. 79-90 
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It has, of course, been pointed out that Bengal sepoys genuinely resented any infringement of the 
ritual rules by which the Company had redefined their status and identity. The mutinies at Barrackpore 
in 1825 and 1852 have both been attributed to this reason (as has, to a certain extent, the mutiny of 
Madras sepoys at Vellore in 1806). 13 But whether the instigators really were acting in defence of their 
caste and religion, or were simply using these issues as a rallying call to achieve other ends, is open to 
question. The Vellore mutiny took place after Sir John Cradock, the recently-appointed Commander- 
in-Chief, had ignored the advice of his Army Board and issued controversial new dress regulations, 
including the removal of beards, caste marks and ear-rings, and the replacement of turbans with round 
caps decorated by leather cockades (made from, it was said, the skin of cows and pigs). The typical 
explanation for the mutiny - which cost the lives of more than 100 Europeans and 350 sepoys - is that 
Muslim and Hindu sepoys alike were responding to a perceived "attack on their respective religions". 14 
But there is also evidence to link the mutiny to a plot to re-establish the sons of Tipu Sultan, who were 
living in the fort of Vellore, as the rulers of Mysore. 15 And there were other parallels with the mutiny 
of 1857. According to Holmes, the sepoys were resentful because the reorganisation of 1796 had 
increased the number of European officers and thereby reduced the authority of native officers; it had 
also introduced the system of promotion by seniority for Europeans and natives alike, so that 
commands were often held by men unfit to exercise authority. 16 
If the defence of religion and caste really was the motive for mutiny, why did the disaffection spread 
to other Madras stations after the withdrawal of the obnoxious dress regulations? It is true that Lord 
William Bentinck, Governor of Madras, then issued a proclamation assuring the sepoys that the 
government had no intention of intefering with their religion. But the Court of Directors probably got it 
right when they blamed the new generation of commandings officers for failing to earn the confidence 
of their men. "If the reorganisation of 1796 had not blasted the hopes of the sepoys and deadened 
their interest in their profession, " concluded Holmes, "if the new generation of English officers had 
treated their men with the sympathy which their predecessors had ever shown", the danger might never 
have arisen. 17 
12 Philips (ed. ), Bentinck Correspondence, 1, p. xxvii. 
11 Alavi, Yhe Sepoys and the Company, p. 91; Barat, 7he BengaINative Infantly, pp. 3034. 
14 Menezes, 'Race, Caste, Mutiny and Discipline, in Soldiers of the Raj, p. 104. 
" Malleson (ed. ), Indian Mutiny, I, pp. 165-7. 
16 Holmes, A History of the Indian Mutiny, p. 5 1. 
17 Ibid., pp. 514. 
157 
The mutiny at Barrackpore in 1825 was likewise the result of mixed motives. It was sparked by an 
order for three regiments of Bengal Native Infantry - the 26", 47h and 62nd - to march to Chittagong to 
reinforce the British and Madras troops fighting in Burma. Having reached Barrackpore near Calcutta, 
however, the sepoys of the 47h N. I. refused to proceed any further. Alavi cites two main reasons: the 
sepoys objected to the high cost of bullock transport for their equipment (including their individual 
cooking and drinking vessels); and they feared that if they did not go by land they would be forced to 
travel by sea. Their ostensible motive, therefore, was the protection of their ritual status. 's They may, 
on the other hand, have been using the defence of caste as an excuse. News had filtered through of the 
defeat of British troops at Ramu. The native papers were full of stories about the difficulty of Burma's 
terrain, the deadliness of its climate and the military prowess of its inhabitants. Even when the 47th's 
colonel offered to provide bullock transport from his own funds, the sepoys upped their demands: they 
would not proceed by sea, and they would not march unless they were guaranteed double batta. The 
showdown came to a climax on 2 November 1825 when a parade of the recalcitrant sepoys refused to 
ground their arms and Sir Edward Paget, the inexperienced Commander-in-Chief, ordered European 
troops to open fire. A one-side massacre ensued. It had been caused, in Kaye's opinion, by the sepoys' 
eagerness "to find a pretext for refusing to march on such hazardous service". But Kaye also stressed 
the damage done to the "discipline and efficiency of the Indian army" by the reorganisation of 1824 
which had split each two-battalion regiment into two separate regiments and, in particular, the division 
of battalion officers betweeen the two new regiments, so that a great many "were detached from the 
men with whom they had been associated throughout many years of active service". 19 Alackof 
empathy between officers and men was therefore a factor, just as it had been in 1806 and would be in 
1857. 
The 1852 'mutiny' was much less serious. Reinforcements were needed to fight in the 2 nd Burma 
War and the 38h N. I., with its headquarters at Barrackpore, was the most conveniently placed. But 
because it was not a general service regiment, its sepoys were asked if they would volunteer for service 
in Rangoon. The initial response, from the bulk of the regiment on duty at Fort William, was that the 
sepoys "were not unwilling to go" if their officers accompanied them. 20 But the first sign of 
disaffection appeared when Burney, the commanding officer, ordered his company commanders to 
18 Alavi, YheSepoysand the Compatiy, p. 91. 
19Malleson(ed. ), Kaye aildMallesolls History of the IndiallMutilly, I, pp. 1934. 
20 Quoted in Barat, Yhe Bengal Native Infantry, p. 285. 
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"assemble their men, call their roll, ask each man to volunteer, & if he declined to cause him to state the 
reason why he declined'. No. I Company refused to comply because, Lord Dalhousie told General 
Gomm, "the sepoys looked on this as compulsion, which practically it was" . 
21 Brigadier Warren, the 
station commander, cancelled the order and instructed the regiment to parade before him the following 
morning. There he told them that the government wished to send them to Rangoon by sea; but if they 
refused to volunteer, they would be marched to Arracan to relieve the 67dN. I., a general service corps, 
which would take their place in Burma. The sepoys'response was that they were "ready to move in any 
direction by land". 22 But the atmosphere soured when some of the native officers continued to try to 
persuade the sepoys to volunteer for the sea journey. It was later claimed that Burney told the men they 
would be sent to Arracan as a punishment if they did not volunteer; he is also said to have threatened 
them with the loss of their invalid pensions. Their patience finally snapped on 17 March when, 
depressed by rumours that they would be put on ships by force, they disobeyed repeated orders to return 
to their lines before finally submitting. 
The Court of Inquiry put most of the blame on Burney and censured his attempt to pressurize the men 
by asking them to state their reasons for not volunteering. He was transferred subsequently to another 
regiment (the 32nd N. I. which, ironically, was one ofjust eight regiments disarmed in 1857 but later 
reincorporated into the new Bengal Army). Dalhousie was also sympathetic towards the sepoys. "The 
men refused nothing we had the right to order them to do, " he informed Gomm. "Wemaycondemn 
their poor spirit, but we have no right to term them insubordinate, for not volunteering to go on board 
ship. " But as the men of the 38h were still in a ferment, "as they suspected Col. Burney of some dodge 
by which he was to get them on board ship when half-way (1), as they could not go at this season by 
country boats to Chittagong, & as they therefore could not reach Arracan till the middle of June", the 
military authorities "thought it better to get rid of all doubt, difficulty, and Colonel Burney by ordering 
23 the 38'h to Dacca" which was much closer. It was also a notoriously unhealthy station and many 
sepoys died of fever and other illnesses during their time there. 
But the central question remains: was the 'mutiny' of the 3 8h N. I. really about the defence of caste? 
or were the sepoys simply looking for an excuse to avoid the unwelcome prospect of fighting in 
Burma? Despite Burney's pressure and the inevitable rumours, the sepoys were never actually ordered 
21 Dalhousie to General Gomm, 10 March 1852, Dalhousie Letters, OIOC, MSS Eur/Photo Eur. 309. 
22 Quoted in Barat, Yhe BengaiNative Itfiantry, p. 286. 
23 Dalhousie to Gomm, 27 March 1852, Dalhousie Letters, OIOC, MSS Eur. /Photo Eur. 309. 
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to embark on ships. There was, moreover, a long tradition of high-caste Bengal sepoys volunteering for 
action outside British India: in 1811, seven thousand had served against the French in Mauritius and 
Java; more recently, the 38h regiment itself had fought in Afghanistan, despite the dread most high- 
caste sepoys had of crossing the Indus because, in the words of Sitararn (himself a volunteer), "the very 
act means loss of caste" ; 24 and during the mutiny, three disarmed regiments of Bengal Native Infantry - 
the 47'h, 65'h and 70'h - would volunteer for service in China. There was also the example set by the 
Bombay Army: a quarter of its sepoys were high-caste men from Hindustan, yet they had never 
objected to foreign service and, in 1856-7, would cross the sea to fight in Persia without demur. In 
theory, all three presidency armies were recruited on the basis that their sepoys would march where 
they were directed, "whether within or beyond the Company's territories". 25 But the various 
interpretations of this rule were very different, as Philip Melvill explained to a Parliamentary select 
committee in 1852: 
In Bengal, except for general service regiments, men enlist upon the understanding that they are not sent by sea for 
service in foreign parts; but the sepoys of the Madras and Bombay armies enlist upon the understanding that they 
will go wherever they are sent. At the same time, it is the practice at Madras to apprise the scpoys of a regiment 
ordered on foreign service, that if any are unwilling to follow their colours their places will be supplied in 
volunteers. 26 
Even Bombay sepoys expected to be consulted before serving outside their presidency, but it was 
purely a formality. "They have never objected to go on general service, to go abroad, or anywhere, " 
Colonel Leslie told the Peel Commission. 27 The obvious conclusion is that caste was pandered to in 
Bengal but not in Bombay. This, itself, was the consequence of the deliberate policy to create an 
exclusively high-caste army in Bengal (a policy that only began to be reversed after the mutiny at 
Barrackpore in 1825 had shown how dangerous caste sensitivity, however contrived, could be). One 
anecdote, told to Sir George Malcolm by one of his staff officers, perfectly illustrates the different 
attitude in the two armies: A Brahmin naik was asked by a European officer why he had left his former 
corps in the Bengal Army on the promotion of a low caste man, but was now serving in a Bombay 
24 Lunt (ed. ), From Sepoy to Subedar, p. 85. 
25 Bengal Army Regulations 1855, OIOC, LML/17/2/442, p. 220. 
26 P. P., H. C., 1852-3, )CML p. 8. 
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regiment with a Jew subedar, a Purwareejemadar and other low caste men. The naik replied: 
"Hindoostan zat ke ghyrat, Bombaypullun ke ghyral" ("In Hindustan it is the pride of caste, in Bombay 
that of the corps"). Malcolm's fear that pride of caste was becoming more prevalent in the Bombay 
Army was the reason he advised Bentinck, in 1830, to limit the number of Hindustani recruits to no 
more than 200 per battalion (see Chapter One) . 
28 This never came to pass, though the overall number 
of Hindustanis in the Bombay Army fell slightly from just over 50% to just over 46% (while the 
number of high-caste troops remained steady at around 25%). Nevertheless, except in the few native 
infantry regiments which had an unusually high proportion of high-caste men - such as the 2 nd , 27tý 28th 
and 29h - professional considerations continued to outweigh issues of caste. 
Major John Jacob emphasized this crucial difference between the Bengal and Bombay armies in an 
essay published in 1850. So much attention was paid to caste in the Bengal Army, he wrote, that the 
sepoys looked upon their European officers not as superior beings but as bad Hindus. He added: 
Instead of being taught to pride themselves on their soldiership and discipline, the scpoys are trained to pride 
themselves on their absurdities of caste, and think that their power and value are best shown by refusing to obey 
any orders which they please to say do not accord with their religious prejudices. It is a grave mistake to suppose 
that religious feelings have any real influence on these occasions ... ; 
but it is certain that the Bengal scpoy is a 
stickler for his imaginary rights ofcaste for the sake ofincreasedpower; he knows that by crying out about his 
caste, he keeps power in his hands, saves himself from many of the hardships of the service, and makes his officers 
afraid of him. 
As proof of this, Jacob provided a comparison: In Bombay a low-caste sepoy could, and often did, rise 
to the rank of subedar by his own merit; in Bengal such a man would not even be admitted to the ranks 
for fear of contaminating the high-caste sepoys. Yet in the Bombay Army "the Brahmin (father, 
brother, or son, it may be, of him of Bengal) stands shoulder to shoulder in the ranks - nay sleeps in the 
same tent - with his Purwaree fellow-soldier, and dreams not of any objection to the arrangement! " If 
this anomaly was pointed out to a Bombay Brahmin sepoy, as it sometimes was by Bengal officers, the 
answer would always be: "What do I care; is he not the soldier of the State? 1129 
27 Evidence of Col. Leslie, 26 Aug 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, p. 94. 
28 Malcolm, Goveniment ofIndia, pp. 234n, 233-4. 
29 Pelly (ed. ), Views and Opinions, pp. 118-19. 
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Douglas Peers has argued that a "growing disenchantment with the high-caste prejudices of the 
Bengal Army" was partly responsible for the clamour to reinstate corporal punishment in the 1840s. He 
quotes one officer as saying "The sepoys did not accept the abolition as a boon or a compliment; on the 
contrary, they merely treated it as a tribute to their own strength, wrung from the fears of the 
government. 00 While there may be some truth in this, it should also be recalled that one of the reasons 
why Hardinge recommended the resumption of flogging was because he considered it to be more 
acceptable to high-caste sepoys than hard labour and mandatory dismissal. And whatever their 
misgivings, the majority of Bengal officers continued to defer to caste at the expense of discipline. 
How else can we explain the many instances of Bengal sepoys being allowed to avoid manual labour 
because it was demeaning to their caste? After the battle of Chilianwalla, for example, most of the 
entrenching work was done by European troops because Bengal sepoys declined (and were allowed to 
do duty as a covering party instead) .31 At the siege of Multan, so General Dundas informed the 
Bombay government, the Bengal sepoys refused to work in the trenches. The officer commanding the 
Bengal Sappers and Miners at Multan later rejected this charge. 32 But on spurious grounds. For as 
Colonel Hill, a former commandant of the Bombay Sappers and Miners, told the Peel Commission, the 
Bengal troops did indeed "march to the trenches and took the pickaxes and shovels in their hands, but 
they did not work. " Hill recalled another occasion during the 2nd Sikh War when the divisional 
commander ordered him to enlist Bengal sepoys for working parties. Their commanding officer 
refiised to comply, however, on the ground that an order for "Bengal troops to work on fatigue parties 
was tantamount to ordering them to mutiny at once". In the Bombay Army, by comparison, Hill had 
never known caste to inferfere with the performance of duty. He related how one of his high-caste 
sepoys, a Brahmin from Oudh, had been in hospital when the corps received orders to march to 
Bombay for embarkation to Persia in early 1857. But instead of staying put, the Brahmin discharged 
himself and marched night and day to overtake his company on the premise that he "would be disgraced 
if his company went on service without him". 33 
A number of other witnesses testified to the fact that only in Bengal was caste allowed to interfere 
with dUty. 34 Colonel Leslie recalled how unwilling high-caste Bengal sappers were to dig 
30 Peers, 'Sepoys, Soliders and the Lash', JICH, 23: 2,1995, p. 23 8. 
31 Thackwell, Narrative of the Second Sikh War, p. 190. 
32 Evidence of Col. Patrick Grant, 14 March 1853, P. P., H. C., 1852-3, XKVII, pp. 127-8. 
33 Evidence of Col. John Hill, 26 Aug 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, pp. 95-6. 
34 They included Maj. -Gen. Steel, John Thomas and Sir Charles Trevelyan, ibid., pp. 70-1,88,112, 
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emplacements during the I" Afghan War, whereas Madras sappers were quite the opposite. So 
frustrated did Leslie become that, on more than one occasion, he ordered his troop of European horse 
artillery to dismount and do the work instead . 
35 Major-General Steel confirmed that caste was not 
pandered to in the Madras Army: on receiving a petition from a high-caste sepoy who objected to the 
palanquin marriage of a lower caste havildar in cantonments, the Commander-in-Chief ruled that the 
bride's palanquin was not to be interefered with - and that was the end of the matter. "If there was an 
act committed to insult or disturb a Mahommedan, a man of high or low caste, or of no caste at all, " 
stated Steel, "we should deal with it according to the articles of war, as contrary to good order and 
military discipline". 36 This was possible because, as one old Madras subedar told Captain Hervey, "We 
put our religion into our knapsacks, sir, whenever our colours are unfurled, or where duty calls. " 
Hervey added: 
Not being over particular, therefore, as regards the due observances of their religion, not overburdened with tender 
consciences, they indulge in the good things of life whenever it suits their convenience, much to the disgust of 
those high-castc bigots of the upper provinces, who look upon the natives of Southern India, and more particularly 
our sepoys, as a set of brute beasts not worthy to exist. Our men in general care not what they cat, or drink... I 
have myself seen Hindoos and Moslcms ... rolling 
drunk in the ditch; their castes and their religion are matters of 
secondary importance. 37 
In Bengal, however, caste distinctions could even override military rank. One Bombay officer recalled 
the following conversation during the siege of Multan between a high-caste sepoy and a lower caste 
naik of the Bengal Army: "We have left our lines: I intend to take command, you go into the ranks, and 
you will obey me. " According to one of the officer's subedars (himself a high-caste Hindu), such a 
proceeding was not unusual . 
38 Even Major-General Birch, Military Secretary to the Government of 
India, could not "conceive the possibility of maintaining discipline in a corps where a low-caste non- 
commissioned officer will, when he meets off duty a Brahman sipahi, crouch down to him with his 
forehead on the ground. " And yet he had seen such an act with his own eyeS. 39 
" Evidence of Col. John Leslie, 26 Aug 1858, ibid., p. 94. 
36 Evidence of Maj. -Gen. R_ Alexander, 25 Aug 1858, ibid., pp. 76-7. 37 Allen (ed. ), Soldier of the Company, p. 112. 
3'Evidence of Colonel S. Poole, 27 Aug 1858, ibid., pp. 116-17. 
39 Quoted in Malleson (ed. ), Kaye andMallesons History of the IndianMuliny, 1, p. 243n. 
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Kaye recorded the typical Bengal response to the criticism of Bombay and Madras officers: "that 
high-caste Hindustanis enlisting into the Bombay or Madras Armies were, to a great extent, cut off 
from the brotherhood, that they were greatly outnumbered in their several regiments, that it was 
convenient to conform to the custom of the country, and that what he did in a foreign country amongst 
strangers was little known at home". 40 There is something in this. But even Bengal sepoys were 
prepared to disregard caste rules when it suited them. This much became clear to John Lang, a British 
lawyer, when he fell in with a company of Bengal Native Infantry escorting treasure from Mainpuri to 
Agra in the early 1850s. In the course of a long conversation with Lieutenant Sixtie, the company 
commander, he discovered that it had become commonplace for high-caste sepoys to ask permission to 
carry the remains of popular officers to the grave, though it was technically an infringement of their 
caste rules. Sixtie commented: 
So much for caste, if it can begot over by an understanding amongst themselves I Castel More than four-fifths of 
what they talk about it pure nonsence and falsehood, as any straightfoward native will confidentially confess to 
you. I doWt mean to say that some Hindoos arc not very strict. Many, indeed, are so. But I mean to say that a very 
small proportion live in accordance with the Shastcrs [sic], and that when they cry out, "if we do so and so we shall 
lose our caste, " it is nothing more than a rotten pretext for escaping some duty, or for refusing to obey a distasteful 
order. 
The truth of Sixtie's words was brought home to Lang the following day when he witnessed a sick 
Brahmin sepoy drink a mixture of brandy and water from his officer's silver tumbler. On being 
lighheartedly accused of having lost his caste, the sepoy replied: 
The Sahib logue [Europeans] believe everything that the natives tell them about caste, and the consequence is they 
believe a great many falsehoods... There is no mention of brandy in the Shasters, Sahib... But, supposing that it 
were forbidden; do not men of every religion frequently and continually depart from the tenets thereof, in minor 
things, or construe them according to their own inclination or convenience, or make them sort of bundobust 
(agreement) with their consciences? Indeed, if we did not make this bundobust, what Hindoo or Mussulman would 
come in contact at all with one another, or with Christians, and certainly we, the natives of India, would not serve 
as soldiers... We should be in continual dread of having our bodies contaminated and our souls placed beyond the 
reach of redemption - and who would submit to that for so many rupees a month? Who can say what animal 
40 Ibid., p. 243. 
164 
supplies the skin which is used for our chacos and accoutrements? The cow, or the pig? The Mussulmans, when 
we laugh together about it, say the cow. We protest that it is pigskin. 
The sepoy also told the tale of Pertab Singh, an emissary of the Rani of Lahore, who tried to encourage 
the Bengal regiments at Barrackpore to rise in 1848 on the ground that the leather on their shakos was 
insulting to both Hindus and Muslims. He was listened to as long as his money lasted, and then handed 
41 
over to the authorities. 
Sir Henry Lawrence made the same point about the adaptability of religious and caste rules in 1856. 
"A cap, a beard, a moustache, a strap, all in their time have given offence, " he wrote. "All oil the 
pretence of religion. But by a little management, by leading instead of drawing, almost anything may 
be done. The man who would not touch leather a few years ago, is now, in the words of a fine old 
subedar, "up to the chin in it. " This was because leather cap-straps had been provided free, whereas 
cloth straps cost between one and two annas. Lawrence concluded: "Tact and management, not 
Brahminism in officers are wanted. eiQ No officer exemplified better the qualities Lawrence was 
referring to than John Jacob. In September 1854, after a particularly raucous celebration of the Muslim 
festival of Mohurram by his men, Jacob banned all "noisy processions" and "disorderly 
displays ... under pretence of religion". 
Though mostly Muslim his men complied with the order. Three 
years later, with the same festival approaching, the disaffected members of the 
& Bengal I. C. tried to 
use Jacob's prohibition to induce the Muslim troopers of the Sind Irregular Horse to rise. The response 
from a senior native officer was that "it is the order and must be obeyed". And it was. Jacob's 
biographer observes that this order became "deservedly famous, as a practical and conclusive proof of 
the truth of his doctrine that under a proper system of discipline the Indian soldier would cheerfully lay 
aside the prejudices of caste or religion when his commanding officer ... declared that this was 
to 43 necessary . 
The only branch of the Bengal Army that operated a similar system of discipline was the Punjab 
Irregular Force. Colonel Wilde told the Peel Commission that his men would have been "severely 
punished" if they had used caste or religion as a pretence to avoid duty. That did not mean that the 
officers were insensitive to religious prejudices: they would not ask their Muslim soldiers to drink from 
a pigskin water-bag, for example; and if such a mistake was made, they would quickly rectify it. But 
41 John Lang, Wanderings in India: and other Sketches ofLife in Hindostan (London, 1859), pp. 140-7. 
42 Lawrence, Essays, Military andPolifical, pp. 408-9. 
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where military duty was concerned, caste issues were not allowed to interfere. So when Wilde's 
regiment was ordered to dig the entire foundations of a fort at Bahadoor Khail, everyone took part, 
including the Brahmins. 44 
In the regular Bengal Army, on the other hand, so-called caste rules were accorded far too much 
respect. So much so, noted a Madras correspodent to the United Service Magazine in 1853, that "the 
Sepoy, seeing himself the object of so much care and solicitude, does not evince that feeling of 
reverence and respect that he did in days 'lang syne"'. It was, the author added, only natural for the 
sepoy to take advantage of the fact that his officer hesitated every time he ordered him to undertake a 
duty that might transgress his caste. Four years later, with the mutiny underway, the editor of the same 
magazine listed the various reasons that had been put forward to explain why the regular Bengal Army 
was so indisciplined. It is argued, he wrote, "that caste, and what it forbids, and the danger attending 
any attempt to control or weaken its despotism, have been grossly exaggerated and greatly overrated, 
which, being only too apparent to the apprehension of the native, has suggested to him the the 
advantage of keeping up the delusion, and gratuitously furnished him with a ... pretext under the cloak 
of which he can further his own ends". 45 
One senior Madras officer, in his evidence to the Peel Commission, blamed the mutiny of the Bengal 
Army on the "way in which caste was pampered and got the upper hand of discipline and 
subordination". 46 Even a former Bengal colonel was prepared to admit that he and his fellow officers 
took more notice of caste than their counterparts in the other presidencies, and that the excuse of caste 
was to a great extent an absurdity. "The men, " he added, "would bejust as willing to take our service, 
, 07 without any reference to caste, as the Madras and Bombay troops do. 
The evidence of this chapter leads to the conclusion that Bengal sepoys did not treat ritual rules as 
seriously as most historians have supposed. This is not to say that they would not have died in defence 
of their caste and religion - but rather that what constituted a genuine threat to both has often been 
misunderstood. Kolff has shown that caste exclusiveness was absent from the long tradition of peasant 
soldiering in north India until Warren Hastings favoured high-caste recruits for the Bengal Army in the 
late eighteenth century. Thereafter the British positively encouraged the observance of caste rules that 
43 Lambrick, Jacob ofJacobabad, pp. 201-2,334. 
44 Evidence of Lt. -Col. Alfred Wilde, 26 Aug 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, p. 92. 
45 United Service Magazine, August 1858 and July 1857, pp. 604 and 318-19. 
46 Evidence of Maj. -Gen. Robert Alexander, 25 Aug 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, p. 80. 
47 Evidence of Col. Edmund Wintle, 28 Aug 1858, ibid., p. 132. 
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were even stricter than those that applied to civilians. The intention was to create an 61ite force that was 
separate from peasant society. Only then could the native army be trusted to enforce government laws 
that infringed upon religious and social customs. The success of this policy would seem to support the 
argument that Bengal sepoys cared more about professional grievances than infringements of Hindu 
custom such as the abolition of sati. 
For the Bengal Army's doctrine of caste was never as inflexible as it appeared: partly because it was 
distinctive to the army and therefore not necessarily enforceable by the village caste committees; and 
partly because caste rules in civil society did not assume their modem exclusiveness until the first half 
of the nineteenth century. "Until well into the colonial period, " wrote Susan Bayly, "much of the 
subcontinent was still populated by people for whom the formal distinctions of caste were of only 
limited importance as a source of corporate and individual lifestyles. "48 This was not, of course, the 
impression gained by the sepoys'European officers who did everything in their power to avoid giving 
offence to caste or religion. It was only natural that the sepoys would take advantage. In his 1858 
minute on the reconstruction of the Bengal Army, Major-General Mansfield wrote that he had long 
been convinced that "the surly conduct of the sepoys when called on to do what did not exactly suit 
their fancy" would lead sooner or later to a confrontation. He added: 
The subserviency of the officers generally to the feeling of high caste, which gave them handsome and intelligent 
men, was, I believe, appreciated in all its strength by the sepoys, who actually played with the fears of their 
Braluninized coloncls, and insisted, on many instances, on the observance of certain customs, even in the presence 
of an enemy, to which we know they are perfectly indifferent under really intelligent and energetic command. 
Thus was the gcrin of resistance to authority and discipline fostered, and it but too often happened that 
commanding officers openly admitted the presence of a power superior to their own discipline, succumbed to it 
themselves, and induced superior authority to give countenance to it also. " 
Mansfield was right. Bengal sepoys were only too happy to use caste as an excuse to avoid unpleasant 
duties: from digging to foreign service. Yet there are plenty of examples of Bengal sepoys being 
persuaded both to dig (as at Arracan during the I st Burma War) and to serve overseas. High-caste 
sepoys, as we have seen, were quite prepared to disregard caste rules when it suited them. In this 
48 B ayly, Ae New Cambridge HistorY of Indfa. - IV. 3, p. 3. 
45 P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx. 62, p. 454-6. 
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context, the General Service Enlistment Order of 1856 (see Chapter one) was unpopular not because it 
threatened a loss of caste per se, but because it seemed to represent yet another nail in the coffin of the 
high-caste 'brotherhood' which dominated the Bengal Army. On 8 November 1856, Canning informed 
the President of the Board of Control that he had no reason to fear that caste feelings would be excited 
by the new enlistment regulation because it would only apply to new recruits, and because the number 
of high-caste sepoys who were happy to join a general service army like Bombay proved that they did 
"not on first entering the service hold very closely to caste privileges". " If caste really had been under 
threat, RaJput and Brahmin recruits would have dried up afler the publication of the order, yet 
according to Canning that did not happen. 51 
Caste could also be used as a smokescreen for other grievances. The mutinies at Madras in 1806 and 
Barrackpore in 1825 are said to have been motivated by a defence of caste and religion. Yet in both 
cases other factors were arguably more important, such as a lack of empathy between the sepoys and 
their European officers and (in the case of 1806) a desire to re-establish a traditional ruler as an 
alternative employer. It is surely no coincidence that similar grievances contributed to the 1857 
mutiny. Moreover the Bengal tradition of using caste as an means to achieve other ends did not cease 
with the suppression of the Indian mutiny. In 1917, for example, 120 members of the 3rd Brahmans 
mutinied when group messing was introduced during the Mesopotamian campaign. "The authorities 
suspected that the main concern of the mutineers was not to preserve their caste, " wrote Omissi, "but to 
exploit the system of individual messing to avoid frontline service. (The food which was introduced 
was in line with Brahmin practice, and was later freely eaten by the regiment y52 
50 Canning to Vernon Smith, 8 Nov 1856, Lyveden Papers, OIOC, MSS. Eur. /F231/4. 
51 Canning to Vernon Smith, 23 March 1857, ibid. 
52 OMiSSi, Yhe Sepoy and the Raj, p. 14 1. 
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Chapter Six - Mutiny: The Cartridge Question 
It is almost impossible to identify with any degree of certainty the exact reason why almost three- 
quarters of the regular Bengal Army chose to mutiny, or partially mutiny, in 1857.1 Most historians 
have pinpointed the fear of an enforced conversion to Christianity as the primary motive. They cite a 
series of recent laws and trends that appeared to undermine traditional customs and beliefs - such as the 
legalization of widows' marriages, the establishment of group messing in jails, the passing of the 
General Service Enlistment Order, and the upsurge of missionary activity - and argue that the 
introduction of Enfield cartridges greased with cow and pig fat was the last straw. But a detailed study 
of the so-called 'cartridge question' can lead to a quite different conclusion. 
All the East India Company's weapons were ordered direct from British manufacturers by its Military 
Store Department in London. These arms were similar to those supplied to the British Army by the 
Board of Ordnance, thus enabling both Company and Royal troops in India to use the same 
ammunition. In 1840, in line with the British Army, the Company switched from flintlock to 
percussion small-arms (the muzzle-loading muskets retained the same'Brown Bess'design that had 
been in use since the eighteenth century, but with their flints replaced by percussion caps). The first 
Company troops to use percussion arms in action were sepoys of the 2d Madras N. I. at the storming of 
Chin-kiang Fu in China in July 1842. Over the next decade or so, nearly 460,000 percussion muskets, 
carbines and pistols were despatched to India. But the procurement of these smooth-bore firearms 
ceased in June 1851 when the British government decided to equip its troops with the revolutionary 
2 Mini6 rifle. 
Rifles had been used by the British and East India Company armies for skirmishing and sniping since 
the early nineteenth century. But their accuracy had been more than offset by a slow rate of loading, a 
seemingly inevitable consequence of the need for the ball or bullet to have a loose fit during loading 
and a tight fit in the rifling grooves on being fired. This conundrum was solved in the 1840s by two 
French officers: the first, Delvigne, developed an elongated bullet with a hollow base which expanded 
1 Seven out of 10 Bengal Light Cavalry regiments and 54 out of 74 Bengal Native Infantry regiments 
mutinied or partially mutinied in 1857. These figures do not include the many other regiments that 
displayed a mutinous disposition before they were disarmed. 
2 D. F. Harding, Smallarms of the East India Company 1600-1856 (London, 1997), 1, pp. 232-3,239 
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when fired; Captain Mini6 improved the design by adding a cup in the cavity to assist uniform 
expansion. Though both men wanted the concept to be called the'Delvigne-Mini6', if came to be 
known by the latter's name alone. The first such weapon chosen by the Board of Ordnance for the 
British Army was the Pattern 1851 Rifled Musket, otherwise known as the Mini6 rifle. But it was never 
generally issued because the British government's 'Committee on Small Arms' decided in 1852 that the 
Mini6's. 702 bore was too large. The Pattern 1853 Rifled Musket, or Enfield rifle, with a. 577 bore was 
eventually chosen instead. 3 
Though the East India Company was promised 30,000 new Enfield rifles by the Board of Ordnance in 
1854, it did not receive any for two years. This was partly because the government factory at Enfield 
was neither large nor modem enough to meet demand; and partly because Britain's entry into the 
Crimean War in 1854 meant that Lord Raglan's expeditionary force was given priority. The war also 
enabled the British government to comer the small-arms market and extinguish unwelcome competition 
by forcing the Court of Directors in March 1856 to cede control of its arms procurement to the new 
War Department (which had replaced the Board of Ordnance in February 1855). 4 The first 
consignment of 1,500 Enfield rifles finally reached the Bengal Presidency in the spring of 1856. They 
were ear-marked for the Bengal Army, but the Indian government agreed to assign them to H. M. 60, h 
Rifles on the ground that their existing rifles were "unservicable and should be replaced immediately". 5 
By the outbreak of mutiny in 1857, the Bengal Presidency had received just over 12,000 Enfields. But 
the only regiment in possession of these weapons was H. M. 60, h Rifles (it had received 1,040). The 
remainder were in the arsenals at Fort William (4,395), Allahabad (3,000), Ferozepore (3,000), Delhi 
(4 1), the Artillery Depot of Instruction at Meerut (525) and the musketry depots at Dum-Durn 
6 
(Damdamah), Sialkot and Ambala. 
It was not the rifles themselves, however, but their ammunition that was to prove so controversial. 
Cartridges for most muzzle-loading percussion firearms of this period took the form of a tube of paper 
that contained a ball (lead tin alloy) and enough powder for a single shot. The approved method of 
loading such a cartridge was to bite the top off to allow the powder to be poured down the barrel. The 
3 Ibid., pp. 119-23. 
4 Ibid., pp. 12344. 
1 Col. A. Abbott to Col. R. J. H. Birch, 7 April 1856 and Birch to Abbott, 25 April 1856, India Military 
Consultations, OIOC, P/43/36, Nos. 194 and 195 of 25 April 1856. 
170 
rest of the cartridge, including the ball, would then be forced down the barrel with the ramrod. This 
type of ammunition was used by both the existing percussion musket and the Enfield rifle, But the 
crucial difference between the two was that the Enfield rifle's grooved bore required the bottom two- 
7 thirds of its cartridge to be greased to facilitate loading. Another rifle - the two-grooved Brunswick 
model - had been used by the 60th Rifles and rifle companies in some Bengal Native Infantry regiments 
since the early 1840s. Its ammunition consisted of a powder cartridge and a separate ball covered with 
a 'patch' of fine cloth smeared with beeswax and coconut Oil, and was therefore considered to be 
inoffensive to both Hindus and Muslims. This was not the case with the substance used to grease the 
new Enfield cartridges. 
In 1853, when the first Enfield cartridges were sent to India to test their reaction to the climate, 
General Gomm warned the Secretary to the Military Board that "unless it be known that the grease 
employed in these cartridges is not of a nature to offend or interfere with the prejudices of caste, it will 
be expedient not to issue them for test to Native corps". As it happened, the grease contained an 
element of tallow (animal fat) which may well have come from either cows or pigs. But the Military 
Board chose to ignore Gomm's counsel and the ammunition was tested over a period of some months 
by being carried in the pouches of sepoy guards at Fort William, Cawnpore and Rangoon. No objection 
to these cartridges was raised either by the sepoys themselves or by the committees of European 
officers set up to report on them. 8 The tests confirmed that the grease could stand up to the Indian 
climate and the consignment was returned to England in 1855. A year later, following hard on the heels 
of the first batch of Enfield rifles was a shipment of greased cartridges and bullet moulds. 9 Thereafter 
the Bengal Army's Ordnance Department began to manufacture its own cartridges at its Fort William, 
Meerut and Dum-Dum arsenals. The grease used for the rifle patch -a mixture of wax and oil - was 
discounted because its lubricating properties disappeared when cartridges were bundled. Instead the 
same combination preferred by the Royal Woolwich Arsenal - five parts tallow, five parts stearine and 
6 Col. Chester to Col. Abbott, 29 April 1857, India Military Consultations, OIOC, P/47/18, No. 81 of 19 
June 1857. 
7 Lewis Winant, Early Percussion Firearms., A History of the Early Percussion Firearms Ignition (New 
york, 1959), p. 255-6. 
' Malleson (ed. ), Kaye andMalleson's History of the Indian Mutiny, 1, pp. 3 79-80. 
9 Birch to Abbott, 7 Nov 1856, India Military Consultations, OIOC, P/46/55, No. 24 of 7 Nov 1856. 
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one part wax - was used. 
10 But the department made the fatal, and unforgiveable, error of not 
specifying what type of tallow was to be used. " 
The 60th Rifles received their fiill complement of 1,040 Enfield rifles on I January 1857.12 At around 
the same time, Bengal Native Infantry regiments began to send detachments of seven men (one 
European officer, one native officer and five non-commissioned officers and sepoys) for instruction in 
the care and handling of the new weapon at the Musketry Depots at Dum-Dum near Calcutta, Ambala 
in the Cis-Sutlej States and Sialkot in the Punjab. 13 But not a greased cartridge had been issued, nor a 
practice shot fired, by the time a rumour began to circulate among the sepoys at the Dum-Dum depot in 
late January that the grease for the new cartridge was offensive to both Hindus and Muslims, and that 
this was part of a systematic plot by government to convert all Indians to Christianity. The origin of 
the rumour was a conversation between a high-caste sepoy of the 2nd N. I. and a low caste khalasi (or 
labourer) from the Dum-Dum magazine. According to a report by Captain Wright, commandant of the 
Rifle Instruction Depot, the sepoy had rejected the khalasi's request to drink from his Iota because he 
did not know his caste, to which the khalasi replied: "You will soon lose your caste, as ere long you 
will have to bite cartridges covered with the fat of pigs and COWS. it 14 
Wright's report was submitted to the station authorities on 23 January 1857 by Major Bontein, 
commanding the Musketry Depot, who also gave details of a parade held the evening before at which 
two-thirds of the native portion of the depot (including all the native officers) had stated their objection 
to the grease applied to the new cartridges and a request for wax and oil to be used instead. Both letters 
were then forwarded to Major-General J. B. Hearsey, commanding the Presidency Division, who sent 
them on to Colonel Birch, the Military Secretary to the Government of India, with the comment that the 
khalasils claim was "no doubt totally groundless", but so "suspiciously disposed" were the sepoys that 
the only remedy was to allow them to grease the cartridges themselves with materials from the bazar. 15 
The Government of India, ever conscious of religious issues, was swift to react: on 27 January, having 
10 Evidence of Lt. M. E. Currie, Commissary of Ordnance, 23 March 1857, P. P., H. C., 1857, XKX, p. 
261; Memorandum by J. G. Bonner, Inspector-General of Stores, 23 March 1857, P. P., H. C., 1857, 
XXX, p. 4. 
" Mall eson (ed. ), Kaye andMalleson's History of the Indian Mutiny, 1, pp. 38 0- 1. 
12 J. A. B. Palmer, 7he Mutiny Outbreak atMeerut in 1857 (Cambridge, 1966), p. 14. 
13 Birch to Sir John Lawrence, 5 Feb 1857, India Military Consultations, OIOC, P/47/5, No. 51 of 6 Feb 
1857. 
14 Capt. J. A. Wright to the Adjutant of the Rifle Instruction Depot, 22 Jan 1857, Forrest (ed. ), State 
Papers, I, p. 3. 
15 Maj. J. Bontein to the Station Staff Officer, 23 Jan 1857 and Hearsey to Maj. W. A. J. Mayhew, 24 Jan 
1857, ibid., pp. 1-3. 
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consulted Colonel Abbott (Inspector-General of Ordnance), Birch ordered that all cartridges at the 
Depots of Instruction (including the Artillery depot at Meerut) were to be issued free from grease and 
that the sepoys were to be allowed "to apply, with their own hands, whatever mixture for the purpose 
they may prefer". Abbott, however, was quick to inform Colonel Chester, the Adjutant-General, who 
was up country with the Commander-in-Chief, General Anson, that such a solution would "answer well 
enough for practice, but would be impracticable on service" because balled cartridges needed to be 
greased before they were bundled. He therefore suggested the replacement of balled cartridges with 
balls covered with grease patches and powder-only cartridges. 16 
Abbott also anticipated the government by making inquiries as to the exact composition of the 
cartridge grease. On 29 January, he reported to Colonel Birch that, in line with the instructions 
received from the Court of Directors, "a mixture of tallow and bees'wax" had been used and that "no 
extraordinary precaution" appeared to have been taken "to insure [sic] the absence of any objectionable 
fat". Ina separate letter that day, Abbott informed Birch that strict orders would be given for the 
exclusive use of sheep or goats' fat if it was decided that some form of tallow was necessary. 17 It has 
never been proven beyond doubt that the original grease for the Enfield cartridge contained beef or pork 
fat. But the circumstantial evidence is compelling. In a letter to the President of the Board of Control 
of 7 February, Canning himself stated that the grease grievance had "turned out to be well founded". is 
In March, the officer in charge of the Fort William arsenal testified that no one had bothered to check 
what type of animal fat was used. At the same tribunal, Abbott admitted that the tallow may well "have 
contained the fat of cows or other animals". 19 
At this stage, therefore, the Dum-Dum sepoys appear to have had a genuine grievance - though not 
one or them had been, or ever would be, issued with a greased cartridge. Even more perplexing is the 
claim by Major Bontein that no greased cartridges were ever made at the Dum-Dum magazine because 
its operatives were still learning the complicated process of manufacture when the rumour began. Nor 
were any greased cartridges ever sent from the Fort William arsenal, where they were being made, to 
16 Birch to Maj. Mayhew, 27 Jan 1857, Birch to Col. C. Chester, 27 Jan 1857 (Telegraphic), Abbott to 
Chester, 28 Jan 1857, P. P., H. C., 1857, XXX, pp. 3740. 
17 Abbott to Birch, 29 Jan 1857 (two separate letters), ibid., pp. 40-1. 
18 Canning to Vernon Smith, 7 Feb 1857, Lyveden Papers, OIOC, MSS Eur/F231/4. 
" Evidence of Lt. Currie and Col. A. Abbott, 23 March 1857, P. P., H. C., 1857, XXX, p. 261. 
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the Dum-Dum depot . 
20 How, then, did the Dum-Dum khalasi discover the truth about the cartridge 
grease? We can only speculate. 
What we do know is that the government moved swiftly to correct its earlier error by halting the 
production of greased cartridges and authorizing the sepoys to apply their own grease. No sooner had 
this concession been announced, however, than sepoys from the four regiments of Bengal Native 
Infantry at Barrackpore, the great military station 16 miles north of Calcutta (and about 30 miles from 
Dum-Dum), were voicing their fears that the paper encasing the new cartridges also contained 
objectionable fat. These suspicions first arose when ungreased Enfield cartridges and the paper used 
for making them were shown to a parade of the 2 nd N. I. at Barrackpore on 4 February (similar fears 
were also expressed during a separate parade of the 34thN. I. ). At a subsequent court of inqury, held 
four days later, witness after witness stated his belief that the paper was objectionable to his caste. One 
said that the rumour began with khalasis from the Fort William arsenal; others referred to bazar gossip 
and a "general report in the cantonment". Two witnesses, a sepoy and the havildar-major (native 
sergeant-major), claimed to have experimented with the paper: the former said that it made a fizzing 
noise when burnt "and smelt as if there was grease in it"; the latter that it would not dissolve in oil and 
that this had convinced him there was no grease in it. But despite this, the havildar-major would not 
bite off the end of an ungreased cartridge because "the other men would object to it". 21 This objection 
to the cartridge paper was groundless: it contained no grease and certainly no tallow. Suspicions had 
arisen partly because the English manufactured paper was slightly thicker than that used to make 
musket cartridges. 22 But the lack of a genuine reason prompts the speculation that some guiding hand - 
within or without the regiments - was trying to keep the cartridge controversy alive by switching 
attention from the grease (which was no longer an issue) to the paper. Canning suspected such a 
conspiracy and told Vernon Smith that there was a mutinous spirit in the 2nd N. I., or at least part of it, 
which had "not been roused by the cartridges alone if at all it . 
23 
The first serious outbreak of open mutiny took place at Berhampore, 110 miles north of Calcutta, 
during the night of 26/27 February. The previous afternoon, the men of the 19th N. I. had refused to 
receive their copper caps for firing exercise on the morning of 27 February because they suspected that 
the paper for the blank practice cartridges contained objectionable grease. These cartridges, it should 
20 Evidence of Maj. Bontein, 18 March 1857, P. P., H. C., 1857, XXX' p. 259. 
21 Proceedings of a Special Court of Inquiry, 6 Feb 1857, Forrest (ed. ), State Papers, 1, pp. 7-13, 
22 Evidence of Maj. Bontein and Lt. Currie, 18 March 1857, P. P., H. C., 1857, )OK pp. 259-60. 
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be stressed, were for their old muskets - not the new Enfield - and were the same type that had been 
issued to the army for many years. They had, moreover, been made up in the regimental magazine the 
previous year by the sepoys of the 7h N. I.. Lieutenant-Colonel Mitchell reminded the native officers of 
these facts and warned them that any sepoy who refused to accept the blank cartridges at the morning 
parade would be court-martialled. At around IIp. m., however, the sepoys broke into their bells-of- 
arms and seized their muskets. Mitchell responded by ordering a detachment of the I 1'h I. C. and some 
European artillery to cover the mutinous sepoys while he went to speak to them. Four hours later, after 
much negotiation, Mitchel I finally agreed to the native officers' suggestion to withdraw the cavalry and 
guns. The men then lodged their weapons and returned to their lines. 24 
During the subsequent Court of Inquiry, the native officers, non-commissioned officers and sepoys 
of the 19'h N. I. sent a petition to General Hearsey to explain their behaviour. They stated that the 
rumour about the new cartridges containing objectionable fat had been in circulation for "two months 
and more", and that they were very much afraid for their religion. Their minds had been temporarily 
put at ease by Colonel Mitchel I's announcement that grease for the new cartridges would be made up in 
front of the sepoys by the company pay-havildars. But their fears returned when they inspected the 
blank cartridges at their bells-of-arms on the afternoon of 26 February. "We perceived them to be of 
two kinds, " they wrote, "and one sort appeared to be different from that formerly served out. Hence we 
doubted whether these might not be the cartridges which had arrived from Calcutta, as we had made 
none ourselves, and were convined that they were greased. " It was for this reason, they claimed, that 
they refused to accept the firing caps. Colonel Mitchell had angrily responded by threatening to take 
the regiment to Burma, where they would all die of hardship, if they did not accept the cartridges. This 
outburst had convinced them that the cartridges were greased. They had seized their arms in fear of 
their lives amidst shouts that they were about to be attacked by Europeans, the cavalry and the guns. 25 
The sepoys' objections, therefore, had switched from the grease on the Enfield cartridge, to the paper 
used for the Enfield cartridge, and finally to the paper on the old musket cartridge. The reference to 
two different kinds of blank cartridge is explained by the fact that, since the mid-1850s, some of the 
paper used for musket ammunition had been produced by the Serampore mills near Calcutta. Its paper 
23 Canning to Vernon Smith, 22 Feb 1857, Lyveden Papers, OIOC, MSS Eur/F231/4. 
24 Lt. -Col. W. St. L. Mitchell to Major A-H. Ross, 27 Feb 1857, Forrest (ed. ), State Papers, I, p. 41. 25 Forrest (ed. ), State Papers, 1, pp. 45-7. 
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was of a slightly darker shade than the familiar English product of John Dickinson & C0.26 Yet it 
contained no grease, nor was grease ever applied to cartridges for smooth-bore muskets. There is, 
therefore, no rational explanation for the behaviour of the 19th N. I. on the night of 26 February beyond 
a complete breakdown of trust between the sepoys and their European officers. Colonel Mitchell had 
assured them that the cartridges were of the old type and contained no grease, and yet they preferred to 
believe the wild rumour that the Indian government was planning their forcible conversion to 
Christianity. It is highly probable that certain members of the regiment were playing upon the fears of 
their comrades to incite mutiny. These ringleaders were almost certainly behind the false reports that 
the blank cartridge paper contained grease and that the regiment was about to be attacked during the 
night of 26/27 February. 
By mid-March, the disaffection had spread to the Musketry Depot at Ambala where detachments 
from 41 Bengal Native Infantry regiments were being instructed in the use of the new Enfield rifle. On 
the morning of 16 March, as all the native detachments were being paraded for drill, Lieutenant 
Martineau, Instructor of Musketry, called aside the native officers to express his surprize that the men 
were still discussing whether or not to the use Enfield cartridges despite his assurance that they could 
apply their own grease. At which point a native officer from the 71t N. I. stepped forward and stated 
that the men at the depot were against using any of the new cartridges until they had ascertained that 
their doing so was "not unacceptable to their comrades in their respective corps". For they feared being 
taunted with loss of caste on return to their regiments. That this was not the generally held opinion, 
however, is proved by the interjection of a jemadar from the 36h N. I. who claimed that the previous 
speaker knew "perfectly well that many of the detachments here entertain no such feelings". The 
Jemadar added: 
I will fire when I am told, &I know many others will do the same. I have sufficient confidence in Government & 
my officers to know that no improper order will be given to us, & to demur using cartridges merely because they 
are of a different form, or made of different paper, is absurd, in fact there is no question of caste in the matter, & he 
who refuses to obey proper orders, or who cavels about doing so on the pretext of religion, is guilty of mutinous 
and insubordinate conduct. 
26 David Harding, 'Arming the East India Company's Forces', Soldiers of the Raj, p. 145. 
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According to Martineau, the jemadar's sentiments were backed up throughout by the native officers of 
27 the 10h and 22nd N. I., while others loudly denounced the views of the first speaker. Here then is 
evidence that not all native soldiers were sufficiently disillusioned with either their European officers or 
the government to believe, or even claim to believe, that the cartridge question was still a legitimate 
issue. Those who continued to do so were, in this native officer's opinion, using religion as a pretext. 
Nevertheless, the fear of social ostracisation was not without foundation. On 19 March, the 
Commander-in-Chief, General the Hon. George Anson, arrived in Ambala on a tour of inspection with 
his escorting regiment, the 36th N. I. But when a havildar and a naik from the regiment, part of the 
detachment doing duty at the Musketry Depot, went to the camp to greet their comrades they were 
refused entry to the tents and taunted by one subedar with having become Christians. Martineau was 
asked to obtain some redress not only by the two aggrieved N. C. Os., but also by the native officers at 
the depot who "regarded the insult as intended for all who as good soldiers were obeying the orders of 
Government by using the new Enfield rifle" . 
28 He therefore conducted his own inquiry among the 
depot's detachments and discovered, so he told the Assistant Adjutant-General, the existence of a 
rumour that the Enfield cartridge had been purposely greased with beef and pork fat "with the express 
object of destroying caste", and that the weapon itself was "nothing more or less than a Government 
missionary to convert the whole Army to Christianity". That "so absurd a rumour should meet with 
ready credence" was proof that the feeling of native troops was anything but sound. Yet it was 
"generally credited", he added, and punchayets had been formed in all Bengal corps from Calcutta to 
Peshawur, determined to regard as outcastes any men who used the new cartridges. 29 
On 23 March, having been informed of the above developments, General Anson addressed a parade 
of the native officers at the depot. Through the medium of an interpreter, he told them that the 
rumoured intention of the government to interfere with their caste and religion, or to coerce them or the 
people of the country in general to do anything which would involve loss of caste, was "utterly 
groundless and false", and that he looked to them to satisfy those under their authority on this point. 30 
The response of the native officers, through the medium of Lieutenant Martineau, was that they knew 
the rumour to be false, but it was "universally credited, not only in their regiments, but in their villages 
27 Capt. E. M. Martineau to Sir John Kaye, 20 Oct 1864, Kaye Mutiny Papers, OIOC, H725, pp. 1023-4. 
28 Ibid., pp. 1027-8. 
29 Lt. Martineau to Capt. S. Becher, 20 March 1857, Martineau Letters, OIOC, MSS Eur/C571. 
30 Becher to Col. Birch, 25 March 1857, India Military Consultations, OIOC, P147/1 1, No. 335 of 3 
April 1857. 
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& their homes". They would not disobey an order to fire, but they wanted the Commander-in-Chief to 
understand the social consequences to themselves, namely loss of caste. Martineau himself could not 
offer any definitive explanation, yet he was disposed to regard the greased cartridge "more as the 
medium than the original cause of this wide spread feeling of distrust that is spreading dissatisfaction to 
our Rule". 31 Part of his reason for believing this, he later testified, was because only I-Endu sepoys 
appeared to be genuinely worried by the cartridge question; the Muslim sepoys, on the other hand, 
simply "laughed at it". 32 
Anson was of a similar conviction. "The'Cartridge' question is more a pretext, than reality, " he 
informed Lord Elphinstone on 29 March, adding: "The sepoys have been pampered & given way to, & 
have ... grown 
insolent beyond bearing. 03 Yet he accepted that the native officers at Ambala genuinely 
feared social ostracism, and so ordered the deferment of actual target practice at the three musketry 
depots until the government had voiced its opinion. 34 
The Supreme Government had meanwhile come to another decision. On 27 March, Canning's 
general order announced the forthcoming disbandment of the 19d'N. I. for "open and defiant mutiny". it 
also took the opportunity to assure the native army that it had ever been "the unvarying rule of the 
Government of India to treat the religious feelings of all its servants, of every creed, with careful 
respect", and that had the sepoys of the 19'h N. I. "confided in their Government, and believed their 
commanding officer, instead of crediting the idle stories with which false and evil-minded men have 
deceived them, their religious scruples would still have remained inviolate" . 
35 The 19'h N. I. was duly 
disbanded at Barrackpore on 31 March, in the presence of the garrison's four regiments of native 
infantry, the Governor-General's Body-Guard and five companies of H. M. 84, h Foot sent up from 
Calcutta and Chinsurah respectively. 
Two days earlier, Barrackpore witnessed the first outbreak of mutinous violence when Sepoy Mungul 
Pandy of the 34"' N. I., armed with a musket and sword, tried to murder the European sergeant-major, 
Hewson, and the adjutant, Lieutenant Baugh. Both received severe sword cuts before Pandy, 
confronted by General Hearsey and his staff, turned his gun upon himself. What was particularly 
shocking about this incident was the fact that upwards of 400 sepoys watched Pandy's unprovoked 
31 Martineau to Becher, 23 March 1857, Martineau Letters, OIOC, MSS Eur/C571. 
32 Examination of Captain Martineau, 23 Feb 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVH1, p. 210. 
33 Anson to Elphinstone, 29 March 1857, Elphinstone Papers, OIOC, MSS Eur/1787/13ox I IB/I 8. 
34 Becher to Col. Birch, 25 March 1857, India Military Consultations, OIOC, P/47/1 1, No. 335 of 3 
April 1857. 
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attack without intervening. Furthermore, the Jemadar of the Quarter Guard ignored repeated orders to 
disarm Pandy, and there is even evidence to suggest that some members of the Guard assisted in the 
attack upon the two Europeans (Hewson, for example, recalled being felled from behind by blows from 
a sepoy's musket). That Hewson and Baugh survived was mainly due to the intervention of Sepoy 
Shaik Pultoo, the only native to offer assistance, who was badly wounded in the process. 36 
Pandy's intention is unclear, though it would appear to have been a failed attempt to incite the whole 
regiment to mutiny. "Come out, you Mainchutes [sister-violaters], the Europeans are here, " he is said 
to have shouted on emerging from his hut. "From biting these cartridges we shall become infidels. Get 
ready, turn out all OfYOU. 07 A separate statement by the same witness has Pandy warning the men that 
the "guns and Europeans had arrived for the purpose of slaughtering them". 38 Hewson recalled him 
saying: "Nikul ao, pultun; nikul ao hamara sath (Come out, men; come out and join me - You sent me 
out here, why don't you follow me). 09 Pandy himself admitted that he had recently been taking Mang 
(an infusion of Indian hemp) and opium, and was not aware of what he was doing at the time of the 
attack . 
40 It seems likely, therefore, that an intoxicated Pandy acted prematurely before his co- 
conspirators were ready. Certainly his false references to the approach of Europeans and the loss of 
religion were repeated in many other mutinies, and they had clearly been decided upon as the best way 
to win over waverers. But in the case of the 34th N. I., there had been no specific dispute over the issue 
of cartridges (though the men had expressed their suspicions about the paper for the new Enfield 
cartridge), and the ground was not yet prepared for fiill-blown mutiny. 
It was later suggested that the evangelism of the 34th's commanding officer, Colonel Wheler, was 
largely to blame for the bad feeling in the regiment. Wheler himself admitted that he had been in the 
habit of speaking to "natives of all classes, sepoys and others" on the subject of Christianity "in the 
highways, cities, bazars and villages", though "not in the lines and regimental bazars". 41 He had, he 
said, "often addressed" sepoys of his own and other regiments in the stations where he had been 
quartered with the aim of converting them to Christianity. 42 Such an officer, Canning told the President 
" Forrest (ed. ), State Papers, 1, pp. 94-7. 
36 Examination of Sgt. -Major JT Hewson and Lt. B. R Baugh, 6 April 1857, ibid., pp. 117-122. 
37 Examination of Havildar (late Sepoy) Shaik Pultoo, 6 April 1857, ibid., p. 124. 
38 Examination of Havildar Shaik Pultoo, 9 April 1857, ibid., pp. 129-30. 
39 Examination of Hewson, 000000000 110 00 Oibid., p. 119. 
40 Interrogation of Mungul Pandy, 4 April 1857, ibid., p. 108. 
410 0000S. Wheler to the Offg. Brig, Major, 4 April 1857, P. P., H. C., 1857, X)ýX, p. 202. 
42 Wheler to Major Ross, A. A. G. Presidency Division, 15 April 1857, ibid., p. 205. 
179 
of the Board of Control, was "not fit to command a regiment". 13 But other opinion was divided. An 
anonymous letter to the Rriend ofIndia asked, with reference to a report that Wheler was about to be 
removed from his command, "by what law a man who lives as a Christian, and peaceably endeavours to 
induce others to be Christians like him, is made an offender". 44 Yhe Bengal Hurharu responded with 
the comment that the "least likely way of making Christians of the Natives in this country, is to get 
turned out of it ourselves" . 
45 Lieutenant Martineau later testified that he had never heard any sepoys at 
Ambala speak complainingly of the efforts of Wheler and missionaries in general to convert natives to 
Christianity and did not think "they cared one bit about it". 46 Anson did not believe the disaffection of 
the Bengal Army could be "traced to the preaching of Commanding officers" because Wheler was an 
isolated case. 47 Yhe Bengal Hurhani also had "no reason to suppose that the prevalence of disaffection 
and insubordination in the Bengal Army had been caused by the proceedings of proselytizing officers". 
Yet, it added, what was "more likely to cause general disaffecton in an army of illiterate natives than 
the suspicion of a design against their national faith", what "more likely to excite such a suspicion than 
the spectacle of a military Commander ... teaching and preaching a foreign religion". In other words, 
the actions of Wheler and men like him were grist to the mill of those who wished "to win away the 
allegiance of the sepoys from Government ii . 
48 
In civil society as a whole, many Indians had become increasingly wary of the government's attempts 
at anglicization during the previous 40 years. In 1813, as part of the 20-year renewal of the East India 
Company's Charter, two decisions were taken which were to have far-reaching consequences for Indian 
language and culture: the Indian government was committed to spending L10,000 a year on education; 
and the long-standing ban on Christian missionaries was removed. As a result of the first initiative, 
Anglicizers and Orientalists began a fierce debate as to what kind of education - English or classical 
Indian - should be funded . 
49 The question was finally settled in 1835 when Thomas Babington 
Macaulay, law member to the new Legislative Council of India, penned his notorious Minute on 
Education which recommended raising up an English-educated middle-class "who may be interpreters 
between us and the millions whom we govern -a class of persons Indian in colour and blood, but 
43 Canning to Vernon Smith, 9 April 1857, Lyveden Papers, OIOC, MSS Eur/F231/5. 
44 Friend OfIlldia, 13 April 1857 
45 Yhe BengalHurhanl, 19 April 1857 
46 Examination of Captain Martineau, 23 Feb 1858, P. P., H. C,, 1859, XVIII, p. 210. 
47 Anson to Lord Elphinstone, 10 May 1857, Elphinstone Papers, MSS Eur/F87/ Box 6A/No. 4, OIOC. 
48 Yhe BellgalHurkani, 28 and 29 May 1857 
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English in tastes, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect". 50 Already a new anglicized 61ite in Calcutta 
had begun "to create institutions to serve its own interests". These were largely educational 
establishments that taught English language, literature and western sciences, and included the Hindu 
College (1816), the Calcutta School Society (1818), the Sanskrit College (1824) and the Oriental 
Seminary (1829). They were supplemented by missionary schools that generally taught Indians of all 
religions and castes for free, notably Dr Duff s Free Church Mission in Calcutta. But even those 
Calcutta 61ites who accepted the necessity of learning English were split between conservatives who 
wanted to limit the incorporation of foreign culture within Hindu society (such as the members of the 
Hindu Dharma Sabha) and "cultural radicals who rejected Hindu social norms in favour of English 
culture and secular rationalism imported from Europe" (led by the brilliant young Eurasian, Henry 
Derozio, who supported the abolition of sad in 1829, just two years before his untimely death at the age 
of 22). 51 The extent to which these cultural developments affected rural communities and military 
cantonments, however, is open to question. The abolition of sad, for example, caused hardly a ripple 
among the native troops. 
The activity of Christian missionaries, however, was potentially more problematical. With the ending 
of the ban on their activity in 1813, missionaries of all denominations made rapid inroads into 
Company territory. At first they were required to possess an official licence; but this stipulation was 
dropped when the Company's Charter was renewed for a further 20 years in 1833. By then, moderate 
evangelicals were receiving the enthusiastic support of both Lord William Bentinck, the Governor- 
52 General (1828-35), and Daniel Wilson, the Bishop of Calcutta (1832-58). In 1834, the American 
Presbyterian Mission established its headquarters at Ludhiana in the Cis-Sutlej States (then part of the 
Punjab). A year later the Mission acquired a printing press and began to publish tracts, translations of 
the scriptures and dictionaries in Punjabi, Urdu, Persian, Hindi and Kashmiri. After the annexation of 
the Punjab in 1849, a number of new missions sprang up. A similar process took place at Agra where 
the Anglican Church Missionary Society set up a mission, orphanage and printing press in 1838. By 
1846 the major missionary societies had an annual budget of 1425,000, nearly half of which was spent 
49 Kenneth W. Jones, 7he New Cambridge History ofIndia. - Voljjj. -I - Socio-religious reform 
movements in British India, pp. 27. 
50 Quoted in Stokes, English Ulilitarians in India, p. 46. 
" Jones, The New Cambridge History of India: Vollff., 1, pp. 28-9. 
52 Porter, Andrew, 7he OxfordHistory of the British Empire: VoL III - Yhe Nineteenth Century 
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by Anglicans and Methodists. The campaign of proselytism in the North-Western Provinces, in 
particular, provoked a stream of pamphlets, books, journals and newspapers in defence of the Hindu 
and Muslim religions from native-owned presses in Agra, Delhi and Meerut. But despite the Christian 
zeal of a number of governors-general - including Lord Canning who made donations to the Calcutta 
Bible Society, the Serampore College (established by Baptist missionaries) and the Free Church 
Mission - the actual number of conversions to Christianity in the Bengal Presidency prior to the mutiny 
was relatively insignificant: the Anglican Church Missionary Society, for example, had just 19,000 
church attendants throughout India by the 1840s, most of them outside Bengal; in the Punjab, where the 
American Presbyterian Mission was active, the total number of converts was fewer than 4,000 by the 
1880s. In the Madras Presidency, on the other hand, the Tinnevelly district recorded nearly 40,000 
Christian converts by 1850, with a further 20,000 in southern Travancore (though the process of 
conversion was actually begun by Jesuits in the 17th Century). They were chiefly Untouchables who 
had little social status to lose. Respectable Hindus in southern India responded in the mid-1840s by 
forming two organizations: the Vibuthi Sangam (Sacred Ash Society), a shadowy group dedicated to 
ending Christian conversions; and the Madras-based Sadu Veda Siddhanta Sabha (Society for 
Spreading the Philosophy of the Four Vedas), which sought the same end by legal means. Both 
societies were probably behind the spate of attacks on Christian villages that were commonplace in the 
late 1840s and 1850s. If anything, therefore, the antagonism towards missionaries was much higher in 
the Madras Presidency than in Bengal. But Hindus across India - especially those of the higher castes - 
were undoubtedly alarmed by the Company's amendment of Hindu law: first, in 1850, to allow 
Christian converts the right of inheritance; and second, in 1856, to legalize the second marriage of 
13 
Hindu widows (and thereby legitimize their subsequent offspring). 
Perhaps of more relevance to the disaffection of the &h and 34dregiments than issues of caste and 
religion, however, was the fact that both were commanded by relatively unfamiliar officers. Mitchell 
had been with his regiment forjust 18 months. Wheler a few years longer, though he had only returned 
to take command of the 34th in 1856 after an absence of seven years. Wheler had also been in 
temporary command of the original 34h N. I. when it was disbanded in 1844 for refusing to serve in 
Sind without extra benefits. It may be assumed, therefore, that he was not particularly popular. 
53 Jones, Yhe New Camhridge History ofIndia: VoINT-1, pp. 52-3,87,156-8; Lawrence James, Raj: 
yhe Making and Onmaking ofBrifish India (London, 1997), pp. 222,228-9; Maclagan, Clemency 
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Furthermore it is surely no coincidence that both regiments were stationed in Lucknow, the capital of 
Oudh, when that kingdom was forcibly annexed by the East India Company in February 1856 on the 
ground of misgovernance. Many of their sepoys came from that province (as did a large proportion of 
sepoys in the Bengal Army as a whole). Not only was the annexation a blow to their national pride, but 
it also brought an end to the privilege enjoyed by all Company soldiers from Oudh of being able to 
prosecute their legal cases and petitions through the British Resident. So abused had this privilege 
become - with some sepoys receiving up to 10 months leave for the sole purpose of prosecuting their 
claims - that in 1853 the maximum leave was stipulated as that which "would enable the applicant to 
travel to Lucknow, remain there for 10 days, and then return (unless the Resident certified that the 
man's continued presence was necessary)ti. 
54 Yet the privilege remained until annexation and there is 
no doubt that its loss - and with it the prestige of serving the Company - was keenly felt. In a letter to 
Canning of I May 1857, Sir Henry Lawrence mentioned that he had received a number of letters 
attributing the "present bad feeling not to the cartridge or any specific question, but to a pretty general 
dissatisfaction at many recent acts of Government which have been skilfully played upon by 
incendiaries". Lawrence gave the example of an Oudh sowar in the Bombay cavalry who was asked if 
he liked annexation. "No, " the sowar replied. "I used to be a great man when I went home; the best in 
the village rose as I approached; now the lowest puff their pipes in my face. "55 Therewereother 
occasions when the annexation of Oudh was cited as a grievance. Lieutenant De Kantzow of the 9th 
N. I. noted that some of his younger sepoys, who had seen the annexation of Oudh with their own eyes 
(including the auctioning of the King's property), referred to their country as having been "snatched". 56 
Martineau recalled that dissatisfaction with the annexation of Oudh was "occasionally alluded to" by 
sepoys at the Musketry Depot at Ambala. 
57 And during the mutiny itself, Captain Thomson of the 53d 
N. I., one of only four men to survive the Cawnpore massacres, was informed by mutinous sepoys that 
"the Company's rai would cease" because of the annexation of Oudh alone. 58 
The upshot of the aborted rising of the 34h N. I. was that Mungul Pandy and the Jemadar of the 
Guard, Issuree Pandy, were hanged for mutiny on 8 and 21 April respectively. With just 10 exceptions 
54 Col. Sleeman to C. Allen, 14 Oct 1852, India Military Consultations, OIOC, P/43/61, No. 375 of 5 
Nov 1852; G. O. G. G., 16 Feb 1853, Abstract of General Orders from 1848 to 1853, OIOC, 
LJMIU17/2/437. 
55 Anderson and Subedar (eds. ), Yhe Last Days of the Company, 1, p. I 10. 
56 Kantzow Papers, OIOC, MSS Eur/Photo/Eur 86, vol. 1, p. 5. 
57 Examination of Captain Martineau, 23 Feb 1858, P. P., 1859, XVHL p. 210. 
58 Capt. Mowbray Thomson, Yhe Story of Cawnpore (London, 1859), p. 194. 
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- three native officers, three N. C. O. s and three sepoys - the remainder of the seven companies present at 
Barrackpore when the incident took place (the other three companies were on detached duty at 
Chittagong) were found guilty of passive mutiny and disbanded by order of the Governor-General on 6 
May. 59 The reaction of the native newspaper, The Hindoo Patriot, to the outbreak of disaffection in the 
Bengal Army was to indicate a cause far deeper than the cartridge question. "Months before a single 
cartridge was greased with beef-swet or hogslard, " it commented on 2 April, "we endeavoured to draw 
public attention to the unsatisfactory state of feeling in the sepoy army... There is no want of 
distinctness or prominence in the symptoms which have already appeared to wam us against the 
existence of a powder mine in the ranks of the native soldiery that wants but the slightest spark to set in 
motion gigantic elements of destruction. 10 
Also in early April, on the advice of Lieutenant-Colonel Hogge (the Director of the Artillery School 
of Instruction at Meerut) and Major Bontein, the government attempted to remove any remaining 
objection to the new cartridges by altering the firing drill for both rifles and muskets. 
61 Instead of 
tearing the top of the cartridge with their teeth, sepoys would now do so with their left hand. 
6' With 
this and the other main concession in place (that of allowing sepoys to apply their own grease), Canning 
authorized the musketry depots to commence firing practice. Any further postponement, he observed, 
would be viewed by the sepoys' comrades in their regiments as a victory; the government would be 
seen to have "admitted the justice of the objection or at least as having doubts upon it, and the prejudice 
63 
would take deeper root than ever" . 
The first live firing at the Ambala musketry depot - using Enfield cartridges greased by the sepoys 
with a composition ofghi and beeswax - took place on 17 April. The native troops at the depot had 
warned Martineau that it would lead to an outbreak in the station - which was garrisoned by the 4th 
L. C., 5h and 60dN. I.., H. M. 9h Lancers and two troops of European Bengal horse artillery - and the 
increased frequency of arson attacks seemed to confirm thiS. 64 As early as 26 March an attempt was 
made to bum down the hut of the native officer in the 36th N. I. who had been the first to declare his 
59 G. O. G. G., 4 May 1857 and Maj. -Gen. Hearsey to Col. Birch, 6 May 1857, Forrest (ed. ), State 
Papers, 1, pp. 222-6. 
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willingness to fire the new cartridge. The fires resumed on 13 April, when the authorities at Ambala 
received orders to commence firing practice, and continued on into May. The targets included the 
depot hospital, a barrack in the European lines, an empty bungalow, a European officer's stables, and 
huts belonging to two high-caste native officers and a havildar from the 50'N. I. who were attached to 
the depot (and who, according to their C. O., had "fired the new cartridges without demur" and 
repeatedly assured him that there was "nothing objectionable in them"). 65 That no one would identify 
the incendiaries despite the offer of a large reward was, Martineau was told, "a certain sign of general 
, 66 dissatisfaction and some impending outbreak'. But not all native regiments were outraged by the 
news from Ambala. When the detachments from the Cawnpore regiments returned from Ambala, 
noted Captain Thomson, "they were amicably received, and allowed to cat with their own caste, 
although they had been using the Enfield rifle and the suspected cartridges". One Muslim sepoy from 
Thomson's 53d N. I. even "brought with him specimens of the cartridges, to assure his comrades that no 
animal fat had been employed in their construction". 67 This docile reaction is confirmed by Jhokun, the 
servant of Colonel Williams of the 50" N. I., another of the Cawnpore units. "The cartridge question 
used to be talked about, " claimed Jhokun, "but it did not engross much attention. The 53rd and 56th N. I. 
showed great lukewarmness until the mutiny actually broke out. " This was probably because the 
instigators of the eventual mutiny at Cawnpore were from the other two regiments: the 2d L. C. and the 
l"N. 1.68 The cartridge question, therefore, was only of interest to those who wished to foment mutiny. 
At the Dum-Dum depot live firing commenced on 23 April without incident. Major Bontein told the 
Assistant Adjutant-General of the Presidency Division that his orders had been "obeyed as a matter of 
course", which was only to have been expected after the "alteration in the method of loading and 
greasing the cartridges". 69 One of the first to step forward and declare his willingness to fire the new 
cartridge was Subedar Bholah Upadhya, a Brahmin from the 17 th N. I. Ms loyalty was rewarded when 
his commanding officer, Major Burroughs, recommended him for the vacant subedar-majorship in the 
regiment though he was only the second senior subedar. The subedar who was passed over, Bhoondu 
15 Capt. E. W. E. Howard to G. C. Barnes, 4 May 1857, P. P., H. C., 1857, )00ý p. 443; Return by Maj. F. 
Maitland, 5h N. I., 24 Feb 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVIII, p. 44. Ajemadar in the 5th N. I. was charged 
with inciting the regiment to ostracize these men, but was acquitted by a native court-martial. 
66 Examination of Captain Martineau, 23 Feb 1858, P. P., I-I. C., 1859, XVIII, p. 210. 
67 Thomson, 7he Story ofCawipore, pp. 24-5. 
61ý Deposition of Jhokun, No. 34, Forrest (ed. ), State Papers, III, Appx., p. CXCVII. 
69 Bontein to Maj. Ross, 23 April 1857, India Military Consultations, OIOC, P/47/15, No. 334 of 15 
May 1857. 
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Sing (an Ahir), would later lead the regiment in mutiny at Azimgarh on 3 June, 70 Before that event 
took place, the men frequently voiced their suspicions about the new cartridges. Unable to understand 
their objections in the light of the government's concessions over greasing and loading, Burroughs 
sought an answer from his shrewdest and most intelligent havildar, Juggernath Tewarry. While 
refusing to enter into specifics, Tewarry pointed out that it was the object of all smart sepoys to get into 
their regiment's rifle company (if it had one), and once there to use patches greased in the government 
magazines. "We do not know what that grease is made of, " added Tewarry, "but did you ever hear any 
sepoy objecting to it? " Then why, said Burroughs, was an objection made know? Tewarry replied: 
"From villainy. " But would say no more. 71 
it is difficult to pinpoint the exact day on which firing practice began at the Sialkot depot. But we do 
know that on 26 April, the day after an "uneasy feeling about the Enfield rifle and cartridge showed 
itself', Lieutenant-Colonel Darwall of the 57h N. I. at Ferozepore "caused a native letter to be written to 
the detached party at the Sialkot depot, to assure them that no greased cartridges were in the regimental 
magazine, or would be used". The letter was also readout to the regiment. "The men were satisfied, " 
noted Darwall, "and nothing further occurred" until 286 men deserted when the regiment was disarmed 
on 14 May. 72 At Sialkot, meanwhile, the sepoys were firing the Enfields without a murmur. After a 
visit to the depot in early May, Sir John Lawrence informed Canning that the sepoys were "highly 
pleased with the new musket, and quite ready to adopt it", not least because they realized the advantage 
it would give them in mountain warfare on the North-West Frontier. 
73 
Within a week the mutiny proper had began at Meerut. The ostensible cause, as it had been at 
Berhampore in February, was a refusal to accept blank cartridges for firing practice. The soldiers in 
question were 90 skirmishers of the 3rd L. C., made up of the 15 men in each troop to whom carbines 
were issued, and described by one officer as "more or less picked men, and quite the 61ite of the 
regiment". 74 On 23 May, these skirmishers were ordered to attend a parade the following morning to 
practise the new firing drill whereby the cartridge was tom rather than bitten. That evening, five of the 
six troop commanders were warned by their men that the skirmishers would not fire the cartridges for 
71 Statement by Lt. Col. F. W. Burroughs, 3 June 1857, Rizvi and Bhargava (eds. ), Freedom Struggle, I, 
V 344-5 * Urroughs to C! Xt. 1. R Chamberlain, 23 Jan 1860, ibid., p. 348. 
72 Return of the 57 N. I. by Lt. -Col. E. Darwall, 3 March 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVI1E[, p. 50. 
73 Lawrence to Canning, 4 May 1857, quoted in Malleson (ed. ), Kaye andMalleson's History ofthe 
Indian Mutiny, 1, pp. 427-8. 
74 Sir Patrick Cadell, 'The Outbreak of the Indian Mutiny, JSAHR, 33,1955, p. 119. 
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fear of getting a bad name. One of these officers informed the adjutant (for transmission to the C. O., 
Colonel Carmichael-Smyth) that the men had said "if they fire any kind of cartridge at present they lay 
themselves open to the imputation from their comrades and other regiments of having fired the 
objectionable ones". 75 In other words they did not care whether the cartridges they were being asked to 
fire were unobjectionable or not; their concern was to escape social ostracization. The warnings were 
genuine. At the following day's parade, 85 out of the 90 skirmishers refused to accept the three blank 
cartridges they were offered, despite Carmichael-Smyth's assurance that they were not greased and 
were the same as they had been using all season. According to the colonel, none of those who refused 
gave any reason for doing so "beyond that they would get a bad name; not one of them urged any 
scruple of religion; they all said they would take these cartridges if the others did. 06 They numbered 
48 Muslims and 37 Hindus. Of the five non-commissioned officers who took the cartridges, three were 
Muslims and two Hindus. 
At the subsequent court of inquiry, both the native quartermaster-havildar and the former acting 
quartermaster havildar testified that the blank cartridges involved had been been manufactured in the 
regimental magazine the previous year. They also confirmed that the paper was the same as that in use 
for many years, and that there was nothing in the material of the cartridges or the manner in which they 
had been made up that would be objectionable to either a Hindu or a Muslim. The former acting 
quartermaster-havildar, one of the five men to accept the cartridges, had even supervised their 
production. ' So, too, had Bhuggun, the Regimental Tindal, who had been making similar cartridges in 
the regiment for over 33 years. "Till now, " he stated, "I never heard any objection of any kind against 
them, and even now I cannot understand what point in particular is objected to. 08 
Apart from Carmichael-Smith, the only other witnesses to give evidence to the court of inquiry were 
the senior Muslim and Hindu sowars from each troop, none of whom was involved in the parade. 
Asked in turn whether they were aware of anything objectionable in the material of the cartridges, most 
admitted that they knew of nothing and that the cartridges seemed to be of the type always used. And 
yet, many added, there was a general rumour or suspicion that there was something wrong with them. 
Only the senior Muslim sowar in the & Troop was prepared to elaborate: "They apparently look like 
75 Capt. H. C. Craigie to Lt. Melville-Clarke, 23 April 1857, Forrest (ed. ), State Papers, I, pp. 228-9 
76 Evidence of Col. G. M. Carmichael-Smyth, 25 April 1857, ibid., pp. 230-2 
77 Evidence of Quartermaster-Havildar Thakoor Sing and Havildar Pursaud Sing, ibid., pp. 232-3. 
78 Evidence of Bhuggun, ibid., pp. 236-7. 
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old ones, but they may, for aught I know, have pig's fat rubbed over them. to 79 The court, made up of 
seven native officers from the two regiments then at Meerut (three from the Yd L. C. and four from the 
2e N. I. ), so concluded that that there was "no adequate cause" for the disobedience the previous day 
beyond a vague rumour that the cartridges contained a suspicious material. They, however, were 
unanimously of the opinion that there was "nothing whatever objectionable in the cartridges" and that 
they could be received and used as before without affecting the religious scruple of either a Hindu or a 
Muslim. Any claim to the contrary was "false". 8t 
In the opinion of Major G. W. Williams, who later conducted an extensive investigation into the 
outbreak at Meerut, those cartridges served out to the troopers could not have been confused with the 
new Enfield cartridge. "Though we can fairly allow for suspicion to have entered the minds of some, " 
he added, "yet this fact is significant of a hostile feeling against Government, and a determination to 
make the worst of the matter, by extending the prejudice originally incited by ... the Enfield cartridges, 
to those of the same kind as has been used by them for generations past . "82 
As a result of the court's findings, Anson agreed with the recommendation by the Judge Advocate- 
General, Colonel Young, that the 85 skirmishers should be charged with collective disobedience before 
a general court-martial. 83 But before the trial could be convened, two similar episodes occurred. First, 
on 27 April, a squad of native artillery recruits at Meerut refused to accept blank cartridges for carbine 
drill. They were paid up and discharged from the service forthwith. 84 Five days later, at Lucknow, the 
71h Oudh I. I. (a local corps under British command) also refused cartridges for musketry practice, 
alleging they were greased. The officer involved is said to have ordered them to bite the cartridges 
because he had not received the revised instructions for loading drill. Nevertheless "it was a foolish 
and groundless objection, " noted Lieutenant Bonham of the Oudh Artillery, "for the cartridges were the 
same as those always in use with the regiment, and being of the ordinary kind, for use with the old 
smooth-bore musket, they had not, of course, been greased. All this was fully explained by the officer 
79 Forrest (ed. ), State Papers, 1, pp. 234-6. 
so The 15'h N. I. had left Meerut for Nasirabad in early April and would soon be replaced by the I Vh N. I. 
from Mirzapur. 
81 Ibid., p. 237. 
82 Memorandum by Major G. W. Williams, 15 Nov 1857, Rizvi and Bhargava (eds. ), Freedom Stniggle, 
V, pp, 10-11. 
83 Memorandum by Col. K. Young to Col. Chester and Anson to Chester, 29 April 1857, ibid., pp. 237- 
240. 
84 Major J. H. Campbell to Major J. Waterfield, 30 April 1857, ibid., p. 241-2. 
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in charge of the parade, but the men still remained obdurate, ""' The following day, 3 May, it was 
discovered that men from the 7th were inciting another native regiment at Lucknow to mutiny. 
Thereupon the Chief Commissioner of Oudh, Sir Henry Lawrence, ordered the disarmament of the 7h 
and during this operation a number of sepoys panicked and deserted. Lawrence's inclination was to 
disband the remaining sepoys and re-enlist those whose innocence could be proved. 8s Canning 
disagreed, pointing out that only the guilty ones should be discharged. 87 In the event, Lawrence effed 
on the side of caution by dismissing only fifteen sepoys and all the native officers bar two; the others 
were forgiven, though as a precaution only 200 were rearmed. 88 But Canning's fellow Supreme 
Council members held very different opinions as to the motive for the 7h's disobedience. Major- 
General Low and J. P. Grant thought that most of the regiment refused to bite the cartridges because 
they genuinely feared a loss of caste; whereas Joseph Dorin regarded the biting of the cartridge as an 
"excuse for mutiny" on the ground that "no new rifles or greased cartridges" had been issued to the 
7 th 89 
The court-martial of the 85 men of the P L. C. took place over the three days of 6,7 and 8 May. The 
court comprised 15 native officers: four from the II th N. I. (which had arrived in Meerut at the end of 
April), two from the Yd Light Cavalry, one from the 20 th N. I., one from the Artillery and five from 
Native infantry regiments stationed in nearby Delhi (one from the 74h and two each from the 3e and 
54'h). Havildar Matadeen, the senior rank of the accused, tried to excuse his action by claiming that the 
night before the parade Brijmohun Sing, the Havildar-Major's orderly, had boasted that he had fired off 
two of the new greased cartridges. It was therefore a fear of losing their caste that had caused him and 
the other men to disobey orders the following day. 90 This accusation is highly suspect. Brijmohun had 
in fact fired off two old blank carbine cartridges using the new loading drill in the presence of his 
colonel. Why, then, would he lie to his comrades? Palmer has suggested a desire to create mischief" 
Certainly Brijmohun, a low-caste Hindu who was considered to be Carmichael-Smyth's pet, was 
unpopular in the regiment and his hut was duly burnt down during the night of 23 April. But 
presumably that was because he had admitted to firing any cartridge, rather than a greased cartridge 
83 Col. John Bonham, Oude in 1857. Some memories of the Itidian Mutiny (London, 1928), pp. 20- 1. 
86 G. Couper to the Sec. to the Govt. of India, 4 May 1857, Forrest (ed. ), State Papers, 11, pp. 8-9. 
" Canning's minute of 10 May 1857, P. P., 1857, YXY, p. 248. 
88 Lawrence to Canning, 17 May 1857, Forrest (ed. ), State Papers, II, p. 20. 
89 Minutes by Dorin and Low, 10 May 1857, and Grant, II May 1857, ibid., pp. 11-16. 
9' Palmer, Ae Mutiny Outbreak at Meerut, pp. 65-6. 
91 Ibid., p. 60. 
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which did not exist. The truth is that there was no real justification for refusing the cartridges on 24 
April beyond a general determination to stick together in defiance of legitimate authority. Some may 
have swallowed the canard that their religion and caste really were in danger; others dared not step out 
of line. But most were probably being manipulated by a hard-core of conspirators who had other ends 
in sight: not least the replacement of the East India Company with a more amenable employer. This 
conspiracy theory will be explored in detail in the next chapter. For Lieutenant Mackenzie of the 3rd 
L. C. was surely right when he noted that word had been "passed throughout the Bengal native army to 
make the cartridge question the test as to which was stronger - the native soldier or the Government 92 
By a majority verdict of 14 to one, all 85 defendants were found guilty and sentenced to 10 years 
imprisonment with hard labour. The court recommended favourable consideration on the ground of 
good character and the fact that the men had been misled by rumours. But the reviewing officer, 
Major-General Hewitt, thought that the latter circumstance aggravated rather than mitigated the crime. 
He therefore confirmed the majority of the sentences, while halving those of the II men who had 
served less than five years on the basis that they were young and had been led astray by their seniors. 93 
The verdict of the court was read out to the prisoners on Saturday, 9 May, at a morning parade attended 
by the whole Meerut garrison: the Yd L. C., the I Ph and 20th N. I., H. M. 60th Rifles, H. M. 6th Dragoon 
Guards (Carabiniers), a troop of European horse artillery and battery of European foot artillery. The 
prisoners were then stripped of their uniforms and shackled in irons. During the hour or so it took to 
complete the shackling, some men cried out "bey kussor (without fault)" and threw their boots away in 
disgust; others called upon their comrades for assistance while also castigating their colonel, the native 
officers who had composed the court-martial and the government. But however tempted they may have 
been, the watching natives troops did nothing, not least because they were being covered by the guns of 
the European soldiers. With the shackling complete, the prisoners were marched to the jail in Meerut 
and there handed over to the civil authorities. 
94 
It has often been claimed that the bloody rising at Meerut the following day - the start of the mutiny 
proper - was motivated by a desire to free these prisoners. But Palmer has shown beyond doubt that the 
native infantry, rather than the cavalry, were the first to rise, and that the plot to mutiny had been 
92 Col. A. R. D. Mackenzie, 'The Outbreak at Meerut', a chapter in Col. E. Vibart, 7he Sepoy Mutiny 
(London, 1898), p. 216. 
93 Palmer, Yhe Mutiny Outbreak atMeerut, p. 67. 
9' Mackenzie, 'The Outbreak at Meerut', 7he Sepoy Mutiny, pp. 218-19; Vet. Surg. John Phillipps to 
R. M. Edwards, 9 May 1857, Edwards Papers, NAK 7902-8. 
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maturing for at least a fortnight. The rescue of the prisoners, therefore, was a "last minute addition to 
the plan". 95 The evidence for a more general plot encompassing regiments in Delhi and elsewhere will 
be considered in the next chapter. Suffice it to say that the cartridge question, even in its most watered 
down form as seen at Meerut, was a perfect vehicle for conspirators to turn the rank and file sepoys 
against British rule. "Some scoundrel has seized upon the cartridge question as an opportunity to unite 
both creeds", wrote the veterinary surgeon of the P L. C. on 9 May, the day before his death at the 
hands of mutineers. 96 
A particularly convincing argument for the cartridge question to be seen as a pretext to mutiny was 
put forward by Major Marriott, the prosecutor, at the trial of the King of Delhi in March 1858. "That 
neither Mussulman nor Hindu had any honest objection to the use of any of the cartridges at Meerut or 
Delhi, " declared Marriott, "is sufficiently proved by the eagerness with which they sought possession of 
them, and the alacrity with which they used them, when their aim and object was the murder of their 
European officers. " Marriott also mentioned the fact that not one of the numerous petitions that had 
been sent to the'restored'King of Delhi by mutineers during the summer of 1857 made any reference to 
the cartridge question, though they contained a host of other trivial grievances. Yet whenever the 
mutineers'words were "uttered with a prospect of reaching European ears, greased cartridges are 
always brought forward". Lastly Marriott made the point that Muslims had no caste nor had they ever 
claimed a loss of religion by touching pork; many Muslim servants of Europeans, he said, handled pork 
daily. And to back this up he reminded the court of Martineau's claim that the Muslim sepoys at 
Ambala had laughed at the cartridge question. "We thus perceive, " he concluded, "that these men 
initiated open mutiny without one pretext for so doing... They had not even the extenuation of a 
pretended grievance; yet they at once leagued themselves in rebellion against us, and induced the 
Hindus to join them, by speciously exciting them on that most vulnerable of points, the fear of being 
forcibly deprived of their caste. " 97 Marriott's additional evidence for this was Mrs Aldwell's claim to 
have been told by Hindu sepoys, after the battle of Hindun on 30 May 1857, that they greatly regretted 
what they had done, "reproached the Mahomedans for having decieved them on pretence of their 
95 Palmer, Yhe Mutiny Outbreak at Meerut, pp. 129-3 1. 
96 Phillipps to P-M. Edwards, 9 May 1857, Edwards Papers, NAM, 7902-8. 
97 Address by Major F. J. Harriott, 9 March 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVIIL pp. 245 and 363. 
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religion, and seemed to doubt greatly whether the English Government had really had any intention of 
interfering with their caste". 98 
Marriott was trying to prove that the King of Delhi was at the centre of a Muslim conspiracy to 
overthrow British rule. He was not the only one to blame the Muslims. In mid-May, shortly after the 
disarmament of native troops at Lahore, Donald MacLeod, the Judicial Commissioner for the Punjab, 
told Bartle Frere that the cartridges had been used to "seduce the credulous, weak & superstitious of 
either class", and that he believed the intrigues to be of Muslim origin. 99 A month later, Canning's 
private secretary confided to the Governor of Ceylon that the "rebellion is now pretty well understood 
to be a Mahomedan one - and the Cartridge question to have been only a pretext to unite the Hindoos 
withthem". 100 It is probably incorrect to blame the mutiny on the Muslims alone. Whatisnotin doubt 
is that a sizeable number of sepoy conspirators - Hindu and Muslim alike - were prepared to use the 
cartridge question to unite opposition to British rule, not because they genuinely feared for their caste 
and religion, but because they believed they would be better off in the service of a native government. 
Major-General Hearsey made just this point in his evidence to the Peel Commission, describing the 
mutiny as a "general movement among the soldier class of Hindoostan" to "throw off the dominion of a 
foreign race, and then to sell their services to the highest native bidder". 101 Hearsey had no doubt been 
influenced by a letter from an officer of the 7& N. I. reporting a comment made to him by a Muslim 
sepoy that "when first the report was spread about, it was generally believed by the men, but that 
subsequently it had been a well understood thing that the cartridge question was merely raised for the 
sake of exciting the men, with a view of getting the whole army to mutiny and thereby upset the 
English Government; that they argued, that as we were turned out of Cabool [Kabul in 1842] and had 
never returned to that place, so, if once we were entirely turned out of India, our rule would cease and 
we should never return". 102 
Many other officers and officials were similarly unconvinced that the cartridge question - or religion 
in general - was a genuine cause of mutiny. "It was all a sham about the cartridges, " wrote a Bengal 
Artillery officer at the siege of Delhi, "for they are now firing them against us. " 103 Another Bengal 
98 Evidence of Mrs Aldwell, ibid., p. 203. 
99 MacLeod to Frere, IS May 1857, Elphinstone Papers, OIOC, MSS Eur/F87A3ox 613/8/1. 
100 Hon. George Talbot to Sir Henry Ward, 19 June 1857, Talbot Papers, OIOC, MSS Eur/F271/1. 
101 P. P., 1859, V, Appx. 71, p. 562. 
102 Ca XNX, yt. Greene to Hearsey, 15 June 1857, P. P., H. C., 1857, p. 503. 
103 2" Lt. H. Chichester to his mother, 14 June 1857, Chichester Letters, NAM, MSS Eur/Photo Eur. 
271. 
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officer on detached duty from his regiment described the cartridge question in July 1857 as a "mere 
farce", adding: "The mutiny is a well organised and pre-concerted plan for the extermination of the 
hated English from India. " 104 According to Hervey Greathed, the senior civilian at Delhi during the 
siege, sepoy deserters invariably cited the cartridge question as the cause of disaffection. But Greathed 
considered the real cause to be the growth of a "consciousness of power" in the army "which could 
"only be exercised by mutiny". 105 William Muir, the intelligence chief at Agra to whom these views 
were divulged, was of a similar opinion: 
The fact is [he informed the Secretary to the Home Department on 19 August 1857] that the sepoys had long been 
puffed up with conceit that the Imperial fabric rested on their shoulders alone: they had constructed it; they 
maintained it. This filled them with an arrogant and independent feeling, which led to the constant feeling of 
grievance when they were not petted and humourcd in everything. Here were the elements of disaffection and 
mutiny. The cartridge was used by the bad designing men of each regiment to inflame the otherwise contented 
soldiery, and when distrust was once infused our most solemn disavowals of intercferencz with caste were 
disbelicvcd. '06 
In a memorandum for the Supreme Council in 1858, Sir John Lawrence characterized the cartridge 
question as simply the spark that ignited a combustible mass. What had made the mass combustible, he 
declared, was the fact that the sepoy army had become too powerful. The sepoys were aware that most 
of the key installations in the country - the fortresses, magazines and treasuries - were largely under 
their control. They imagined they could overthrow the British government at will, and replace it with 
one of their own. It was this sense of their own power, said Lawrence, that had induced them to 
revolt. 107 
But arguably the most perspicacious comment on the cartridge question and the causes of the mutiny 
was provided by Christopher McGuinness, a lowly sergeant in the Bengal Army's Public Works 
Department, in a letter to his brother-in-law. He wrote: 
104 Captain Pierce to his parents, 12 July 1857, Pierce Letters, Add. MSS 425000,111, BL. 
105 Greathed quoted in W. Muir to Brig. -Gen. Havelock, 12 Aug 1857, P. P., H. C., 1857-8, XLIV, p. 
200. 
106 Muir to C. Beadon, 19 Aug 1857, Rizvi and Bhargava (eds. ), Freedom Struggle, L p. 33 1. 
10' Quoted in Sir Richard Temple, LordLawrence (London, 1889), pp. 127-8. 
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For some years past the Bengal Scpoy has been changing the tone of his conduct. He was in former years a humble 
man. He became a pet in all cases where his caste could be brought forward. He was allowed every indulgence. 
His commanding officer became a mere cyphcr, without the power to either punish or promote; his officers instead 
of studying regimental duties were seldom present with their corps, in fact each eagerly sought staff employment 
from it... The result of such mis-rcgulations soon became apparent. The sepoy became sclf-conceited, impertinent, 
careless, a grumbler... From recent information we are led to suppose that an excuse for a general uprising of 
sepoys in open mutiny was long wanted, and an unfortunate affair of cartridges being made at home for our 
improved rifle, gave the first spark to die flame. log 
There is, of course, much evidence that appears to support the theory that sepoys were motivated by 
nothing more than a desire to preserve their caste and religion. Some of it is provided by European 
officers. At the height of the cartridge question, for example, Lieutenant De Kantzow of the 9h N. I. 
was asked by some of his Oudh sepoys why, having already endured the loss of their country, they 
could be expected to stand by and see their caste "contaminated also"? 
109 Having spoken to the native 
officers of the 4"' N. I. in May 1857, Captain Taylor was convinced that they genuinely believed the 
cartridges were a "trick injurious to their religion". 
110 Captain Sneyd of the 28h N. I., in a letter to his 
mother of 27 May, noted that the majority of the sepoys liked their officers but were "suspicious of the 
Government about their refigion". 111 
Other evidence comes from native sources. According to Ghulam Abbas, during a stormy interview 
with the King of Delhi in the Red Fort on II May, the native officers of the 3 rd L. C. justified the mutiny 
at Meerut on the ground that they had been "required to bite cartridges" greased with beef and pork 
f t. 112 a This lie was then repeated in the Delhi Proclamation, issued by the rebels between II and 15 
May 1857, which stated that the Governor-General had served out "cartridges made up with swine and 
beef fat" to "deprive the army of their religion". ' 13 A similar attempt to justify the rebellion on the 
ground of religion was made by Nana Sahib's proclamation of 6 July. 
114 
Tapti Roy is convinced that such evidence proves the mutiny-rebellion was religiously motivated. 
"Let us listen ... to what the soldiers said after they 
had mutinied, " she writes. "Without exception, they 
10' Sgt. McGuiness to Mr Moore, dated 1857, McGuiness Letters, OIOC, MSS Eur/Photo Eur. 183. 
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answered in the idiom of religion. Not only are there official reports on sepoy actions but also letters 
and proclamations written by the rebels themselves in which they declare their reasons for turning 
against their masters... The widely shared opinion among the British officers that the'soldiery had a 
hard religious panic'was substantially corroborated by the language used in the written addresses sent 
out to mobilize men in the cause of religion. Here the uprising was described not so much as a struggle 
for political ends as an imperative, a sacred duty, for upholding religion which stood threatened by the 
British rule. " 115 
Much of what Roy says is true. Many officers, sepoys and rebels did talk in the idiom of religion. 
The real question is why? The officers were simply repeating the accusations made by their own 
troops. They may even have wanted to believe that religion was the primary grievance because the 
alternative - deeper-lying professional grievances - would have reflected badly on them and the service 
in general. Some of the sepoys (perhaps even the majority) may well have considered their caste and 
religion to be in danger, however irrational this belief became in relation to the cartridge question itself 
But that in itself shows a complete breakdown of trust between them and their European officers, an 
intra-service issue that was many years in gestation. For these sepoys the defence of religion may have 
provided a personal justiflcation for mutinying that professional grievances could not. Lastly there 
were the conspirators (both within and without the Bengal Army) and the rebel leaders who jumped on 
the band-waggon. These men were bound to set up a cry of "religion in danger" as the only way to 
unite both Muslims and Hindus against their British overlords. Their aspirations were the real driving 
force behind mutiny. Ahsanullah Khan, the King of Delhi's personal physician, who had much contact 
with the leading mutineers, wrote later: 
Although the issue of the now cartridges was the ostensible cause of the mutiny, it was not in reality so. Some 
individuals of the native army had long before been adverse to and dissatisfied with the British Government. They 
considered that they were treated with severity, and eagerly siezcd the opportunity of the issue of new cartridges as 
affording a good pretext for their defection. The wily and intriguing among them made it the fulcrum of their 
designs to excite the whole army against their rulers, and, mixing therewith a religious element, alienated the minds 
of the troops from the Government... [Had] the new cartridges not been issued, they would have made some other 
III Roy, Yhe Politics of a Popular Uprising, p. 5 1. 
195 
pretext to mutiny, because if they had been actuated by religious motives alone, they would have given up service; 
and if they wished to serve, they would not have mutinicd. 116 
116 Supplementary Evidence of Hakim Ahsanullah Khan, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVIH, p. 267. 
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Chapter Seven - Mutiny: The Conspiracy 
Some historians have acknowledged the existence of a widespread conspiracy within the Bengal Army 
in 1857,1 others the possibility that external agencies were also involved. 2 Yet they still identify the 
defence of caste and religion as the key to the mutiny. But if, as this chapter will demonstrate, 
disaffected elements of the Bengal Army were in contact with each other and with disgruntled civilians 
both before and during the cartridge question, there is every likelihood that the conspirators' aims were 
far more ambitious. 
A comparison between the mutinies in the Bengal Army in 1849/50 and 1857 is particularly 
instructive. In the former case, it will be recalled, Napier received information that as many as 24 
native infantry regiments (a third of the total) were tainted with a "mutinous spirit" and that they were 
in communication with each other. Napier commented: 
In all mutinies, some men more daring than others are allowed to take the lead while the more wary prepare to 
profit when the time suits; a few men in a few corps, a few corps in any army begin; if successful they arejoined 
by their more calculating, and by their more timid comrades... To what extent [the conspiracy] was secretly carried 
is unknown; but the four sepoys condemned [in the 32d N. I. at Wazirabad] went from company to company 
administering unlawful oaths to insist on higher pay from a Government of a different religion, and a different 
raccl Many regiments were of the same mind, and it may be assumed that each had, at least, four agitators 
similarly employed. 3 
There is good reason to suspect the existence of similar small cabals in each regiment of the Bengal 
Native Infantry and Cavalry in 1857. During his 12 years as adjutant of the 17"' N. I., Major Burroughs 
established a "thorough system of espionage" which enabled him to know exactly what was going on. 
But when he tried to re-establish this system on returning to the regiment as commanding officer in 
early 1857 (after a two year detachment as commandant of the Bhagulpur Hill Rangers), he found "no 
1S ee Holmes, A History of the Indian Mutiny, p. 5 65; Majumdar, Yhe Sepoy Mutiny, p. 218; Palmer, 
y7le Mutiny Outbreak atMeerut, pp. 130-3; and Stokes, Yhe Peasant Armed, pp. 50-1. 
'2 See Malleson (ed. ), Kaye andMallesons History of the Indian Mutiny, I, p. 256. 
3 Napier, Defects, Civil andMilitary, pp. 14,61-2. 
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one willing or possessing sufficient courage" to give him any information. This, and other 
circumstances, caused him to conclude that "the plot for revolt, was not recent, although probably 
known to a select few only in each Regiment". 4 
One of the senior civilian conspirators was almost certainly Dhondu Pant (better known as Nana 
Sahib), the adopted son of BaJi Rao If, the last Peshwa of the Maratha Confederacy. Defeated by the 
British in the Yd Maratha War of 1817-18, the Peshwa had exchanged his power base in western India 
for a Company pension of 800,000 rupees and exile in Bithur, 12 miles north of Cawnpore. When he 
died in 185 1, Nana Sahib inherited his Bithur estate and a huge personal fortune of 25 million rupees. 
But Lord Dalhousie - in a decision that contradicted the Hindu practice of allowing adopted heirs to 
succeed their royal fathers - would not allow the Nana to assume the title of Peshwa, nor would he pay 
him all or even a part of BaJi Rao's pension. 5 The Nana was not even permitted to use the Peshwa's 
honorific title of maharaja. The Nana appealed against these decisions - without success - to both the 
Governor-General and the Court of Directors in London. In the latter instance, the petition was carried 
in person by his confidential agent, a young Muslim named Azimullah Khan. During his return 
journey, Azimullah leamt of the failure of the British assault on Sebastopol of 18 June 1855. He 
therefore made a detour to the Crimea to judge the course of the war for himself. According to the 
celebrated Times correspondent, W. H. Russell (who met him there), he discovered a British Army in a 
"state of some depression" and formed "a very unfavourable opinion of its morale and physique in 
comparison with that of the French". 6 Back in India at this time, the native bazaars of the great 
military stations were buzzing with the news that Britain had suffered a catastrophic reverse in the 
Crimea. "[The] news was always fabricated to show that the Sirkar was usually defeated, and that the 
Russians had destroyed all the English soldiers and sunk all their warships, " recalled Sitaram Pandy of 
the 63d N. I. "This idea was fostered by interested parties with the result that when the Mutiny broke 
out, most Indians believed that the Sirkar had no other troops than those which were already in India. 
The sepoys' belief in British invincibility had been shattered first by the ignominious retreat from Kabul 
4 Lt. -Col. Burroughs to Capt. I. H. Chamberlain, Jan 1860, Rizvi and Bhargava (eds. ), Freedom 
Stniggle, I, p. 347. 
5 The same principle underpinned Dalhousie's infamous Doctrine of Lapse, whereby states were 
forfeited to the paramount power (the East India Company) in the event of there being no natural heirs. 
The doctrine was used to justify, among others, the annexation of Satara in 1848, and Nagpur and 
Jhansi in 1854 
6 W. H. Russell, My Diary hi India (London, 1859), 1, pp. 167-8. 
'Lunt (ed. ), From Sepoy to Subedar, p. 73. 
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in 1842. The reverses of the Sikhs wars and the Crimean War were seen as further proof that British 
military power was in irreversible decline. In other words, the time was right for a change of employer. 
After returning to India, says Russell, Azimullah accompanied the Nana to Lucknow, where they 
remained some time, and subseqently the "worthy couple, on the pretence of a pilgrimage to the hills -a 
Hindoo and a Mussulman joined in a holy excursion - visited the Military stations all along the main 
trunk road, and went as far as [Ambala)". 8 
Corroboration of the Nana's scheming is provided by a native emissary called Sitaram Bawa. In a 
statement given to the Judicial Commissoner of Mysore in January 1858, Sitaram claimed that Nana 
began suggesting rebellion to native princes - including the rulers and former rulers of Gwalior, Assam, 
Jaipur, Jodhpur, Jammu, Baroda, Hyderabad, Kolapore, Satara and Indore - as early as the autumn of 
1855. At first nobody replied to his letters. But afler the annexation of Oudh, the "answers began to 
pour in" from both Hindus and Muslims. Among the Nana's first adherents, said Sitaram, was Maun 
Singh, the biggest talukdar (landowner) in the Faizabad district of Oudh, who lost all but three of his 
villages in the revenue settlement of 1856. Other dispossessed talukdars then joined the conspiracy, as 
did the "Soukars" of Lucknow and Golab Singh, the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir. An agreement 
was also made with the King of Delhi. The financial assistance provided by many of these influential 
plotters was used to seduce serving sepoys and disbanded members of the King of Oudh's army alike. 
"The military classes were enticed by a promise of restoring the old times of licence, " commented 
Sitaram, "and they all prefer that to a regular form of Government. "9 
Kaye, for one, was convinced by this and other evidence. "There is nothing in my mind more clearly 
substantiated, " he wrote, "than the complicity of the Nana Sahib in wide-spread intrigues before the 
outbreak of the mutiny. The concurrent testimony of witnesses examined in parts of the country widely 
distant from each other takes this story altogether out of the regions of the conjectural. " Kaye 
particularly refers to machinations between the Nana and the family of the late Raja of Satara whose 
south Maratha state had'lapsed'to the Bombay Presidency in 1848. He also links Nana's plot to the 
attempt by adherents of the King of Oudh to tamper with the troops in the Presidency Division in early 
1857.10 Kaye, it should be mentioned, was an officer in the Bengal Artillery (183241) before 
becoming a journalist (he founded the Calcutta Review in 1844) and finally a member of the East India 
Russell, My Diary in India, I, pp. 170 
Statement of Sitaram Bawa to RB. Devereux, 28 Jan 1858, Rizvi and Bhargava (eds. ), Freedom 
Struggle, 1, pp, 372-6 
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Company's Home Service (1856-74). His willingness to believe in an external conspiracy theory may 
have been an unconscious attempt to protect the reputation of the Bengal Army and its officers. He 
had, on the other hand, published many of Henry Lawrence's articles criticizing the army and was well 
aware of its shortfalls. 
Russell's claim that Nana Sahib and Azimullah both visited military stations as far as Ambala is not 
quite accurate. Kaye believed that the Nana, who rarely ventured beyond the limits of Bithur, made 
threejoumeys in the early months of 1857: to Kalpi, Delhi and finally to Lucknow. " But Azimulla 
did travel to Ambala. Lieutenant Martineau bumped into him at the Dak bungalow in January 1857, 
shortly after taking up his appointment as instructor of the Musketry Depot. Martineau had first made 
Azimullah's aquaintance the previous October on the journey from Suez to Aden, and had been struck 
by the bitterness with which he spoke of Lord Dalhousie's recent annexation of Nagpur. On meeting 
him again at Ambala, Martineau gained the impression that he was on a "tour of inspection to feel the 
temper of the Mahratta, Rajpoot, & Seik Chiefs on his route from Bombay to enable him to report 
progress to his master". 12 Further evidence linking the Nana and Azimullah to the eventual outbreak of 
mutiny at Cawnpore in June 1857 will be considered in Chapter Eight, 
The first definite indication of a conspiracy to mutiny within the Bengal Army was given on 26 
January 1857 when, according to Jemadar Durriow Sing, the subedar-major and other senior native 
officers of the 34"' N. I. made an abortive attempt to capture key installations in Calcutta with the 
assistance of three companies of the regiment en route to Chittagong in east Bengal. All four regiments 
at Barrackpore were implicated in the plot by Sing, as were the Calcutta Native Militia and certain 
retainers of Wajid Ali, ex-King of Oudh, who had been living in exile at Garderfs Reach in Calcutta 
since his deposition in early 1856. The sepoys'reward was to have been an increase in pay from seven 
to 10 rupees amonth. The plan was abandoned, said Sing, partly because he sent two of his sepoys to 
warn the authorities to be on the alert, and partly because the guard on the Lieutenant-Govemor's 
residence at Alipore, commanded by Subedar-Major Ram Lail, the chief conspirator, was relieved by 
Europeans on the morning of the 26th. But this did not prevent Ram Lail from trying to incite Sing's 
10 Mal I eson (ed. ), Kaye andMallesons History of the Indian Mutiny, L p. 425. 
11 bid., p. 423. 
12 Capt. E. M. Martineau to Sir John Kaye, 20 Oct 1864, Kaye Mutiny Papers, OIOC, H725, pp. 469-70. 
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Treasury guard to mutiny by saying he would not serve any longer because of the objectionable 
cartridges. 13 
Three important observations can be made about Sing's evidence: first, that the chief conspirators 
were all senior figures in the regiment (Sing identified by name the subedar-major, two subedars, one 
jemadar, the drill havildar and the regimental munshi), though overall they were a relatively small 
group and had yet to convince enough of their colleagues that mutiny was in their interests; second, that 
the timing of the conspiracy, just four days after the supposed origin of the cartridge controversy at the 
Dum-Dum depot, could mean that the plot to overthrow the British government had been in existence 
for longer than the rumour about the cartridges (which must have been seen as a godsend); third, that 
the supposed aim of the conspirators was to replace the British with a native ruler who would increase 
their pay (in other words, their motive was partly financial). 
The existence of a wider plot to mutiny is confirmed by other evidence. On 28 January, General 
Hearscy reported to government the simultaneous burning of European property at Barrackpore and the 
railhead of Raniganj, where separate wings of the 2nd N. I. were stationed. 14 It was later alleged by 
Mainodin Hassan Khan, one of the leading rebels at Delhi during the mutiny (and therefore in a 
position to know), that the burning of the Raniganj telegraph office was a preconcerted signal that 
would be communicated along the line from Calcutta to Punjab, and that those in the know would 
respond with similar acts. Mainodin also claimed that the origin of the mutiny was not religious but 
political, namely the annexation of Oudh. It was, therefore, no coincidence that two of the three native 
infantry regiments stationed in Lucknow at that time - the 19 th and 34 th Regiments (the other was the 
17'h) - were at the centre of the conspiracy. Mainodin explained: 
Both these regiments were full of bitterness ... and from them letters were written to other Purbcah regiments. The 
34' took the lead. These letters reminded every regiment of the ancient dynasties of Hindustan; pointed out that 
the annexation of Oudc had been followed by the disbandment of the Oude army, for the second time since the 
connection of the English with Oudc; and showed that their place was being filled by the enlistment of Punjabis 
and Sikhs, and the formation of a Punjab army. The very bread had been torn out of the mouths of men who knew 
no other profession than that of the sword. The letters went on to say that further annexations might be cxpected, 
with little or no use for the native army. Thus was it pressed upon the Scpoys that they must rebel to reseat the 
13 Evidence of Jemadar Darriow Sing, 17 April 1857, Forrest (ed. ), State Papers, 1, pp. 156-60. 14 Hearsey to Major W. A. J. Mayhew, 28 Jan 1857, Forrest (ed. ), State Papers, 1, pp. 4-5. 
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ancient kings on their thrones, and drive the trespassers away. The welfare of the soldier caste required this; the 
honour of their chiefs was at stake. 15 
Sitaram Pandy of the 63d N. I. was also convinced that the "seizing of Oudh filled the minds of the 
sepoys with distrust and led them to plot against the Government". He added: "Agents of the Nawab 
[King] of Oudh and also of the King of Delhi were sent all over India to discover the temper of the 
army. They worked upon the feelings of the sepoys, telling them how treacherously the foreigners had 
behaved towards their king. They invented ten thousand lies and promises to persuade the soldiers to 
06 
mutiny and turn against their masters... 
The involvement in this plot of Wajid Ali, the Muslim ex-King of Oudh, or at least members of his 
entourage, is highly possible. Major Burroughs discovered after the mutiny of his regiment - the 17d- 
in June 1857 that it, the 19'h and the 34h had all offered their services to the King of Oudh at the time of 
annexation in early 1856.17 The link between the Barrackpore conspirators and Wajid Ali is further 
established by the correspondence of an unnamed jemadar of the 34th N. I. in which he refers to 
members of his regiment and the Vd N. I. "joining" or "siding with" the King of Oudh. Sir John Kaye, 
who read these letters in their original form, was convinced that the sepoys at Barrackpore "were 
induced to believe that, if they broke away from the English harness, they would obtain more lucrative 
service under the restored kingship of Oudh". 18 
From the start senior figures in the Bengal Presidency suspected outside interference. In his letter to 
the Deputy Adjutant-General of 28 January, Major-General Hearsey blamed "Brahmins or agents of the 
religious Hindu party in Calcutta (I believe it is called the Dhurma Subha)" for the rumour that the 
cartridges were part of a government plot to convert natives to Christianity. 19 By late February, 
Canning told Vernon Smith, he had switched his suspicions to the "King of Oude's people at Garden 
Reach". Canning himself was not entirely convinced. "I cannot say that his evidence is very 
conclusive, " he added, "but if there has been any attempt to seduce them with a view to embarrassing 
the Government it is much more likely to have come from the Oude courtiers than the Brahmins as was 
first suspected. "'0 Within a month Canning's belief in a conspiracy had hardened. HetoldVernon 
'5 Charles T. Metcalfe (trans. ), Two Native Narratives of the Mutiny in Delhi (London, 1898), pp. 3 7-9. 
16 Lunt (ed. ), From Sepoy to Subedar, p. 16 1. 
17 Burroughs to Chamberlain, Jan 1860, Rizvi and Bhargava (eds. ), Rreedom Struggle, 1, p. 342. 
18 Malleson (ed. ), Kaye andMallesons History of the Indian Mutiny, 1, p. 42 1. 
'9 Hearsey to Major W. A. J. Mayhew, 28 Jan 1857, Forrest (ed. ), State Papers, 1, pp. 4-5. 
20 Canning to Vernon Smith, 7 February 1857, Lyveden Papers, OIOC, MSS. Eur/F231/4. 
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Smith that while many sepoys, even the majority, were sincere in their alarm for their religion, these 
fears had been put into their heads by civilians, though once such feelings had taken root they were 
"disseminated from one corps to another without aid from without". He was convinced that the prime 
movers had no ostensible connection with the army, though whether they were "political malcontents 
such as the King of Oude's followers or religious alarmists" he could not say. But despite the emphasis 
on religion, he added, the "moving purpose may be purely political" and there were some small 
incidents" to point the finger at the "Oude herd". 2 1 Hearsey, a fluent I-Iindi speaker who had Eurasian 
sons and who prided himself on his close relations with his native troops, was of a similar opinion. 
"Rajah Maun Sing and other [senior advisers] of the ex-King of Oude, " he informed government on 5 
April, "have been bribing some evil-minded & traiterous Hindoos of the 19'h and 34h N. I. to seize the 
first opportunity to incite disturbance. This cartridge business came opportunely for them & they 
seized it even before the cartridges were made for distribution... In short, the sepoys have never even 
seen a greased Car1ridge. "22 
At Barrackpore, meanwhile, the conspirators were struggling to win over enough of their fellow 
soldiers. During the evening of 5 February, the same Jemadar Durriow Sing of the 34h who had helped 
to foil the plot to seize Calcutta was forcibly taken by two sepoys to the parade ground where he found 
a large gathering of about 300 soldiers from all four regiments, their faces covered with masks. Having 
asked Sing to join them, they explained that they were willing to die for their religion and that, if they 
could make an arrangement that evening, they would plunder the station and kill all the Europeans the 
following night. Sing responded by advising the men to disperse and warning them that they would 
"not get such good masters in future". But he did not inform his superiors until 10 February, when he 
gave a sworn deposition in the presence of his company commander, adjutant, commanding officer and 
station commander (Brigadier Grant). The only voice he could recognize, he told them, was that of 
Mookta Persaud, the drill havildar who was part of the earlier plot to seize Calcutta. 23 
Sing's version of events is backed up by Ramshahai Lalla, a low-caste (Kait) sepoy in the same 
regiment. He told the authorities that he had been aware of the secret assembly on 5 February but did 
not attend it. The following day, however, he discovered that a second meeting had been arranged for 
that evening at which delegates from each of the four regiments at Barrackpore would take an oath and 
11 Canning to Vernon Smith, 23 March 1857, ibid. 
22 Hearsey to Col. Birch, 5 April 1857, Mutiny Papers, BL, Add. MSS 41489, f 78. The italics are 
Hearsey's. 
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decide on their future course of action. Lalla then waited until early evening before taking this 
intelligence to his company commander, Lieutenant Allen, with whom he was on particularly good 
terms. He told Allen that the men were "apprehensive of being forced to give up their caste and be 
made Christians" and that they had determined to rise up against their officers before proceeding to 
Calcutta. They had decided to act before it was too late, said Sing, because rumours had already 
reached them that a European regiment and artillery was on its way from Dinapore to assist in carrying 
out the measures of government. Men of other regiments were to be asked to cooperate with their 
comrades in Barrackpore, he added, as it was an affair which concerned them all equally. But despite 
Lalla's suggestion that he should proceed to the meeting place (a large tree near the station magazine) 
between eight and nine p. m. to see for himself, Allen chose to inform his superiors. When he did 
finally reach the assembly point, it was afler nine and the place was deserted. Lalla was convinced that 
the conspirators cancelled the meeting because they suspected the authorities were on to them. 24 
In a letter to government of II February, Major-General Hearsey likened the disaffection at 
Barrackpore to a "mine ready for explosion". The minds of the sepoys, he added, had "been misled by 
some designing scoundrels who have managed to make them believe that their refigiousprejudices, 
their caste, is to be interfered with by Government". 25 That some of these scoundrels were probably 
soldiers themselves does not seem to have occurred to Hearsey at this juncture. These ringleaders were 
almost certainly behind the move to spread the net of disaffection. On 12 February, for example, the 
native doctor of the 43rd N. I. told his commanding officer that he had overheard a sepoy of 2 nd N. I. tell 
a comrade that a cossid (hand-delivered message) had been sent to the 19th N. I. at Berhampore and to 
the regiments at Dinapore (the 7h, e and 40'h N. I. ), "informing them that ten or twelve of us have 
raised a disturbance, and we want you to support USvo. 
26 The mutinous behaviour of the 19'h N. I. during 
the night of 26 February, therefore, needs to be seen in the context of this mutinous correspondence. It 
is surely no coincidence that a havildar's guard from the 34d' N. I., escorting a party of European 
invalids, arrived at Berhampore the day before the mutiny. 27 On II March, Canning told Vernon Smith 
that there was much evidence to show that the men of the 19'h N. I. had been "seduced from without", 
23 Deposition of Jemadar Durriow Sing, 10 Feb 1857, Forrest (ed. ), State Papers, I, pp. 20-2. 
24 Examination of Sepoy Ramsahai Lalla, II Feb 1857, ibid., pp. 22-4; Statement by Lt. A. S. Allen, 8 
Feb 1857, ibid., pp. 17-18. 
25 Hearsey to Col. Birch, II Feb 1857, ibid., p. 24. 
26 Statement by Major H. W. Matthews, 12 Feb 1857, ibid., pp. 29-3 0. 
27 Lt. -Col. Mitchell to Major Ross, 27 Feb 1857, ibid., p. 41. 
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particularly the sending of emissaries from Barrackpore and the arrival of the guard of the 34th. 28 But 
the clincher came after the regiment had been disbanded on 31 March. In two petitions to Major- 
General Hearsey, the "faithful" officers and men of the 15h claimed that the regiment had been led 
astray by the "advice of some wicked men". The names of the instigators, they added, were only 
known to their enemies who were young sepoys and therefore "independent of the Honourable 
Company's service". Those thought to be faithfiil had not been let in on the plot. They were prepared 
to say, however, that the guard of the 34h was the cause of the mutiny. 29 
Given that the disbanded men of the 19'h were trying to secure a reversal of the government's 
punishment, there is every reason not to accept these two petitions at face value. It is extremely 
unlikely that the "loyal" officers and sepoys would not have known the identity of at least some of the 
ringleaders. Their decision not to hand them over, therefore, is probably an indication that a sizeable 
proportion of the regiment was disaffected. Certainly there is evidence that, having dispersed, the 
disbanded men of the 19'h incited other regiments to mutiny. In May, for example, the commanding 
officer of the 17dN. I. prohibited the admittance of strangers into the regimental lines in an attempt to 
prevent fraternization between his sepoys and those former members of the I SP who lived in the 
vicinity (the two regiments had forged close links during their time at Lucknow). But contact was 
made, nonetheless, and the 17 th mutinied soon after. 30 So who were these disaffected men? One clue 
was provided by a conversation between the regimental doctor and a group of disbanded Muslim 
sepoys. Asked the real reason behind the mutiny, the Muslims replied that the Hindus in the regiment 
"had threatened them with instant death" if they told the authorities, yet they promised to disclose the 
"true cause" of the supposed cartridge outbreak after the Hindus had dispersed to their homes .31 This 
promise was never kept, but we can surmise that the Muslims were referring particularly to the majority 
high-caste Hindus. We can also surmise that the "true cause" was not a genuine fear for religion but a 
general dissatisfaction with the service of the British raj: partly because of the annexation of Oudh, 
from where many of them hailed; partly because of the change in recruitment policy which was 
beginning to undermine the high-caste monopoly; and partly because of a number of professional 
grievances such as low pay and poor career prospects. 
28 Canning to Vernon Smith, II March 1857, Lyveden Papers, OIOC, MSS Eur/F231/4. 
29 Forrest (ed. ), State Papers, L pp. 1034. 
30 Return by Major F. W. Burroughs, 4 June 1857, P. P., H. C., 1859, WEIL pp. 25. 
31 Hearsey to Col. Birch, 4 April 1857, Mutiny Papers, BL, Add. MSS 41489, f 73. 
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March saw further attempts by BarTackpore troops to incite a rising. First, on 5 March, a jemadar of 
the 7& N. I., which had only arrived in January, held an illegal meeting in his hut at which he 
encouraged the men of his company to refuse to bite the new cartridges and to take part in a prospective 
mutiny. Five days later, two sepoys of the 2! 
0 N. I. tried and failed to induce the subedar in command of 
the Mint Guard at Calcutta to march his men into Fort William as part of a wider mutinous venture. All 
three were found guilty of mutiny by native general courts-martial (mainly on the strength of evidence 
provided by their fellow soldiers): the two sepoys were given 14 years' imprisonment with hard labour; 
the jemadar got away with dismissal. Anson, believing this latter punishment to be insufficient, asked 
the court to reconsider, but it would not budge. 
32 The court's recalcitrance is revealing not only because 
it implies a wider sympathy towards the jemadaes illegal action, but also because it emphasizes the 
court's lack of respect for their Commander-in-Chief (not to mention the latter's inability to insist upon 
a more suitable punishment). 
In late March, the Barrackpore conspirators made contact with the 63d N. I., part of a field force that 
was stationed in the unsettled Sonthal region of west Bengal. The only tangible consequence was a 
temporary refusal by 14 sepoys in three companies of the 63d to take annual leave until the regiments at 
Barrackpore had taken theirs. 33 Colonel Burney, commanding the field force, traced this intransigence 
to the recent arrival of two sepoys from Barrackpore, travelling incognito by train and bearing cossids. 34 
The first doubts about the new cartridges, however, had been raised by the detachment of the 63rd N. I. 
at the Dum-Dum depot. "The men from our regiment wrote to others in the regiment telling them of 
[the objectionable grease rumour], " recalled Jemadar Sitaram Pandy, "and there was soon excitement in 
every regiment. Some men pointed out that in forty years' service nothing had ever been done by the 
Sirkar [Indian government] to insult their religion, but ... the sepoys' minds 
had been inflamed by the 
seizure of Oudh. Interested parties were quick to point out that the great aim of the English was to turn 
us all into Christians, and they had therefore introduced the cartridge in order to bring this about ... 
05 
But the majority of the 63d would not be won over by the blandishments of the conspirators and, 
though later disarmed at Berhampore, the corps became one of only II native infantry regiments to be 
reincorporated as a body into the post-mutiny Bengal Army. 
32 P. P., H. C., 1857, XXX, pp. 109-24,257-94. 
33 Two of them were the 61ite light and grenadier companies. in many of the mutinies of 1857, the most 
disaffected soldiers were from these companies. This is possibly because they contained the tallest and 
smartest soldiers, and therefore a large proportion of high-caste sepoys. 
34 Col. Burney to Major Ross, 29 March 1857, P. P., H. C., 1857, )DCX, p. 104 
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Also included in that number were the 43d and 7& N. I. Of the four Barrackpore regiments, only the 
43 rd was not directly implicated in the plotting. During March, in an attempt to keep his regiment 
separate from its disaffected counterparts, the subedar-major of the 43d rejected an invitation to dine 
36 1, 
with the 2nd N. L. The native officers and men of the 70' N. I. would later attempt to prove their 
loyalty by offering to serve against the mutineers (this offer was not accepted, though they were 
subsequently sent overseas to fight in the 2nd China War). It was a Muslim sepoy of the 7&, it will be 
recalled, who informed one of his officers that the cartridge question was merely a pretext to mutiny. 
The sole black mark against the 70th was the agitation of the disaffected jemadar, and he was promptly 
handed over to the authorities by men of his own regiment. So why were the 43d and 7& regiments so 
impervious to the blandishments of the conspirators? With regard to the 43 rd , the presence of a much- 
respected commanding officer, Major Matthews, should not be underestimated. Matthews had joined 
the regiment in 1824 and been present for most of the next 33 years (the main exception being four and 
a half years on detachment to the Assam Sebundy Corps), seeing action on the Bhutan frontier, in the 
I' Afghan War, the Gwalior campaign and the I" Sikh War. Colonel Kennedy of the 701h , on the other 
hand, had served most of his 30 year career in the 25th N. I. and Commissariat Department. Only in 
1856 was he appointed to command the 7& Regiment. 37 He was, therefore, virtually a stranger to his 
sepoys, though his experience as a Commissariat officer, having to speak the vernacular and dealing 
with natives of all classes, may have compensated to some extent. 
The only other evidence we have of contact between the Barrackpore conspirators and other native 
troops at this time is a claim by Colonel Sherer, the commanding officer of the 73d N. I., that a sepoy 
from his two companies at Dacca was sent to Barrackpore in March to find out what was going on. 
When those two companies rejoined regimental headquarters at Jalpigori in June, they contained a 
number of disaffected men who spread a falsehood that Europeans were on their way to disarm the 
corps. This nearly provoked a mutiny, with almost all the grenadier company and many from other 
companies sleeping with their loaded muskets. But Sherer managed to regain control by winning over 
the dominant Oudh and Bhojpore factions: the former group by promoting an influential Oudh naik to 
jemadar; and the latter by appointing a popular Bhojpore man to the vacant havildar-majorship. These 
two men subsequently arrested two havildars; and nine sepoys who were plotting to murder their 
35 Lunt (ed. ), From Sepoy to Subedar, p. 162. 
36 Maj. H. W. Matthews to Brig. Grant, March 1857, Mutiny Papers, BL, Add. MSS 41489, f 19. 
37 Service Records of the officers of the East India Company Army, Hodson Index, NAM, 
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officers. The only mutiny involving the regiment took place in November as a consequence of an 
attempt to disarm the two new companies on duty at Dacca. 
38 Sherer, it should be added, had only been 
in command of the regiment since January. But like Kennedy he was a good linguist who had spent 
much of his service on detached duties (latterly in the Stud Department). He had also become a soldier 
at the relatively late age of 21 - Kennedy was 22 - having begun a degree at Oxford . 
39 I-Egh-flyers with 
staff experience, like Sherer and Kennedy, probably made more effective colonels than regimental 
officers who were no longer with their original corps (Mitchell and Wheler) and even some of those 
who were (Carmichael-Smyth of the 3rd L. C. ). 
In the light of all the evidence placing the 34h at the very centre of the conspiracy to overturn British 
rule, the reaction of the regiment to Mungul Pandy's bungled attempt to incite mutiny on 29 March 
begins to make sense. But why did Pandy's action not result in full-blown mutiny? The answer 
probably lies in the ringleaders' realization that the time was not right: partly because not enough 
members of the other Barrackpore regiments, particularly the 43d and 7&, had been won over to the 
cause of mutiny; and partly because the 34h itself was not of one opinion. As with the Výh N. I., the 
main pro-mutiny faction was probably dominated by high-caste Hindus (who comprised 53% of the 
regiment). This might explain why, during the drama of 29 March, one sepoy told Colonel Wheeler 
that no one would use force against Mungul Pandy because he was a Brahmin. 
40 Captain Drury 
confirmed this impression when he told the Court of Inquiry that he was convinced the Quarter Guard 
would have refused any order to shoot Pandy on account of their "sulky and reluctant manner", their 
"natural disinclination to kill a man of his caste", and their fear of the bad "opinion of their comrades in 
the lines as it was impossible to say, there being a large proportion of Brahmins in the regiment, who 
approved of what he was doing and who did not" . 
41 Two Sikh members of the Quarter Guard later 
claimed that their Brahmin jemadar, Issuree Pandy, ordered them not to intervene. 
42 Stokes has argued 
that the relatively high proportion of Sikhs in the regiment (around 7%) affected its unity of action on 
this occasion . 
43 But that was surely down to the unwillingness of the other high-caste sepoys to commit 
themselves. The significance of the Sikhs, on the other hand, is that they were too few in number to 
38 Col. G. M. Sherer to Major Ross, 28 Feb 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVIII, pp. 14-15 
39 Service Records, Hodson Index, NAM. 
40 Evidence of Lt. -Col. S. G. Wheler, 30 March 1857, Forrest (ed. ), State Papers, 14 pp. 147-8. 
41 Evidence of Capt. Drury, ibid., p. 150. 
42 Ensign F. E. A. Charnier to Capt. Drury, 7 April 1857, ibid., p. 1523 
" Stokes, Yhe Peasant Anned, p. 52 
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support their European superiors. Captain Drury, who did not believe they were mixed up in the 
disturbances, said they were unwilling to come forward on the 20 because they were in such a 
minority. 44 However Sikhs were not always a calming influence. The Ludhiana regiment of irregular 
Sikh infantry mutinied at Benares on 4 June, and Sikhs played a leading part in the mutiny of the two 
wings of the 12'h N. I. at Jhansi and Nowgong on 6 and 10 June respectively. 45 
With the failure of Mungul Pandy's attempt to provoke the 3e N. I. to mutiny on 29 March (and the 
subsequent disbandment of the regiment on 6 May), the focal point of disaffection moved from the 
Presidency Division to the more isolated stations up country. One of the means by which ill-feeling 
spread throughout the Bengal Army was the fraternization of detachments at the musketry depots. In 
mid-March, it will be recalled, Lieutenant Martineau was told by sepoys at the Ambala depot that all 
Bengal regiments contained cabals determined to brand those who used the new cartridges as outcastes. 
These secret committees had one aim: to convince their comrades that the cartridge question was part of 
a wider government conspiracy to deprive them of their religion and caste. In case they were doubted, 
a number of other rumours were spread to reinforce this belief. 
In early March, for example, a sepoy at Ambala showed Martineau a letter from his brother in the I' 
N. I. at Cawnpore warning him about contaminated flour. A couple of days later, after the sepoy had 
shown the letter to his comrades, he explained its significance to Martineau. The rumour was that flour 
retailed from government depots had been deliberately mixed with the ground bones of cows and pigs 
to deprive the the natives of their religion. "I was excesssively startled, " recalled Martineau, "and saw 
at once that some brain of more than ordinary cunning had succeeded in combining for the time being 
the parties of both Hindus and Mahomedans against us. "46 According to W. H. Carey, resident in India 
at the time, the rumour originated on 8 March when a merchant, hoping to clear his stock before other 
supplies arrived, sold a large quantity of flour at an unusually low price in the market at Cawnpore. 
Carey identified a sepoy who bought some of the flour as the man responsible for spreading the "evil 
report" that it had been mixed with bullock and pig! s bones at the Canal Departmenes mills at 
Evidence of Capt. Drury, 30 March 1857, ibid., p. 151. 
Gov. -Gen. to the Court of Directors, 19 June 1857, P. P., 11C., 1857-8, XLIV, p. 425; Deposition of 
Francis Reilly, 5&6 July, Mutiny Papers, BL, Add. MSS 41996, f. 97; Capt. Scot to Mrs Ryves, 12 
July 1857, Scot Papers, OlOC, MSS Eur/C324. 
46 Captain E. M. Martineau to Sir John Kaye, 20 Oct 1864, Kaye Mutiny Papers, OIOC, H725, p. 1023. 
209 
Cawnpore. 47 The fact that the mills were run by native contractors with whom the owners of the grain 
made their own arrangements was either not known or deliberately concealed . 
48 The cartridge question 
had been so skilfully handled by the conspirators that many of their fellow soldiers were willing to 
believe the government was capable ofjust about anything. In the coming months more than one 
officer would hear his men repeat the contaminated flour rumour as if it were fact. It was taken so 
seriously by the sepoys of the I& Oudh I. I. that, in early June, they insisted on emptying carts of flour - 
which had been procured for them by the native mayor - into the river . 
49 They and other troops at 
Sitapur mutinied the following day. 
The bone dust rumour was predated by the mysterious arrival of chapatties in the North-West 
Provinces. They first appeared in the Agra Division in January and quickly spread north to the frontier 
of the Punjab, east to Oudh and south-east to Allahabad. The recipients of these flat unleavened cakes 
were chaukidars (village watchmen) who were told to bake five more and deliver them to their 
counterparts in the five nearest villages. In this way the chapatties spread, in geometrical ratio, at a rate 
of up to a hundred miles a night. The origin and purpose of these chapatties has never been 
satisfactorily established, though contemporary speculation was rife. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan pointed 
out that, with cholera prevalent at the time, some people regarded the chapatties as a talisman to ward 
off the disease. 50 But most interpretations were not so benign. The native newspapers at Delhi thought 
their appearance was "an invitation to the whole country to unite for some secret object afterwards to be 
disclosed". " Mainodin Hassan Khan, then the thanadar (chief officer) of a police station just outside 
Delhi, told the local magistrate that he regarded the chapatties as "significant of some greater 
disturbance, that would follow immediately". Before the downfall of Maratha power, Mainodin 
explained, a sprig of millet and a morsel of bread had been passed from village to village to signify a 
forthcoming upheaval. 52 The British spy Jat Mail, a resident of Delhi, claimed that some people 
regarded the chapatties as a warning of some impending calamity, others that their purpose was to warn 
against the government's plot to force Christianity upon the people, and still others that they were being 
circulated by government to intimate to the people of Hindustan that they would all be compelled to eat 
47 W. H. Carey, The Mahomedan Rebellion (Rurki, 1857), pp. 27-8. 
48 Rizvi and Bhargava (eds. ), Freedom Struggle, 1, p. 396. 
49 ibid., IL p. 22. 
50 Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, An &W on the Causes ofthe Indian Revolt (Calcutta, 1860), Capt. W. N. 
Lees (trans. ), p. 3. 
51 Examination of Chuni, 9 Feb 1858, P. P., RC., 1859, X'M p. 195. 
52 Metcalfe (trans. ), Two Native Narratives, pp. 39-4 1. 
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the same food as Christians. 53 One food and one faith. This last view, according to Martineau, was 
prevalent among "the sepoys of every regiment that furnished a detachment to the depot at Ambala". 54 
At the time the British did not attach particular importance to the appearance of the chapatties. "Is it 
treason orjest? " asked the pro-government Friend ofIndia on 5 March. "Is thereto bean 'explosion of 
feeling' or only of laughter? " Captain Thomson of the 53rd N. I. noted that "various speculations were 
made by Europeans as to the import of this extreme activity", but it was invariably dismissed as native 
superstition. " The exceptions, according to the Collector of Mathura, were those "few who 
remembered that a similar distribution of cakes had been made in Madras towards the end of the last 
century, and had been followed by the mutiny of Vellore". 56 Only in retrospect were the chapatties 
generally regarded as the harbingers of mutiny. In his narrative of the outbreak at Agra, the 
commissioner stated that he had reason to believe the appearance of the chapattis "had some bearing 
upon the Hindoo prophecy limiting British rule to a centenary of years", and that sepoys of the 34th N. I. 
were involved in some way. 57 Lieutenant Mackenzie of the P L. C. was in no doubt that they were "in 
some way a signal, understood by the sepoys, of warning to be in readiness for coming events". 58 The 
commissioner of Agra's reference to the 3e N. I. is the only tenuous link between the military 
conspirators and the chapatties. Yet the appearance of the cakes in January 1857, at the outset of the 
cartridge question, suggests a possible connection. If the intention was to unsettle the minds of sepoys 
and civilians alike, and make them more receptive to wild rumour, then it certainly succeeded. 59 
53 Examination of Jat Mall, 3 Feb 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVIII, p. 184. 
54 Examination of Capt. Martineau, 23 Feb 1858, ibid., p. 210. 
55 Thomson, Me Story of Cawnpore, p. 24. 
5' Mark Thornhill, Me Personal Adventures and Erperiences ofa Magistrate during the Rise, 
Progress, and Suppression of the Indian Mutiny (L ondon, 18 8 4), p. 2. 
57 Narra ti ve of E ve n is at lending th eouI break of Dist ur ban c es and the R estora tion of Au th ori ty in the 
Agra Division in 1857-58 (Calcutta, 188 1), p. 4. 
51 Mackenzie, 'The Outbreak at Meerut', Yhe Sepoy Mutiny, pp. 216-17. 
59 RanaJit Guha has argued thatthere is no way of knowing whether or not the chapati had anything to 
do with the uprisings of 1857'. He added: 'Yet the attempt on the part of some bureaucrats and scholars 
to decipher it after the event and the size of the literature this has inspired are a measure of the urge for 
an understanding of insurgency in terms of the processes of its transmission. At a certain level this urge 
expressed itself in the search for a prime cause and helped by an obvious predilection, spawned a 
conspiracy theory. It was then easy to read into this hitherto inexplicable relay a meaning appropriate 
to that theory and brand it, in retrospect, as the signal of the troubles just experienced. ' (Ranaj it Guha, 
Elementary Aspects ofPeasant Insurgency (Delhi, 1983, p. 240). Guha has a point. But his argument 
does not preclude the possibility that disaffected soldiers and/or civilians may have initiated the 
spreading of the chapatties with no specific 'message' in mind. They would not have wanted them to be 
understood by the peasant communities who received them. Their intention was rather to create a 
general climate of fear and suspicion in which rebellion cold flourish. 'If the transmission of these 
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The next obvious example of conspiracy took place at Lucknow on 3 May, the day after the 7 th Oudh 
I. I. had refused the blank cartridges, when two sepoys from that regiment sent a note to the 48th N. I. 
saying they had acted for the faith and awaited the 48h's orders. It can probably be deduced from this 
that ringleaders from at least two native regiments at Lucknow (and probably more) had agreed in 
advance that they would act when the cartridge question came to a head. Unfortunately the messenger 
delivered the note to an old subedar - almost certainly not the intended recipient - who handed it over to 
his European superiors. The two sepoys were arrested, the regiment disarmed and the plot to mutiny 
not reactivated until the end of the month. 60 
On the same day at Nowgong in Central India, where a portion of the 120'N. I., 14'h I. C. and 4/9th 
Foot Artillery (F. A. ) were stationed, Dr Thomas Mawe informed his sister of his belief that the various 
fires since 24 April had been coordinated by a small group of conspirators. Mawe added that a sepoy 
on leave from his regiment at Benares (the 37h N. I. ) had recently attempted to incite a local raja to rise 
against the government; but the raja had handed him and his seditious documents over to the British 
resident . 
61 The Joint Magistrate of the Ambala cantonment was convinced that the spate of fires at his 
and other stations was evidence of a conspiracy embracing the whole Bengal Army. Not all sepoys 
were directly involved, he told the Commissioner of the Cis-Sutlej States, but a majority were 
supportive to the extent that "no single man dared come forward to expose it". 
62 
And so to the outbreak at Meerut on 10 May 1857. Sen concluded that it was not pre-meditated. 63 
But the evidence to the contrary is highly persuasive. We know, for example, that the refilsal by 
skirmishers of the 
P L. C. to accept blank cartridges on 23 April was planned in advance. According to 
depositions taken from three Hindu members of the regiment by Major G. W. Williams, the first act of 
"open and decided mutiny" took place during the evening of 22 April when two Muslim naiks, Pir Ali 
and Kudrat Ali, convinced their comrades that the cartridges for firing practice the next day had been 
prepared with beef and pork fat, the men then swore on the Ganges and the Koran (depending upon 
cakes was only intended to create a mysterious uneasiness,, wrote one British magistrate, 'that object 
was gained. '(Sherer, Daily Life during the Indian Mutiny, pp. 7-8). 
60 Lawrence to Canning, 3 May 1857, Forrest (ed. ), State Papers, II, p. 8. 
61 Mawe to his sister, 3 May 1857, Mawe Letters, OIOC, MSS Eur/C324. 
62 Capt. E. W. E. Howard to G. C. Barnes, 4 May 1857, P. P. H. C., 1857, )OCX, p. 444. 
63 Sen, Eighteen Fifty-Seven, p. 402. 
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their religion) that they would reffise the cartridges until the whole Bengal Army had accepted them. 64 
The two Alis were clearly the ringleaders. Their arrest with 83 other skirmishers the following day is 
possibly the reason why the Yd L. C. did not play a leading part in the rising on 10 May. 
That role was taken on by the ringleaders of the 20'h N. I. - the I Ph N. I. had only arrived at Meerut in 
late April - who began by concerting their actions with the three native infantry regiments at Delhi, 30 
miles to the south-east. But the plot may also have involved Bahadur Shah 111, the 82-year-old King of 
Delhi who had succeeded to the throne of the great Moghul emperors in 1837. The title had not 
conferred any real authority since the fall of Delhi to the British in 1803 (and long before that date the 
Moghuls had been eclipsed by the Maratha Confederacy as the dominant power in north and central 
India). A Company pensioner whose temporal power did not extend beyond the walls of the Royal 
palace (also known as the Red Fort), the King was nevertheless a symbol of ancient legitimacy to many 
Hindus and Muslims alike. Moreover his relations with the British had been deteriorating since Lord 
Ellenborough had discontinued the practice whereby Govemors-General presented him with nazirs 
(ceremonial gifts) three times a year. He had particularly resented the government's refilsal to 
recognize as heir his youngest and favourite son, Mirza Jawan Bakht, after the death of the heir- 
apparent, Prince Dara Bukht, in 1849. Instead the government nominated Bahadur Shah's eldest 
surviving son, Mirza Fakir-ud-din, on condition that he vacated the Red Fort on becoming King. 65 In 
1854, according to his secretary Mukund Lal, Bahadur Shah allowed some infantry soldiers at Delhi to 
become his disciples and from this day "a sort of understanding was established between the army and 
the King". 66 His hakim (personal physician) and adviser, Ahsanullah Khan, said his actual intrigues 
began a year later when he sent his nephew with a letter to the Shah of Persia, requesting assistance 
against the British "in the shape of money and troops". Despite subsequent letters, Ahsanullah was not 
aware of any reply, though during the Persian War (1856-7) the King told him that "he had strong 
hopes of receiving aid from Persia in the shape of money and troops". 67 According to an intinerant 
mendicant who had good contacts in the palace, these hopes were fostered by Hasan Askari, a religious 
adviser to the King, who told him that he had had a divine revelation that the dominion of Persia would 
extend over the whole of Hindustan, and "that the splendour of the sovereignty of Delhi will again 
64 Major G. W. Williams' memorandum of 15 Nov 1857, Rivzi and Bhargava (eds. ), Freedom Struggle, 
v, pp. 10-11; Palmer, Yhe Mutiny Outbreak atMeerut, p. 60. 
65 Supplementary evidence of Ahsanullah Khan, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVHI, p. 264; Malleson (ed. ), Indian 
Mutiny, Ii, pp. 10-25. 
66 Examination of Mukund Lal , 12 Feb 1857, ibid., p. 206. 
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revive" . 
68 Delhi Muslims in general (including sepoys) were excited by the possibility that Persian 
troops might invade India to eject the British, said one native news-writer. The anticipation was 
heightened further by the anti-British sentiment of the leading native journal, the Sadik-ul-Akhhar 
('Authentic News), copies of which were delivered to the Royal palace . 
69 Ahsanullah claimed that the 
Royal princes, in particular, attached great importance to the journal's false reports that the British were 
being defeated by the Persians, and that they may have communicated its contents to the King. 70 But 
Ahsanullah could not confirm that Bahadur Shah had been in contact with Bengal troops during the 
cartridge question, though the King undoubtedly "believed that his own prosperity would go hand in 
71 
hand with the ruin of British power". Mukund Lal has claimed, on the other hand, that the Royal 
palace received intelligence that the troops at Meerut were going to mutiny a full 20 days before they 
actually did. Four days before the outbreak at Delhi (I I May), he added, the King's personal attendants 
were predicting that the army would soon revolt and "come to the palace, when the government of the 
King would be re-established". 72 
Other hints that the insurrection at Meerut and Delhi was planned in advance were provided by Sir 
Theophilus Metcalfe, the Joint Magistrate at Delhi, who later testified that an anonymous petition was 
presented to the magistrate in late April 1857, stating that the Cashmere Gate would soon be wrested 
from British control. "This gate being our chief stronghold in the city, and main connection with the 
cantonments of Delhi, " commented Metcalfe, "it would naturally be the first point seized in any attempt 
at insurrection in the city, and it was the only gate at which there was ever a military guard. " The guard 
duly mutinied on II May and the gate was secured by the rebels. At around the same time in April, 
said Metcalfe, a member of the King's Bodyguard "secretly urged a ressaldar of the 14'h I. C. to leave 
our service, and to take service with the King, telling him, as an inducement to do so, that before the hot 
weather was over, the Russians would have come to India, and the Government of the English be at an 
end". Metcalfe had been given this information by the ressaldar himself -a Eurasian named Everett - 
who also told him that, about six months earlier, the King had sent an emissary to Russia. ' There was 
also a curious conversation that took place at the beginning of May between Captain Tytler of the 38h 
67 Supplementary evidence of Ahsanullah Khan, ibid., pp. 265-6. 
68 Petition from Muhammad Darwash to the Lt. -Gov. of the North-Western Provinces, 24 March 1857, 
ibid., p. 179. 
69 Examination of Chuni, 9 Feb 1857, ibid., pp. 194-5. 
70 Examination of Ahsanullah Khan, II Feb 1858, ibid., p. 201. 
71 Supplementary evidence of Ahsanullah Khan, ibid., p. 266. 
72 Examination of Mukund Lal , 12 and 13 Feb 1857, ibid., p. 207. 
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N. I. and one of his old servants who was going to visit his family. When Tytler said he hoped he would 
return, the man replied, "Yes, sir, provided your hearth is still in existence". Tytler inferred from this 
that the man had forewarning of some type of disturbance. 74 
But the key evidence linking the outbreaks at Meerut and Delhi was provided by Jat Mall, the British 
spy. A few days before the mutiny, he claimed to have learned from sepoys on duty at the palace that 
"it had been arranged in case greased cartridges were pressed upon them, that the Meerut troops were to 
come here [to Delhi], where they would be joined by the Delhi troops, and it was said that the compact 
had been arranged through some native officers, who went over on court-martial duty to Meerut". 75 
Five of the 15 native officers who sat in judgement on the 85 skirmishers of the P L. C. from 6 to 8 
May, it will be recalled, were from the three native infantry regiments at Delhi: one from the 74h and 
two each from the 38 th and 540. Sceptics may argue that the harsh sentence passed on the skirmishers 
contradicts the theory that the native officers from Delhi were part of a plot to mutiny. A lesser 
sentence or an acquittal, however, would simply have aroused the suspicions of the British. In any 
case, the outbreak would provide an ideal opportunity to rescue the prisoners. 
Ahsanullah Khan went even further than Jat Mall by revealing that men of the 38dN. I. had told him 
that "they had leagued with the troops at Meerut" before the mutiny, and that the latter had 
"corresponded with the troops in all other places, so that from every cantonment troops would arrive at 
Delhi". Even after the outbreak, said Ahsunulla, "letters were received at Delhi from which it was 
evident that [sepoys all over India] had beforehand made common cause among themselves". For their 
part the mutinous officers at Delhi wrote - and got the King to write - to many regiments, inviting them 
to join them. A typical appeal, according to Ahsunulla, was as follows: "So many of us have come in 
here; do you also, according to your promise, come over quic y? ' 76 
Sen has argued that there was not even a conspiracy to mutiny among the regiments at Meerut. He 
cites evidence that purports to show that the mutiny began after a cooles boy from H. M. 6& Rifles 
started a rumour in the Sudder Bazar that Europeans troops were coming to disarm the natives. 
77 The 
rumour was believed, according to General Hewitt, because the 6e Rifles were parading for evening 
73 Examination of Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, 8 Feb 1858, ibid., pp. 190-1. 
74 Examination of Capt. R. Tytler, 13 Feb 1858, ibid., p. 209. 
75 Examination of Jat Mall, 3 Feb 1858, ibid., p. 182. 
76 Additional evidence of Hakim Ahsanullah Khan, ibid., p. 268. 
77 Sen, Eighteen Fifty-seven, pp. 534. 
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church service. 78 But Palmer rejected this version of events on the grounds that the story of the cook 
boy was hearsay and the church parade was not due to take place until 6.30 p. m, a ftill hour and a half 
after the rumour began. He suspects that sepoys from the 2& N. I. were responsible for the rumour. 
Certainly the uproar began first in their lines before spreading to those of the 11"' N. I. and 3rd L. C. 79 
The 2&'s leading role may also be connected to the appearance of a mysterious Hindufakir (religious 
mendicant) at Meerut about a month before the mutiny. According to one havildar, he arrived on an 
elephant and was accompanied by a native carriage, horses and about 10 followers. He is said to have 
stayed a number of days in the lines of the 2& N. I. before being ordered out of the station by the 
magistrate, Johnstone. During his subsequent investigation, Major G. W. Williams discovered that, prior 
to arriving at Meerut, thefakir had been seen at the musketry depot at Ambala, but despite these 
"suspicious facts" nothing of a seditious nature was ever proved against him. "O 
Palmer also points to two important facts which contradict Sen's claim that the outbreak was not 
premeditated: the warning given during the evening of 9 May by a native officer of the 3 rd L. C. to his 
troop commander, Lieutenant Gough, that the native infantry would mutiny the following day and the 
cavalry would follow their lead; 
81 and the deliberate cutting of the telegraph line between Meerut and 
Delhi before 4 p. m. on the 10 May. 82 There is also evidence that, at 2 p. m., a Kashmiri prostitute 
named Sophie was told by a sepoy in the Sudder Baza that the native troops would mutiny that day. 
3 
The speed with which native civilians - particularly Muslim butchers from the bazar -joined in the 
mayhem and murder would seem to imply that even they were forewarned. 
At Delhi, Captain Tytler noted that a carriage containing sepoys from Meerut arrived in his regiment's 
lines at 3 p. rn on 10 May. 84 His wife concluded that they were "emissaries sent over from Meerut to 
warn the soldiers to be prepared for the next day's proceedings". 
85 Jat Mall confirmed the arrival of 
letters at the palace that day "bringing intelligence that 82 [sic] soldiers had been imprisoned, and that a 
serious disturbance was to take place in consequence". As a result of this, the sepoys guarding the 
78 Forrest (ed. ), State Papers, I, p. 250. 
79 Palmer, Yhe Mutiny Outbreak at Meerut, pp. 72-6 
so Rizvi and Bhargava (eds. ), Freedom Struggle, V, pp. 397-9; Major G. W. Williams' memorandum, 15 
Nov 1857, ibid., p. 10. 
81 Gen. Sir Hugh Gough, OldMemories (London, 1897), pp. 21-2. 
82 Vibart, Yhe SepoyMutiny, pp. 255-6. 
83 Deposition of Gulab Jan, Rizvi and Bhargava (eds. ), Freedom Struggle, I, p. 404. 
84 Examination of Capt. Tytler, 13 Feb 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVM, pp. 208-9. 
11 Anthony Sattin (ed. ), An Englishwoman in India: Yhe Memoirs ofHarriet Tyller 1828-1858 (Oxford, 
1986), p. 114. 
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palace made no secret of their belief that, after mutinying, the troops at Meerut would come to Delhi. 86 
The conclusion drawn by Captain Marriott, the prosecutor at the trial of the King of Delhi, was that the 
outbreak at Meerut did not occur on 9 May - the day the skirmishers were put in irons - because the 
conspirators needed time to warn the Delhi regiments. Even the hour of mutiny (5 p. m. ) was evidence 
of "cunning and craft" in that the native lines were two miles from their European equivalent. The 
conspirators would have calculated on the lapse of at least one and a half hours before the Europeans 
could have made an appearance. By which time it would have been dark, said Marriott, and the 
mutineers long gone - which is exactly what happened. 
87 
The disagreement between the mutineers as to their eventual destination is sometimes cited as proof 
that the risings at Meerut and Delhi were not coordinated. According to Munshi Mohanlal - who 
overheard a conversation between a sowar of the 
P L. C. and a sepoy in Delhi - the main body of 
mutineers stopped a few miles outside Meerut to decide on a course of action. The majority wanted to 
head for either Rohilkhand to the north-east or Agra to the south. This fact, however, is entirely 
consistent with the theory that only a small number of sepoys and sowars were part of the conspiracy to 
mutiny at Meerut. It was almost certainly these men who persuaded the majority that any march 
without artillery would be fatal. Delhi was a much more attractive proposition, they argued, because it 
was void of European troops and would be easy to capture, It also contained a large magazine and the 
King of Delhi, round whom more rebel troops could rally. The pro-Delhi speakers have never been 
identified. But it is reasonable to assume that they were the self-same conspirators who had already 
been in contact with the Delhi troops. Sir John Lawrence, who was aware of Mohanlal's evidence, later 
wrote: "It is very possible, indeed probable, that the native soldiers [at) Delhi were so far in the scheme 
that they had engaged to stand by their comrades at Meerut. Suck indeed, was the case all over the 
Bengal Presidcncy. "88 
The behaviour of the troops at Delhi during the morning of II May certainly supports Lawrence's 
theory. Even before the vanguard of the Meerut mutineers - sowars of the 3 rd L. C. - entered the walled 
city of Delhi at around 7.30 a. m., the local garrison was showing signs of disaffection. At an early 
morning parade to hear the general order announcing the execution of Jemadar Issuree Pandy of the 301 
N. I., the three Delhi regiments gave vent to their disapproval. The 3e, for example, "hissed and 
86 Examination of Jat Mall, 5 Feb 1858, P. P., RC., 1859, XVIII, p. 185. 
87 Address by Major F. J. Harriott, 9 March 1858, ibid., p. 246. 
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shuffled their feet" as the order was read out in the vernacular, "showing by their actions their sympathy 
with the executed sepoy". 89 When the news of the mutineers' arrival reached the military cantonments - 
on a ridge to the north of the city - Lieutenant-Colonel Ripley was ordered to march his regiment, the 
540'N. I., down to the Cashmere Gate to quell the disturbance. Confronted there by sowars of the 3`1 
L. C., Ripley ordered his men to open fire. But to a man they refused and the mutinous troopers were 
able to cut down Ripley and a number of his officers without hindrance. 
90 Ripley had only been 
transferred to the 54th from the I" Bengal European Fusiliers a year earlier, and his experience of native 
troops was extremely limited. 91 
Captains Tytler and Gardiner, meanwhile, had been instructed to take their companies of the 38h N. I. 
to a house on the ridge above the new powder magazine in case the mutineers decided to advance. As 
the cartridges and caps were being handed out, Tytler noticed that many of the men seized more than 
they were entitled to, but he was in too much of a hurry to do anything about it. Having arrived at the 
house, Tytler sent out pickets and ordered the rest of the men to shelter from the sun inside. But with 
fires visible in the city, the sepoys began to gather in little groups outside and Tytler had to order them 
in again. That afternoon, on entering one of the rooms, Tytler came across a sepoy telling the rest of 
the men that "every power of government existed their [sic] allotted time, and that it was nothing 
extraordinary that that of the English had come to an end". Before he could arrest the man, the main 
magazine in the city exploded and the men of the two companies grabbed their arms and set off for the 
city, shouting "Pillhivi Raj Ki Jail (Victory to the Sovereign of the World)". Tytler later expressed his 
conviction that his men had been expecting a disturbance before it actually broke out. 
92 
The King of Delhi is often said to have been surprized by the arrival of the mutineers on II May. 
This is the impression given by the evidence of his confidential advisor, Ghulam Abbas, at the King's 
trial in 1858. But then Ghulam, who was acting as the King's attorney, was trying to depict Bahadur 
Shah as an unwilling figurehead of the rebellion. When the sowars of the 
P L. C. first appeared 
beneath the walls of the Royal palace, said Ghulam, the King immediately informed Captain Douglas, 
the Commandant of the Palace Guard. Soon after the King complied with a request by Simon Fraser, 
the Commissioner, to provide guns and infantry to protect Douglas's apartments in the palace's Lahore 
89 Palmer, Yhe Mutiny Outhreak atMeerut, p. 120, Sir John Lawrence's minute of 19 April 1858, 
Anderson and Subedar (eds. ), The Last Days of the Company, 1, pp. 111- 12 
Sattin (ed. ), An Englishwoman in India, p. 115. 
Vibart, 7he SepcyMutiny, pp. 12-13,16-17 
91 Service Records, Hodson Index, NAM. 
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Gate and to send palanquins to collect two European ladies who were staying there. But they arrived 
too late and all the Europeans were massacred. Then, as sowars from Meerut, accompanied by two 
companies of native infantry on guard at the palace, marched into the Diwan-i-Khas (Hall of Private 
Audience) and told the King that they had mutinied because they had been "required to bite cartridges" 
greased with beef and pork fat, and had therefore come to Delhi to claim his protection, he is said to 
have replied: "I did not call for you; you have acted very wickedly. " At which point another 200 
Meerut mutineers (this time infantry) arrived to tell the King that "unless you join us, we are all dead 
men, and we must in that case just do what we can for ourselves". Whereupon the King sat down and 
"the soldiery, officers and all, came forward one by one, bowed their heads before him, asking him to 
place his hand on them", which he did. 93 
Despite Ghulam's partiality as a witness, it is possible that the King - however disaffected - was not 
personally aware of the plot to mutiny at Meerut and Delhi. But some senior palace figures 
undoubtedly were. How else can we explain the involvement of the King's armed retainers in the 
murder of Fraser, Douglas and other Europeans in the Red Fort even before Bahadur Shah had given 
his blessing to the mutineers in the Hall of Private Audience? 94 Or the despatch of a detachment of the 
palace guard to the city magazine between 10 and IIa. m. - ostensibly under orders from the King - to 
relieve the regular guard of the 38th N. I. and to escort all the European employees of the Ordnance 
Department to the Red Fort. When the handful of Europeans refused to open the gates, the King's 
guards brought scaling ladders for sepoys of the I Ph and 20'h N. I. to use in an attack which lasted more 
than three hours. It prompted the whole native establishment of the magazine to switch sides and was 
coordinated, according to Lieutenant Forrest (one of only three survivors), by a son and grandson of the 
King. The siege was finally brought to a conclusion at 3.30 p. m. when the European defenders blew 
up the magazine. 95 
In retrospect, Forrest was convinced that the magazine's native employees were expecting an uprising. 
For several days prior to the outbreak, he told the King's trial, the employees had been "insolent and 
overbearing", particularly the Muslims. On II May itself, the senior natives and workmen had arrived 
for work in smarter clothes than normal. It was only after reaching the safety of Meerut, however, that 
he heard a second-hand account that someone in the magazine at Delhi had been sending circulars to all 
92 Examination of Capt. R. Tytler, 13 Feb 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVIIL p. 209. 
9' Examination of Ghulam Abbas, 29 Jan 1858, ibid., p. 136-7 
94 Examination of Jat Mal, 3 Feb 1858, ibid., p. 18 1. 
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the native regiments to the effect that the cartridges prepared in the magazine had been smeared with a 
objectionable fat, and that they were not to believe their European officers when they denied it. Forrest 
suspected Karim Baksh, the head of the native establishment, "an intelligent man and also a good 
scholar, capable of writing Persian well". So suspicious was Baksh's conduct during the attack on the 
magazine that the Commissary of Ordnance, Lieutenant Willoughby, ordered Forrest to remove him 
from the gate and shoot him if he returned to it. He was later hanged "for his treacherous conduct on 
that occasion". '6 If the story about Baksh and the circulars is true, it confirms both the involvement of 
magazine employees in the plot to mutiny and the theory that the cartridge question was being used as a 
pretext to incite mutiny. For no one knew better than Karim Baksh that Enfield cartridges were never 
manufactured at the Delhi arsenal. The greased variety were only ever made at the Fort William and 
Meerut arsenals, and not anywhere in India after January 1857. 
An interesting codicil to the outbreak at Meerut and Delhi occurred in Ambala. During the morning 
of 10 May, a sepoy from the Grenadier Company of the 60'h N. I. was arrested for demanding to be 
taken by the orderly havildar to his company commander to complain about the introduction of the new 
cartridge. No sooner had news of his confinement spread than 200 members of his regiment assembled 
in undress at the quarter-guard, demanding to be placed alongside the prisoner. They only agreed to 
disperse when their C. O., Lieutenant-Colonel Drought, promised a thorough inquiry. Not long after, in 
a curious echo of events at Meerut, a cry went up in the 60th lines and the musketry depot lines "that the 
lancers and artillery were coming down to cut up the native infantry regiments". At which point men 
from every company broke into their bells-of-arms and grabbed muskets and ammunition. Once again 
the commanding officer's personal intervention calmed the situation and the men eventually agreed to 
return their weaponS. 97 Drought, it will be recalled, had only returned to the 60th in January after 
nearly three years on furlough. But prior to that he had served with the regiment for almost 30 
unbroken years, seeing action at the siege and capture of Bharatpur and during the latter stages of the I't 
Afghan War. 98 He was a familiar and experienced officer whose influence may well have prevented an 
outbreak at Ambala. 
95 Examination of Capt. Forrest, 5 and 6 Feb 1858, ibid., pp. 186-7. 
96 Examination of Capt. Forrest, 6 Feb 1858, ibid., p. 188. 
9" Brevet Lt. -Col. R. Drought to Major Ewart, A. A. G. Sirhind Div., 23 March 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, 
XVIII, p. 61. 
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Having read the proceedings of the subsequent court of inquiry, which probably sat on II May, 
Drought ordered the release of the prisoner on the ground that he was a "mere tool, and that the whole 
tumult on the I&_ was a preconcerted plot" in which the "credulity of the men, on the score of caste" 
had been "worked upon by traitors to the State". According to Private Potiphar of H. M. 's 9h Lancers, 
the conspiracy had even spread to their syces (native grooms). Coordinated by a senior syce known as 
a jemadar, the plan was to hamstring the lancers' horses so they would not be able to act against the 
mutinous sepoys. But the plot was given away by a low-caste syce and the jemadar was arrested on 10 
May. Among his papers, wrote Potiphar, "letters were found which proved that he had been holding 
correspondence with many of the regiments who afterwards mutined". He was tried, found guilty and 
hanged. The otherjemadars were discharged. 99 
Drought was later accused by Sir Henry Barnard, commanding the Sirhind Division, of covering up 
the mutinous acts of his men and superseded in command by Lieutenant-Colonel Seaton (formerly of 
the 35h N. I. ), but not before fresh attempts were made to provoke the regiment to mutiny. At sunset on 
12 May, the officer of the day was warned by the native officer commanding the quarter-guard that the 
sepoys intended to rise at 10 p. m. and murder all their officers. Nothing occurred that night, but the 
following evening "some evil-diposed person" again started a panic in the lines of the 61Yh by spreading 
a report that the European troops were on their way. For the third time Drought managed to defuse the 
situation, this time by allowing each company to furnish a picket of 10 men under a European officer. 
The next day - the last of Drought's independent command - fragments of anonymous letters in the 
"Persian and Nagtee character" were found on the 60% parade ground. On the morning of 10 June, the 
day the regiment finally mutinied at Rohtak near Delhi, a number of men received similar letters 
written in Persian. Drought is convinced that these letters precipitated the mutiny. 100 
This sequence of events concerning the 60th N. I. is revealing in a number of ways. The attempted 
rising on the I Oh, for example, bears an uncanny resemblance to the simultaneous outbreak at Meerut in 
that both were the result of a conspiracy to take advantage of the cartridge question, and both were set 
off by the same lie that European troops were approaching. Also the decision to incite the first up- 
country mutinies in stations that contained a sizeable European garrison may have been deliberate: 
partly because the presence of European troops made it easier to promote a climate of fear and panic; 
and partly because the Europeans would be harder to catch off guard once the uprising had begun. This 
99 T/S Account of Mutiny, Potiphar Papers, NAM, 7201-45-2, pp. 5-6. 
221 
is how it proved in the Punjab, where the majority of European troops were stationed, and where the 
authorities took pre-emptive action to disarm a number of disaffected regiments in the fortnight or so 
after the outbreak at Meerut. The only circumstantial evidence that links the events at Meerut and 
Ambala, however, is Major Williams'claim that the mysteriousfaqir had recently been present in both 
stations. 
So why did the rising at Ambala not develop into the full-blown mutiny that was witnessed at 
Meerut? One possible answer is that the 5h, the other native regiment at Ambala, was not sufficiently 
disaffected to be included in the plot. But we know from Major Maitland, the commanding officer of 
the 5', that his regiment contained a cabal that was fiercely opposed to the new cartridges. Gimlette is 
convinced that the 5th was in on the plot to mutiny on 10 May, and its sepoys also broke into their bells- 
of-arms, though Maitland makes no mention of this in his official report. He does state, however, that 
the 51h displayed so mutinous a disposition at Ambala on 18 May that it was broken up into small 
detachments. "' This failed to remove the bad feeling and two companies subsequently mutinied, two 
were disbanded and the rest were disarmed. In other words, the 5h did contain enough disgruntled 
sepoys to make it a willing participant in the attempted mutiny of 10 May. Could it be, then, that the 
conspirators in the 5th N. I. were waiting to follow the 6& N. I. 's lead, just as the I I'h N. I. and Yd L. C. 
responded to the 2& N. Vs promptings at Meerut? If so, then the reason why the sepoys of the 60' N. I. 
would not cross the Rubicon by killing Europeans - as the 2e N. I. did - may explain why the rising 
failed at Ambala and succeeded at Meerut. And the answer to that question may lie in the identity of 
the respective commanding officers. Drought, as already stated, was a familiar figure in his regiment. 
Maitland, on the other hand, only joined the 50'N. I. as a captain in 1842 and spent most of the next 15 
years on detachment to the Gwalior Contingent. 
102 If the 5h had taken the lead on 10 May, the outcome 
may well have been different. 
At Meerut, the experienced colonel of the 20'h N. I. was absent on 10 May (possibly on sick leave), 
and a relatively junior officer, Captain Taylor, was in temporary command. 
103 Though Taylor had 
served with the regiment for 18 years, seeing action in the I" Afghan War and against the Afiidi 
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tribesmen in 1853, he may not have commanded the same respect as a more senior officer. It is 
probably no coincidence that the other two native infantry regiments in the temporary command of 
captains - the 28 th and 29h - both mutinied in 1857. The least disaffected regiment at Meerut the I Ith 
N. I., was commanded by a colonel, Finnis, who had only joined the regiment in June 1856. But like 
Kennedy of the 7& and Sherer of the 73 rd, Finnis had extra-regimental experience (with the Public 
Works Department) which may have stood him in good stead. 104 He was killed on 10 May by sepoys 
of the 20'h N. I., as was Captain Macdonald, one of their own officers. 105 The remaining native regiment 
at Meerut - the 3d L. C. - was commanded by Colonel Carmichael-Smyth who, though experienced, was 
not popular with his men. Referring to the skirmishers' refusal to accept blank cartridges on 24 April, 
Comet MacNabb noted that the men "hate Smyth" and "if almost any other officer had gone down they 
would have fired them off'. MacNabb added that the adjutant, Lieutenant Clarke, was "always severe 
tothemen". 106 Clarke was just 22 and had only been with the regiment for four years (three months as 
adjutant). This combination of an unpopular commanding officer and a young, inexperienced and 
overbearing adjutant made it much less likely that the majority of the P L. C. would remain loyal in 
1857. 
After the suppression of the mutiny, James Cracroft Wilson, the former Judge of Moradabad, was 
appointed a Special Commissioner to punish guilty and reward deserving natives. The evidence he 
collected, he said, was proof that "Sunday, 31" of May, 1857, was the day fixed for mutiny to 
commence throughout the Bengal Army; that there were committees of about three members in each 
regiment, which conducted the duties of the mutiny; that the sepoys, as a body, knew nothing of the 
plans arranged; and that the only compact entered into by regiments, as a body, was, that their particular 
regiments would do as the other regiments did". 107 
However Major G. W. Williams, Cracroft Wilson! s fellow Special Commissioner, did not agree. it 
was only afler the outbreak at Meerut, he wrote, that "corps after corps caught the infection, excited and 
encouraged by the uncontradicted boast of the extermination of all Europeans, and the overthrow of the 
British rule" by the native troops at Meerut and Delhi. Even when the boast proved hollow, they were 
"still lured on by the glowing accounts of unbounded wealth obtained from the plunder of Europeans 
104 Service Records, Hodson Index, NAM. 
'05 Palmer, Yhe Mutiny Outbreak at Meerut, pp. 76-7. 
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and Government treasuries, and the honors and promotions expected from a rebel King". Many also 
believed the rumours, "kept alive by evil and designing men", that their religion was in danger. If any 
such plot for a general mutiny had existed, Williams concluded, the Meerut troops "were indeed rash 
and insane to mar the whole". 108 
The truth probably lies midway between these two theories. Cracroft Wilson omitted to specify the 
evidence from which he drew his conclusion. But his point about secret committees coordinating the 
uprising is supported by much of the documentation already cited in this chapter. For security reasons 
alone, those made party to such a plot would necessarily have been few in number. Williams, on the 
other hand, is surely right in his assessment of the motives that drove many sepoys to mutiny. If the 
two theories are combined, we are left with a loose network of conspirators who were prepared to incite 
mutiny as and when the occasion presented itself. Their success would depend upon a number of 
variables: the closeness of the relationship between the native troops and their European officers 
(particularly the commanding officer); the presence of other European troops; the proximity to 
unguarded treasure and other regiments that had already mutinied; and, of course, the number of sepoys 
prepared to believe (or appear to believe) that their religion and caste were in danger. Given that most 
soldiers were in the dark, however, the conspirators would not have been foolish enough to imagine that 
they could coordinate a general mutiny on a single day. 
But to understand why the cartridge question was manipulated to provide a pretext for mutiny, we 
need to identify the aspirations of the army ringleaders themselves. They were, by definition, 
ambitious men. They were drawn from a complete cross-section of army ranks - including native 
officers who were close to receiving their pensions and therefore had the most to lose - and were 
probably united by a shared exasperation with the limitations of Company service. Their pre-mutiny 
links to the courts of disaffected princes like the ex-King of Oudh and the King of Delhi are surely 
indicative of an aim that was both political and professional: the replacement of their British employers 
with a native government that would provide greater career opportunities and increased pay. 
108 Maj. G. W. Williams'memorandurn of 15 Nov 1857, Rizvi and Bhargava (eds. ), Freedom Struggle, 
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Chapter Eight - Mutiny: The Pattern of Rebellion 
Much can be learned about the nature of 1857 by studying the pattern of mutiny after the outbreak at 
Meerut. How, when and where did the various regiments revolt? What proportion of their numbers 
became active mutineers, remained loyal or returned to their homes? Who were the chief instigators 
and did they take command of the mutinous regiments? Did the mutineers retain their regimental 
discipline or become a disorganised rabble? What were the mutineers hoping to achieve? In an attempt 
to answer these questions, this chapter will first chart the spread of mutiny to its high point in June 
before moving on to specific themes. The narrative section will consider, in particular, the possible link 
between a commanding officer's record of service and the willingness of his regiment to mutiny. 
if the post-Meerut mutinies were solely about "contagion", as Mukherjee has suggested, ' then a 
gradual spread outwards from Delhi would be expected. To some extent this happened. But the 
disarmament of regiments about to mutiny also needs to be taken into account. In May, most of these 
incidents took place in the Punjab, hundreds of miles from Delhi, where the majority of European 
troops were stationed. 2 They provide ftirther evidence of a widespread conspiracy and indicate a desire 
to strike before the Europeans could recover from the shock of Meerut and Delhi by securing key 
strategic points such as Lahore Fort, the Ferozepore magazine and the Attock Ferry. 
Thanks to the actions of two young telegraph signallers at Delhi, fragmentary news of the outbreak 
reached Ambala on II May. 3 From there it was flashed to Lahore, the capital of the Punjab, and on to 
the main stations in the province. A rider was also sent to inform General Anson, the Commander-in- 
Chief, who was at Simla in the hills. Brigadier Corbett, commanding at Lahore, received the telegram 
from Ambala on the morning of 12 May. Around the same time, the cantonment Joint Magistrate 
passed on information from his spies that the four native regiments at Lahore - the 10h, 26th and 49th 
1 Mukherjee, Awadh in Revolt, p. 65. 
2 In 1852 the Indian garrison included 29 Queen's regiments. This total was reduced by three during the 
Crimean War, with only one added by the outbreak of the mutiny. There were, therefore, 27 Queen's 
regiments (4 cavalry and 23 infantry) assigned to India in May 1857: 18 to Bengal, 5 to Bombay and 4 
to Madras. Each presidency had, in addition, three regiments of Company European infantry. But 
three of Bombay's European regiments were serving in Persia, while two of Bengal's and one of 
Madras's were stationed in Burma. As a result, the Bengal presidency had only 19 European regiments 
(2 of H. Ms cavalry, 14 of H. M. 's infantry and 3 of Company infantry) located within its territory: 12 of 
whom were in the Punjab and the neighbouring Cis-Sutlej region. 
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N. I. and the 8t" L. C. - intended to mutiny and seize the fort on 15 May when the monthly relief took 
place and 1,100 armed soldiers would have been present. Corbett decided to take no chances and 
4 disarm all four corps. He was supported by Robert Montgomery, the Judicial Commissioner of the 
Punjab, who was the senior civil officer present in Lahore. 5 Policed by H. M. 8lt Foot two troops of 
Bengal European horse artillery and four companies of Bengal European foot artillery without cannon, 
the disarmament parade passed without incident on the morning of 13 May. The disaffection of the 
Lahore brigade, however, was not in doubt. On 14 May, a plot by the disarmed regiments to secure the 
Ferozepore magazine, 45 miles to the south, was also foiled by intelligence from spies, though a 
number did desert. Finally, on 30 July, the majority of the 2eN. I. mutinied, butchering their C. O., 
Major Spencer, the European quartermaster-sergeant, and a subedar and havildar-major who tried to 
intervene. The other regiments are also said to have intended rising at the signal of the midday gun, but 
the plan was disrupted by Spencer's murder. Of the 600 sepoys who fled the cantonments at Man Mir, 
500 were subsequently drowned, killed fighting mounted police and villagers, or executed. They were 
mainly Oudh men who had earlier been separated from 140 of their comrades, Bhojpore Brahmins from 
Behar province, because the latter were thought to be more loyal. The same segregation had been 
applied to the other two native infantry regiments. In the event, the Bhojpore men were not involved in 
6 the conspiracy and survived. 
With Lieutenant-Colonel Evans on sick leave, Spencer was in temporary command in the summer of 
1857. Apart from a brief spell as cantonment magistrate in the early 1850s, he had served with the 26th 
for all of his 28-year career, seeing action in the I" Afghan and I" Sikh Wars (the regiment so 
distinguished itself during the former campaign that it was made into an 61ite light infantry corpS). 7 IES 
murder, therefore, is particularly puzzling. He may have been unpopular (like Carmichael-Smyth), or 
he may simply have been in the wrong place at the wrong time. 
The existence of a plot for combined action between the native regiments at Lahore and Ferozepore, 
the largest arsenal in upper India, is implied by the behaviour of 45'h and 57'h N. I. at the latter station on 
13 and 14 May. On the 13th, as the 57th N. I. was being replaced as the magazine guard by H. M. 61" 
3 P. V. Luke, Uow the Electric Telegraph Saved India', Vibart, Yhe Sepoy Mutiny, pp. 250-67. 
4 Statement by Brig. S. Corbett, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVIII, p. 48. 
5 Sir John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner, was en route to join his family in the Murree hills and 
had reached Rawalpindi when he received news of the outbreak. 
6 Statement by Brig. S. Corbett, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVIU, p. 48; Off. Sec. to the Chief Comm. of the 
Punjab to the Sec. to the Govt. of India, 3 Aug 1857, P. P., H. C., 1857-8, XLIV, pp. 303-4. 
7 Service Records, Hodson Index, NAM. 
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Foot, the majority of the 45h's sepoys - led by the grenadiers - mutinied and burnt much of the 
cantonment. The following day, as the remnants of the 45h N. I. and the whole of the 57h N. I. were 
being disarmed, almost 300 of the latter corps fled. 8 The I& L. C., the other native corps at Ferozepore, 
is said to have behaved well at this time, even helping to capture some of the mutineers. It was 
disarmed as a precaution on 10 July but resented having its horses requisitioned for the Delhi Field 
Force. Two hundred sowars finally mutinied on 19 August, killing their veterinary surgeon and two 
European gunners in the process. 9 Members of all three regiments joined the rebels at Delhi. 10 
Lieutenant-Colonel Liptrap had only been in command of the 45 th . the most disaffected regiment at 
Ferozepore, since 1856. Most of his service had been with the 42nd N. I. with whom he had seen action 
in the I" Burma War, the I" Afghan War and the Sonthal Revolt of 1855. He was, at 61, the 
oldest regimental commander in the Bengal Army. Lieutenant-Colonel Darvall of the 570'N. I., on the 
other hand, was 50 and had served with the regiment for most of his career. Major MacDonell, the 48- 
year-old commander of the I& L. C., boasted a similar record - including active service in the Vt 
Afghan War, the Gwalior campaign and the Vd Sikh War - and it may have been due to his influence 
that the regiment did not mutiny on 13 May. 
The next rising was, once again, at Meerut. After the initital mutiny, six companies of Bengal 
Sappers & Miners were ordered down from their headquarters at Rurki to stiffen the force that was 
planning to march on Delhi. On 16 May, despite the presence of so many European troops, four 
companies mutinied, killing their commandant, Captain Fraser, and the havildar-major. The ostensible 
cause was Fraser's insistence that their ammunition be kept under lock and key. Pursued by Carabiniers 
and horse artillery, 56 sappers were killed and 280 escaped. The other two companies, on duty at the 
time, were disarmed but continued to work. Two days later, the two companies left behind at Rurki 
also mutinied. " 
On 20 May, four companies of the 9h N. I. rose at the small town of Aligarh, between Delhi and Agra. 
According to one European witness, the news of the mutinies at Delhi and Meerut had caused an 
"immense sensation" in the area and during the night of 17 May a vacant European bungalow was burnt 
8 Return of 45 th N. I., 3 March 1858 and Return of the 57h N. I. by Lt. Col. Darwall, 3 March 1858, P. P., 
H. C., XVIIL pp. 49-50. 
9 D. F. MacLeod to B. Frere, 15 May 1857, Elphinstone Papers, OIOC, MSS Eur/F87/Box 6B/8/1; 
Gimlette, A Postscript to the Records of the Indian Mutiny, pp. 69-70. 
" Off. Sec. to the Chief Comm. of the Punjab to the Sec. to the Govt. of India, 27 Aug 1857, P. P., H. C., 
1857-8, XLIV, p. 307. 
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to the ground. Two days later, four sepoys of the 96'were attending a wedding at a village near Aligarh 
when they heard a local Brahmin zemindar (landholder) boast that he was responsible for the attack and 
that worse was in store. They reported this and a trap was laid. The following day, as the zemindar 
was in the process of telling a native N. C. O. that he would provide two thousand men to assist in 
murdering the Europeans and plundering the treasury if the regiment could be induced to mutiny, he 
was arrested by sepoys hidden nearby. A native court-martial found him guilty of rebellion and his 
execution was fixed for that evening. But during the parade to witness his hanging, one sepoy incited 
the others to mutiny with the words: "Behold a martyr to our religion. " 12 The military and civil 
officers, however, were allowed to escape with their lives. It may be significant that the 9'b's temporary 
commanding officer, 48-year-old Major Eld, had spent much of his career on detached duties in Assam 
and Manipur, though he had been present for most of the previous seven years. 13 As the news of the 
Aligarh rising spread through the Agra region, the other detachments of the 9th N. I. rose in sympathy. 
Only a week earlier, however, members of the two companies at Etawah killed four and captured two 
mutineers from the Yd L. C. who were trying to resist arrest. 14 Such contradictory behaviour was 
repeated all over India and suggests an ongoing power struggle in most regiments between the 
disaffected and those who preferred to remain true to their salt. Even a portion - between 60 and 70 - of 
those most violent of mutineers, the Yd L. C., had stayed loyal on 10 May. 
Meanwhile, sepoys at Peshawur in the North-West Frontier Province were plotting a mutiny. On 18 
May, conspirators in the 5 I't N. I. sent a letter to the respective headquarters of the 64th N. I. and Kelat-i- 
Ghilzie Regiment (a corps of irregular infantry) at nearby Fort Shubkudr in the Khyber Pass. It stated 
that it came from the whole Peshawur cantonment and informed the two regiments that cartridges 
would havetobebittenon22May. "Obrotherl" it continued. "The religion ofHindoos and 
Mahommedansisallone. Therefore all you soldiers should know this. Here all the sepoys are atthe 
biding of the Jemadar, Soobadar, Buhadoor, and Havildar Major. All are discontented with this 
"Forrest (ed. ), State Papers, I, pp. 253-4,256-7; Gimlette, A Postscript to the Records of the Indian 
Mutiny, pp. 28-9. 
12 Yhe BengalHurkaru andIndia Gazette, 12 March 1858; Return by Major Percy Eld, 91h N. I., P. P., 
H. C., XVIIL p. 53; Kantzow Papers, OIOC, MSS Eur/Photo. Eur. 86, vol. 1, p. 10. 
" Service Records, Hodson Index, NAM. 
14 Narrative by Allan Hume, Magistrate at Etawah, 18 Nov 1858, Rizvi and Bhargava (eds. ), Freedom 
Struggle, V, pp. 6304. 
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business, whether small or great. What more need be written? Do as you think best. " A postscript in a 
different hand urged the regiments to march into Peshawur on the 21'. 15 
The bearer of the letter, a Brahmin priest, handed it to a sepoy of the 64 th N. I. He probably gave it to 
his subedar-major (to whom it was principally addressed) and it was eventually turned over to the 
commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Garrett. Herbert Edwardes, the Commissioner of Peshawur, 
was particularly surprised by this act of loyalty because the seizure of other mutinous correspondence 
between Muslim "bigots" at Patna and a naik and sepoys of the 64h N. I. had convinced him that the 
regiment was disaffected. These letters had also alluded to a lengthy correspondence between the same 
native soldiers and "Hindoostanee fanatics in Swat and Sitana". The letter from the 51'tN. I. was given 
up by the 64h N. I. not because the latter was innocent, Edwardes concluded, but because it would have 
been impossible for its three detachments "to collect and act together without the co-operation of the 
Kelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment which was similar placed in the same outposts". The latter regiment, wrote 
Edwardes, had probably made it clear it would not cooperate and so the 64h had given up the letter to 
"gain a name of loyalty for themselves". The other possibility, of course, is that the letter was handed 
to members of the regiment who were neither part of the conspiracy nor sufficiently disaffected to keep 
it secret. Edwardes believed that the letter proved "beyond a doubt that whatever moved the 
Mahommedans, the Hindoos were moved by the cartridges". 16 He is right in the sense that the ma ority j 
were being manipulated by the minority. For the conspirators at Peshawur knew only too well that 
cartridges would not have to be "bitten" on 22 May; 
17 for the rising to succeed, however, a religious 
cause that embraced both faiths was essential. 
As a result of this letter (and the other intercepted correspondence), most of the native corps in and 
around Peshawur - the 24'h, 27thl 5 1" and 64th N. I. and 50'L. C. - were disarmed on 22 May. The 
exception was the 21r" N. I. which Brigadier Cotton, the acting divisional commander, believed to be 
loyal. It repaid his faith by becoming one of only two traditionally-recruited regiments of Bengal 
Native Infantry to retain its arms throughout the mutiny. The other corps, the 3 1" N. I., was not wholly 
beyond reproach in that one of its detached companies mutinied in June. Both regiments were 
commanded by familiar and relatively young offlicers: Major Milne was 45 and, other than a spell in the 
15 An Intercepted Letter from Peshawur (translation by Herbert Edwardes, 30 May 1857), NAK 5504- 
63. 
16 Rizvi and Bhargava (eds. ), Freedom Siniggle, L pp. 3534. 
17 Since the introduction of the new firing drill in early April 1857, all cartridges had been tom with the 
hand rather than bitten. (See p. 182). 
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Commissariat Department, had spent most of his career with the 21"; Major Hampton, one year older, 
had been with the regiment for 27 years and seen action in five campaigns. Even more important, 
perhaps, was the fact that - as mentioned in Chapter Three - both had native family ties: Milne was 
married to a Eurasian; Hampton had two Eurasian daughters. 's 
A few days afler the disarmament at Peshawur, when it became clear that their treasonable 
correspondence had been intercepted, the subedar-major and 250 men of the 51t N. I. fled into the 
mountains. Many were returned by Pathan tribesmen, including the subedar-major who was hanged on 
29 May. But the plotting continued and on 28 August, as their lines were being searched for arms, the 
men of the 5 I't rose, killed and wounded more than 50 members of H. M. 701b Foot and headed for the 
surrounding jungle. More than 700 were recaptured and summarily executed. But they were not alone 
in their plans to rise. Arms and ammunition, recorded General Cotton, were found concealed in the 
roofs and walls of every one of the disarmed regiments. 19 But only one actually mutinied - the 51"N. I. 
- and its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Cooper, had been with it forjust a year. Garrett of the 64h 
N. I. - the next most disaffected regiment - had known his men for barely 18 months, The other 
commanding officers - Lieutenant-Colonel Harington of the 5h L. C., Major Shakespear of the 24th N. I. 
and Lieutenant-Colonel Plumbe of the 27"' N. I. - had spent most of their careers with their corps. 20 
This may have prevented the conspirators in their regiments from gaining enough adherents to risk an 
armed rising. 
one mutiny which did occur in the Peshawur district in May involved the 55, h N. I. A detachment of 
the regiment was based at Nowshera, south-east of Peshawur, with a sub-unit guarding the Indus 
crossing at Attock. On 21 May, as the guard was being replaced by men from the 5 th Punjab I. I., it 
loaded its weapons and marched off to Nowshera where it was apprehended by Major Verner and 
sowars of the 10th I. C. But when the rest of the detachment heard about the arrests, they mutinied, fired 
on the sowars and released their comrades. Verner ordered his men to oppose the mutineers but they 
refused. Next day the detachment of the 55h N. I. crossed the Kabul river and headed north to rejoin the 
main body of the regiment in the fort at Hoti Murdan. On the night of 24/25 May, with most of the 
regiment up in arms and the European officers under house arrest, the commanding officer, Lieutenant- 
Colonel Spottiswoode, shot himself in despair. Meanwhile a column of European troops had been 
18 Service Records, Hodson Index, NAM. 
19 Rogers Papers, NAM, 7310-57; Gimlette, A Postscript to the Records of the IndianMufiny, pp, 163- 
5; Return by Maj. -Gen. S. Cotton, 19 April 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVM, pp. 50-1. 
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despatched from Peshawur. As it approached the fort at daybreak on the 25 th . the mutineers fled 
towards the Swat hills with as much treasure and ammunition as they could carry. Only a handful 
survived, including some Hindu sepoys who - ironically given their alleged reason for rebelling - were 
forced to convert to Islam by Kohistan tribesmen. One hundred and forty-three native officers, N. C. O. s 
and sepoys stayed with their officers on 25 May: the eight Sikhs among them joined the newly-raised 
16'h Punjab I. I.; the remaining soldiers were posted to the 51"N. I. and shared its fate . 
21 S pottiswoode, 
it should be added, was a former adjutant of the 21" N. I. and had been with the 55dforjust two years. 22 
For its failure to act against the sepoys of the 55h N. I. at Nowshera and after they fled from Hoti 
Mardan on 25 May, the I& I. C. came under considerable suspicion. These doubts were confirmed in 
June when the civil authorities discovered a "treasonable correspondence between the regiment and the 
King of Delhi, the Chief of Swat country and the inhabitants of the City of Peshawar". On 26 June, the 
two wings of the regiment were disbanded simultaneously at Nowshera and Peshawur. 23 Just over two 
months later, however, a ressaidar and 50 sowars of the 10th I. C. arrived in Delhi and offered their 
services to Bahadur Shah. The ressaldar also proposed calling in the rest of the regiment from their 
homes in the surrounding area, though there is no evidence that he did. His motive, he declared, was to 
defend the faith and protect the King's throne. But the question of money was also raised, albeit 
obliquely, when the ressaldar mentioned that he and his men had been forced to abandon all their 
property, money and arrears of pay. 24 Their genuine aims, therefore, were probably twofold: to see the 
restoration of the Mughal empire and to join a service which offered higher pay and greater career 
opportunities than the British. Given their alleged correspondence with Bahadur Shah, they had surely 
seen a copy of the proclamation issued in his name shortly after the mutiny at Delhi, promising double 
pay to all Company soldiers who murdered their officers and transferred their allegiance to hiM. 25 
Their commanding officer, Major Vemer, had been with the I oth I. C. - and its predecessor, the 
Cavalry of the Bundelkhand Legion - since 1840, longer than any other commandant of irregular 
cavalry. During that time he and his men had served in three campaigns, including the Vt Sikh War. 
At first sight, therefore, it is surprising that that such a familiar officer was not able to stem the spread 
" Service Records, Hodson Index, NAM. 
21 Return by Maj. -Gen- S. Cotton, 19 April 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVIII, pp. 52; Gimlette, A 
postscript to the Records of the IndianMutiny, pp. 172-4; List of corps that Mutinied, II Aug 1858, 
F. C., NAL Nos. 1753-54 of 30 Dee 1859. 
22 Service Records, Hodson Index, NAM. 
23 List of corps that Mutinied, II Aug 1858, F. C., NAI, Nos. 1753-54 of 30 Dec 1859, 
24 Petition of Ressaldar Nur Muhammad Khan, 29 Aug 1857, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVIii, p. 170. 
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of disaffection in his regiment. On the other hand, it may have been his influence that prevented his 
sowars from openly siding with the 55dN. I. in May 1857. 
Nasirabad in Rajputana, 300 miles to the south-west of Delhi, was the scene of the next mutiny. The 
garrison was made up of the 15'h and 30'h N. I., a battery of native foot artillery and the I't Bombay 
Lancers. On 18 May, the commanding officer of the 15"' N. I. received information from two sources 
that some of his sepoys were holding secret meetings at night. He therefore gave orders that the men 
were not to leave their lines after roll-call. As an additional precaution, a cavalry guard was placed 
over the guns at night. But in the afternoon of 28 May, twenty-one of the "worst characters" of the 15th 
N. I., who had secreted their arms in their huts, managed to take possession of the guns before the 
arrival of the night picket. 26 The artillerymen simply stood and watched, though a few protected the 
lives of their officers. 27 The remaining troops were assembled and ordered to recover the guns. The 
Bombay Lancers, considered the most loyal, made a show of obeying but veered away at the last 
moment, and thereby caused the death of two of their unsupported European officers. In the opinion of 
Lieutenant Pierce of the 30'h N. I., the Bombay troopers "sympathized" with the mutineers and had "no 
th intention of making any effort to retake the guns". 28 Nor did the men of the 15 N. I. who, led by the 
light company, began to steal over to join their mutinous comrades. In a final effort to save the 
Colours, Lieutenant-Colonel Shuldharn ordered the grenadier company to follow him towards the 
cavalry. As some attempted to obey, they were mobbed by the rest who opened fire on their fleeing 
officers. The 30'h N. I., meanwhile, was standing firm but they would not attack the mutineers. At 
dusk, the native officers received a note from the subedar of the 15'h N. I. to the effect that unless they 
joined the mutineers by 8 p. m. they would be fired upon. To prevent further bloodshed, they advised 
their European officers to quit the station. As the station commander, the cavalry and the officers of the 
151 N. I. had already left for Beawur, 35 miles to the south-west, they reluctantly agreed. They were 
accompanied by four native officers and nine other ranks. The following morning, the subedar-major 
and another 2-300 sepoys detached themselves from the mutineers and began to march on Beawur. But 
many were dissuaded by men in the employ of a notorious dacoit (who had been in communication 
25 Rizvi and Bhargava (eds. ), Freedom Siniggle, 1, pp. 438-9 
26 Lt. Col. J. R. Shuldharn to the Adjt. -Gen., 7 March 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVIII, p. 55 
27 Timbrell Narrative, OIOC, MSS Eur/C201. 
28 Lt. T. Pierce to his parents, 27 July 1857, Pierce Letters, BL, Add. MSS 42500, vol. 3, f. 33. 
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with a disaffected jemadar), and others lost heart when they heard the false rumour that all their officers 
had been killed. Only the subedar-major and 56 others made it to Beawur where they were disarmed. "' 
The ringleaders of the mutiny were undoubtedly men of the 15'h N. I. They had only recently arrived 
from Meerut where the I 10N. I. had taken their place. It is fair to assume, therefore, that they were part 
of the conspiracy to mutiny at their previous station. They arrived, in the words of one officer of the 
30th N. I., "ready primed for revolt, and it has only been delayed on account of the great difficulty they 
30 
experienced in seducing our regiment to join them". Part of this difficulty may have been due to the 
identity of the 30'h N. Vs commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, who had joined the 
regiment as an ensign and served with it in the V Afghan and 2nd Sikh Wars, receiving wounds at both 
Saudulpur and Chilianwala. Lieutenant-Colonel Shuldam, on the other hand, had been with the 15'h for 
less than three years. 31 
The day after the mutiny at Nasirabad, a detachment of the 4ýh I. C. and the headquarters of the 
Hurrianah Light Infantry rose at Hansi, 90 miles to the north-west of Delhi. The timing was partly 
determined by financial considerations in that the latter corps broke out shortly after the men had 
received their monthly pay. That thejoint mutiny was planned is proven by the fact that Captain 
Stafford, the Hurrianah U. 's commanding officer, was given advance warning by two brothers, a 
jemadar and the drill-havildar. 32 In a knock-on effect, detachments of both regiments mutinied at neaby 
Sirsa a day ortwo later. The headquarters of the 0I. C. had left Hansi on 20 May to join the 
Commander-in-Chief s force of European and loyal native troops assembling at Kumaul, south of 
Ambala, with the intention of retaking Delhi. Its 94 men did good service under Captain Hall and, 
despite being disarmed and dismounted in August as a precaution, two were promoted for gallant 
conduct and one received the Order of Merit, Yd Class, for saving the life of Brigadier Hope Grant. " 
Hall, it should be mentioned, had served in the regiment since 1850. Captain Stafford had been with 
the Hurrianah L. I. for even longer - 12 years - and this length of service may have saved his life, though 
it could not prevent his regiment from mutinying. 34 
Anson died of cholera on 27 May and Major-General Sir Henry Barnard, commanding the Sirhind 
Division, took control of the troops converging on Delhi. Major-General Thomas Reed of the 
29 Lt. -Col. W. C. Campbell to D. A. A. G. Meerut Div., 15 March 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVIIL p. 56 30 Lt. Pierce to his parents, I'd June 1857, Pierce Letters, BL, Add. MSS 42500, vol. 3, ff. 9-10. 
31 Service Records, Hodson Index, NAM. 
32 Account of mutiny by Capt. W. Stafford, 25 March 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVIII, p. 45. 
33 Return of the 4h I. C. by Capt. G. B. Hall, I April 1858, ibid., p. 47. 
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Peshawur Division, now the senior Queen's officer in Bengal, was named temporary Commander-in- 
Chief (pending the arrival of Sir Patrick Grant from Madras). On the day of Anson's death, Brigadier 
Wilson left Meerut with a mixed force of 1,000 Europeans and, on 30 May, defeated 3,000 rebels at 
Ghazi-ud-din-nagar on the Hindun river, 10 miles east of Delhi. Wilson gained a second - mainly 
artillery - victory the following day. On 7 June, the two European-led forces linked hands at Alipur, 10 
miles north of Delhi. A day later, the combined force of 5,500 men - henceforth known as the Delhi 
Field Force - won a hard fought battle at Badli-ki-Serai, six miles from the city, before occupying the 
site of the former cantonment on a ridge to the north-west . The three-month siege of Delhi had begun, 
though the increasingly outnumbered Europeans were more properly besieged than besiegers. 
Meanwhile a small mutiny had taken place at Mathura, 30 miles north-west of Agra. According to 
the magistrate Mark Thornhill, the district became disturbed after the arrival of the news from Delhi 
and the details of the King's proclamation. This manifested itself chiefly in attacks on banias 
(moneylenders) and the ejection of new zemindars by their predecessors. But on 30 May, as 460,000 
rupees were about to be despatched to Agra Fort, the treasury guard (a company of the 67h N. I. and its 
replacement, a company of the 4e N. I. ) attacked their officers - murdering one - before setting off for 
Delhi with the money. 35 News of the outbreak reached Agra that night and the headquarters of the 4&h 
and 67th N. I. were disarmed the following morning (though some sepoys still made their way to Delhi 
without arms). Both commanding officers were relatively unfamiliar to their troops: Colonel Haldane, 
60, had been with the 44'h N. I. forjust two years; Lieutenant-Colonel Cotton, 48, had only returned to 
the 67h in 1856 after 13 years with the Judge Advocate's Department. The mutineers arrived in Delhi 
on 5 June and promptly handed most if not all of the treasure over to King's rebel government. 36 By 
supplying the rebels with military and financial support, they were hoping to secure their own long- 
term employment prospects. Their chief motive, therefore, was essentially professional. 
Lucknow was the next garrison to rise. On 30 May, a sepoy of the 13 th N. I. - who had earlier been 
rewarded by Sir Henry Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner, for assisting in the capture of a spy - told 
one of his European officers that a mutiny would commence at 9 p. m. in the lines of the 71" N. I., at the 
Muriaon cantonments three miles north of the city. The message was passed to the Chief 
34 Service Records, Hodson Index, NAM. 
35 Thornhill to G. F. Harvey, Comm. of Agra Div., 10 Aug 1858, and Thornhill to C. B. Thornhill, Sec. 
to GovL N. W. P., 5 June 1857, Rizvi and Bhargava (eds. ), Rreedom Struggle, V, p. 685-90. 
36 A spy's return of the number of troops in Delhi, 14 Aug 1857, P. P., H. C., 1857-8, XLIV, p. 307. 
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Commissioner, but such warnings were commonplace and no specific action was taken. 37 According 
to an Oudh artillery officer, treasonable correspondence between the 48th N. I. and relatives of the ex- 
King of Oudh had recently been intercepted . 
38 The troops were known to be disaffected and the 
greater part of H. M. 32d Regiment and a battery of European foot artillery had already been moved to 
the native cantonments as a precaution. At the appointed time, however, members of all three infantry 
regiments mutinied and murdered a number of their officers. Prevented from marching towards the city 
by the presence of European troops, the mutineers moved off in the direction of the nearby cavalry lines 
at Mudkipur where they were joined by at least 30 members of the 7h L. C. More followed on 31 May 
as the remaining cavalry at Lucknow - about ISO sabres - took part in the successful operation to eject 
the mutineers from Mudkipur. A few native officers and 70 or so sepoys remained faithful and did 
good work rounding up stray mutineers. Among them was the 71-year-old subedar-major, who told his 
commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Master, that he was aware of the conspiracy to mutiny, but 
could not say anything for fear of his life . 
39 It may be significant that Master had only returned to the 
regiment in October 1855 after eight years with the I Vh I. C. 
Of the three regular Bengal Native Infantry regiments, around 700 remained loyal, most of them from 
the 13"' and 48th N. I., though a number of the latter were distrusted and subsequently disarmed. 40 The 
loyalty of the greater part of the 13th was probably down to Major Bru6re, their commanding officer, 
who had served with the regiment for 25 years. When he was killed defending the Residency on 4 
September, his surviving men were genuinely grief-stricken; as a sign of respect they attended his 
funeral, and some were even prepared to ignore caste concerns by carrying his body to the grave. " 
Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer of the 48h was also a familiar figure, having joined the regiment as an 
ensign in 1826. Despite the occasional absence on staff duty, he had seen plenty of action with the 48d, 
notably at Mudki and Ferozeshah during the I" Sikh War. Palmer's influence may have prevented 
almost half his regiment from joining the mutineers on 30 May. He later commanded the Regiment of 
Lucknow, formed around the faithful remmants of the l3tý 48 1h and 71 1 N. I. The latter regiment had 
the smallest number of loyal sepoys - about 100 - and is generally considered to have been the most 
disaffected. It comes as no surprise, therefore, to learn that the 71"'s commanding officer, Colonel 
37 Maj. T. F. Wilson, Yhe Defence ofLucknow (London, 1858), pp. 1-2; Forrest (ed. ), State Papers, IL 
Introd., p. 23. 
38 Bonham, Oude in 1857, p. 35. 
31 Evidence of Lt. -Col- Master, 24 Aug 1858, P. P., RC., 1859, V, p. 61. 
40 Sir H. Lawrence to Canning, I June 1857, Forrest (ed. ), State Papers, H, p. 25. 
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Halford, had only served with it for 18 months. He also happened to be 60, the second eldest 
regimental C. O. in the Bengal Army; Bru4e, by contrast, was 44 and Palmer 49.42 
The mutiny at Lucknow was followed by a civil uprising in which green banners - the standard of the 
prophet Mohammed - were raised and one European clerk was murdered. Though easily suppressed by 
the city police, evidence soon came to light of "an extensive conspiracy in the city and in the 
cantonments". A former lahsildar (native revenue collector) pointed the finger at Shurruff-ud Dowlah, 
a senior figure in the court of the ex-King, Wajid Ali Shah, and a prime minister to two of Wajid's 
predecessors. He was arrested (albeit temporarily), as were two of his siblings, the brother of the ex- 
King (Mustapha Ali Khan), the Raja of Tulsipur and two members of the Delhi royal family. Shurruff 
would later become a prominent member of the rebel government in Oudh. A more summaryjustice 
was meted out to 22 conspirators, said to have been sent from Benares and elsewhere to corrupt the 
troops, who were shot after a drumhead court-martial. 43 But with all the European troops concentrated 
in Lucknow, the remaining 15,000 or so native troops in Oudh - including irregulars - had no one to 
police them and over the next fortnight they mutinied almost to a man. Lawrence was convinced the 
mutinies had been planned in conjunction with disaffected civilians. "Everything had been conducted 
with the utmost regularity, " he informed Canning, with specific reference to the uprising at Faizabad on 
8 June, "the Native civil officers taking prominent places; and the King of Delhi had been proclaimed. 
In all quarters we hear of similar method and regularity... Yhis quiet method bespeaks some leading 
injhience. 04 
Meanwhile, Rohilkhand, the province to the north-east of Delhi, had also risen in rebellion. On 
Sunday 31 May, mutinies took place in Bareilly, the capital, and Shahjahanpur, one of the bigger 
towns. Two days before the outbreak at Bareilly, Khan Bahadur Khan, the descendant of the last 
Muslim ruler of the province, was visited by members of the native garrison: the 18d' and 68h N. L, the 
8' I. C. and a battery of native foot artillery. The exact details of the conversation are not known, but the 
following day Khan told the Commissioner that the regiments would certainly mutiny. " Also on 30 
May, Colonel Troup of the 68th N. I. discovered that the artillery pay havildar had addressed a letter to 
41 Gimlette, A Postscript to the Records of the IndianMuliny, p. 104. 
42 Service Records, Hodson Index, NAM. 
43 Maj. -Gen. George Hutchinson, Narrative of the Mutinies in Oude (London, 1859), pp. 71-5; Wilson, 
Ae Defence ofLuclaiow, p. 18. 
44 Kaye, History of the Sepoy Mar, 111, pp. 451-2. 
45 Daily Narrative of Events of Badaun, Bareilly, and Shahjahanpur from 12 th May 1857 to 19 th jUly 
1857, Bareilly Commissioner's Office, Rizvi and Bhargava (eds. ), Freedom Struggle, V, p. 175. 
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both native infantry regiments, "urging them by the most sacred oaths to rise and murder their European 
officers, stating that such had been done at all the other stations, and that if they would not do so, the 
46 Hindoos were to consider that they had eaten beef and the Mussulman's pork" . Of the two infantry 
regiments, the 68h N. I. is said to have been the most disaffected. Along with the artillerymen, its 
sepoys were at the forefront of the mutiny on 31 May, hunting down and murdering one officer and the 
quartermaster-sergeant. The men of the 18dN. I., on the other hand, hesitated for some time and only 
turned when they were threatened by the golundazze. Even then they concealed their officers and 
allowed them to escape (though five were subsequently murdered by rebellious villagers). The most 
prominent traitor in the 8h I. C. was Mahomed Shafi, the senior ressaldar, who is said to have had an 
understanding with Khan Bahadur Khan (who, on 31 May, declared himself the ruler of Rohilkhand on 
behalf of the King of Delhi). But even Shafi could not convince his men to murder their European 
officers who were allowed to escape to Naini Tal, accompanied by 12 native officers and II sowars. " 
The level of disaffection in a corps can once again be correlated to the identity of its commanding 
officer. Troup, for example, had served just two years with the 68'h, - whereas Major Pearson of the 181 
had been with the same regiment for the whole of his 27-year career. The commandant of the 8dI. C., 
Lieutenant Mackenzie, was also relatively familiar, having joined as the adjutant in 1849.48 
A spate of mutinies took place in early June in garrisons as far apart as Moradabad in Rohilkhand, 
Benares on the lower Ganges, Nimach in central India, Cawnpore in the Doab, Jhansi in Bundelkhand 
and Jullundur in the Punjab (see Appendix 2). When news of the Delhi outbreak reached the holy city 
of Benares on 12 May, it made the large "ruffian population" - many of whom openly carried arms - 
even more volatile than usual. Fearing a civil uprising, both the commissioner and local brigadier 
suggested evacuating the troops to the nearby stronghold at Chumar. But this was vetoed by Judge 
Gubbins and the magistrate, Francis Lind, on the ground that it would put in jeopardy the road, river 
and telegraph communications between Calcutta and upper India. 49 The garrison at that stage was 
composed of the 37' N. I., the Ludhiana Regiment of Sikhs, a wing of the 13'b I. C. and half of battery of 
European artillery. Colonel Gordon was convinced his Sikhs would remain loyal but had "misgivings" 
about the 37h. As for the irregular cavalry, they had let it be known that they would be passively 
faithful, but "could not be trusted to charge or fire upon mutineers on the cartridge question". Lind 
46 Troup to the D. A. G., 10 June 1857, ibid., pp. 190-1. 
47 Gimlette, A Postscript to the Records of the IndianMutiny, pp. 114,184,196. 
48 Service Records, Hodson Index, NAM. 
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took this to mean they were at heart as mutinous as the sepoys. Discontent increased with the 
circulation of rumours that the government was planning to issue bread containing pig and cow bones at 
a below market price. 50 On 27 May, a trooper of the 1P I. C. tried to incite the Sikhs to mutiny; but he 
was promptly handed over to the authorities by a Sikh havildar who was rewarded with promotion to 
jemadar. 51 Around the same time, a respected subedar in the 37tb N. I. informed his commanding 
officer, Spottiswoode, that he had nothing to fear from the regiment in general, even though it 
contained some bad men who might try to intimidate the well-disposed into mutinying. 52 
Matters came to a head, nevertheless, in early June when the outlying stations were ordered to send in 
their treasure for safekeeping. This was the signal for the 17dN. I. to mutiny at Azimgarh, 50 miles to 
the north, on 3 June. The news reached Benares the following morning. By now the garrison had been 
reinforced by 150 men of H. M. I Oh Foot (from Dinapore in Bihar) and 60 members of the I" Madras 
European Fusiliers, rushed across the Bay of Bengal and on from Calcutta by bullock transport. Present 
with the vanguard of the I" M. E. F. was its commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel James Neill. It 
was Neill who persuaded the local commander, Brigadier Ponsonby, to carry out an immediate 
disarmament of the 37h N. 1.53 At the hastily-arranged afternoon parade, the Europeans and Sikhs were 
still not in position when Spottiswoode ordered his men, by companies, to lodge their muskets in their 
bells-of-arms. He had got as far as No. 6 Company - and was convinced that the regiment contained a 
majority of loyal sepoys - when two or three voices called out, "Our officers are deceiving us, they 
want us to give up our arms, that the Europeans who are coming up may shoot us down P. Tocalinthe 
men, Spottiswoode galloped away to prevent the advancing Europeans from coming any closer. But no 
sooner had he returned than shots rang out from the direction of No. 2 Company (fired, in the first 
instance, by the pay havildar), causing the men to rush towards the bells-of-arms to rearm themselves. 54 
In the confusion of the gun battle that followed, sowars of the 13 th I. C. are said to have shot in the 
direction of the Sikhs, who faced about and returned fire. One Sikh attempted to murder Colonel 
Gordon, but a faithful havildar intervened, receiving the bullet in his arm, Assuming the Sikhs had 
mutinied, the European gunners opened fire on them, causing the whole regiment to scatter. The 
mutineers at once fled the station. But elements from all three native regiments remained loyal, 
49 Memorandum of the Services of Francis M. Lind, Lind Papers, NAK 5106-1-36, pp. 1-4. 
50 Francis Lind's diary entry for 19 May 1857, Lind Papers, NAM, 5 105-70-2, p. 62. 
51 Lt. P-W. Glasse to Capt F. J. Nelson, 16 March 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVIII, p. 32. 
52 Lt. Col, A C. Spottiswoode to Brig. J. Christie, II March 1858, ibid., p. 28. 
53 Lt. _Col. J. G. Neill to the Adjt. -Gen., 6 June 1857, P. P., H. C., 1857, XXX, p. 479. 
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including more than 200 Sikhs (some of whom formed the treasury guard) and 14 members of the 37 th 
N. I. guarding the paymaster's compound. Lieutenant Glasse, the adjutant of the Sikhs, thought that the 
fidelity of the treasury guard, in particular, was proof that the regiment had "no design ofjoining the 
plans of the mutineers". But he was also prepared to concede that "a certain number out of such a body, 
comprising, as it did, several Poorbeahs in the superior ranks, must have cherished a mutinous spirit". 
In a similar vein, some of the loyal sepoys of the 37h N. I. told Spottiswoode that the "majority of the 
men were entirely ignorant of the intentions of the turbulent characters" and that more would have 
remained loyal if they had not been shot at indiscriminately. As proof of this, the company on detached 
duty at Chunar stayed loyal even after hearing of the mutiny at Benares. The detachment of two 
companies of Sikhs at Jounpore, on the other hand, rose up and murdered their European officer when 
they received the news. 55 
The mutiny at Benares is a perfect example of how an evil-disposed minority was able to manipulate 
the majority by playing on their fears and credulity. The cry that Europeans were coming to do them 
harm was repeated in too many other mutinies where it was palpably false to be considered a genuine, 
spur of the moment warning. It had probably been agreed by conspirators beforehand as the best way 
to win over waverers. But the fact that so many were won over by such unlikely claims is yet more 
evidence of a breakdown of trust between European officers and their native troops. The confidence of 
the 37"' N. I. in their commanding officer, for example, cannot have been helped by his absence for 20 
56 
of the previous 22 years on furlough and detached duty with the Stud Department. 
The rising of the troops at Cawnpore on 4-5 June contains yet more evidence of a conspiracy between 
disaffected soldiers and disgruntled civilians. Having returned from his suspicious tour of military 
stations (including Delhi and Ambala), Azimullah Khan accompanied Nana Sahib on a visit to Luckow 
in April 1857. Among the civil officials who received them was Martin Gubbins, the Financial 
Commissioner of Oudh. He found the Nana "arrogant and presuming", and became suspicious when 
the Nana departed suddenly for Cawnpore on "urgent business". Sir Henry Lawrence shared Gubbins' 
suspicions and authorized him to warn Sir Henry Wheeler, commanding at Cawnpore, that the Nana 
was not to be trusted. The warning was obviously ignored because, on 22 May, at Wheelees request, 
Nana Sahib arrived at Cawnpore with two guns and 300 horse to guard the treasury and maintain 
54 Lt. Col. A. C. Spottiswoode to Brig. J. Christie, II March 1858, ibid., p. 29. 
15 ibid. pp. 29-30; Lt. R. W. Glasse to Capt F. J. Nelson, 16 March 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVIII, p. 32 
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order. 57 The only European troops stationed at Cawnpore were 15 invalids from H. M. 3Vd Foot and a 
company of foot artillery. By early June they had been joined by 55 fit members of H. M. 32 nd Foot 
(sent over from Lucknow), 70 soldiers of H. M. 84h Foot and 15 Madras Fusiliers (the first 
reinforcements to arrive from Calcutta). But they were heavily outnumbered by the native garrison 
which consisted of the 2nd L. C., the I", 53d and 56"' N. I., and two companies of native foot artillery. 
By the time Nana Sahib arrived at Cawnpore, the troops were already on the verge of mutinying. 
According to a sowar of the 2rd L. C. who remained faithful, the arrival of the news from Meerut 
prompted sepoys and sowars alike to discuss an outbreak. 
58 On 20 May, a fire in the lines of the I' N. I. 
was interpreted by Europeans as the "probable signal for revolt", but the presence of the I's European 
officers and the arrival of the European artillery deterred an outbreak. 
59 That night the 2nd L. C. also 
showed signs of disaffection, excited by a message from a sepoy of the 5e N. I. that the Europeans 
were on their way to destroy them. 60 It too came to nothing. Two days later, some of the I" N. I. were 
"overheard wildly talking of mutiny & murder, and made a proposal to destroy their officers". 61 
Around the same time, a detachment of the 2 nd L. C. on treasure escort duty at Fatehpur were heard 
talking "openly of offering their services to the New Government [at Delhi] to . 
62 
After 22 May - according to Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, who took 42 depositions in the course of 
his investigation into the outbreak at Cawnpore - the corruption of the native troops was conducted by 
two of the Nana's sowars, Rahim Khan and Muddut Ali. But the Vd L. C., in particular, were "already 
ripe for mutiny" and needed "little persuasion". On I June, wrote Williams, six of their ringleaders - 
Subedar Teeka Singh, Havildar-Major Gopal Singh and four sowars - had a secret meeting with the 
Nana, his brother, Bala Rao, and Azimullah that lasted two hours. It reached the ears of the magistrate, 
Charles Hillersdon, nonetheless, and when he asked the Nana to account for it, he received the reply 
63 
that it had been held to ensure the troops remained "firm and loyal". Yet on 2 June one of the sowars 
present at the meeting, Shumsh-ud-din Khan, is said to have told the prostitute Asisun that the Peshwa's 
reign would commence in a day or two and he would be in a position to fill her room with gold 
57 MR Gubbins, AnAccounl of theMutiniesinOudh (London, 1858), pp. 30-1 
58 Deposition of Sowar Ewuz Khan, Forrest (ed. ), State Papers, M, Appx., p. c-ci. 
19 Thomson, Yhe Story of Cawnpore, pp. 28-9. 
60 Statement of Jemadar Shaikh Salamut Ali, 25 June 1857, Kaye Mutiny Papers, OIOC, H725, p. 569. 
61 Mrs Ewart to her sister, 27 May 1857, Ewart Letters, OIOC, MSS Eur/B267. 
62 John Sherer to his wife, 31 May 1857, O. P. Bhatnagar (ed. ), Private Correspoildence ofJ W. Sherer, 
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mohurs. 64 The following day, according to a prominent Cawnpore citizen, the Nana and his advisers 
held another secret consultation with the subedars of the cavalry and infantry regiments. 65 He is 
probably referring to subedars from the I" N. I. and 2d L. C., the two regiments that mutinied during the 
evening of 4 June. The other two infantry regiments - the 53'd and 56h N. I. - and the two companies of 
foot artillery did not break out until the following morning. They had been abandoned by their 
European officers, who had been ordered into Wheelees hastily-constructed entrenchment for their own 
safety, and by their native officers, whom Wheeler had asked to report on the temper of their men. 
According to a sepoy of the 53"1 N. I., the mutiny began when the light company of the 53 rd and the 
grenadier company of the 56th "concocted a plot for the seizure of the regimental colours and treasure". 
But most of the men were not disposed to join them until Wheeler, believing both regiments had 
already turned, ordered his artillery to open fire on the native lines. 66 Lieutenant-Colonel Williams 
noted that the 53 d N. I. appeared to have been the "least tainted" and that many of those who deserted 
and joined their mutinous comrades "did so from fear of being implicated in the consequences of 
revolt". By far the largest number of faithful sepoys were from the 53'd: 10 native officers, 15 N. C. O. s 
and 22 sepoyS. 67 One of the officers, Jemadar Shaikh Ali, later insisted that Nana Sahib "was the man 
68 
who corrupted the troops at Cawnpore: first the 2d Cavalry and Id N. I. and then the rest went". 
According to Williams' memorandum, a sowar from the Vd L. C. and a subedar of the I" N. I. visited 
Nana Sahib on the morning of 5 June and gave him the option of a kingdom if he joined with them or 
death if he sided with the British. He is said to have replied: "What have I to do with the British. I am 
with you. " Having sworn to be their chief, he instructed the mutineers to carry the government treasure 
to the nearby village of Kullianpore, where he would join them for the march to Delhi. The Nana then 
consulted his advisors as to whether this was the best course of action. Azimullah "pointed out the 
folly of proceeding to Delhi, where their individual power and influence would necessarily cease". He 
recommended instead the Nana "recalling the mutineers, taking possession of Cawnpore, and extending 
his authority as far as he could to the eastward; adding that he was thoroughly acquainted with the 
resources of the British, that the number of Europeans in India was scarce one-fourth that of the Native 
64 Deposition by Kunhye Pershad, ibid., p. cxxviii-ix. 
65 Narrative of Events by Nanukchund, ibid., p. ccxciii. 
66 Deposition of Sepoy Bhola Khan, Forrest (ed. ), State Papers, III, Appx., p. cvi. 
67 Forrest (ed. ), State Papers, 11, introd., pp. 15 5-7. 
68 Statement of Jemadar Shaikh Salamut Ali, 25 June 1857, Kaye Mutiny Papers, OIOC, H725, p. 968 
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army, and that the latter having mutinied, the former were powerless". 69 Thus began the three-week 
siege of Wheeler's entrenchment that was to end in the death of all but a handful of its European 
garrison. 
At Cawnpore, as with so many earlier mutinies, there seems to be some correlation between a 
regiment's level of disaffection and the relative familitary of its commanding officer. Lieutenant- 
Colonel Ewart of the I" N. I., for example, had known his men for only two years. Much of his 
previous service had been in the judge advocate's department. That he was considered to be something 
of a martinet is proven by the way his former sepoys carried out a mock parade before murdering him 
as he was being carried from the shattered entrenchment on 27 June. 70 Colonel Stephen Williams had 
spent even less time with the 56'h N. I., the next most disaffected infantry regiment, though he was more 
regimentally experienced and had seen more active service than Ewart. Major Hillersdon, however, 
had served all his 20-year career with the 53'd N. I., generally considered to be the least disaffected 
regiment at Cawnpore. The cavalry regiment - the 2nd L. C. - is the exception to the rule, just as it was 
at Meerut. It was being temporarily commanded by Major Vibart who, like Hillersdon, had begun his 
service with the same regiment. However the original corps had been disbanded for cowardice in the 
face of the enemy in 1840 during the I't Afghan War. The regiment that mutinied in 1857, therefore, 
had only been in existence for 15 years. Originally designated the I Ph L. C., it was accorded the honour 
of being renamed the 2nd L. C. after illustrious service at the Battle of Multan in 1848. Vibart had 
gained particular renown during this action by cutting down a Sikh standard-bearer and capturing a 
regimental standard. The fact that his former sowars helped to carry his possessions during the ill-fated 
march to the boats at Sad Chowra Ghat on 27 June indicates that he was not personally unpopular. Yet 
he was unable to prevent his regiment from mutinying. 
71 
Nana Sahib's involvement in the Cawnpore outbreak is significant for a number of reasons. In the first 
place, his pre-mutiny machinations indicate the existence of a plot for a rebellion by both civilians and 
sepoys that pre-dated the cartridge question by almost a year. Sitaram Bawa's claim that the conspiracy 
only got off the ground after the annexation of Oudh is entirely consistent with the fact that two of the 
'9 Memorandum by Lt-Col. Williams, 29 March 1859, Forrest (ed. ), State Papers, III, Appx., pp. x1v 
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regiments then stationed at Lucknow - the 19th and 34th N. I. - were at the forefront of the disaffection 
in 1857 . 
72 In this context, the cartridge controversy was a heaven-sent opportunity for the conspirators 
to unite Hindu and Muslim sepoys against their European masters. It may be no coincidence that the 
rumour about bone dust being added to flour originated at Cawnpore (see Chapter Seven). Then there 
is Sitararn Bawa's point that the "military classes" were enticed by the promise that the old days of 
licence would be restored. 73 This is important because it identifies plunder as a motive for mutiny. By 
1856, with most of India under the heel of the British, the opportunity for native soldiers to supplement 
their relatively meagre pay with plunder had all but vanished. Only the replacement of the British with 
native rulers would bring back this cycle of war and rapine. Lastly the mutineers'offer of a kingdom or 
death to Nana Sahib confirms that they were the real power behind the rebel movement Oust as they 
were at Delhi). Yet only a handful of mutineers tried to set themselves up as rulers in their own right: 
possibly because they realized that only legitimate princes had a chance of gaining enough grass-roots 
support to defeat the British; and possibly because their chief aim had always been to attach themselves 
to a viable employer. 
Of the six ruling princes named by Sitaram Bawa as party to the Nana's conspiracy - the Nizarn of 
Hyderabad, Maharaja Holkar of Indore, Maharaja Scindia of Gwalior, and the Maharajas of Jaipur, 
Jodhpur and Jammu - not one openly rebelled during the Indian mutiny. But that was probably because 
they had the most to lose. The British certainly suspected more than one of them of disloyalty and 
came to the conclusion that they were waiting to see how events unfolded before they committed 
themselves. These suspicions were partly founded upon the inability or unwillingness of these princes 
to prevent their own troops from mutinying. Most of the European-officered Gwalior Contingent 
mutinied in the first two weeks of June 1857, as did a cavalry regiment of the Hyderabad Contingent. 
Two of Holkar's native-controlled regiments rose and attacked the British Residency at Indore on I 
July, and the whole of the Joudhpur Legion turned against its officers in late August (see Appendices 2 
and 3 for details). Referring to the first three of these mutinies in a letter of 23 July, the Governor of 
Madras wrote: "Holkar's and Scindiah's conduct appears questionable, at all events they appear to have 
been shaken for a short time but subsequently to have recovered themselves & remained staunch... The 
' Statement of Sitarain Bawa to H. B. Devereux, 28 Jan 1858, Rizvi and Bhargava (eds. ), Freedom 
Struggle, 1, pp. 372-6. 
73 Ibid. 
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Nizam [of Hyderabad] appears true at present but from all I can learn he is a wretched weak creature 
who will certainly go wrong if his present Minister, Salar Gang, should not be got rid of. "74 
The mutinies at Gwalior and Scindia's reaction are particularly revealing. In late May, Scindia told 
the British political agent, Major Macpherson, that the worst affected of his contingent (most of whom 
werepurbias from Bengal) had been holding "nightly meetings for administering pledges" and been 
"boasting of the destruction of the English power and of all Christians" since the arrival of news from 
Meerut. Furthermore "emissaries and letters from Delhi, Calcutta, and other centres of the revolt" had 
been circulating in Gwalior. Six of the former had been arrested and discharged as deserters from 
Bengal regiments, said Macpherson, but nothing more serious could be proved against them. Scindia's 
own inquiries as to the cause of the revolt had revealed a "general hostility to our rule" with the 
"cartridge question being declared to be merely its pretext". Macpherson added: 
Scindia and the Dewan [chief minister] ... said most confidently that, as no reigning prince of influence had joined 
the revolt, and as its leaders at Dclhi were plainly unequal to their great enterprise, but especially as Benarcs, Gya 
(Gays), and the other ccntrcs of Hindu opinion, to which all had looked, had abstained from sanctioning any 
religious pretext alleged for it, when DcIhi should be crushed, the belief in our ascendancy would at once return, 
and the revolt be arrested. 75 
This may explain why Scindia never sided with his mutinous troops, despite severe pressure for him to 
do so after Macpherson and the other European survivors left Gwalior for Agra on 17 June. "I may 
observe, " wrote Macpherson, "that had Scindia, in this the dark hour of the stonn, supported by the 
Dewan alone with the two chiefs of his troops, yielded to the pressure of the opinions and temptations 
which impelled him to strike against us, the character of the revolt had been entirely changed... But he 
believed in our final triumph, and that it was his true policy to strain his power to contribute to it. " For 
four months, the troops "menaced, beseeched, dictated, wheedled, and insulted Scindia. by turns". He, 
in turn, used every stratagem available to keep them at Gwalior until the British had concentrated 
enough forces to retake Delhi. Then, said, Macpherson, he "despatched them to rout by our arms". 76 
" Lord Harris to Robert Vernon Smith, 23 July 1857, Lyveden Papers, OIOC, MSS Eur/F23 1/5. 
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According to Ahsanullah Khan, the mutinous troops at Delhi persuaded the King to send shukkas 
(messages) to a number of princes - including the Maharajas of Gwalior, Jodhpur, Jaipur and Jammu - 
"calling upon them to come over with their troops and munitions of war". But none of the above four 
replied because they had "no inclination to side with the King". 77 However Scindia might have been 
hedging his bets. In a letter attributed to him of 18 November 1857, he congratulated the rebel Nawab 
of Banda for having reclaimed his former domain. "You have beaten and driven out the English, " he 
wrote. "This is good news to me. Tell me of whoever comes to fight with you and I will give you 
assistance with my army... I hear that the Rewa Raja has allowed the English to stay with him. At this 
I am much displeased... I have published your name from this to Delhi. u78 Such behaviour was 
certainly in line with Maratha diplomatic tradition: during the 2nd Maratha War the Peshwa, Baji Rao, 
was an official ally of the Company but kept in regular contact with its enemies, the Maharajas of 
Gwalior and NagpUr. 79 
Former rulers - such as the Nawabs of Farruckabad and Banda, the Raja of Assam, and the families of 
the late Rajas of Kolhapur, Satara and Jhansi - had less to lose and were more willing to risk rebellion. 
The young Raja of Assam, for example, was arrested and sent out of his province in September 1857 
after being implicated in a plot to incite the I" Assam Light Infantry to mutiny. 80 The extent to which 
the Rani was complicit in the outbreak at Jhansi, on the other hand, is much disputed. D. V. Tahmankar, 
her best known biographer, is convinced that her "agents moved about freely and kept her informed of 
the preparations which were being made for a rising". When Nana Sahib, her former playmate, arrived 
in nearby Kalpi in early 1857, writes Tahmankar, "he was met by the Ranee's men, though the British 
officials at Jhansi knew nothing of his visit". 81 By late May, the deputy superintendent at Jhansi is said 
to have obtained "private information ... that the Ranee and the troops were one and that some treachery 
,, 82 was intended .A 
few days later, the officer commanding at Nowgong received letters from both the 
Jhansi superintendent and his deputy, informing him that they had learned from separate sources that 
Lakshman Rao, one of the Rani's servants, "was doing his best to induce the men of the 12ýh [N. I. ] to 
77 Supplementary Evidence of Hakim Ahsanullah Khan, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVIII, p. 274. 
78 Rizvi and Bhargava (eds. ), Freedom Siniggle, IV, pp. 626-7. 
79 Dirk H. A. Kolff, 'The End of anAncien Rigime: Colonial War in India 1798-18181, J. A. de Moor and 
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mutiny", though it was "not known whether the Ranee authorized these proceedings". 83 Sepoy Aman 
Khan later claimed that the mutiny on 5/6 June was sparked by the receipt of a letter from Delhi stating 
that the Jhansi troops would be regarded as "outcastes" and men who "had lost their faith" unless they 
joined the rebellion. According to Khan, "the insurgents previous to the mutiny did not consult the 
Ranee". 84 But Khan may not have been privy to the conspiracy. As for the other former rulers, it is 
surely no coincidence that by far the most serious mutiny in the Bombay Army was perpetrated by 
sepoys of the 27th N. I. at Kolhapur. The Nawab of Farrukhabad, on the other hand, appears to have 
taken no part in any pre-mutiny plotting and only agreed to set himself up as subordinate ruler to the 
King of Delhi when mutineers threatened to kill him if he did not. 85 
Other influential rebels included large landholders who had had their estates broken up by revenue 
settlements of the Company. The most notable was Raja Kunwar Singh of Jagdishpur in Bihar, the 
recruiting heartland of the Bengal Native Infantry. S. B. Chaudhuri is not entirely convinced that 
Kunwar Singh incited the three regiments at Dinapore - the 7th, 8h and 401, N. I. - to mutiny on 25 July 
1857.86 Yet the circumstantial evidence is compelling: the three regiments made straight for Jagdishpur 
and put themselves under the Raja's command; they were joined, three weeks later, by the mutinous 5h 
I. C. from Bhagaipur. Another disgruntled landholder was the Raja of Mainpuri who had forfeited 149 
of his 200 villages as a result of the British land settlement. He was indirectly implicated in the rising 
of the I Oh N. I. at Fatehgarh on 18 June in that a letter from the Raja's uncle, exhorting the sepoys of the 
loth to mutiny, was intercepted two weeks earlier. 87 The Raja himself later petitioned the King of Delhi 
for troops, but the mutinous officers insisted that none could be sent until the British had been driven 
from the ridge. " 
Within six weeks of the outbreak at Meerut, nearly half the native corps in the regular Bengal Army 
had mutinied, partially mutinied or been disbanded. They included: 4 out of 10 Bengal Light Cavalry 
regiments; 39 out of 74 Bengal Native Infantry regiments; 6 out of 18 Bengal Irregular Cavalry 
regiments; 7 out of 18 companies of Bengal Foot Artillery; I out of 4 troops of Bengal Horse Artillery; 
:3 Capt. P. Scot to the D. A. G., 28 July 1857, P. P., 1857-8, XLIV, p. 183. 
4 Deposition of Sepoy Arnan Khan, Rizvi and Bhargava (eds. ), Freedom Struggle, In, pp. 26-7. 
11 Narrative of what occurred at Farrukhabad, ibid., V, pp. 730-3. 
86 Chaudhuri, Civil Rebellion, p. 32. 
87 List of Notable Rebels, F. C., NAI, Nos. 1354-5 of 30 Dec 1859, No. 83. 
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and 6 out of 12 companies of Bengal Sappers and Miners. They had been joined in rebellion by three 
local corps, the whole of the Oudh Irregular Force (3 cavalry regiments, 10 infantry regiments, 4 
companies of foot artillery, 2 battalions of military police), the Malwa Contingent, the Bharatpur 
Legion, and most of the Gwalior Contingent (I out of 2 cavalry regiments, 6 out of 7 infantry regiments 
and 3 out of 4 companies of foot artillery). A further three Bengal Light Cavalry regiments, 13 Bengal 
Native Infantry regiments, three Bengal Irregular Cavalry regiments, seven companies of Bengal Foot 
Artillery, two troops of Bengal Horse Artillery and two companies of Bengal Sappers and Miners had 
also been disarmed by this time. The uprisings reached their peak during the week of 3-10 June when 
mutinies took place in 15 regiments of Bengal Native Infantry, three regiments of Bengal Light 
Cavalry, four regiments of Bengal Irregular Cavalry, five companies of Bengal Foot Artillery, one 
company of Bengal Horse Artillery, one Gwalior infantry regiment, one local regiment and most of the 
Oudh Irregular Force. 89 The fact that the mutinies began in May and peaked in June, the height of the 
hot season, was almost certainly deliberate. European troops were at a disadvantage in hot weather and 
many were stationed in the hills. 
90 
In the majority of cases - as if in confirmation of Ahsanullah's claim that it was agreed by the 
conspirators beforehand - the mutinous regiments headed for Delhi. By mid-August - according to one 
British spy - the rebel army at Delhi was composed of 20 and a half regiments of infantry and three and 
a half regiments of cavalry, giving a grand total of 17,975 mutineers and 33 guns. 
91 But not all the 
rebel troops made it to Delhi. Some, notably in the Punjab, were intercepted and destroyed en route. 
9' 
Others coalesced around alternative rebel authorities: such as Nana Sahib who was proclaimed the new 
Peshwa at Bithur on I July; Biijis Qadir, the younger son of WaJid Ali, who was crowned King of 
Oudh at Lucknow on 5 July; Raja Koer Singh of Jugdishpur in Bihar; and the Nawabs of Banda and 
Farruckhabad. In each case, however, the mutinous troops were anxious to set up some form of 
alternative government to the British. 
This determination to transfer their allegiance to a native employer was motivated by considerations 
that were both political and professional in nature: political in the sense that they were seeking to 
replace their colonial overlords with traditional native rulers; professional in that many of them, 
" Supplementary Evidence of Hakim Ahsanullah Khan, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVIII, p. 276. 
89 See Appendix 2 for details. 
90 3 of the 4 European regiments in the Sirhind Division, for example, were in hill stations. 
91 Letter from Fulleh Mahomed Khan, 13 Aug 1857, Spy Letters, NAM, 6807-138. 
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particularly the conspirators, hoped that service under these new employers would be more rewarding 
than it had become under the British. They were, as Kolff has put it, simply exercising their rights 
under the terms of the traditional military labour market. "To take leave of a master, whose 'salt one 
had eaten', " writes Kolff, "did neither amount to a breach of faith nor to the end of a relationship. " He 
gives the example of a battalion of Bombay sepoys which, having arrived in Poona in July 1805 one 
thousand strong, had less than 400 men six months later. 93 By 1857, however, the East India Company 
had so successfully dominated the military labour market that it was no longer possible for sepoys to 
pick and choose their employer with impunity. The only way to create an alternative was to destroy 
British power. In this sense it was all or nothing which may explain why, according to Ahsanullah, the 
mutineers decided in advance "to kill all Europeans including women and children, in every 
cantonment". 9' Such atrocities would tar whole regiments with the same mutinous brush and help to 
ensure that the less enthusiastic sepoys joined the rebellion because they no longer had anything to lose. 
"There were some who remained faithful, " wrote Sitararn Pandy, "and there were still more whose fate 
it was to be in a regiment that mutinied. These had no desire to rebel against the Sirkar, but feared that 
no allowance would be made for them when so many others had gone wrong. This was well 
understood by those who instigated the mutiny. Their first object was to implicate an entire regiment so 
that everyone had to throw in their lot with them. "95 
The argument that the ringleaders were seeking to replace one employer with another is supported by 
the way in which many mutinous corps retained their command structure and cohesiveness. Stokes 
observed that the "problem of re-establishing discipline and internal order within a unit" could be 
"formidable", partly because the mutinous faction was usually "composed of men from the ranks". This 
was true in a number of cases, notably the mutinies of the 
P L. C. at Meerut, the 6h N. I. at Allahabad, 
the ffh N. I. at Nowgong and Jhansi, the 28"' N. I. at Shafijahanpur, the 32nd N. I. (two companies) at 
Deogurh, the 37h N. I. at Benares, the 53 d and 56h N. I. at Cawnpore, the 7lt at Lucknow, and 
Scindia's Contingent at Gwalior. But in many more instances, native officers took an active part in the 
plotting and perpetration of mutiny. These ringleaders include: the subedar-majors of the 1', 34h, 41'4, 
5 I'd, 69h N. I; subedars in the 2nd and 4h L. C., 5h, IOh, ffh, 15ý 17'11P 2&, 22nd, 34ýh, 42nd, 50h, 52ýd and 
92 The mutineers from Sialkot - the 4e N. I. and a wing of the 9th L. C. - were destroyed almost to a man 
by Nicholson's moveable column on 10 July 1857. 
93 Kolff, 'The end of an Ancien ftime', Imperialism and War, pp. 26-7. 
94 Supplementary Evidence of Hakim Ahsanullah Khan, P. P., H. C., 1859, XV111, p. 268. 
95 Lunt (ed. ), From Sepoy to Subedar, p. 174. 
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72nd N. I., 5/7h and 6/8h F. A., Oh, 7h and 10th Oudh I. I., P and 7th Gwalior Infantry, Mhairwarrah 
Battalion and 2d Punjab I. C.; ressaldars in the 4h, 8h, 9g, 1&, 12'h, 14th and 15th I. C., 2nd Oudh I. C. and 
Nagpore I. C; and jemadars in the 5tý 32"d, 33rd 3411', 501h and 7& N. I., and I't Hyderabad Cavalry. 
Many of these native officers were working hand in glove with other non-commissioned and sepoy 
conspirators. But no sooner had a regiment mutinied than its remaining native officers tended either to 
take, or to be given, control. Lal Khan, a Muslim subedar of the 3 rd L. C., is said to have been elected 
generalissimo of the Meerut brigade with Bulcho Singh, a Hindu subedar from the 20'h N. I., as his 
second-in-command. 96 They may have been the same two subedars who, according to the courtier 
Munshi Jiwan Lal, "formally tendered the services of the [mutinous] troops to the King" on II May. A 
day later, the "whole body of native officers" of the Meerut regiments presented nazzars (tribute 
money) to the King and "described themselves as faithful soldiers awaiting his orders". But they were 
the real power in Delhi, as was proven by the Kingýs acquiescence to their demand that he should 
proceed through the streets on an elephant to "allay the fears of the citizens and order the people to 
resume their ordinary occupationS'e. 
97 The political influence of native officers was also evident in 
Lucknow where they only agreed to the coronation of Biijis Qadir as King of Oudh on the following 
conditions: orders from Delhi were to override any other authority; the King's wazir (chief minister) 
was to be selected by the army; officers were not to be appointed to the mutinous regiments without the 
consent of the army; double pay was to be issued from the date of their leaving the English service; and 
98 
no one was to interfere with the "treatment and disposal of those who were friends to the English". 
The native officers were demanding not just financial reward, but professional autonomy and a say in 
the political process as well. 
Some native officers even set themselves up as defacto rulers. Shortly after the mutiny of two 
companies of the 560'N. I. at Hamirpur on 14 June, their senior subedar, Ali Bux, proclaimed the rule of 
the Mughal dynasty with himself as the King of Delhi's agent. Three days later, Bux ordered the 
execution of the magistrate, Lloyd, and another European official. 
99 In the Fatehgarh district, Subedar 
Thakur Pandy of the 41' N. I. assumed administrative control of the eastern division, while two other 
subedars "formed a kind of Appellate Court and appear to have been invested with the same powers as 
96 United Service Magazine, August 1857, p. 475. 
97 Metcalfe (trans. ), Tivo Native Narratives, pp. 83-6. 
9' Statement of Mir WaJid Ali, 8 July 1859, Rizvi and Bhargava (eds. ), Freedom Struggle, 111, p. 85. 
99 List of Notable Rebels, F. C., NAI, Nos. 1354-5 of 30 Dec 1859, No. 248. 
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the Lieutenant-Governor of the N. W. P. had under the British rule". 100 All three were under the nominal 
authority of the reluctant Nawab of Farrukhabad. 
But most native officers were content to monopolize the command structure of mutinous regiments, 
brigades and even armies. Following the mutiny at Nimach, for example, Subedar Shaikh Riadut Ali of 
the I" L. C. was appointed brigadier. He "issued orders in the name of the King of Delhi, " wrote 
Gimlette, "and promoted subedars and jemadars to be colonels and majors". Subedar Gurres Ram of 
the 72nd N. I. was given command of his regiment, and a jemadar in the I't L. C. was made the brigade 
major. Even after the defeat of the Nimach Brigade at Najafgarh in late August, a portion of the 72nd 
N. I. kept together under the command of another subedar, Hira Singh, who was promoted to the rank of 
colonel. 101 At Cawnporc, Subedar Tika Singh of the 2"d L. C., the senior conspirator, was given the rank 
of general and command of the rebel cavalry, while the subedar-major of the I" N. I. controlled the 
inf ntry. 
102 
a The S& N. I. was initially led by its havildar-major; but he was replaced by a subedar after 
the I" N. I. had "established it as a rule that men who joined from Furlough should get their places and 
103 promotion". Ajemadar commanded the 53d N. I., probably because no subedar was available. 
Colonel Lennox of the 22d N. I. named Subedar Dulip Singh of his own regiment and the ressaldar of 
the troop of 15'h I. C. as the chief instigators of the mutiny at Fyzabad. 104 Gimlette added: "The Subedar 
Major of the 22nd ... assumed command of the station ... and ordinary routine was carried on. Subedars 
became Majors and Captains. Jemadars became Lieutenants, and all with these ranks annexed the 
horse, carriages and property of their predecessors. " 105 Even at Jhansi, where the chief conspirators 
were identified as four sepoys, the rebel leaders were native officers: Ressaldar Faiz Ali of the 14th I. C. 
and Subedar Lal Bahadur of the 12'h N. I. Ali was allegedly responsible for the infamous massacre of 
57 Christian men, women and children on 8 June. 106 
The native officer to achieve the greatest prominence during the mutiny was Subedar Bakht Khan of 
6'h/8'h Foot Artillery which mutinied at Bareilly on 31 May. One of the chief conspirators, Bakht Khan 
was in command when the Bareilly mutineers - augemented by the 28h and 29h N. I. from Shahjahanpur 
100 Ibid., Nos. U 8,119 and 120. 
101 Gimlette, A Postscript to the Records of the IndianMutiny, pp. 36,187-9. 
102 Statement of Sowar Jahangir Khan, Rizvi and Bhargava (eds. ), Freedom Struggle, IV, pp. 501-2; 
Gimlette, A Postscript to the Records of the Indian Mutiny, p. 72. 
103 Rizvi and Bhargava (eds. ), Freedom Struggle, IV, p. 669; Forrest (ed. ), State Papers, II, Introd., p. 
159. 
104 Statement by Col. W. G. Lennox, I Aug 1857, Faizabad Mutiny, NAM, 5204-73. 
'05 Gimlette, A Postscript to the Records of the IndfanMutitly, p. 121. 
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and Moradabad respectively - arrived in Delhi on 2 July. At a subsequent audience with the King, 
Bakht Khan said that he had come with 400,000 rupees and that his men had been given six month's 
pay in advance. He added that he did not require any financial assistance and would pay the balance of 
his money into the King's treasury if the rebels were victorious. He also promised to impose discipline 
if he was made Commander-in-Chief of the rebel army and the King agreed. Bakht Khan replaced four 
ineffectual royal princes - Mirza Mogul, Mirza Kizr Sultan, Mirza Abu Bakr and Mirza Abdulla - at the 
head of the rebel army, though Mirza Mogul, the King's eldest surviving son, stayed on as his Adjutant- 
General. But Bakht Khan's own tenure failed to dislodge the Europeans from the Delhi ridge and, on 
23 August, after accusations that he had been negotiating with the enemy, he was replaced in supreme 
command by a 12-man committee (six nominated by the King and six by the rebel officers). 107 
Native officers were not always ascendant in rebel regiments. According to Major Macpherson, 
Subedar-Major Amanut Ali of the V Infantry, Gwalior Contingent, was promoted to "general" by the 
rebels at Gwalior, "but the most violent sepoys in fact commanded". He added: "These troops spent 
their whole time in council, punchayels, courts, and deputations; and the Maharajah [Scindia] was 
compelled to receive daily ... one of the 
latter, composed of officers from every corps with privates 
delegated to watch them. .. 
008 This power-sharing arrangement was similar to thepunchayet system 
which had held sway in the Khalsa (Sikh army) prior to the I" Sikh War (not to mention the military 
committees which had dominated the parliamentary army after the English Civil War), and probably 
explains why Scindia found it so easy to play one faction of the Gwalior Contingent off against another. 
occasionally other ranks assumed positions of authority. After the mutiny at Allahabad on 6 June, the 
200 or so members of the 6th N. I. who made for Cawnpore were commanded by a jemadar, but with a 
sepoyas his acting havildar-major. 
109 When Jemadar SitaramPandy, on leave from the 6PNI, was 
taken prisoner in Oudh by a band of mutineers, he noted that the "leader of this party was a sepoy, 
although there were two mibedars with it". 110 Also, according to the offical record of notable rebels, 
Juggut Singh of the 52"d N. I. "became a leader of the rebels and was killed in May 1858 with 13 of his 
followers". III 
106 Rizvi and Bhargava (eds. ), Freedom Struggle, III, pp. 22-3; 26-7; List of Notable Rebels, F. C., NAI, 
Nos. 1354-5 of 30 Dec 1859, No. 229. 
107 Metcalfe (trans. ), Two Native Narratives, pp. 63,89,96,133-5,204-5. 
10" Macpherson to Hamilton, 10 Feb 1858, Rizvi (ed. ), Freedom Struggle, III, pp. 166-189 
109 Deposition by Drummer John Fitchett, Forrest (ed. ), State Papers, III, Appx., p, Iiii. 
110 Lunt (ed. ), Rrom Sepoy to Subedar, p. 165. 
111 List of Notable Rebels, F. C., NAI, Nos. 1354-5 of 30 Dec 1859, No. 176/ 
251 
Overall, however, former native officers dominated the military hierarchy of rebel regiments: partly 
because so many of them had taken an active part in the pre-mutiny plotting; but mainly because most 
mutineers realized that adherence to military rank was the best and fairest way to maintain regimental 
cohesion and discipline. The willingness with which many sepoy conspirators were prepared to submit 
to the post-mutiny authority of their military superiors is surely proof that professional considerations 
were paramount. The sensitivity of the rank and file towards service issues like seniority, for example, 
was much in evidence. In late August, the native officers of the 3rd N. I. petitioned the King of Delhi on 
behalf of the regiment's other ranks (N. C. O. s and sepoys) who objected to the fact that latecomers to the 
Royal service had recently been placed on the same general list of seniority that applied to those who 
had been fighting all summer. Formerly, said the petition, these late arrivals bad been "kept on as 
supernumeraries, in the grades in which they had formerly served". 
112 
Interestingly enough, a rough estimate of the number of Bengal Native Infantrymen who either 
mutinied, were disarmed and disbanded, or remained loyal, indicates that native officers were over 
represented in the latter category. 
113 This is not surprising, given their age and proximity to a Company 
pension. More remarkable is the significant proportion of native officers involved in the planning and 
execution of mutiny, and the conduct of military operations thereafter. Prior to the mutiny, Napier and 
Lawrence highlighted the inadequacy of career prospects for native officers and the danger of thwarting 
legitimate ambition. Both were ignored, but the accuracy of their predictions seems to have been 
proven by the significant role played by native officers during the mutiny. According to Major O'Brien 
of the 60' Oudh I. I., a "large body" of the native officers of his regiment, the 22nd N. I. and the 15'h I. C. 
were "active instigators of the mutiny" at Faizabad on 8 June. He added: "The prizes they hope to gain 
by being put in the position the European officers formerly held, & having perhaps from one to four 
hundred rupees pay per mensum, being in my opinion one of their chief inducements to side with the 
rebels. " 114 
Long-term financial reward and regimental cohesion went hand in hand. The mutineers could hardly 
expect to be employed as a body by the restored native rulers unless they retained their discipline. 
112 Petition of the commissioned officers of the 3d N. I., 26 Aug 1857, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVIU, p. 170. 
113 Mutinied: 392 native officers and 36,358 other ranks. Disarmed: 331 native officers and 21,314 
other ranks. Disbanded: 41 native officers and 2,151 other ranks. Remained loyal: 150 native officers 
and 5,598 other ranks. These figures do not include men on furlough who later returned to their 
, 
ýiments. For details see Appendix 3. re 11 Major Charles OBrien, 'Account of the Mutiny of the Troops at Fyzabad', Kaye Mutiny Papers 
OIOC, H725, p. 573. 
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Their political influence was also dependent upon an outward display of unity - as were their lives in 
that only disciplined troops had a hope of defeating European regiments in the field. A host of accounts 
confirm this retention of regimental organization. When the II 
th and 2& N. I. arrived at Delhi on the 
morning of II May, one European officer described them as "coming up in military formation,... in 
subdivisions of companies with fixed bayonets and sloped arms". 
115 As the Nimach mutineers marched 
towards Delhi, via Agra, the infantry were in front, followed by the artillery and cavalry, with advance 
and rear guards "told off, and Cavalry flanking parties thrown out". 
116 At Faizabad the "band played at 
mess every night", guards "were posted, and parades ordered at usual". 
117 Even the internal disciplinary 
system of mutinous regiments was similar to that which had operated under the British. When a sepoy 
of the I IdN. I. was found asleep on sentry duty at Delhi in July, he was tried and found guilty by a 
court-martial of all the regiment's native officers. The only deviation from the British system was that 
the Commander-in-Chief, Bakht Khan, was asked to award a punishment instead of confirming the 
court's. 118 
Tapti Roy commented on a similar degree of organisation among the rebel troops in Bundelkhand 
(the majority of whom were from the splendidly-disciplined Gwalior Contingent): 
A series of orders issued practically every day from Kalpi in the name of Tantia Topey [Nana Sahib's military 
commander] strikingly illustrates the meticulous planning and organization that went into the soldiers' actions. A 
strict hierarchy of ranks was specified for each regiment with a brigadicr-major in command, followed by a 
subahdar-major, havildar-major, jamadar, naik and the soldiers... Regular inspection, muster rolls and daily drill 
were compulsory. A change of guards at 10 a. m., 4 p. m. and 10 p. m. was also mandatory. For hearing 
representations or dispensing justice, periodic courts represented by one soldier, one sardar and jamadars of 
infantry and artillery together with moulavics [Muslim scholars] and pandits [teamed Brahmins] were 
summoned... Every offence would call for an appropriate punishment... Provisions were made for the families of 
those injured or killed. Strict orders were given for enlistment, recruitment and discipline. Of the soldiers who 
escaped from Jhansi, five were apprehended or hanged. 
' 19 
115 Examination of Capt. Forrest, S Feb 1857, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVIIL p. 186. 
116 Gimlette, A Postscript to the Records of the IndianMutiny, p. 36. 
117 Ibid., p. 121. 
Petition of the Officers of the I I'hN. I., 16 July 1857, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVIII, p. 162. 
Roy, 7he Politics of a Popular Uprising, p. 64-5. 
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This professionalism was evident when the Bundelkhand rebels went into action. The assistant 
magistrate who was present during Tantia Topi's successful siege of Chirkhari, in early 1858, noted: 
"They had their bugle calls during the last grand assault, and each separate band of matchlock-men was 
led on and performed its task under the tuition evidently of some of the smartest sepoys who had been 
instructed by us in the art of war. They had their hospital doolies [litters], and they appeared to have a 
large and well regulated bazar with abundance of supplies. They, in short, displayed all the active 
energies of the battlefield. " 
120 Even during the defeat of the rebels at Kunch in May 1858, Sir Hugh 
Rose, the British commander, was moved to praise the professionalism and courage of the skirmishers 
of the 52'd N. I. who "covered the retreat very well..., facing about kneeling and firing with great 
coolness". 121 
The importance of military discipline and financial incentives was recognized by all rebel 
governments. On 6 July, Nana Sahib issued a series of proclamations detailing the internal 
organization of regiments and their officers' monthly rates of pay: colonels would receive 750 rupees, 
majors 500 rupees, adjutants 250 and quartermasters 150. The latter pair would also receive their 
(unspecified) pay as subedars; the other subedars in command of companies would be given an 
additional allowance of 30 rupees. Provision was also made for pensions to be paid to retired and 
disabled soldiers, and the families of those killed in battle. 122 But as pay was being distributed in early 
July, after the destruction of the Europeans at Cawnpore, the rebel troops began "quarrelling about the 
rewards" and "General Tika Singh" and his men went to see the Nana at Bithur to insist on their share 
of the treasure. 123 Their demands must have been met because the Nana returned to Cawnpore and - 
according to a sowar in the 2d L. C. - distributed two months'pay. 124 
The Delhi Proclamation, issued in the name of the King in mid-May, promised to pay Company 
sepoys 10 rupees a month and sowars 30 if they switched their allegiance to him. 125 Ishtihars 
(administrative notes) specifying the organization and pay of troops were regularly issued at Delhi. 
one such, published on 6 July, stated that there would be one colonel as commanding officer, one 
major as second-in-command and one adjutant for every regiment of infantry and cavalry. "Duties and 
120 J. H. Came to the Sec. to the Govt. of India, 4 March 1858, quoted in Roy, ibid., p. 64. 
121 Rose to Lord Elphinstone, 28 June 1858, Elphinstone Papers, OIOC, MSS Eur/F87ABox 6A/4 
122 S. C., NAI, Nos. 86-9 of 31 July 1857. 
123 Narrative of Events by Nanukchund, Forrest (ed. ), State Papers, III, Appx., pp. CcIXXXiii-ccclvii. 
124 Rizvi and Bhargava (eds. ), Freedom Siniggle, IV, pp. 500-1. 
125 Ibid., 1, pp. 438-9. 
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emoluments commensurate with each rank were also spelled oUt., 
"26 According to Mainodin, 
perwanahs (warrants) were extorted daily from the King and addressed to Bengal regiments, promising 
monthly salaries of 30 rupees to sepoys and 50 to sowars if they joined the King's army. "Inevery 
instance, " recalled Mainodin, "the King's perwanah had the effect of causing the soldiers to mutiny and 
make their way to Delhi. At the sight of the King's perwanah the men who had fought for the English 
forgot the past, in the desire to be re-established under a native sovereign. " 127 
Such generous rates of pay, however, were not realistic. The King had no treasury in May 1857 and 
the new government's fund-raising efforts could not keep pace with its expenses. On 28 May, an 
altercation broke out between the native officers of the 3rd L. C. and the Delhi regiments over the 
government's offer of nine rupees for sowars and seven for sepoys. The cavalry are said to have 
demanded 30 rupees with no deductions, while the infantry were prepared to accept their old pay. "The 
Meerut sowars accused the Delhi regiments of having enriched themselves by plunder, " recorded 
Munshi Jiwan Lal, "whereas the Meerut men had by their good behaviour reaped nothing... The foot 
sepoys replied that the Meerut men were rebellious and utterly bad. " The volatile atmosphere was 
finally defused when the King's servants promised the cavalry 20 rupees a month, 128 But the financial 
situation at Delhi steadily worsened, despite the occasional donation of Company money to the King's 
treasury by newly-arrived mutineers. In an undated letter, the King instructed his son, Mirza Mughal, 
not to accept any more applications for enlistment in the royal army by non-Company troops because 
there was no money to pay them. The regular forces in Delhi had not even brought enough treasure for 
their own expenses, he explained, and it was impossible to collect the land revenue until the country 
had been pacified. Therefore only those irregulars who were financially self-sufficient for at least two 
months were to be given permission to come to Delhi. They would be compensated when order had 
been re-established, but only after the pay arrears of regular troops had been dealt with. 129 These latter 
had become so acute by early September that the army was threatening to plunder the city unless its pay 
demands - said to be 573,000 rupees a month - were met. A partial payment was made on 2 September, 
but only enough to give each sepoy one rupee and each sowar two. 130 The rebel troops at Delhi had 
another reason to regret their change of employer. According to the spy Jat Mall, the wounded 
126 Roy, 7he Politics of a Popular Uprising, p. 53 -4. 
127 Metcalfe (trans. ), Two Native Narratives, p. 60. 
128 Ibid., p. 105. 
129 King of Delhi to Mirza Mughal, undated, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVI[II, p. 172. 
130 Metcalfe (trans. ), Two Native Narratives, pp. 215-17. 
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"contrasted the neglect with which they were treated in Delhi, with the care they would have 
experienced under similar circumstances had they been fighting for the English". 
131 
At Lucknow, too, the rebel government was unable to redeem its promises of pay. The official 
salaries ranged from 1,000 rupees for colonels and 165 for subedars to 30 for troopers and 12 for 
sepoys. But according to 7he Bengal Hurkaru, these figures were "purely nominal" as no man had "yet 
received full salary for any month". 
132 Firoz Shah, the cousin of the King of Delhi, who took charge of 
the insurrection at Mandesur in the state of Gwalior in August, promised to pay his sepoys 15 rupees a 
month. By late September, however, money was scarce and pay had been reduced to the pre-mutiny 
level of seven rupees. 133 
But the inability of rebel governments to make good their pledges over pay does not undermine the 
importance of financial incentives as a motive to mutiny. "I consider that the native troops mutinied in 
the hope of worldy gain, " stated Ahsanullah Khan, who was in a good position tojudge. "The 
admixture of religion was only intended to disguise their real object. If they were really fighting for 
religion, they would not have plundered the houses and property of the people, nor would they have 
oppressed and injured them... 11134 Some regiments (as we have seen) handed the Company treasure 
they had been guarding over to the rebel authorities, others kept it to pay their men, and a few - like the 
17th N. I. - simply divided it among themselves. 
135 But most sepoys: were able to benefit by plunder or 
extortion during the anarchy that ensued. At Gwalior, the mutineers offered their services to Scindia in 
return for the four and a half lakhs of treasure the British had made over to him; but if he refused to 
"lead them against Agra, which they would make over to him, with such provinces as he desired", he 
would have to pay " 12 or 15 lacs more", and provide supplies and carriage for them "to move whither 
they pleased". They were eventually placated by a "donation of three months'pay, and the promise of 
service". "' According to Sir Hugh Rose, every sepoy killed by his Central India Field Force had 
"generally from 90 to 100 rupees about him". 137 
131 Examination of Jat Mall, 3 Feb 1858, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVIH, p. 185. 
132 The Bengal Hurkaru andIndia Gazelle, 15 April 1858. 
133 Lt. -Col. H. M. Durand to G. F. Edmonstone, 28 Sept 1857, Rizvi and Bhargava (eds. ), Freedom 
Struggle, III, pp. 1404. 
134 Supplementary Evidence of Hakim Ahsanullah Khan, P. P., H. C., 1859, XVIII, p. 268. 
135 Statement of Drummer John Saunders, 17'h N. I., F. C. (Supp. ), NAI, Nos. 525-30 of 30 Dec 1859. 
136 Major S. C. Macpherson to Sir R. Hamilton, 10 Feb 1858, Rizvi and Bhargava (eds. ), Freedom 
Struggle, IH, pp. 187-8. 
137 Rose to Lord Elpinstone, 10 April 1858, Elphinstone Papers, OIOC, MSS Eur/F87ABox 6A/No. 4. 
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Some mutinous sepoys used promises of higher pay to induce those still loyal to rise. At Jhansi, for 
example, the 52 N. C. O. s and sepoys of the 12th N. I. who mutinied on 5 June "invited all men of the 
deen [faith] to flock to their standard, offering to remunerate each man for his services at the rate of 
twelve rupees per month". They were joined by the remaining troops in the station the following 
day. 138 In January 1858, the native officers of the mutinous Gwalior Contingent offered the sepoys in 
the service of the pro-British Raja of Chirkhari 10 rupees a month to come over to them. Many did, 
while others refused to fight, giving the Raja no option but to surrender. He was forced to pay an 
indemnity of three lakhs of rupees, part of which was sent to the Nana while the rest was used to settle 
the soldiers'wage arrears. The Nana had promised his troops a gratuity of one month's pay, pensions 
for those who fell in action and licence to plunder goods up to the value of 100 1 rupees if the attack 
was successful. 
139 
There is no statistical proof that mutineers from one branch of the Bengal Army were any more 
motivated by the lure of financial gain than those from another. But given that most irregular 
cavalrymen were Muslims - and therefore had neither caste nor religion in common with the majority of 
military conspirators - it is probably fair to conclude that they reacted to, rather than initiated, the 
disorder, regarding it as an opportunity both to restore the Mughals and to enrich themselves. No 
irregular cavalrymen appear to have been involved in the plotting prior to the Meerut outbreak, and 
only two regiments had mutinied by the end of May. They were, moreover, the most debt-ridden native 
troops in the Bengal Army, and debt was an obvious incentive to mutiny. Captain Dennys of the Kotah 
Contingent blamed penury for the mutiny of his Muslim horse on 4 July. "I always felt that our cavalry 
could not be relied upon, " he wrote later. "They were well dressed and fairly well mounted but their 
general state of hopeless indebtedness was sufficient to prevent their remaining loyal, if anything like 
absolute anarchy should ever come. "140 The Bengal irregular cavalrymen were in a similar position. So 
when, for example, the sowars of the 12ý'I. C. mutinied at Sigauli on 23 July, killing their commandant 
and his wife in the process, their first act was to raid the regimental bank of 50,000 rupees and to 
plunder the shops of banias [moneylenders]. Having divided the proceeds, they headed for the Opium 
Agency at Gobind Gunge which they also pillaged. 141 
138 Deposition of a native of Bengal, Rizvi and Bhargava (eds. ), Freedom Struggle, III, p. 43 
139 Roy, 7he Politics of a Popular Uprising, pp. 624. 
140 Dennys Memoirs, NAM, 7901-95, pp. 41-2. 
141 Memorandum by Capt. C. A. Byers regarding the death of Major Holmes, 5 Aug 1857, Mutiny 
Papers, B. L., Add. MSS 41488, ff. 49-51. 
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By the end of 1857 - according to my calculations 
142 
_ an estimated 40,412 natives of the regular Bengal 
Army had mutinied. They had been joined by 3,309 Bengal Irregular Cavalrymen, 2,452 local troops, 
17,129 members of contingents, legions and various irregular forces and many thousands of disaffected 
civilians. A further 26,681 regular Bengal troops had been disarmed or disbanded, as had 3,120 Bengal 
Irregular Cavalryman and 1,396 other irregular troops. Just 6,065 regulars had remained loyal, though 
their numbers were boosted by 2,149 Bengal Irregular Cavalrymen, 15,075 locals and 17,129 members 
of irregular forces (mainly the Punjab Irregular Force). 
143 In trying to estimate the number of trained 
troops who actually fought against the British in 1857, however, two factors need to be taken into 
account: on the one hand, a significant proportion of mutineers simply returned to their villages and 
took no part in the fighting; on the other, a number of the disarmed and disbanded troops were 
sufficiently disaffected to join the rebellion regardless. But the former were probably more numerous 
than the latter, so a figure in the region of 50,000 active mutineers is probably about right. 
This chapter, however, is primarily concerned with the pattern of mutiny and the insight it affords 
into the motives of the mutineers. From the evidence produced, certain conclusions can be reached. 
The first is that the mutinies - planned as well as actual - which succeeded the Delhi and Meerut 
outbreak were not all the result of a knock-on effect. If they had been, they would have spread 
outwards in roughly concentric circles. Instead, some of the earliest mutinies took place in stations as 
far apart as Nasirabad in Rajputana and Nowshera in northern Punjab. They were undoubtedly 
prompted by the initial outbreak; but their timing tended to depend upon the level of disaffection in 
particular regiments. 
144 The 15dN. I. at Nasirabad, for example, had only recently moved from Meerut 
where it probably became tainted by association. In general, the ringleaders would have considered a 
regiment ripe for mutiny when they had succeeded in convincing a sizeable proportion of their fellow 
sepoys that the British really did intend to take away their caste and religion. Then they either planned 
a mutiny in advance with conspirators in other regiments - as at Lahore, Peshawur, Hansi, Lucknow, 
142 See Appendix 3. 
143 The combined figure for regular Bengal troops (including the Bengal Irregular Cavalry) of 81,736 
does not match the establishment total of around 106,000 because a significant proportion of men were 
on annual leave when the mutiny broke out. Some mutinied and some returned to duty. 
144 Ranajit Guha has argued that only 'official and pro-landlord accounts' of peasant insurgency describe 
it in terms of a'contagion'. The peasants themselves regarded rebellion'as a form of collective 
enterprise'. (Guha, Elementary Aspects ofPeasant Insurgency, p. 220). 
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Bareilly and Cawnpore - or they simply took advantage of a suitable opportunity to encourage their 
comrades to rise, such as the execution of the Brahmin zemindar at Aligarh, the movement of treasure 
at Mathura and Azi mgarh, or the disarmament of native corps at Benares and Dinapore. 
Most of the joint mutinies were planned in conjunction with civilian conspirators. Thisisentirely 
consistent with the prime aim of most active mutineers: to be re-employed by a restored native ruler. 
"All regiments took their Colours with them, " observed Sitaram Pandy of the 63d N. I. "They did not 
break their oath by deserting them. They left the service of the English and were supposed to have 
entered the service of another government. 
045 Tapti Roy has interpreted the soldiers' actions in a 
purely political light. "The decision of every rebel unit to move towards the centre [Delhi and 
Cawnporel, " she wrote, "was ... part of an 
implicit strategy, to build, uphold and strengthen an 
alternative supra-local political order. "146 In fact this strategy had been predetermined by the sepoy 
plotters whose original incentive was probably more professional than political in that they hoped their 
new employers would provide more pay and greater career opportunites than the British had. Their 
political involvement, therefore was simply a means to a professional end, though it became for some 
an end in itself. 
Roy herself noted that the mutinous sepoys "maintained not only the military organizations of their 
regiments but also the hierarchy of rank and order within each regiment". 
147 Yet she failed to draw the 
obvious conclusion: that the mutinies were more about professional than religious, or even political, 
grievances. Some activists were undoubtedly 'politicized' in that they sought the overthrow of British 
rule. But they would not have been able to hoodwink enough of their fellow soldiers unless the Bengal 
Army generally had been unhappy with the terms of its employment. Set in the historical context of the 
Indian military labour market, where there was a long tradition of mercenary soldiers from eastern 
Hindustan who were liable to switch employers if the occasion demanded, the Indian mutiny makes 
perfect sense. 
A key factor in the gradual alienation of the sepoys from their employer was, as stated in Chapters 3 
and 4, their deteriorating relationship with their European officers. The link between a commanding 
officer's length of service and the relative disaffection of his regiment in 1857 indicates that a familiar 
and popular commanding officer could slow down the process of alienation. In some cases the 
145 Lunt (ed. ), From Sepoy to Subedar, p. 174. 
141 Roy, The Politics of a Popular Uprising, p. 45. 
147 Ibid., p. 44. 
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presence of such an officer was enough to deter a regiment from mutinying; in others it helped to save 
European lives. But even a popular officer was not always able to prevent his men from succumbing to 
peer pressure and the material lure of higher wages and plunder. 
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Chapter Nine - The Peel Commission and Military Reform 
This chapter will review the deliberations of the Royal Commission appointed to advise on the 
reorganisation of the Indian Army. It will conclude that a large chunk of the Commission's evidence, 
its recommendations and the subsequent military reforms were directed towards redressing the type of 
professional grievances that underlay the mutiny. Admittedly the Commission was not set up 
specifically to identify the causes of the military revolt. Nor was the oral and written evidence 
presented to it entirely free from an element of hindsight. On the other hand, a number of its key 
proposals (particularly those additional recommendations which went beyond its original remit) were 
virtually identical to the military reforms that were being urged upon the Bengal Army before the 
mutiny by far-sighted men such as Henry Lawrence and John Jacob. These proposals were, it could be 
argued, an implicit response to what the Commissioners (or more properly their witnesses) had 
identified as the fundamental causes of mutiny. 
In late November 1857, with Delhi recaptured but the rebellion far from over, the Court of Directors 
authorised Lord Canning to assemble a mixed commission of officers (both Company and Queen's) and 
civil servants to report on the future organisation of the Indian Army. But Canning was unwilling to 
devote his key personnel to such an onerous task and, in May 1858, despite the opposition of Sir James 
Outram. (a member of his Council) and others, he appointed a single officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry 
Durand, to conduct the inquiry. Durand sent a detailed questionnaire to 85 military and civil officers. 
They were required to provide written responses to a series of questions on Recruiting, Rules of 
Discipline, Organisation, Promotion and various other aspects of army life. In August, Durand began 
drafting summaries of the replies for Lord Canning. ' 
Meanwhile, on IS July 1858, a Royal Commission had been set up in London "to inquire into the 
organisation of the Indian Army". Its chairman was Major-General Jonathan Peel, Secretary of State 
for War and brother of the late Prime Minister. I-Es ten co-members were: Lord Stanley, Commissioner 
for Indian Affairs (and later Secretary of State for India); the Duke of Cambridge, Commander-in-Chief 
of the British Army; General the Marquess of Tweeddale, the former Governor and Commander-in- 
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Chief of Madras; Lieutenant-General Sir George Wetherall, Adjutant-General of the British Army; 
Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Smith, a celebrated veteran of the Peninsula, Waterloo and I't Sikh War; 
Major-General Viscount Melville, commander of a Bombay cavalry brigade in the 2nd Sikh War; 
Major-General Henry Hancock, the former Adjutant-General of the Bombay Army; Major-General 
Patrick Montgomerie; Colonel William Burlton; and Colonel Thomas Tait, the Commandant of the 3 rd 
Bengal I. C. and the only member still a serving officer in the Indian Army. 2 
On 2 August 1858, shortly before the Peel Commission began its inquiries, Queen Victoria gave her 
assent to an act which transferred the administration of India from the East India Company to the 
Crown. 3 With the Indian Army now the direct responsibility of the Queen, the Commission was asked 
to respond to eleven questions regarding the army's future organisation. Six questions (numbers 1,3,7, 
9,10,11) were partly or wholly concerned with the native portion, including the terms of the Indian 
Army's transfer to the Crown, the proportion of European to native troops, the possibility of mixing 
European and native troops in regiments or brigades, the preference for regular or irregular native corps 
(or a mixture of both), the desirability of retaining native artillery corps, and the question of whether 
cadets for native corps should be attached first to European regiments "to secure uniformity of drill and 
discipline". The remaining five questions (numbers 2,4,5,6 and 8) were exclusively about European 
troops: the size of the permanent European force, the proportion of local troops in that force, the 
method of their recruitment, the relief of Queen's regiments, and the possible consolidation of local and 
Queen's regiments so that troops could be transferred from one branch of the service to the other. 4 
By December 1858, the Commission had examined 47 witnesses and collected a vast amount of 
written evidence (including the responses to Durand's questionnaire and Durand's own summaries). Its 
report was submitted on 7 March 1859. Much of the evidence concerning native corps, particularly 
those of the Bengal Army, has been dealt with in previous chapters. Here we are more concerned with 
the interpretation put on it by the Commissioners. Their responses to the original eleven questions 
were as follows: 
1 Shibly, 'The Reorganisation of the Indian Armies, 1858-1879', Ph. D thesis, p. 45; Michael Maclagan, 
Clemenc, y Canning (London, 1962), pp. 240-1. 
2 P. P., H. C., 1859, V, p. i. 
3 Act 21 & 22 Vict., Cap. 106, P. P., H. C., 1857-8, H, pp. 367-94. 
4 P. P., H. C., 1859, V, P. vi. 
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1. No change should be made in the terms of employment for existing Company officers (including rates of pay, 
pensions and promotion by seniority), but new regulations could be applied to future officers. 2. The total number 
of Europeans necessary for the security of India "should ... be about 80,000; of which 50,000 would be required for 
Bengal, 15,000 for Madras, and 15,000 for Bombay". 3. The "amount of Native force should not ... bear a greater 
proportion to the European, in Cavalry and Infantry, than two to one for Bengal, and three to one for Madras and 
Bombay rcspcctivcly". 4. The Commissioners were "unable to arrive at any unanimity of opinion" with regard to 
the proportion of Local European regiments to regiments of die Line, but the majority came down in favour of 
abolishing the Local force on the grounds that it caused professional jealousies and was less disciplined than its 
Line counterpart. 5. In the event that the European force was split between Local and Line regiments, the lattces 
tour of service in India "should not exceed twelve years". 6. The Commissioners could see "no obstacle to at once 
allowing the [European] off iccrs of die junior ranks (second lieutenants, comets, and ensigns) to exchange from 
one Branch of the service to the other", but there was "a great difficulty in the higher ranks, arising from the 
seniority system of promotion". 7. With regard to the mixture of European and native troops, the Commissioners 
agreed with die "proponderancc of evidence" that "any admixture of the two forces, rcgimentally, would be 
detrimental to the cfficicncy and discipline of both, but that the admixture by brigade would be most 
advantageous". 8. Recruitment to a Local European force "should be kept up by drafts" from England and 
$'volunteers from regiments of the Line" leaving India. 9. All Bengal native cavalry should be on the "irregular 
system" (with a commandant, an adjutant, a medical officer and one European officer per squadron, and the sowars 
receiving an increase in pay to enable them "to purchase and maintain horses and arms of a superior description"), 
and the other presidencies following suit if it was thought necessary; the native infantry, on the other hand, should 
be "mainly regular". 10. Artillery "should be mainly a European force" with exceptions being made for stations 
which were "peculiarly detrimental to the European constitution [e. g. mountain artillery]". 11. European cadets 
for native corps should "be thoroughly drilled and instructed in their military duty" in Britain before they were sent 
out to India. 
5 
Only the answers to questions 9 and II were an attempt to redress the type of professional grievances 
that many believed were responsible for the mutiny. This was mainly because the questions themselves 
had not been drafted with any such intention in mind: they were more concerned with the deterrent 
value of an enlarged European force, and therefore concentrated on its size and organisation vis-ii-vis its 
native counterpart. 6 But during their examination of the evidence, the Commissioners had had their 
5 Ibid., p. ix-xiv. 
6 The pre-mutiny strength of the European force in India was 43,000: 19,000 Company troops and 
24,000 Europeans. During the mutiny, three more regiments of infantry and four of cavalry were added 
to the Company's establishment of nine European infintry regiments; the 27 Queen's regiments (four 
263 
attention drawn to a number of "important points", many of which were about issues of recruitment and 
conditions of service. The Commissioners therefore made nine additional recommendations: 
1. That the Native Amy should be composed of different nationalities and castes, and as a general rule, mixed 
promiscuously through each regiment. 2. That all men of the regular Native Army ... should be enlisted for general 
service. 3. That a modification should be made in the uniform of the Native troops, assimilating it more to the 
dress of the country, and making it more suitable to the climatc. 4. That Europeans should, as far as possible, be 
employed in the scientific branches of the service, but that Corps of pioneers be formed, for the purpose of 
relieving the European sappcrs from those duties which entail exposure to the climate. 5. That the Articles of War, 
which govern the Native Amy, be revised, and that the power of commanding officers be increased. 6. That the 
promotion of Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, be regulated on the principle of efficiency, 
rather than of seniority, and that commanding officers of regiments have the same power to promote non- 
commissioned officers, as is vested in officcrs commanding regiments of the line. 7. That whereas the pay and 
allowances of officers and men arc now issued under various heads, the attention of H. M. Government be drawn to 
the expediency ... of adopting, 
if practicable, fixed scales of allowances for the troops in garrison or cantonments, 
and the field. 8. That the Commandcr-in-Chicf in Bengal be styled the Commandcr-in-Chief in India, and that the 
General Officers commanding the annics of the minor Presidencies be Commanders of the Forces, with the power 
and advantages which they have hitherto enjoyed. 9. [That] the eff iciency of the Indian Army has hitherto been 
injuriously affected by the small number of officers usually doing duty with the regiments to which they belong. 
[To reverse this trend] various schemes have been suggested: a. The formation of a Staff Corps b. The system of 
"seconding" officers who arc on detached employ... c. Placing the European officers of each Presidency an 
general lists for promotion. Your Commissioners not being prepared to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion on 
this point, without reference to India, recommend that the subject be submitted without delay, for the report of the 
7 Governors and Conimanders-in-Chief.. 
Of all the recommendations made by the Peel Commission, the most contentious was the one that 
advocated irregular cavalry (at least in Bengal) but "mainly" regular infantry. In his evidence, 
Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Somerset, the Commander-in-Chief of Bombay, had come out against 
irregular corps because they were less disciplined and gave too much power to native officers. But in a 
cavalry and 23 infantry) were increased to 76 (11 cavalry and 65 infantry). By the final suppression of 
the mutiny in 1859, the total number of European officers and men in India was 98,000 (21,000 
Company and 77,000 Queen's troops) [Sources: Return by Col. J. Holland, P. P., H. C., 1859, V, Appx 7, 
?. 371; Shibly, The Reorganisation of the Indian Armies, Ph. D. thesis, pp. 47-8]. 
P. P., H. C., 1859, V, p. xiv. 
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minute of 4 June 1858, J. P. Grant, the President of the Governor-General's Council, approved of 
irregulars on the basis that they were the most effective soldiers and could be recruited from untainted 
areas. Canning's opinion was a compromise. In a memorandum of August 1858, he suggested that all 
cavalry and 30 regiments of Bengal Native Infantry should be on the irregular system, with a further 20 
of the latter as regulars. 3 But others like Sir Bartle Frere, Commissioner of Sind, and Brigadier-General 
John Jacob, Commandant of the Sind Irregular Horse, believed that the system should be wholly 
irregular. Frere observed that a regular regiment with a full complement of European officers would 
"militate against the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officers". 9 Jacob noted that the 
native officers would be "always more powerful, more obedient, and more faithful under a few well- 
selected officers than under a great number taken at hazard with regard to character or qualification". 
Four European officers were more than adequate. The large number allowed in a regular regiment, said 
Jacob, "prevents the native officer, whatever his merit, from attaining a responsible or very respectable 
position in the army thereby keeping out of its ranks natives of birth, and family, and preventing in the 
native soldier the full development of that love for and pride in the service which are essential to great 
efficiency". Irregular sowars, Jacob added, cost less than half their regular counterparts. 10 Frere and 
Jacob were supported by the members of the influential Punjab Committee - Sir John Lawrence, 
Brigadier-General Neville Chamberlain and Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Edwardes - who recommended 
extending the system which operated within the Punjab Irregular Force to the rest of the native army of 
Bengal, including promotion by merit and substantial powers for commanding officers. But to ensure 
its success, they added, the European officers would have to be carefully selected: a "bad European 
officer cannot work a system of merit, he would soon spoil the best native officer in the world". II 
In June 1859, having considered the Peel Commission's report, the Military and Political Committee 
of the Council of India concurred with the view that all Bengal native cavalry regiments should be 
organized on the irregular system. They could not, however, agree about native infantry. Three 
members (J. P. Willoughby, John Lawrence and J. Eastwick) wanted all infantry regiments on the 
irregular system; the other two (R. J. H. Vivian and H. M. Durand) were, like Canning, in favour of 20 
regular and 30 irregular corps. Sir Charles Wood, Secretary of State for India from 1859 to 1866, sided 
with the majority on grounds of economy and politics: the irregular system was cheaper and would 
8 Shibly, The Reorganisation of the Indian Armies', Ph. D. thesis, p. 128. 
9 P. P., H. C., 1859, VIII, pp. 701 
10 Ibid., pp 733 and 745. 
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encourage natives of a higher rank to enter the army. European officers, he added, could be appointed 
to the irregular regiments by selection from a Staff Corps. Canning and Sir Hugh Rose, Commander- 
in-Chief of India from 1860 to 1865, disagreed, the former pointing out that a pool of regular regiments 
was needed from which to select the best officers for the irregular corps. But both Lord Elphinstone 
and Lieutenant-General Sir William Mansfield, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Bombay 
respectively, were of the opinion that all troops in India should be irregular, with four or five officers 
per regiment selected from a Staff Corps. 12 
The idea for a Staff Corps - whereby unattached officers on a general list would be appointed to staff, 
civil and regimental duty - had been suggested first by Sir John Malcolm, the Governor of Bombay, in 
1830. Other officers and senior officials - including Lieutenant-General Sir Willoughby Cotton, 
Commander-in-Chief of Bombay, and Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General - had urged the creation 
of such a corps prior to the mutiny. But it had always been rejected on the ground of expense. 
However once the Peel Commission had accepted that the "efficiency of the Indian Army" had been 
"injuriously affected by the small number of officers usually doing duty with [their] regiments", not 
least because those lefl behind resented such duty, reform became a priority. Of the three options 
mentioned by the Commission, Canning and the Political and Military Committee of the Council of 
India favoured the system of 'seconding' (i. e. replacing officers who were on detached employ) because, 
they said, it was the best adapted to the requirements of service in India and would be the most 
economical. But Sir Charles Wood and the Military Finance Commission in Calcutta preferred the 
formation of a large Staff Corps of all arms because it would ensure continuity in detached 
appointments and would enable officers to be selected for the new irregular regiments. 13 
Supported by the majority of Canning's Council and most other senior figures in India bar the 
Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief, Wood's preference for irregular regiments and a Staff 
Corps prevailed. Drafts of the warrant for the formation of a separate Staff Corps in each presidency 
were laid before the Council on 8 January 1861. All Company and Queen's officers under the rank of 
field officer were eligible for admittance (as were all officers then in staff employ under the substantive 
rank of colonel). Henceforth staff employ would include appointments to civil and political posts, to 
the general and personal staff, and to regimental duty. Ten days after the formation of the Staff Corps, 
11 Ibid., pp. 649-89. 
12 Shibly, 'The Reorganisation of the Indian Armies', Ph. D. thesis, pp. 133-5. 
13 Ibid., pp. 199-211. 
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Wood instructed that all native regiments were to be organized on the irregular system with six 
European officers (not including a medical officer). This alteration would result in a "very considerable 
saving", said Wood, "as nearly one half the charge of a regular regiment consists of the pay and 
allowances of its officers". He also insisted that the "efficiency of the regiments will in no respect 
suffer, whilst an opportunity will be given of raising the character and position of the native officers, 
and, probably, of affording an opening for the employment of natives in a higher position". 14 
In 1861, the Bengal cavalry and infantry were reorganised on the irregular system. The 19 surviving 
cavalry regiments" (not including the Guides and the five Punjabi corps) were renumbered I sý_ I 9th 
Bengal Cavalry and consisted of 13 native officers, 60 N. C. O. s, 6 buglers and 6 troops of 70 sowars 
each. Of the 44 renumbered infantry regiments, the V'-1 lth were from the old regular army. 16 
Henceforth they contained 16 native officers, 80 N. C. O. s, 16 drummers and eight companies of 75 
sepoys each. By late 1863, the Bombay Army had followed suit. Madras held out for longer because 
its Governor, William Denison, and its Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant-General James Hope Grant, 
did not believe that Madras native officers were fit to command troops or companies: not least because 
they were mostly low class and not able to use social position as a means to inspire respect. Denison, in 
particular, was fearful of giving them too much responsibility. If "they are to lead their troops in 
action", he wrote, "and thus get knowledge and self-confidence, we shall find that we have raised up a 
class of men more dangerous than useful". The Madras officials were supported by Sir Hugh Rose who 
suggested abolishing native officers altogether. But in 1865, with the replacement of Rose and Hope 
Grant by William Mansfield and Le Marchant respectively, the Madras Army finally embraced the 
irregular system with regard to the number and duties of European and native officers. The cavalry 
switched to the full silladar system the following year. 17 
The chief importance of the irregular system is that it did away with the tendency of European 
officers to regard regimental duty as a sign of professional failure. Henceforth officers were selected 
for regimental appointments from the Staff Corps, and after 1864 those with less than seven years, 
service would have to serve a year's probation and then be examined by a committee of officers before 
14 Ibid., pp. 144-5. 
15 They were, in numerical order, the I't, 2"d, 40', Oh, 7"', e, 17th and 18'h I. C., the I" and 2nd HodsoWs 
Horse, the 1", 2 nd and 4h Sikh I. C., Murray's Jat Horse, the Multani Horse, the Rohilkhand Horse, 
Robart's Horse, the 2" Maratha Horse and Fane's Horse. 
16 They were, in numerical order, the 21't, 3 1". 32nd ý 
33'ý 42nd 
ý 
43'ý 47'hX 59thP 63'ý 65'h) 70'h. An 
additional two corps - the Regiment ofLucknow and the 
Loyal Poorbeah Regiment - had grown out of 
the remnants ofregular corps. They became the 16th and 17'h NJ in the reorganised Bengal Army. 
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a permanent posting. The financial incentive to avoid regimental duty was also removed by the 
equalisation of military allowances with "those obtainable in the early stages of civil ... or quasi-military 
employ". Regimental positions were now regarded as staff appointments with allowances as well as 
pay. From October 1863, a commandant of an infantry regiment received an additional 700 rupees a 
month, the senior and junior wing commandants 270 and 23 0 respectively, the adjutant 200, the 
Quartermaster 150 and the Doing duty officer 100. "It was because of this financial attraction that there 
was, after the reorganisation of the native army, " writes Shibly, "no difficulty in getting adequate 
European officers for native regiments. " Of the 517 members of the Staff Corps in 1875,370 held 
appointments in native regiments. 18 
The irregular system also provided native troops with the incentives of greater responsibility and 
higher pay. In a cavalry regiment, for example, the six senior native officers were in command of 
troops (or ressallahs) and received from Rs. 120 to 300 per month, depending upon seniority. Even the 
sowars were paid Rs. 27 a month, with the maximum good conduct pay increasing it to 30. Native 
officers in the pre-mutiny irregular cavalry, by contrast, had received a maximum of Rs. 150 a month, 
with sowars on Rs. 20. The eight subedars in the reorganised infantry regiments commanded 
companies and were paid from Rs. 67 to 100 a month, with an extra Rs. 25 for the subedar-major, while 
the eight jemadars were on Rs. 30 to 35 (the pre-mutiny rates were fixed at Rs. 67 for subedars and Rs. 
24.8 forjemadars). But the pay of havildars, naiks and sepoys remained at its former monthly rate of 
Rs. 14,12 and 7 respectively until 1895.19 
By the late 1870s, most regiments in the Indian Army were undermanned. General Sir Neville 
Chamberlain, Commander-in-Chief of Madras, put this down to the fact that the sepoys' static pay had 
"not kept pace with the relative advantages to be obtained in other employments". Moreover, he 
added, their pay had decreased in actual terms "because of the universal rise in the cost of living". 20 
In fact, according to one survey of prices and wages, the average pay for an agricultural labourer 
"would seem to have risen much in many districts since 1873 and to have fallen much in others". In 
Midnapore in Bengal, for example, it rose from 4 to 7 rupees a month between 1873 to 1880. But in the 
North-Western Provinces and Oudh it was fairly static and even fell in some districts (like Faizabad 
17 Shibly, 'The Reorganisation of the Indian Armies', Ph. D. thesis, pp. 149-60,170-6 
181bid., pp. 156-7. 
19 Ibid., pp. 147,166. 
20 Chamberlain to the Duke of Cambridge, 17 April 1879, Chamberlain Correspondence, OIOC, MSS 
Eur/C203. 
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where it dropped from Rs. 4 to Rs. 3.4.6). The price of wheat in the North-Western Provinces and 
Oudh, on the other hand, increased from an average of 23.8 seers per rupee for the period 1861-4 to 
15.85 seers per rupee during 1877-80. The latter period saw "wide-spread drought and scarcity over an 
enormous tract of Central, Western, and Southern India, causing a general rise of prices all over 
India" .2' 
Omissi confirms the trend in rising prices by citing the increase in the cost of a sepoy's 
average monthly supply of atta, dal, ghi, sugar, salt, firewood and tobacco from Rs. 3.6.8 in 1848 to Rs. 
4.11.3 in 1875. The problem of declining recruitment was eased, he says, by an increase in the sepoy's 
basic pay to nine rupees in 1895 and II in 1911.22 
In his letter about low recruitment levels, Chamberlain also suggested that a "more rigid discipline" 
may have "lessened the popularity of the army". 
23 This was an oblique reference to another crucial area 
of military reform recommended by the Peel Commission: an increase in the power of regimental 
commanding officers to punish. The vast majority of witnesses who gave evidence to the Commission 
were of the opinion that Bengal officers, in particular, needed more authority over their men, including 
enhanced powers to punish and reward (see Chapter Four). But some, like John Jacob and the Punjab 
Committee, accepted that the quality of commanding officers had to be improved if they were to be 
entrusted with enhanced powers. This was achieved by the switch to the irregular system and the 
institution of the Staff Corps in 1861: henceforth regimental officers were selected. Later that year, the 
revised Articles of War went a long way to satisfying the reformers'other demands: Article 3 gave 
commanding officers the summary power to reduce N. C. O. s to the ranks and to discharge N. C. O. s and 
ordinary soldiers (a punishment that carried with it a mandatory loss of pension); Article 67 gave 
commanding officers the option to try offences normally applicable to a District Court-Martial by a 
Regimental Court-Martial; Article 81 authorised commanding officers to hold summary trials of 
N. C. O. s and soldiers and, on conviction, to carry out sentences without confirmation from higher 
authorities, as long as the sentences were not more severe than could be awarded by District Courts- 
Martial; and Article 83 affirmed the commanding officer's summary power to award light sentences - 
including extra drill, restriction to barrack limits, confinement in the Quarter Guard, defaulters' room or 
solitary cell, removal from staff situations or acting appointments, piling or unpiling shot and cleaning 
21 J. E. O'Conor, Prices and Wages in India (Calcutta, 1886), pp. 4-20,43 
22 OMiSSi' Yhe Sepoy and the Raj, pp. 54-5. 
23 Chamberlain to the Duke of Cambridge, 17 April 1879, Chamberlain Correspondence, OIOC, MSS 
EurIC203. 
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accoutrements - with the maximum award at the discretion of individual Commanders-in-Chief24 By 
1873, commanding officers could also deprive soldiers of good conduct pay. 25 
In an effort to bolster further the authority of Bengal commanding officers, the Peel Commission 
recommended that efficiency should replace seniority as the dominant factor in the promotion of native 
troops. The reforms of the 1860s acted on this advice. No sepoy was to be promoted to N. C. O. unless 
he possessed "a competent knowledge of reading and writing in at least one character, except when 
commanding officers may deem it desirable or expedient to make exceptions in the case of men who 
have displayed conspicuous courage, or who possess [other useful] qualifications". In general, 
seniority was to be taken into account, but commanding officers had the discretion to override it. 26 
"The vicious system of promotion by seniority, in itself sufficient to destroy the discipline of any army, 
has been abolished, " wrote Chesney in 1868, "and by the new Articles of War commanding officers are 
vested with considerable powers, both for reward and punishment. 47 
Another recommendation of the Peel Commission was that the uniform of native troops should be 
assimilated "more to the dress of the country" and made "more suitable to the climate". The hated 
leather stock had already been discontinued by a General Order of 15 February 1859. So too had the 
bulky shako headdress, as the loyal sepoys of the Bengal Native Infantry took to wearing their undress 
Kilmarnock caps (first introduced in 1847) instead . 
28 From March 1860, commanding officers of 
native infantry regiments were given the option to issuepugris (turbans). Apart from the Gurkhas and a 
handful of other corps, who retained their Kilmarnocks, most infantry regiments were wearing pugris 
by the close of the century. Another major alteration took place in 1863 when the tight coatee was 
replaced by the so-called zouave jacket, said to be based on the coat wom by French zouaves (colonial 
troops) during the Crimean War. In fact that coat was short and worn open with large braid loops. The 
model adopted by the Indian native infantry was a long, red single-breasted tunic with cut-away skirts 
and no collar, not that dissimilar to the coat wom by the British Army. It was not particularly 'native' in 
style, but it was certainly more comfortable and durable than the old coatee . 
29 TheIndianisation'of 
24 Articles of War, Act XXIX of 1861, OIOC, L/N4IU17/11/15. 
25 Bengal Army Regulations 1873, OIOC, LJMIU17/2/443, p. 98. 
26 Ibid., pp. 43,96. 
27 Chesney, Itidiati Polity, p. 290. 
" Mollo, Yhe lndian, 4rmy, pp. 98,10 1. 
"'Carman, Itidiati Army Uidfortns, II, p. 108. 
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dress was more apparent in 1869 when sepoys were issued with baggy, blue knickerbocker trousers, 
wom either with white gaiters or drab puttees. 30 
Given that only Bengal Irregular Cavalry regiments survived the reorganisation of the Indian Army, 
the reform of cavalry dress was not an issue. If anything, the uniform for the new Bengal cavalry 
regiments was more formal than it had been for the old Bengal Irregular Cavalry. The exceptions were 
the eight surviving irregular cavalry regiments (renamed the Vý41' Bengal Cavalry) who were allowed 
to retain their alkaluk coats. The others wore kurtas (loose frock coats) for winter and white 'American' 
drill for summer. By 1874, however, all regiments were wearingpugris, curnmerbunds and a loose 
lairta of regimental pattern. 31 The Bengal Sappers and Miners also conformed to the general pattern in 
that shakos and trousers were replaced by pugris, pyjaftias and dark blue puttees. 32 All regular native 
artillery (horse and foot) had been abolished on the ground that it was too dangerous to leave such a 
vital branch in the hands of Indians. The irregular exceptions were five mountain batteries of the 
Punjab Irregular Force and four batteries of the Hyderabad Contingent. 
The only other recommendations of the Peel Commission that directly concern this study were those 
concerning recruitment: "That the Native Army should be composed of different nationalities and 
castes, and as a general rule, mixed promiscuously through each regiment" and "That all men of the 
regular Native Army ... should 
be enlisted for general service". 33 Both were aimed at dismantling the 
high-caste Hindu brotherhood in the Bengal Native Infantry that had made a general mutiny possible. 
Interestingly enough, the Commissioners' report made no specific mention of religion. If they had 
believed religion to be as central to the mutiny as most subsequent historians have done, it is reasonable 
to assume they would have referred to it in some way: if only to recommend the Indian government to 
be cautious when introducing measures which might offend the sepoys' faith. Instead the 
Commissioners proposed to weaken the position of the high-caste sepoys in the Bengal Army still 
further by broadening the recruitment base, the very policy that is said to have contributed to the mutiny 
in the first place. 
Three positions on recruitment had emerged from the evidence. The first, generally held by officers 
and civil servants familiar with the Madras and Bombay armies, advocated a balanced pattern of 
recruitment from all sections of society. Soldierly ability, and not caste, was what counted for men like 
11 Mollo, The Indian Army, p. 128. 
31 Ibid., p. 114-15. 
32 Carman, Indian Anny Unifonns, 11, pp. 57-8. 
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Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Mark Cubbon. They tended to agree with the military axiom that there are no 
bad soldiers, only bad officers. Diametrically opposed to this position was the view held by Major- 
General J. B. Hearsey and others that the recruitment of all Brahmins and Muslims from Hindustan 
should cease. Hearsey particularly mentioned the regions of Oudh, the Doab, Shahabad, Bhcjpore and 
Robilkhand. Both positions were determined to prevent caste from interfering with military discipline. 
"Any soldier refusing to work, " said Hearsey, "because it interfered with his caste was to be tried by 
court-martial and sentenced to be flogged, or transportation for life. " The third position recommended 
using the best material available. The Punjab Committee, for example, wanted to counterbalance 
Hindustani soldiers by recruiting Christians, Eurasians, Santals, Bhils and other unfashionable races, as 
well as more Punjabis and Gurkhas. They also emphasised the need to balance and separate castes. 34 
The first recommendation of the Commissioners, therefore, was a fudging of the first and third 
positions. 
Even before the appointment of the Peel Commission, native levies had been raised in Bengal from 
mainly low-caste recruits. The Mainpuri Levy (later the 35'h N. I. ) were wholly so; the levies raised at 
Bareilly (36dN. I. ), Meerut (37h N. I. ), Agra (38dN. I. ) and Shahjahanpur (4& N. I. ) had been allowed 
to enlist two companies of Rajputs each. No decision bad been taken on their long-term future by 1860 
when Sir Hugh Rose, the new Commander-in-Chief of India, came down in favour of mixed 
recruitment. "The homogenous composition of the old Native Army, fostering caste, combination and 
indiscipline, " he remarked to Lord Canning, "was one of the springs of the mutiny, and has been proved 
to be an element of danger in a Native army. " He therefore suggested limiting the proportion of any 
one sect or caste in each regiment to a quarter, with Sikh and Gurkha corps the only exceptions. 35 
Sir Charles Wood disagreed. He was in favour of a general mixture system (different races and castes 
throughout the companies of regiments) in conjunction with a district system whereby each regiment 
was recruited from a particular locality. "The difference, " he informed Rose on 25 April 1862, "will be 
greater in some regiments than in others, some regiments will be more, others less homogenous and 
here another sort of variety will be created. " His intention was divide and rule. He told Denison in 
1861 that he never wanted to "see again a great Army, very much the same in its feelings and 
11 P. P., H. C., 1859, V, p. xiv. 
34 Cohen, Yhe Itidian Army, pp. 36-8. 
35 Adit. -Gen. of the Army to the Sec. to the Govt of India in the Mil. Dept., I Oct 1860, quoted in 
Shibly, 'The Reorganisation of the Indian Armies', Ph. D. thesis, pp. 325. 
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prejudices and connections, confident in its strength, and so disposed to unite in rebellion together. If 
one regiment mutinies, I should like to have the next so alien that it would be ready to fire into it". 36 
A compromise was finally reached in November 1862 when the Government of India authorised four 
different systems of enlistment for the Bengal regiments of native infantry: the four Gurkha regiments 
(not line corps) and two Muzbi Sikh regiments (23d and 32d N. I. ) were to continue to recruit from a 
single class; the nine Hindustani regiments (1ý 2nd, 3'ý 4ti% 7th, 11"' , 
ffh, 16'h and 17th N. I. ) and the 
other two Sikh regiments (14"' and 15th N. I. ) would recruit from the same classes under the District 
system; the Punjab regiments raised in 1857-8 and the Assam and Sylhet corps, 15 in number (19'h, 
20'i% 21", 22nd, 24h, 25h, 2e, 27'hV 28ý 29h, 3&, and 31'tN. I., 4VO, Ord and 44hN. 1), would embrace 
the General mixture system with no one class greater than 50 per cent of the total; and the remaining 16 
regiments would operate under a Class company system (whereby each company was composed of a 
different race or caste). The Bengal cavalry was also recruited under a variety of systems: Single class 
(I", le and 15'h B. C. ); General mixture (2d , 
P, 4'h, 50and 7th B. C. ); and Class troop (6h, 8"'Y 9d, 1&, 
I ith, ffh, l3ti% 16'h, 17d, I 8'h, 190'B q. 37 
These systems remained unchanged for two decades. But during that time more and more 
commanding officers of the General mixture regiments began to report that long association removed 
any class or race differences between their men, thereby fostering a general esprit de corps. This trend 
was seen as increasing the threat of a mutinous combination and the General mixture system was 
abolished in 1883. Thereafter, 32 regiments of Bengal infantry and 14 of Bengal cavalry were 
organised on the Class company or troop system; and the remaining 12 regiments of infantry and 3 of 
cavalry used the Class regiment system. By 1899, with a halt having been called to the enlistment of 
low-caste men or menial classes, there were just 22 Class company and 42 Class infantry regiments in 
Bengal. Madras and Bombay also abandoned the General mixture system between 1887 and 1889: but 
their regiments were placed on the Class company or troop system, with the exception of one Class 
regiment in Madras. In general terms, the chief recruitment ground for the Bengal Army had moved 
from Oudh and its adjacent provinces to Nepal, the Punjab and the North-West Frontier. In 1893, for 
example, only nine of the 64 regiments of Bengal infantry were composed of high-caste men: seven of 
38 Rajputs and two of Brahmins. 
36 Wood to Rose, 25 April 1862 and Wood to Denison, 8 April 1861, ibid., pp. 336-7. 
37 Shibly, 'The Reorganisation of the Indian Armies', Ph. D. thesis, pp. 345-9. 
38 Ibid., pp. 390-2. 
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Shibly has argued that the new irregular system did not go as far as native soldiers wanted it to. 
"Before the mutiny, " he writes, "a native officer in the irregular cavalry could rise to the command of a 
squadron which was, under the new system, commanded by British officers. " He also points out that 
the intention to "raise the character and position of the native officers by affording an opening for the 
employment of natives of higher position" was "not wholly Milled". The vast majority of native 
officers continued to be promoted from the ranks: not a single direct commission in the Bengal infantry 
39 
was given until 1873, while only 35 were awarded between 1873-85. All this is true. But the 
introduction of the irregular system was still a significant improvement - an opinion Shibly shares: 
That the new system answered better than the old one might fairly be asserted, - firstly, on the ground of the greater 
efficiency, secondly, from the achievements of these regiments in the field, and thirdly, from their obedience. 
There were no instances where any of the regiments had refused to perform pioneer work when necessary, not 
merely in sieges, but at any time in the f icld, or had refused to go on foreign service when required... The superior 
position and authority entrusted to the native officers, and the efficiency required of them in drill and discipline, 
developed and improved their capacitieS. 40 
There were 20 mutinies in the Indian Army between 1858 and 1947, half of them during the First and 
Second World Wars. 41 None occurred before 1886, while the 15 that took place between the 1880s and 
the 1930s have been described by Omissi as "minor". The smallest involved just 20 men, the largest a 
single regiment. Only one - the mutiny of four companies of the 5th Light Infantry at Singapore in 
1915 - resulted in sepoy violence against their officers. Most of the mutinies - including the seven that 
occurred between 1886 and 1914 - were little more than peaceful collective protests over professional 
issues such as pay, allowances, promotions and the conditions of service. "These affairs should not be 
seen as miniature versions of 1857, " writes Omissi. "They bore much greater resemblance to the strikes 
and protests of industrial workers, just as peasant-soldiers had much in common with other labour 
39 Ibid., pp. 380-1. 
40 Ibid., p. 179. 
41 See table of mutinies in Menezes, 'Race, Caste, Mutiny and Discipline in the Indian Army, from its 
origins to 1947, in Guy and Boyden (eds. ), Soldiers of the Raj, pp. 100-17. 
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migrants. it 42 
Yet it could be argued that these mutinies had many characteristics similar to 1857 -just on a smaller 
scale. That they did not develop into anything more significant is surely down to the post-1857 military 
reforms: the increased ratio of European to native troops (which remained at around 1: 2 until 1914), 
the concentration of artillery in European hands and the brigading of one European regiment with every 
43 
two native corps so that no major station was left without a European presence. Also significant were 
the improvements made to the service conditions of all three presidency armies, and the Bengal Army 
in particular: the creation of a Staff Corps and the selection of European officers for more lucrative 
regimental duties which came to be regarded as an honour rather than a chore; the increase in the power 
of commanding officers to punish and reward, including the replacement of seniority with merit as the 
dominant principle of promotion; the switch to irregular regiments with fewer Europeans, which gave 
native officers more responsibility and greaterjob satisfaction; the increase in pay for native infantry 
officers and all native cavalrymen; the switch from tight and uncomfortable European-style uniforms to 
those more suited to the Indian climate; and, crucially, the Bengal Army's shift in recruitment from the 
high-caste Hindus of Oudh and the North-Western Provinces to the Sikhs and Muslims of the Punjab, 
the Gurkhas of Nepal and the lower castes of Hindustan. 
A number of men were central to the creation of the new irregular system, including Sir Charles 
Wood (later Lord Halifax), Sir John (later Lord) Lawrence, Lord Elphinstone, and Generals Sir James 
Outram, (Sir) Neville Chamberlain and Sir William Mansfield (later Lord Sandhurst) - but none more 
so than Brigadier-General John Jacob who had been urging similar reforms since the 1840s. "It was on 
the basis of John Jacob's principles, " wrote H. T. Lambrick, "that the armies of India were reorganized 
after the Mutiny. "44 If Jacob had been listened to earlier, the Indian mutiny might not have occurred. 
He died in December 185 8; but he would have been gratified to hear the judgement passed on the new 
irregular system by Lord Napier, the Commander-in-Chief of India, in 1875: "No impartial observer, 
who knows what the old army was, and what the present one is, can hesitate for a moment to pronounce 
the regiments of the present day greatly superior to those of the old army; better drill [sic] and 
disciplined, more obedient, less fettered by assumptions of religious restraint, more moveable, more 
42 OMiSSi, 77ie Sepoy and the Raj, pp. 133-152. 
43 ibid., p. 132; Shibly, 'The Reorganisation of the Indian Armies', Ph. D. thesis, p. 374. 
44 Lambrick-, John Jacob ofJacobabad, p. 3 84. 
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ready for every service. , 45 A greater contrast vAth the indisciplined, caste-ridden, disaffected Bengal 
Army of 1857 is hard to imagine. 
43 Adjt. -Gen. to the Sec. to the Govt. of India in the Military Dept., 14 Aug 1875, quoted in Shibly, 'The 
Reorganisation of the Indian Armies', Ph. D. thesis, pp. 179. 
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Conclusion 
For much of the last century, Indian and British scholars downplayed the importance of professional 
grievances in their accounts of why the Indian mutiny took place. Most viewed the Bengal sepoys as 
uniformed peasants who were affected by the same social, economic and religious concerns as their 
civilian counterparts. They tended to identify the defence of caste and religion as the key to the 
military uprising, while regarding the latter as little more than a precursor to a general revolt. Not since 
the publication of T. Rice Holmes'History of the IndianMufiny in 1882 has a historian of the mutiny 
attempted to explain it in terms of issues internal to the army. Yet this study's identification of 
professional concerns as the essential cause of the Indian mutiny is very much in line with the recent 
historiography of military revolts. The mutinies of the French Royal armies in 1790-1 and 1830, the 
Italian regiments of the Austrian Imperial Army in 1848, the Russian Army in 1916-17, the French 
Army in 1917, and elements of the British 8h Army in 1943 have all been attributed chiefly tomilitaryl 
factors. I 
it is, of course, difficult to make a direct comparison between mutinies by European and colonial 
troops, not least because of the ethnic and religious differences between officers and soldiers that were 
a feature of the latter. Proto-nationalism in colonial 
forces is another factor that can contribute to 
military unrest. It would, therefore, be far more satisfactory to compare the Indian mutiny to other 
colonial revolts. What is striking about the recent 
history of colonial forces, however, is how loyal 
they proved to be. In his recently published essay, 'Guardians of Empire', David Killingray 
acknowledged that colonial soldiers "needed careful 
handling" and that "disciplinary methods, food, 
service overseas, policing roles, access to women, and religious sensibilities" all had to be taken into 
I H. F. A., Strachan, H. F. A., 'The British Army and Society', Yhe Historical Journal, Vol. 22, No. 1, 
1979, pp. 247-54; Jean-Paul Bertaud, 7he Army of the French Revolution: From Citizen-Soldiers 10 
11; strument qfPog, er (Princeton, 1979); Samuel F. Scott, Yhe Response of the RoyalArmy to the French 
Revolution: Yhe Role and Deielopment of the Line Army 1787-93 (Oxford, 1978); Douglas Porch, 
ArMY and the Revolution: France 1815-1848 (London, 1974); Alan Sked, Yhe Survival of the 
Habsburg Empire: RadelzkY, the imperial ariny and the class war, 1848 (London, 1979); Alan 
Wildman, YheDid of the Russian ImperialArmy. - 7he 01dArmy and the Soldiers'Revoll (march-April 
1917) (Princeton, 1980); Guy Pedroncini, LesMutinieresde 1917 (Paris, 1967); Douglas Gill and 
Gloden Dallas, 'Mutiny at Etaples Base in 1917', Past andPresent, No. 69,1975, pp. 88-112; David 
Englander, 'Mutinies and Military Morale', in Hew Strachan (ed. ), Yhe OxfordIllustratedHistory of the 
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account. Despite these precautions, "there was always the potential for disaffection". And yet, he 
conceded, mutiny among colonial troops "was relatively rare". Most colordal revolts were "much 
smaller-scale protests" than the Indian mutiny, "usually over conditions of pay and service, and easily 
contained". In the vast majority of cases, the service of colonial soldiers "was marked by loyalty to the 
regime". Killingray referred in particular to the fidelity of the askaris in German East Africa during the 
First World War "despite the hardships of defeat and retreat", the wfllingness of French colonial troops 
to fight in Algeria and Indo-China during the final stages of Empire, and the Portugese mobilisation of 
a growing number of African soldiers to fight nationalist forces in Mozambique and Angola in the 
1960s and 1970s. 2 The obvious conclusion to be drawn is that colonial soldiers remained loyal as long 
as their conditions of service were acceptable - even at the very end of Empire. This was the lesson the 
British in India had to learn the hard way. 
If we do compare the Indian mutiny to revolts by other European annies, a number of common 
factors can be identified. The series of mutinies by British Highland troops in 1743,1778-9,1783, 
1794-5,1797 and 1804, for example, have been attributed by the narrative historian John Prebble to 
Jacobite sympathies. 3 But Hew Strachan rejected this "single phenomenon" theory, emphasizing 
instead the similarities between the Highland mutinies and the revolt of the Bengal Army in 1857, and 
'$not only in the broad context of a vanishing way of 
life and a declining social order". For Strachan, 
the "real issues" in both cases "were predominantly professional": 
insufficient pay, a fear of foreign 
service and, above all, the 
failure of officers to understand their men or to inspire trust. He added: 
In particular those used to 
disciplining English recruits had little fccling for the pride and self-esteem of the 
Highlanders, little comprehension of their 
language, little awareness that forms of discipline suited to coarser 
spirits (especially flogging) 
did not befit their gentlemanly aspirations... [All but one of the mutinous regiments) 
were manifesting the pains of adaption to the 
'professionalization process. This is most clearly the case with the 
Fcncible regiments... Fcncible indiscipline attributed to the influence of the mob manifests that radicial, urban and 
Lowland (not Highland) discontent rode on the back of basic and genuine grievances regarding conditions of 
scrviCe. 4 
First World War (Oxford, 1998), pp. 191-203; Saul David, Mutiny at Salerno: An Ityustice Fxposed 
(Brassey's, 1995). 
2 David Killingray, 'Guardians of Empire', in Killingray and Omissi (eds. ), Guardians ofEmpire: Yhe 
ArmedRorces ofthe ColonialPowers c. 1700-1964 (Manchester, 1999), pp. 16-17. 3 John Prcbble, Muffily: HighlandRegiments in Revolt, 1743-1804 (London, 1975). 
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The French Army of Louis XVI also had similarities to the Bengal Army of 1857. Both were 
comprised of volunteer troops who served mainly for financial reward; both were officered by a ruling 
caste far removed, in social and economic terms, from their men. According to Jean Paul Bertaud, 90 
per cent of the pre-revolutionary French Army officers were aristocrats, though "mostly members of 
the lesser provincial nobility". The typical recruit, on the other hand, was either a peasant or the son of 
an artisan who was induced to join up by the offer of a bounty of up to 120 livres (depending upon age 
and height); an agricultural labourer, by comparison, would struggle to earn 100 livres in a year. 5 The 
conditions of service for Louis XVI's troops were not that dissimilar to those experienced by the 
Bengal sepoys in the 1850s: they were poorly paid Oust 6 sous 8 deniers a day, of which 2 sous 6 
deniers was deducted for army bread), badly housed and had little contact with their officers. "Poverty, 
humiliation, and contempt, " wrote Bertaud. "The common soldier was scorned by his officers, and 
sometimes by the bourgeois, many of whom shut their doors and fastened their shutters on hearing of 
the approach of the military. " There was also no outlet for ambition: between 1781 and 1789, for 
example, only 46 men were commissioned from the ranks; commoners were rarely promoted beyond 
lieutenant. (' 
The enthusiastic response of many Royal troops to the French Revolution is generally accepted as the 
reason for the latter's success. The widespread mutinies of 1790 and 1791, in particular, made it 
impossible for the King to launch a successful counter-revolution. Yet scholars of the Royal Army 
have tended to attribute its disaffection to military grievances rather than ideological beliefs. "The 
essential cause of insubordination, wrote Samuel F. Scott, "existed within, not outside, the Royal 
Army. Civilians often provided encouragement to the soldiers and the [Jacobin] clubs sometimes 
offered a forum for them to voice their complaints. But, it was conditions in the army that created the 
complaints, and it was not the Revolution, but its overthrow of traditional authority, that allowed them 
to be expressed as they were. "7 The same could be said of the Bengal Army in 1857. It, too, was 
encouraged to mutiny by civilians who were seeking political change. It did so not primarily for 
reasons of ideology or religion, but because it was seeking to improve its conditions of service. 
The most criticial problem in the French Royal Army, according to ScM "was the hostility between 
soldiers and officers". He added: "Divided by the chasm of birth in an estate society, the two enjoyed 
4 H. F. A. Strachan, 'The British Army in Society', pp. 252-3. 
5 Bertaud, 7he Army of the Erench Revolution, pp. 17,19. 
6 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
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entirely different conditions of military service, including duties, rights, and prerogatives. " The 
Revolution was an opportunity to redress these past iniquities and led to an outburst of complaints 
against "the monopolization of high ranks by nobles, harsh and sometimes inequitable discipline, the 
disdain with which they were treated by their superiors, and peculation on the part of their officers". 
These complaints against noble officers were only translated into political terms, said Scott, as a result 
of the drastic constitutional and social changes introduced by the revolutionary authorities. 8 By 1857, 
the Bengal mutineers were also alienated from their European officers. They, too, embraced political 
change - the overthrow of the same ruling class from which their officers came - as a prerequisite to 
achieving their professional ends. 
Scott also identified a correlation between the number of officers absent from a particular regiment 
during the regular semester leave from October 1789 to May 1790, and that regiment's propensity to 
mutiny. The higher the number, the more disaffected the regiment. Scott cited the absences not as an 
indication that the remaining officers were unable to cope: many of the examples of disaffection took 
place after the officers had returned from leave. But rather as evidence of the "nearly total separation 
between officers and men". 9 A similar disdain for regimental service and the concerns of their men 
was displayed by most Bengal officers in their quest for detached appointments prior to the mutiny. 
Another striking similarity between the mutinies of 1790-1 and 1857 was the role played by the ranks 
immediately below the white officers: non-commissioned officers in the French Army and native 
officers in the Bengal Army. Scott's description of the former could just as easily apply to the latter: 
"The N. C. O. s, especially the sergeants, had extensive military service ... but until 1789 their ambitions 
in the army had been frustrated. The Revolution brought them greatly expanded opportunities for 
advancement, and most of them embraced it warmly. " In 1790 and 1791, wrote Scott, they organized 
and led mutinies. "The hostility of many officers to the Revolution, intensified after the King's 
attempted flight [to Varennes in June 1791], provided many N. C. O. s with an opportunity to serve both 
the new regime and their personal ambitions by purging the army of counter-revolutionary officers. " 
As aristocratic officers were forced out, most of their replacements were former N. C. O. s. 10 
The other group that made a significant contribution to undermining their noble superiors was that of 
officers promoted from the ranks, commonly known as'officers of fortune!. They came from the same 
7 Scott, yhe Respoine of the RojalArmy to the French Revolution, p. 100. 
' Ibid., p. 121. 
91bid., p. Ill. 
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lower-class background as N. C. O. s and had had similar, if slightly more successful, careers. "Their 
frustration and resentment at never being fully accepted as officers, " wrote Scott "made them at least 
as hostile to the Old Regime as were the sergeants. " As evidence he cited the prevalence of grenadier 
companies, whose officers were invariably 'officers of fortune', in incidents Of insubordination during 
the critical years of 1789 to 1791.11 The aspirations of French N. C. O. s and 'officers of fortune, during 
the French Revolution, therefore, are roughly analagous to those displayed by Bengal native officers in 
1857: they all sought to further their careers by expelling the dominant officer caste that had held them 
back. 
Professional concerns are also said to have been largely responsible for the mutiny of the French 
Army in 1830. Pay was poor for all ranks, but particularly so for N. C. O. s and soldiers who earned 
about a third as much as their British counterparts. They also had to put up with slow promotion, 
dilapidated and overcrowded barracks, insanitary latrines and - because most Restoration regiments 
were under strength - almost constant guard duty. Douglas Porch is of the opinion that even minor 
reforms could have "dispelled the pessimism permeating the army". 
12 But, as with the Bengal Army, 
they were only carried out after the troops had mutinied. 
According to Porch, the disaffection was orchestrated by N. C. O. s who, on receiving the news of the 
July Revolution in Paris, encouraged the troops to disobey their officers. Many led groups of soldiers 
to Paris with the avowed intention of defending the revolution from a Bourbon counter-stroke. 
However their primary motive, wrote Porch, was the "prospect of higher pay and a promotion promised 
to those who joined the Paris National Guard". In the army generally, the N. C. O. s were quick "to 
denounce their superiors as Carlists and counter-revolutionaries" because they wished to take their 
places. Their ambition was particularly keen because the social distinction between N. C. O. s and most 
officers was barely discernible in the Restoration army. Successive revolutionary governments had 
democratized the officer corps to the extent that more than half of Charles X's officers had come up 
through the ranks. Napoleon's dictum that every French soldier carried a marshal's baton in his 
knapsack was still widely believed. "Young soldiers from a lower middle-class background ... formed 
the NCO class in the army and they resented the low pay, lack of privacy and inhuman barrack 
conditions forced on them by the Restoration. Consequently, they were eager for a commission even at 
ibid., pp. 111-12. 
Ibid., p. 112. 
12 Porch, Anny wid the Revolution, pp. 28-9,33. 
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the price of revolution, and not unwilling to aid in the overthrow of a regime which neglected their 
interests. The Restoration's alienation of the NCO class explains why this group was quick to join the 
revolutionaries in 1830. " 13 
Republican ideology had "only limited appeal" for Charles Xs army, wrote Porch, "and had served as 
little more than a rallying point for discontent with conditions of service". As proof he cited the 
decline of republicanism in France after 1834, explaining that the "simultaneous repression of the 
republican movement [in 1834] and the reform of conditions of service brought open political dissent 
within the army to a near end". He also referred to the Algerian conquest of the 1830s which promised 
promotion and the opportunity for plunder. By 1848, with its grievances mostly redressed, the army 
was largely apolitical and played no part in the February revolution which overthrew the OrMans 
dynasty. When it was called upon to act, it did so without hesitation. "The army's June crackdown on 
the revolutionary movement initiated a European counter-revolution, " wrote Porch, "and placed the 
army's loyalty to the government beyond serious question for more than a century. it 14 The Bengal 
Army underwent a similar metamorphosis thanks to the military reforms of the 1860s. "The 
Government of India made sure that military service was well rewarded, " wrote David Omissi, "thus 
cementing its vital alliance with the communities that provided the bulk of army recruits. The Rai was 
safer if the men who defended it won honour and made a profit. They did, and the discipline of the 
troops usually remained steady. The authorities had learned the lesson of 1857, and paid careful 
attention to the needs and grievances of the ranks. "" Despite global conflict, growing civil unrest and 
the rising tide of nationalism, the Indian Army gave no further indication of serious disaffection until 
the Second World War when thousands of Indian soldiers, captured by the Japanese at Singapore, 
joined Subas Chandra Bose's anti-British Indian National Army. "By then, however, " wrote 
Killingray, "the imperial structure in India was starting to fall apart and the British departure seemed to 
many only a question of time. Despite these pressures-the Indian Army remained a loyal instrument 
of the fading Rai ...... 
6 
The central role played by professional grievances is also evident in the mutiny of Italian regiments 
of the Austrian Imperial Army during the revolutions of 1848, though some soldiers were 
understandably influenced by patriotic sentiment. There were, of course, significant differences 
13 Ibid., pp. 29,424. 
14 Ibid., pp. 138-9. 
15 omissi, Yhe Sepoy and the Raj, p. 192. 
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between the Austrian and Bengal armies of that era. The former was a polyglot force, conscripted 
from the various ethnic groupings that made up the Austrian Empire: including Germans, Italians, 
Czechs, Hungarians and South Slavs. But there was one important similarity: both were officered in 
the main by the ruling caste which, in the case of the Austrian Army, was ethnic German and of noble 
birth. In his study of the Austian Imperial Army in 1848, Alan Sked confirmed that up to three- 
quarters of officers in Italian regiments wcrc'forcign', most of them German. The language problem 
was therefore a "very serious one" and "it was commonly held that German-speaking soldiers were 
always promoted more quickly since these were the only troops the officers could depend on to 
communicate orders". The nationalities understandably "resented being officered by German-speaking 
foreigners", wrote Sked, "and seeing German troops promoted more quickly than anyone else". 17 A 
similar language problem was evident in the Bengal Army by the 1850s as fewer officers bothered to 
learn native tongues. 
But the alienation between officers and men in the Austrian Army was not simply a racial issue. 
There was also the social gulf, with most ordinary soldiers the sons of the poorest peasants who could 
not afford to buy an exemption from military service. Officers tended to regard such recruits with 
contempt and the fccling was mutual. "There were 
few ofticers who enjoyed any popularity amongst 
their subordinates, " wrote one enlightened staff officer. "The majority of them lack the capacity to 
adjust themselves to the way of thought of the common man.. The officer supervises and conducts the 
exercises, the drilling of recruits; he holds school 
for the men; in short, while on duty he spends most of 
his day with them. Yet he never takes the trouble to study the character of the men, to speak with them 
in their mode of speech or to teach them their duties by example. "18 
if the Bengal Army in the 1850s was too soft on its native troops with commanding officers denied 
adequate powers to punish, the Austrian Army was too harsh. According to Sked, it "expected blind 
obedience from its soldiers and was prepared to do everything possible to secure it". Most 
punishments were either corporal or capital. Violence to superiors, for example, was punishable by 
death whether the superior was injured or not. Corporal punishment with a hazel stick (the equivalent 
of a rattan cane) was a summary power enjoyed by a number of officers: from colonels, who could 
order 50 strokes, to captains in command of companies, who could award 25. There was also the 
16 Killingray, 'Guardians of Empire', p. 17. 
17 Sked, 77)e Stirvivvi of ihe Habsburg Empire, pp. 29-30,524. 
" ibid., pp. 34-5,39. 
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infamous 'running of the gauntlet'whereby offenders were made to pass between two rows of 150 men 
armed with birch switches. "The result of punishments such as these, " wrote Sked, " ... was naturally to 
degrade, humiliate and brutalise the men and, not surprisingly, to encourage violence and 
disobedience. " Austrian soldiers were also very badly paid. A private received 5 kr. a day, of which 3 
kr. was deducted to meet his mess bill. The average peasant, after paying all his taxes and feudal dues, 
would still be left with about 9 kr. a day. The common soldier was therefore the economic equal of a 
landless labourer and could only make ends meet by finding a part-time job. In addition, pensions were 
paltry (the equivalent of four shillings per year for every year they had served over six) and only four 
men in each company of 200 men were permitted to marry. 
19 
Sked attributed the desertion of thousands of Imperial troops from their colours in 1848 to a number 
of factors: the revolutionary atmosphere, the alienation be een o icers and so diers, the anti- tw ff I 
Habsburg stand of the Church, and the fear of being sent away from one's homeland. He added that 
Italian soldiers found it difficult to resist the blandishments of their fellow countrymen: "instead of 
discipline, they offered hospitality - free bread, free wine - and even money". As with the French 
Army in 1790-1 and 1830, when political upheaval preceded mutiny, unacceptable conditions of 
service clearly played a significant role in the mass defection of Italian troops in 1848. Sked 
acknowledged this with the remark that the deserters were often accompanied "by these, perhaps key 
figures, the N. C. O. s". 20 Their ambition to become officers in the newnational' armies was almost 
certainly a major incentive to revolt -just as it was for N. C. Os in the French Army in 1790-1 and 1830, 
and for native officers in the Bengal Army in 1857. 
It is not ideal to compare the Indian mutiny with revolts by conscripted armies during the two World 
wars. Not least because a new factor is evident in both of the latter: war weariness. But the central 
argument that mutinies are primarily about unacceptable service conditions still seems to hold true. 
Alan Wildman's authoritative account of e End of the Russiat Imperia A y, for e mple, 7h II rin xa 
concludes that "battle fatigue and war weariness with the war in general, rather than revolutionary 
agitation or infection from the rear, was the more immediate and fiindamental factor" in the mutinies of 
1916, "and they do not in themselves reflect an incipient politicization of the army". He added: 
--politicization, when it did come about on a massive scale in 1917, emanated from the rear and was 
most pronounced in the garrisons and transfer points, from whence it found its way to the front. The 
ibid., pp. 37-8,40-1. 
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mutinies, on the other hand, reflected primarily the desperate situation at the front: the grinding effect 
of unending casualties, costly and futile attacks, and deteriorating organization and leadership on the 
most battered units. 1121 Wildman referred, in particular, to the gradual deterioration in the quality and 
quantity of food for frontline soldiers. During the peak of the food crisis, which hit the front in 
December 1916-January 1917, bread rations were reduced from three pounds a day to one, and 
sometimes replaced entirely by cash payments (which were meaningless without supplies) or other 
products. "One common substitute was lentils (chechevifsa), " wrote Wildman, "which the soldiers 
despised so thoroughly that it can almost be accounted as a major cause of the Revolution. 02 
The widespread mutinies in the French Army in 1917 are also generally acknowleged to have been 
fmilitaryl rather than 'political' in origin. Main, who took over as Commander-in-Chief at the end of 
the first phase of mutinies on 15 May 1917, later cited three main causes. The first was the "launching 
and exploitation of a pacifist propaganda campaign" in the winter of 1916-17, with soldiers in the 
trenches bombarded by "antimilitarist and anarchist leaflets" and their confidence in their commanders 
further undermined by the "reprehensible habit" in the civilian press of editorials criticizing military 
operations. Second, Main referred to the poor physical conditions at the front, including inadequate 
leave and bad food. Third, was the overconfidence of the the military commanders - Nivelle and 
Mangin - who convinced the troops that they had discovered the formula for offensive success. When 
the so-called Nivelle offensive in the Chemin des Dames failed to achieve a breakthrough, the 
disappointment of the soldiers made them all the more susceptible to pacifists and other traitors. But, 
added Ntain, soldiers became "politicized" only when they felt down by their leaders. Restoring 
discipline was therefore a matter of restoring appropriate leadershi P. 23 
French historians have tended to downplay the role of subversion from the interior. Jean Ratinaud 
characterized the mutinies in 1960 as a "quasi-professional strike" that ended when "intelligence and 
friendship took their place alongside discipline and order"ý4 Some English-language historians, alive 
to early signs of the French moral collapse in 1940, have paid more attention to the part played by the 
subversives. In 1962, for example, John Williams wrote of "weary and demoralized poilus who found 
20 Ibid., pp. 59,206. 
21 Wildman, Yhe End ofthe Russian IniperialArmy, pp. 119-20. 
22 Ibid., p. 108. 
Quoted in Leonard V. Smith, BetweenMutin and Obedience: ne Case of the French Fifth infantry LY 
Division during World War I (Princeton, 1994), pp. 176-7. 
285 
themselves "egged on to rebellion by home-front traitors and pacifists". A year later, Richard Watt 
came to roughly the same conclusion: but with the rider that politics and the subversives played a 
"distinctly secondary role in intitiating the mutinies". He added: "This is not to deny their importance 
or the growing influence that the pacifist-defeatist group was to gain among the troops. But it is most 
certainly a fact that at the end of May the troops that were revolting did not constitute a revolutionary 
force, as was later to be claimed. Rather they were the symptoms of an almost mortal disease within 
the Army: the disease of despair. "25 Here, too, there are similarities with 1857 in that most Bengal 
mutineers would not have characterised themselves as revolutionaries (but rather as mercenary soldiers 
seeking to obtain improved conditions of service with a new employer). 
The most exhaustive study of the 1917 mutinies - and the first based on archival evidence, including 
the military justice records - was published in 1967 by the French historian Guy Pedroncini, He 
concluded that the mutinies were a limited and sophisticated protest against three years of fruitless 
offensives, culminating in the Chemin des Dames fiasco. He was able to demonstrate that the 
mutinous acts always took place in "active" sectors where troops believed they were about to be 
ordered 'over the top'. The significance of pacifist propaganda was exaggerated by the military 
commanders, he claimed, as an excuse for their failings. To Pedroncini, the mutinies were strictly 
military protests and therefore "nonpolitical". The soldiers revolutionary rhetoric was simply a "more 
human desire to save one! s life". He added: "The revolution, according to the evidence, was simply 
something to cling to, without thereby taking on a great sigrificance. 
06 
In 1994, in his study of one particularly disaffected French infantry division - the 5h - the American 
historian Leonard Smith concluded that Pedroncini had underestimated the political element of the 
protests. In support of his argument, Smith stressed the diversity of soldiers' demands during the 
mutinies in the 5h Division: from calls for more regular leave and better food, to appeals for peace and 
an end to the butchery. Soldiers could juxtapose a demand for peace with the reform of leave policy, 
wrote Smith, because they were both attempts to establish links with civilian life: "Consequently, the 
'political' significance to soldiers of this link can scarcely be overestimated... Once links to the home 
front were guaranteed by leave reform, soldiers could give up their demand for immediate peace. " 
Smith argued that the soldiers' perception of themselves as citizens rather than subjects was the all- 
24 Jean Ratinaud, 1917 ou LaNvolle despoilus (Paris, 1960), pp. 15,19. 
25 Richard M. Watt, Dare Call It Treason (New York, 1963), pp. 195-6,3 03. 
26 Pedroncini, Les Mutinieres de 1917, pp. 71-89,125. 
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important factor that "opened the door to tacit negotiations with Main", and that the latter's "offer of 
repression, reforms, and proportionality" was what "he and French soldiers could persuade each other 
to accept" . 
27 No doubt Smith has a point. But he cannot get away from the central fact that the 
mutinies would not have taken place if life on the front line had been more bearable. In this sense, 
conditions of service - albeit extreme wartime conditions - were chiefly responsible for the mutinies. 
once they were improved - with better food, more regular leave and, most importantly, no more futile 
offensives - the loyalty of the French Army 
in World War I was never again in doubt. 
Smith does make one point that strikes a chord with the mutinies of 1857: that, according to the 
postal censorship records, the grievances of the 10% or so of troops who were "participants" in the 
mutinies in 1917 were "essentially the same" as those held by the "waiting, and otherwise silent, 
Majority,,. 213 In other words, the army as a whole was disgruntled, but only a minority were prepared to 
follow words by deeds. The actual instigators of mutiny - the group analagous to the conspirators of 
1857 - were a smaller proportion still. 
The disturbances by British and Dominion troops at the Etaples base camp in September 1917 have 
also been explained in terms of 'military' 
factors. The main outbreak of indiscipline occurred on 9 
September afler the arrest and assault of a New Zealand gunner by the Military Police. It worsened 
when the outnumbered policemen shot 
into the crowd and killed a popular corporal in the Gordon 
Highlanders, prompting thousands of men to invade the town of Etaples in pursuit of the police. The 
unruly demonstrations continued 
for six days. According to the camp adjutant, Major Guinness, the 
"chief cause of discontent" was the fact that men who had already done much service at the front had to 
undergo "the same strenuous training as the 
drafls of recruits arriving from home". Guinness also 
referred to the lack of familiarity 
between officers and men: "It should be realised that each Infantry 
Base Depot was commanded by an elderly retired officer who had an adjutant to help him. The 
remaining officers, like the men, were either reinforcements 
from home, or had been sent down the line 
on account of ill-health, and therefore 
did not know them. 49 
In their analysis of the disturbances, Gill and Dallas referred to the "particular hatred" directed 
towards the Military Police at Etaples - who had not seen active service and who were trying to impose 
"the disciplinary standard of the glasshouse" - and the rioters' intention to release military prisoners. 
27 Smith, Between Mutiny and Ohedience, pp. 178,188-91,195. 
28 Ibid., p. 188. 
29 Quoted in Gill and Dallas, 'Mutiny at Etaples Base in 1917', pp. 97-8. 
287 
They also commented upon the prominent role played by Anzac soldiers - who had a tendency to be 
"contemptuous of the narrow discipline to which British troops subscribed, and [who] were led by 
officers who had invariably first shown their qualities as privates in the ranks" - and their close 
relationship with the Scottish troops "who gave the mutiny its force". There was also the inevitable 
factor of low morale after three years of seemingly-futile offensives. 30 
David Englander is of the opinion that all military disorder in 1914-18 "arose primarily from the 
circumstances of the war". He added: "Soldier grievances invariably were concerned with the conduct 
of the war in respect of themselves and their families. Apart from questions concerning food and drink, 
soldiers were exercised by issues respecting pay and allowances, clothing and comforts, shelter, 
warmth, and rest. Dominating all was the question of leave and family income support. Soldiers lived 
01 
and died in the trenches while directing their conscious life homewards. 
Similar preoccupations lay behind the relatively small-scale mutiny by 193 veterans of the 50'h (Tyne 
Tees) and 5 1" (Highland) Divisions at the Salerno beachhead in September 1943. Proud members of 
Montgomery's illustrious 8h Army that drove Rommel out of Africa, the veterans had been wounded or 
taken sick during the Sicilian campaign and sent to hospitals in North Africa to recuperate. By early 
September they had been transferred to a transit camp at Tripoli to await a posting back to their units in 
Sicily. Instead they were sent as emergency reinforcements to British divisions serving with the U. S. 
51 Army at Salerno. Their refusal tojoin unfamiliar units at Salerno resulted in their arrest, court- 
martial and subsequent conviction for mutiny. 
Those involved have always insisted that the transit camp authorities told them that they were 
returning to their units -a claim corroborated by documentary evidence 
32 
- and that this deliberate 
deception encouraged many who were medically unfit to accompany the draft. No doubt this 
breakdown of trust between officers and men genuinely outraged some mutineers who could not 
envisage service with units other than their own; but it certainly gave others a useful excuse to demand 
a return to their original units. For my own detailed study of the mutiny has revealed a more 
fundamental incentive to disobey orders at Salerno: the widely-believed rumour (true as it turned out) 
that the 50'h and 51" Division had been ear-marked for return to Britain to take part in the invasion of 
30 Ibid., pp. 98-102. 
31 Englander, Mutinies and Military Morale', p. 201. 
32 David, Mutiny at Salerno, p. 209. 
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33 France. Some of the veterans had not seen their families for over two years, during which time they 
had been almost constantly in action. They were battle weary and homesick, and the thought of 
missing the boat home must have been more than many could bear (as it happened, those veterans who 
did agree to join units at Salerno were later returned to their divisions before they set sail for Britain). 
But whichever grievance is accorded the highest priority - deception by officers or lack of home leave - 
its essential 'military' nature is not in doubt. 
The Salerno mutiny shares one other characteristic with earlier military insurrections: the central role 
played by N. C. O. s. The senior mutineers at Salerno were three sergeants. They later claimed that they 
did not use their rank to influence their juniors. 34 That may not have been their intention: but when 
such respected and experienced soldiers (one had fought in the Dunkirk campaign) made their position 
clear -as they did repeatedly -they were to bound to affect the actions of others. The court-martial 
recognized the key role played by the sergeants when it sentenced all three to death (later commuted to 
12 years' penal servitude and finally suspended altogether). 
By comparing the Indian mutiny with other military revolts, it is possible to draw two conclusions: 
first, that mutinies tend to originate with professional grievances; second, that disaffected troops only 
become 'politicized' as a means to redress those grievances. It is, of course, extremely difficult to 
pinpoint the motives of a group of men - even one as apparently homogenous as the Bengal Native 
Infantry. Yet it is probably fair to say that the pre-1857 Bengal Army was riddled with the same type 
of generic military problems which often cause mutinies: low pay, poor career prospects and worsening 
relations between the men and their officers. Other factors relevant to the 1857 mutiny were unique to 
the Bengal Army: in particular, the indulgence with which European officers treated issues of caste, 
thereby encouraging the sepoys to use caste as an excuse both to avoid unwelcome duty and to provide 
a redress for other grievances; and the gradual relaxation of discipline so that that by 1857 the sepoys 
were, in the words of the Rriend ofIndia, "confident of their power to dictate terms to their masters". 35 
The extent to which these 'military' factors became clothed with wider issues rooted in society is one 
of the great imponderables. Many sepoys may well have convinced themselves that their caste and 
religion were in danger in 1857, however irrational that belief was in relation to the cartridge question 
itself It may even have provided a personal justification for mutinying that mere service grievances 
33 Ibid., pp. 25,73. 
34 Ibid., pp. 54-5. 
35 rwend of India, 7 May 18 57 
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could not. But there seems little doubt that the cartridge question was manipulated to provide a pretext 
for mutiny by a loose network of military conspirators and disgruntled civilians. These ambitious 
soldiers - including a surprisingly high proportion of native officers - were probably united by a shared 
exasperation with the limitations of Company service. Their pre-mutiny plotting with civilians - and 
the way in which many mutinous regiments strove to retain their command structure and organisation - 
is entirely consistent with the chief aim of most 'active' mutineers: to be re-employed by a restored 
native ruler. They were simply exercising the traditional right of mercenary soldiers to choose an 
alternative employer. It could be argued, therefore, that the sepoys mutinied because they imagined 
that service under the new native rulers of India would be more rewarding than it had become under the 
British. 
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Appendix I- The disposition of Bengal troops as of 10 May 
1857 
Station Native European 
PRESIDENCY DIVISION 
Alipore Calcutta Native Militia 
Akyab (Arracan) Arracan Bn. 
-- Barrackpore 340', 43d and 70'h N. I. F, 
Berhampore 6P N. I.; I Ph I. C. 
Bhagalpur Bhagalpur Hill Rangers 
Calcutta 25'h N. I. 
Chera Punji Sylhet L. I. Bn. 
Chinsurah H. M. 8e Foot* 
Chota Nagpore Ramgarh Force 
Darjeeling Sebundy Corps of Sappers and 
Miners 
Dibrugarh I" Assam L. I. 
Dum-Dum I't/9"', 2d/9'h, P/90and 5h/9P' 
F. A. 
3rd/5th F. A. (No. 20 F. B. ); H. M. 
53d Foot 
Gowhatty 2"d Assam L. I. 
Jalpigori 73d N. I. 
Mian Owng (Pegu) Pegu L. I. Bn. 
Midnapur Shekhawati Brigade 
Sonthal District 32d and 63rd N. I.; 5h I. C. 
DINAPORE DIVISION 
Allahabad 6h N. I.; OhN" F. A.; Ferozepore 
Regt. 
Azamgarh 170'N. I. 
Benares 37h N. I., 13"' I. C.; Ludhiana Regt 2nd/3rd F. A. (No. 12 F. B. ) 
Dinapore 7r, 8th and 400'N. I. H. M. 1"/I& Foot; 4h/5hF. A. 
(No. IIF. B. ) 
Ghazipur 65th N. I. 
Gorak-hpur 12th I. C. 
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CAYINPORE DIVISION 
- - Cawnpore C, I", 53d and 566 N. 1, 201 
&/7'h and I't/8dF. A. 
I"/60'F. A. 
Dariabad 5h Oudh I. I. 
Fatehgarh I O'h N. I. 
Faizabad 5h/7h F. . (No. 13 F. B. 
); 22d 
N. I.; 15dI. C. (I tp); 6d'Oudh I. I. 
Gonda 3rd Oudh I. I. 
- Lucknow (No. 2 F. B. ); 71S L. C, 
13th , 48d' and 
7 I't N. I.; 2d, 3rd and 
Reserve Oudh Art.; 2d Oudh I. C.; 
and 7h Oudh I. I. 
H. M. 32"d Foot; 41h/l" F. A. (No. 9 
F. B. ) 
Persidpur I' Oudh I. I. 
Pertabgarh 3rd Oudh I. C. 
Secrora I' Oudh Art.; I' Oudh I. C.; 2! d 
Oudh I. I. 
- Sitapur h I. I.; I" 41"N. I.; 9' and 100'Ouj 
Oudh M. P. 
- -- Sultanpur Oudh . C, 8h 
Oudh I. I.; F 15FI 
M. P. 
MEERUT DIVISION 
- - - Almora . A.; 66h N. I. 
(Gurkhas); --7r/ 8'5 F 
Sirmur Bn. 
Aligarh 90'N. I. 
Agra 4e and 67dN. I. Yd B. E. R.; Vd/5h F. A. (No. 21 
F. B. ) 
Bareilly 18' and 68h N. I.; 8dIT; 6/8h 
F. A. (No. 15 F. B. ) 
- - Delhi iTnd 740'N. I.; 3/ýýF .A 
--T81-, 5-T 
(No. 5 F. B. ) 
Hansi 4uI. C., Hurrianah L. I. Bn. 
- Meerut LC.; I Ifi'and 20'h N. I. 3"r H. M. Oh D. G.; H. M. 1'/60'h 
Rifles; 2rd/l" H. k; 3d/3d F. A. 
(No. 14 F. B. ) 
Moradabad 29h N. I. 
Rurki Sappers & Miners 
Shahjahanpur 28h N. I. 
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SIRHIND DIVISION 
- - - - Ambala 4"7 C,, 5h and 60'h N. I. -, 45 L Sik h 
I. I. 
H. M. 9th L.; 2nd/3rd and 3rd/3 rd H. A. 
Dehra Dun Kemaon Bn. 
Dagshai 
- - 
I" B. E. F. 
Hoshiapur N . I.; 9'h I. C.; 50'/1" H. A. 33'T 
Jullundur 60'L. C.; 360'and 61'N. I. H. M. I"/8h Foot; I"/I'H. A. 
Kasauli H. M. 75h Foot 
Phillour Yd N. I. 4h/6h F. A. 
Nurpur 4h N. I. 
Jutogh New Nasiri Bn. 
Subathu To B. E. F. 
LAHORE DIVISION 
Amritsar 59ýi N. I., 3"h/80'F. A. (No. 16 F. B. ) 
Ferozcpore 10 L. C.; 45hand57hN. I. H. M. 6 1" Foot; F. A. (No. 
19 F. B. ) 
Gardaspur (check) 2nd I. C. 
Govindghur 
- - 
2nd/l" F. A. 
Lahore 81ý L. C.,, 160', 260'and 45's N. 1. H. M. 8 1" Foot; 2nd-3d/2nd H. A.; 
I ý4th/4h F. A. 
Multan 62d and 69h N. I.; I" I. C.; 4h/3rd 
H. A. 
- 
4h/3rd F. A. 
Sialkot 9M LC.; 3 5h and 46h N. I. Fr H. M. 52d L. I.; 3d/l" H. A.; 3 ilF- 
F. A. (No. 17 F. B. ) 
PESHAWUR DIVISION 
Asni Yh Punjab I. C. 
Attock 4h/8h F. A. 
Bunnu Yd Punjab I. C.; 5h Punjab I. I. 
Dera Ghazi Khan 2nd Punjab I. C.; 4h Punjab I. I. 
-- - - - - Dcra Ismail Khan I'Pu nj abI. C.; 6h Pu rj ab I I .; 3 
7 
Sikh I. I. 
Hazara V Sikh I. I.; 1", 2% 3rd and 4u' 
Hazara Mountain Batteries 
Hoti Mardan Corps of Guides 
Jhelum 14uand 39h N. I.; 4th/7h F. A. (No. 
I F. B. ) 
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Kangra 2d Sikh I. I. 
-- - Kohat T Punjab I. C.; I", 2d and P 
Punjab I. I. 
Nowshera 55'b N. I.; I& I. C. 
- 
H. M. 27' Foot 
Pcshawur 5"' L. C.; 21", 24ý 27 'hs 51" and 
64'h N. 1; 7h and 18'h I. C. 
H. M. 7& and 87h Foot; I "/2nd and 
I"/3d H. Aý; I't/1" (No. 7 F. B. ), 
I st/2nd (No. 10 F. B. ), 2 nd-4th/2d 
F. A. 
Rawalpindi 58"'N. I.; 16'hI. C. H. M. I "/24h Foot 
Shumshabad 17'h I. C. 
RAJPUTANA 
Ajmer 
Bewar Mharwarra Bn. 
Erinpura Jodhpur Legion 
Karauli Kotah Cont. 
-- - - Nasirabad 17 an d 50th N. I.; I' Bo. L. C**; 
2'd/7th F. A. (No. 6 F. B. ) 
DUNDELKHAND 
- - Jhansi IF N. I. (left wing); IT I . C., 
4'h/9'h F. A. (half company, with 
half No. 18 F. B. ) 
Lalitpur Inf, Gwalior Cont. 
CENTRAL INDIA 
- Agar 2'ý' Cav., Gwalior Cont.; 7h Inf , 
Gwalior Cont. 
Chanda 2" NaSpur I. I. 
Jabalpur 52d N. I. 
Kharwarra Mewar Cont. 
Mhow I' L. C. (wing); 23"' N. I. 2: d/6th F. A. 
Mehidpur United Malwa Cont. 
Nagode S& N. I. 
Nimach I" L. C.; 72d N. I.; 4M/7 HA 
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Nowgong 12'h N. I.; 14'h I. C. (wing); 4h/9h 
F. A. (half company, with half No. 
18 F. B. ) 
Rajpur P Nagpur I. I. 
Sagar 3 1' and 42d N. I.; P I. C. I"/3d F. A. (No. 4 F. B. ) 
Sehore Bhopal Cont. 
Sirdarpur Malwa Cont. 
Sitabuldi I' NaSpur I. I. 
Takli Nagpur I. C. 
GWALIOR 
- - - Gwalior 7, F and OArt., Gwalior Cont.; 
I' Cav., Gwalior Cont.; Is'. 2nd, 3rd 
and 4"' Inf, Gwalior Cont. 
Sipri 3 Id Art., Gwalior Cont.; 5h Inf., 
Gwalior Cont. 
SIND 
Jacobabad Oh I. C.; Sind I. H**. 
PEGU H. M. 2W" and 3 5"' Foot 
IN TRANSIT OhN. I. (to Mirzapur) 
Note: Unless specified, the reference to a corps denotes its headquarters. 
* Arrived at Calcutta from Rangoon on 20 March 1857 to assist in the disbandment of the 19'h N. I. 
** Bombay army 
European troops in Bengal army: 2 regiments of British cavalry; 16 regiments of British infantry (2 
in Pegu); 3 regiments of Bengal infantry; 9 troops of Bengal horse artillery; 24 companies of Bengal 
foot artillery (with 13 field batteries attached). Total (including European officers and N. C. O. s in 
native corps) 
Regular native troops in Bengal army: 10 regiments of Bengal light cavalry; 74 regiments of Bengal 
native infantry; 4 troops of Bengal horse artillery; 18 companies of Bengal foot artillery (with 8 field 
batteries attached); 12 companies of Bengal sappers and miners; 18 regiments of Bengal irregular 
cavalry. 
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Irregular native troops commanded by Bengal officers: Punjab Irregular Force (5 infantry 
regiments, 6 cavalry regiments, 3 troops of Guide cavalry, 6 companies of Guide infantry, 4 batteries of 
Hazara mountain artillery); Oudh Irregular Force (3 cavalry regiments, 10 infantry regiments, 4 artillery 
companies); 15 local infantry corps (including 2 Sikh and 3 Gurkha); 4 Sikh infantry regiments; 
Sebundy Corps of Sappers and Miners; Shekhawatee Brigade; Assam Local Company of Artillery; 
Ramgurh Local Force (I cavalry regiment, I light infantry regiment, I artillery company of artillery); 
Gwalior Contingent (2 cavalry regiments, 7 infantry regiments, 4 artillery companies); Joudpore Legion 
(3 cavalry ressallahs, 8 infantry companies); United Malwa Contingent (8 cavalry ressallahs, 8 infantry 
companies, I artillery company); Bhopal Contingent (3 cavalry ressallahs, 6 infantry companies, I 
artillery company); Kotah Contingent (4 cavalry ressallahs, 8 infantry companies; I artillery company); 
Nagpore Irregular Force (I cavalry regiment, 3 infantry regiments, I horse artillery troops); Malwa 
Bheel Corps (7 infantry companies); Mewar Bheel Corps (I infantry regiment). 
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Appendix 2- When and where Bengal regiments mutinied, 
were disarmed or disbanded in 1857-58 
MUTINIED: 
Date Place Corps 
26 February Berhampore 19'h N. I. 
29 March Barrackpore 3e N. I. 
2 May Lucknow 7'h Oudh I. I. 
10 May Meerut 3rd L. C.; 11"' and 20"' NI 
II May Delhi 385,54v' and 74h N. I.; 3rd/7h F. A. (No. 5 F. B. ) 
13 May Ferozepore 45h N. I. 
- 14 May Ferozepore 5T N. I. 
14 May Mozaffarnagar 2& N. I. (29 men) 
15 May Kasauli Nasiri Bn. (Treasury Guard) 
16 May Meerut Bengal sappers & miners (4 coys) 
18 May Rurki Bengal sappers & miners (2 coys) 
20 May Aligarh 9h N. I. 
21 May Nowshera 55"' N. I. (2 coys) 
22 May Mainpuri 9h N. I. (2 coys) 
22 May Bolundshahr 90'N. I. (I coy) 
23 May Etawah Vh N. I. (2 coys) 
24 May Hatrass I" Cav., Gwalior Cont. 
24 May Hod Mardan 55h N. I. 
28 May Nasirabad 15 th and 300'N. I.; 2nd/7h F. A. (No. 6 F. B. ) 
29 May Hansi 4h I. C. (det. ); Hurrianah L. I. 
30 May Sirsa 4h I. C. (det. ); Hurrianah L. I. (det. ) 
30 May Hissar Hurrianah L. I. (det. ) 
30 May Mathura 44h N. I. (I coy) and 67h N. I. (I coy) 
- - 30 May Lucknow 48h and 7 1' N. I.; 2! d and Res. Oudh Art. 13"' , 
31 May Lucknow Th L. C. 
31 May Bareilly 18W and 68h N. I.; 8h I. C.; 6h/e F. A. (No. 15 F. B. ) 
31 May Shahjahanpur 28h N. I. 
31 May Hodal Bharatpur Legion 
May (undated) Near Cawnpore 4h Oudh I. I. (wing) 
I June Near Mainpun 2nd Oudh I. C. 
2 June Saharanpur 5h N. I. (17 men) 
A 
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3 June Azimgarh 17'h N. I. 
3- June Moradabad 290'N. I. 
3 June Nimach I" L. C.; 72ý N. I.; 1"14'h H. A.; 7h Inf, Gwalior Cont. 
3 June Sitapur 41" N. I.; 9h and I Oh Oudh I. I.; I' Oudh M. P. 
4 June Benares 37th N. I.; 13'h I. C.; Ludhiana Regt 
4 June Cawnpore 2d L. C.; I" N. I. 
5 June Cawnpore 53d and 56h N. I.; &/7h and 1"18'h F. A.; Yd Oudh Art. 
5 June Jhansi 12'h N. I. (I coy) 
5 June Jaunpur Ludhiana Regt. (2 coys) 
6 June Allahabad 60'N. I.; 
elVh F. A; Yd Oudh I. I. 
6 June Jhansi 120'N. I. (4 coys); 14'h I. C.; 4h/9h F. A. (half company, 
with half No. 18 F. B. ) 
7 June Chobeypur 7h L. C. (2 tps); 48h N. I. (2 coys) 
7 June Jullundur Oh L. C.; 36h and 61" N. I. 
8 June Phillour 3rd N. I. 
8 June Faizabad th 22 N. I.; 15g'I. C. (det. ); 5h/7h F. A. (No. 13 F. B. ); 6 
Oudh I. I. 
9 June Dariabad 5' Oudh I. I. 
9 June Ludhiana Yd N. I. (I coy) 
9 June Near Nimach United Malwa Cont. 
9 June Secrora I" Oudh I. C.; 2d Oudh I. I.; I' Oudh Art. 
9 June Salone I" Oudh I. I. 
9 June Sultanpur 15'h I. C.; 8"' Oudh I. I.; 2nd Oudh M. P. 
10 June Fatehpur 6h N. I. (I coy) 
io June Pershadipur I' Oudh 1.1. (4 coys) 
- - 10 June Nowgong 72 =N . I., 14th I. C. 
(wing); 4th/9h F. A. (half company, with 
half No. 18 F. B. ) 
10 June Rohtak 60'h N. I. 
II June Gonda 3rd Oudh I. I. 
II June Orai 53d N. I. (I coy) and 56h N. I. (I coy) 
12 June Aurungabad I' Cav., Hyderabad Cont. 
12 June Lalitpur 6h Oudh I. I. 
13 June Sitabuldi NagpurI. C.; I" NagpurI. I. 
14 June Gwalior 2nd and 4"' Inf, Gwalior Cont.; I" and 2"d Art., dTalior 
Cont. 
14 June Hamirpur 5& N. I. (2 coys) 
14 June Banda I" N. I. (3 coys) 
Mid-June Malthoni 31'N. I. (I coy) 
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16 June Etawah I" Inf, Gwalior Cont. 
- 17/18 June Sipri 3"'r Inf, Gwalior Cont.; P Art., Gwalior Cont. 
18 June Fatehgarh I&N. I. 
21 June Mozuffurnugger 40'1. C. (det. ) 
30 June Lucknow 
June (undated) Almora P/e F. A. 
June (undated) Kussowlie 4 th I. C. (det. ) 
Early July Bhopawar Malwa Bheel Corps 
I July Indore 2 Indore infregts (no Europ. officers) 
I July Lucknow F. A. (No. 2 F. B. ) check 
I July Mhow Pt L. C. (wing); 23 rd N. I. 
I July Sagar P I. C.; 42nd N. I. 
------ 2 July Sasni F Cav., Gwalior Cont.; 40'Art., Gwalior Cont. 
3 July Agar 5h Oudh I. I. 
4 July Near Agra Kotah Cont. 
7 July Jhelum 140'N. I. 
7 July Rawalpindi 14th N. I. (2 coys) 
9 July Sialkot 9h L. C.; 46uN. I. 
II July Saharunpur 29 N. I. (I coy) 
12 July Jagadhri 5"' N. I. (2 coys) 
25 July Sagauli 12'h I. C. (HQ wing) 
25 July Dinapore 70% 8h and 40'h N. I. 
30 July Hazaibagh 8"' N. I. (2 coys) 
I August Ramghur Ramghur L. I. (det. ) and Ramghur Art. (det. ) 
2 August Ranchi Ramghur L. I. 
6 August Sehore Bhopal Cont. 
14 August Bhagulpur 5h I. C. 
14 August Doomka 5h I. C. (det. ) 
15 August Rohni 5h I. C. (det. ) 
19 August Ferozepore I& L. C. 
21 August Mount Abu Jodhpur Legion (det. ) 
22 August Erinpura Jodhpur Legion 
28 August Peshawur 5 1" N. I. 
31 August Multan 62nd and 69P N. I.; &Vd H. A. 
16 September Nagode 50' N. I. 
18 September Jabulpur 52nd N. I. 
19 September Patun 52'd N. I. (I coy) 
September (undated) Sehore 52d N. I. (2 coys) 
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September (undated) Kalabagh 90'I. C. (det. ) 
9 October Deogurh 32- N. I. (2 coys) 
17 October Rampur Haut 32"d N. I. (2 coys) 
18 November Chittagong 340'N. I. (3 coys) 
22 November Dacca 73d N. I. (2 coys) 
4 December Madarigunj I luI. C. (det. ) 
5 December Jalpigori I luI. C. (det. ) 
January 1858 Rajput P Nagpur I. I. (partial) 
DISARMED: 
Date Place Corps 
3 May Lucknow 7"' Oudh I. I. 
13 May Lahore WFL. C.; 16'ý 26'ý ýý ýNI. 
14 May Ferozepore 450'and 57'h N. I. (partially) 
16 May Meerut Bengal sappers & miners (2 coys) 
- 22 May Peshawur 56 LC. -, E4ý 27'ý 5 1" and 64h N. I. 
28 May Ambala 4h L. C. 
29 May Ambala 50'N. I. 
31 May Agra 44h and 67h N. I. 
5 June Ambala 4"h L. C. (det. ) 
10 June Multan 62 nd and 69h N. I. 
14 June Barrackpore V6, Ord and 70'h N. I. 
14 June Calcutta 25h N. I. 
22 June Dera Ismail Khan 39"' N. I. 
25 June Phillour 3rd and 350'N. I. 
June (undated) Attock 4t4/-O' F. A. 
June (undated) Barrackpore 32"d N. I. 
- June (undated) Dum-Dum e/797, 27ýr, 51% 3d/9h and T/(-9w-F-. A 
June (undated) Lahore 4b/7th F. A. (No. I F. D. ) 
June (undated) Multan 4th/3rd H. A. 
June (undated) Nurpur I't/7'h F. A. 
June (undated) Peshawur 7% 16th and 18th I. C. 
June (undated) Rawalpindi 4h/-2nd H. A. 
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7 July Rawalpindi 58"' N. I. 
9 July Amritsar Wh N. I. 
10 July Amritsar 9uL. C. (wing) 
10 July Ferozepore I O'h L. C. 
14 July Futtehpore IT-I. C(det. ) 
Mid-July Thannesur 5h N. I. (I coy) 
July (undated) Kohat 5 8h N. I. (3 coys) 
I August Gorakhpur 17u'I. C. (2 coys); ffh I. C. (det. ) 
2 August Berhampore 63d N. I.; I I'h I. C. 
9 August Delhi 4 th I. C. 
10 August Ghazipur 65th N. I. 
August (undated) Delhi P N. I. (I coy) 
September (undated) Shamshabad 17th I. C. 
15 December Indore Indore troops 
16 May 1858 Nurpur 4h N. I. 
16 May 1858 Kangra 4h N. I. (wing) 
DISBANDED 
Date Place Corps 
31 March Barrackpore 19'J'N. I. 
6 May Barrackpore 34'h N. I, 
30 May Ambala 5uN. I. (two coys) 
26June Nowshera IOh LC. (HQ wing) 
26 June Peshawur IOh I. C. (left wing) 
June (undated) ta ui Nagpur 1. . 
7 July Rawalpindi 14"' N. I. (2 coys) 
Note: unless specified, the reference to a corps denotes its headquarters 
301 
Appendix 3- Estimate of the number of Bengal native troops 
who mutinied, were disarmed and disbanded, or stayed loyal 
Corps Mutinied Disarmed Disbanded Stayed Loyal 
BENGAL HORSE 
ARTILLERY 
4'ý Tp/1" Bde 1+90* 
5' Tp/1" Bde 1+90* 
46'Tý/ý Bde 1+90* 
4' Tp/P Bde 1+90* 
Total: 2+ 180* 1+90* 1+90* 
BENGALFOOT 
ARTILLERY 
I" Co/70'Bn 2+85* 
2' Co/70'Bn I+ 72* 1+13 
3' Co/70'Bn 2+85* 
40'Co/70'Bn 2+85* 
Sth Co/7dBn 2+85* 
6d'Co/7'h Bn 2+85* 
I" Co/8h Bn 2+85* 
2'd Co/8tb Bn 2+85* 
3rd Co/8th Bn 2+85* 
---W- " Co/8uBn 2+ 85* 
5'h Co/8h Bn 2+ 85* 
& Co/8b Bn 2+85* 
I' Co/9h Bn 2+85* 
2'd Co/9"' Bn 2+ 85* 
Yo Co/9h Dn 2+ 85* 
4'h Co/9h Bn 2+85* 
5'h Co/9h Bn 2+85* 
e Co/91h Bn 1 +28* 1 +57* 
Total: 18 + 780* 17 + 737* 1+13 
BENGAL LIGHT 
CAVALRY 
I" L. C. 8+ 400* 
2 nd L. C. 7+ 450* 1+6 
P L. C. 6+ 325* 2+ 75* 
4'h L. C. 8 +-400* 
SO'L. C. 8+ 400* 
Oh L. C. 280 156 
7'h L. C. 325* 75* 
8'h L. C. 4+273 
90'L. C. 3+238 150* 
10'h L. C. 200 100 
Total (L. C. ): 24 + 2,218* 20 + 1,479* 3+ 156* 
BENGAL NATIVE 
INFANTRY 
I" N. I. 12 + 850* 
2nd N. I. 12 + 850* 
P N. I. 760 90 
4"' N. I. 12 + 850* 
5'h N. I. 139 11+666 3+180 
6"' N. I. 12 + 850* 
7'J'N. I. 7+792 4+65 
8"' N. I. 12 + 850* 
9'h N. I. 10+747 1 
1 O'h N. I. 12+850 
I Ph N. I. 650* 200 
12'h N. I. 9+ 750* 3+100 
1P N. I. 252 10+584 
14" N. I. 13+769 100 (Sikhs) 
15'h N. I. 7+834 1+15 
16'h N. I. 8+736 
17'h N. I. 7+746 2+115 13 
18'h N. I. 12 + 850* -- 
19"' N. I. 18+1,092 
20'h N. I. 12 + 850* 
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A 
21"N. I. 12+850 
22'd N. I. 12 + 850* 
23'd N. I. 12 + 844* 6 
24'h N. I. 21+875 
25'h N. I. 12 + 850* 
26"' N. I. 7+634 12+897 
27'h N. I. 16+836 
280'N. I. 11 + 845* 1+15 
29'h N. I. 12 + 843* 8 
3& N. I. 5+ 762* 5+52 4+9 
3 1' N. I. 120* 20+831 
32! 'd N. I. 4+375 8+ 600* 1+27 
33 Id N. I. 13+874 
340'N. I. 6+ 300* 6+408 3+7 
35g'N. I. 12 + 850* 
3e N. I. 6+ 650* 2+ 109* 
37'h N. I. 12+869 2+126 
3 8h N. I. 12 + 850* 
39"' N. I. 12 + 850* 
4e N. I. 10+915 7+100 
41" N. I. 12 + 830* 20 
42"d N. I. 10+630 2+220 
43d N. I. 12 + 850* 
44'h N. I. 1+112 10 + 750* 1+2 
45'h N. I. 4+482 9+391 
4e N. I. 9+907 
Oh N. I. 12 + 850* 
480'N. I. 2+465 1+311 22 7+80 
49'h N. I. 14+833 
50'h N. I. 4+645 10+140 
5 1" N. I. 17+715 
52'd N. I. 12 + 950* 2+16 
53'd N. I. 4+ 810* 10+37 
540'N. I. 12 + 850* 
55'h N. I. 8+945 8+1361 8 (Sikhs) 
6'h N. I. 11 + 845* 1 +5 
57'h N. I. 286 11+613 




580'N. I. 16 + 820* 
59'h N. I. 12 + 850* 
6e N. I. 10+800 
61'N. I. 2+827 10+126 
62'd N. I. 650 12 + 850* 
63'd N. I. 12 + 850* 
640'N. I. 22+968 
65'h N. I. 14 + 950* 
66'h N. I. 20+1,140 
670'N. I. 1+90 12+894 
680'N. I. 12 + 850* 
690'N. T. 650* 12 + 850* 
W N. I. 12 + 850* 
71'N. I. 1+620 11 + 100* 
72"d N. I. 14+953 1+14 
73'd N. I. 200* 6 5+524 





41 + 2,151* 150 + 5,598* 
BENGAL 
IRREGULAR CAVALRY 
111I. C. 12 + 566* 
2"d I. C. 12 + 566* 
P I. C. 236 12 + 220* 
40'I. C. 8+333 94 1+10 
5'h I. C. 5+366 5+59 
6 th I. C. 12 + 566* 
7"' I. C. 10 + 450* 
8th I. C. 439* 12+11 
gth I. C. 1+29 9+ 421 
I 01h I. C. 10 + 450* 
1 Ith I. C. 4+200 6+250 
12 th I. C. 8+ 350* 2+83 
13th I. C. 10 + 400* 40 
W I. C. 10 + 450* 
15th I. C. 10 + 450* 
le I. C. 10 + 450* 
305 
170'I. C. 10 + 450* 
18"' I. C. 10 + 450* 
Total: 56 + 3,253* 46 + 2,184* 19 + 871* 68 + 2,081 
BENGAL SAPPERS & 
MINERS 
Total: 440 500* 53 
LOCAL INFANTRY: 
CATEGORY A2 
Ferozepore Regt. (Sikhs) 20 + 920* 
Ludhiana Regt. (Sikhs) 8+497 7+232 
Sirmur Bn. (Gurkhas) 20 + 920* 
Kemaon Bn. (Gurkhas) 20 + 920* 
New Nasiri Bn. (Gurkhas) 20 + 920* 
Kelat-I-Ghilzie 20 + 920* 
Total: 8+497 107 + 4,832* 
LOCAL INFANTRY: 
CATEGORY B 
Affacan Bn. 20 + 920* 
I" Assam L. I. Bn. I+1 16 + 934* 
2nd Assam L. I. Bn. 20 + 920* 
Bhagalpur Hill Rangers 20 + 920* 
Calcutta Native Militia 20 + 920* 
Hurrianah L. I. Bn. 14+750 
Mharwara, Bn. 20 + 920* 
Pegu U. Bn. 20 + 920* 
Sylhet L. I. Bn. 20 + 920* 
Total: 15+751 158 + 7,395* 
OTHER LOCAL CORPS 
Bengal M. P. Bn. 14 + 800* 
Ramgarh Force: 
Artillery 2+80 
I. C. 19 + 350* 1+30 
' Paid and organized like regular corps 
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10 + 720* 




Artillery 2+ 80* 
I. C. 12+ 500* 
1.1. 20 + 920* 
Total: 31+1,150 53 + 2,530* 
PUNJAB IRREGULAR 
FORCE 
I"I. C. 18+ 566* 
2n" I. C. 3 N. O. s 15 + 566* 
3td I. C. 18 + 566* 
4"' 1. C. 18 + -566* 
5"' I. C. 18 + 566* 
114 1.1. 16 + 912* 
2nd 1.1. 16 + 912* 
Yd 1.1. 16 + 912* 
4"' 1.1. 16 + 912* 
5th 1.1. 16 + 912* 
60'1.1. 16 + 912* 
Hazara, Mountain Battery: 
I" L. F. B. -3 + 110* 
2n'j L. F. B. 3+ 110* 
Yd L. F. B. 3+ 110* 
4'h L. F. B. 3+ 110* 
Corps of Guides: 
Cavalry 
Infantry 
I' Sikh Inf. 20 + 920* 
2"d Sikh Inf 20 + 920* 
Yd Sikh Inf. 20 + 920* 
4' Sikh Inf 20 + 920* 




I' Art. 2+85* 
2"d Art. 2+ 85* 
P Art. 2+85* 
Reserve Art. 2+85* 
I,, I. C. 9+ 460* 
2'd I. C. 9+ 460* 
3"' 1. C. 9+ 420* 40 
I,, 1.1. 12 + 750* 
2! 0 1.1. 12 + 750* 
P 1.1. 12 + 750* 
4'h 1.1. 12 + 750* 
5u'I. I. 12 + 750* 
& 1.1. 12 + 750* 
7'h 1.1. 6+ 350* 300* 6+15 
8 th I. 1. 12 + 750* 
91h 1.1. 12 + 750* - 
101h 1.1. 12 + 750* 
Total: 149 + 89780* 340 6+15 
OUDH MILITARY 
POLICE 
- I'tRegt. 12 + 750* 
26d Rcgt. 12 + 750* 
Total: 24 + 1,500* 
GWALIOR 
CONTINGENT 
I' Artillery 2+ 85* 
2'd Artillery 2+ 85* 
3'd Artillery 2+85* 
4'h Artillery 2+85* 
I' Cavalry 9+ 460* 
2"d Cavalry 9+ 460* 
I' Infantry 12 + 750* 
Vd Infantry 12 + 750* 
P Infantry 10 + 748* 2+2 
4'h Infantry 12 + 750* 
5'11 Infantry 12 + 750* 
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6' infantry 6+ 375* 6+ 375* 
7'h Infantry 12 + 750* 
Total: 102 + 6,133* 6+ 375* 




Artillery 1 +30* 
Cavalry 4+ 200* 
Infantry 8+ 400* 
Total: 13 + 630* 
INDOREIRREGULAR 
FORCE4 
V4 Infantry 10 + 700* 
2nd Infantry 10 + 700* 
Total: 20 + 1,400* 
JODHPUR LEGION 
Artillery 1 +30* 
Cavalry 5+158 
Infantry 8+376 
Total: 14 + 564* 
KOTAH CONTINGENT 
Artillery 1 +30* 
Cavalry 4+ 200* 
Infantry 10 + 550* 
Total: 15 + 780* 
UNITED MALWA 
CONTINGENT 
Artillery I+ 60* 
Cavalry 10 + 600* 
Infantry 10 + 600* 
' Troops of independent states not commanded by European officers 
4 Ibid. 
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Total: 21 + 1,260* 
MALWA BHEEL CORPS 10 + 500* 
MEWAR BHEEL CORPS 
(check) 
14 + 850* 
NAGPURIRREGULAR 
FORCE 
Artillery 15 45 
Cavalry 3 N. O. s 9+ 600* 
I" Infantry 14 + 800* 
2'd Infantry 14 + 800* 
P Infantry 2 14 + 798* 
Total: 3+17 9+ 645* 42 + 2,398* 
NIMAR POLICE CORPS 
Cavalry 10 + 400* 
Infantry 14 + 700* 
Total 24 + 1,100* 
* Estimate 
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Elphinstone Papers: Papers of John, 130'Baron Elphinstone; 
Elphinstone (Mountstuart) Papers: Papers of Hon. Mounstuart Elphinstone 
Ewart Letters: Letters from Emma Ewart, wife of Colonel John Ewart (I'd Bengal N. I. ), to her sister 
Goldney Papers: Memoirs of Mrs Louisa Goldney 
Grant Letters: Two letters from Lt. -Gen. Sir Patrick Grant, C. -in-C. India May-Aug. 1857, to Maj. -Gen. 
Sir Henry Barnard, in command of siege of Delhi 
Hickman Papers: Papers of Major George Hickman, late 70'h Bengal N. I. 
Jacob Papers: Papers of Brigadier John Jacob 
Kantzow Papers: Record of the Services of Col. Charles Adolphus de Kantzow in India, 1853-88 
Kaye Mutiny Papers: The Mutiny Papers of Sir John Kaye 
Lawrence Correspondence: Correspondence of Lord Lawrence to Brig. -Gen. N. Chamberlain 
Lawrence Letters: The Letters of Sir Henry Lawrence 
Lyveden Papers: The Papers of Robert Vernon Smith, I" Baron Lyveden 
Martineau Letters: Letters from Lt. Edward Martineau to Captain Septimus Becher, AAG of the Army 
Mawe Letters: Letters from Dr Thomas Mawe, B. M. S., to his sister describing the early stages of the 
Mutiny 
McGuiness Letters: Letters of Sgt. Christopher McGuinness 
Nicholl Letters: Letters of Lt. Thomas Nicholl, B. A. 
Sandhurst Papers: Memoranda, correspondence and telegrams of Maj-Gen. Sir William Rose 
Mansfield, I't Baron Sandhurst 
Scot Papers: Personal Narrative of the Escape from Nowgong by Captain P. G. Scot, 12'h Bengal N. I. 
Talbot Papers: Private Diary and Letter Book of the Hon. Gerald Talbot, P. S. to Lord Canning 1856-8 
Timbrell Narrative: Narrative of her family's escape from Nasirabad in 1857 by Mrs Agnes Timbrell, 
wife of Capt. Charles Timbrell (1823-60), Bengal Art' lery 
Walcot Papers: Letters from Lieutenant William Walcot, 47tý Bengal N. I., to his wife 
Warner Letters: Letters from Ensign Wynyard Warner, 4& Bengal N. I., and Lt. Ashton Warner, 7fl' 
Bengal L. C., to members of their family 
Wood Papers: Papers of Sir Charles Wood, President of the Board of Control 1853-55 and Sec. of State 
for India, 1859-60 
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(b) National Archives of India (ArAI), New Delhi 
Mutiny Papers 
(c) National A rchives of Scotland (NA S), E &nburgh 
Dalhousie Papers: Papers of the I& Earl and I" Marquess of Dalhousie 
(d) Department ofManuscripts, National Library of Scotland (NLS), Edinburgh 
Grey Diaries: Diaries of Veterinary-Surgeon Edward Simpson Grey, e Hussars 
(e) Department ofManuscripts, British Library (BL), London 
Dermys Memoirs: Memoirs of General J. B. Dermys 
Mutiny Papers: Letters and Papers relating to the Indian Mutiny 
Napier Papers: Papers of Sir Charles J. Napier 
Peel Papers: Correspondence of Sir Robert Peel 
Pierce Letters: The Letters of Thomas Pierce 
Service Record of the 3 1" B. N. I.: Services of the late 3 1' now 2"d L. I. during the mutiny and 
Rebellion in 1857 
(/) Department of Documents, National Army Musuem (NAAV, London 
Chamier Letters: Letters from Lieutenant Edward Charnier (3e Bengal N. I. ), A-D. C. and Persian 
Interpreter to General Sir James Outram, G. C. B. 
Chichester Letters: Typescript copy of letters home, dated 1856-64, by Maj-Gen Hugh Chichester 
(1836-95), Bengal (later Royal) Artillery 1856-86 
Coghill Papers: Papers of Lt. and Adjt. Kendal Coghill, 2d B. E. F. 
Edwards Papers: R. M. Edwards, Diary of Events in the Districts of Saharunpore and Mozuffurnugger 
from I ld'May 1857 to April 27h 1858' 
Gambier Letters: Letters of Lt. Charles H. F. Gambier, 38h Bengal N. I. 
Hall Papers: Colonel Montagu Hall, 'Reminiscences of the Indian Mutiny' 
Intercepted Letter: An Intercepted Letter from Peshawur 
Lawrence Letters: Letters of the Lawrence family 
Lind Papers: The Diary and Correspondence of Francis M. Lind, Collector of Benares 
Lindsay Letters: Letters of Major William Lindsay, A. A. G. Cawpore 
Lyster Papers: The Papers of Lt. General Harry H. Lyster, V. C. 
Montagu Hall Diary: Diary of Colonel Montagu Hall, Royal Munster Fusiliers (formerly I' B. E. F. ) 
Potiphar Papers: Documents of Private Frederick Potiphar, 9th Lancers, 1845-60 
Richardson Papers: Maj-Gen. J. F. Richardson (8h Bengal I. C. ), Memoirs of Service in India 1841-58 
Rogers Papers: Reminiscences of Foreign Service by Henry Rogers, M. D., late surgeon, H. M. 701h 
Regiment 
Oth Shebbeare Letters: Letters of Major Robert H. Shebbeare, V. C, 6 Bengal N. I. 
Sneyd Letters: Letters of Captain Henry Sneyd, 28aBengal N. I. 
Spy Letters: Copies of letters from spies in the city of Delhi 
th Wilkie Correspondence: Correspondence of Colonel David Wilkie, 4 Bengal N. I. 
Wilson Letters: Letters of Sir Archdale Wilson to his wife 
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